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Or what all this is going to be about… 
“Inside time there is another time 
Ever still 
Lacking hours, weight and shadow 
Solely alive 
Like that old man on the bench 
Self-absorbed identical endless 
Always unseen 
It’s transparency” 
(Octavio Paz, “The same time”) 
 
“Dentro del tiempo hay otro tiempo, 
Quieto 
Sin horas ni peso ni sombra 
Sólo vivo 
Como el viejo del banco 
Unimismado idéntico perpetuo 
Nunca lo vemos 
Es la transparencia” 
(Octavio Paz, “El mismo tiempo”) 
 
We, raised and educated in the Western civilization, believe that past is somehow behind us 
while future is somewhere ahead. Because of this, we use expressions like “c’mon face the 
past!” as if one were commanding the other to spatially turn around and see (face) the past; or 
“winter (or future) is coming” as if things were moving, approaching to us from the front. 
Notwithstanding how deeply-ingrained these beliefs are in our Western-minded metaphoric 
mapping of time, some people have come to adopt a quite different world view: you might get 
a blank stare in return if you command an Aymara (ancient people still living in the Andes 
highlands) to face the past. Well, that’s what she always does: walking back to the future (which 
lies behind her), always seeing, facing her past. Winter wouldn’t be coming to her (from the 
front) but reaching, hunting her from the back, as if their entire metaphoric mapping of time 
were turned radically upside down1. Or would it be rather the other way around and we, 
Western-minded thinkers, have being having our world view turned upside down all along? 
Probably neither option, as a good deal of we call ‘time’ is culturally made and, consequently, 
it varies along places and time. Nonetheless, beyond what we, as human beings, might come 
                                                          
1 Take a look at this must-read paper about our metaphoric mapping of time: Núñez, R. and Sweetser, E. (2006). 
“With the Future Behind Them: Convergent Evidence from Aymara Language and Gesture in the Crosslinguistic 
Comparison of Spatial Construals of Time”. Cognitive Science 30: 401-450 
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to think about our experienced, culturally-made time, Nature might conceal something that we 
can still call ‘time’; time that probably lacks many of the (colorful) culturally-based properties 
that human beings have largely thought it has. Probably flowless, coming from and going 
nowhere. Neither back nor in front. Lacking hours, identical even transparent. And yet, maybe 
capturing one of its more irrevocable and persistent (even essential) properties: its 
directionality. And about this the thesis is going to be. 
*** 
Time is bewildering. Take any property one typically ascribes to time and this will surely 
enclose a deep, largely-discussed philosophical problem. In this light, time looks like a still 
alive fertile terrain for philosophical inquiry. Beyond its unquestionable philosophical richness, 
time has a hard-to-handle dual feature, neatly condensed in Augustine’s words. 
“What is time? If nobody asks me, I know; but if I were desirous to explain it to 
one that should ask me, plainly I know not” 
On the one hand, time is familiar, too familiar to us. Allegedly, one knows what time is because 
one has daily experience of it. Time is so constitutive of our language, of our knowledge, of 
our day-to-day lives, of our very existence as human beings that one thinks one has a fair, well-
grounded grasp of its essential features. Unquestionably, time is there, flying away in front of 
us –one witnesses how things are unavoidably devoured by time, slipping into non-existence, 
over and over. It intuitively seems that one knows what time is, and yet philosophical inquiry 
just comes into play when details need to be spelled out just a tiny bit further. 
On the other hand, as one starts looking into our daily experience of time and its alleged 
properties, we quickly lose the North. In this sense, time is so elusive, that one is rapidly left 
clueless about where our inquiry should start off and how it should be properly conducted. Is 
time object of philosophical investigation exclusively? Or does it fall better under scientific 
inquiry? If the latter is the case, which science would be the most adequate to delve into the 
nature of time? Further, various problems around time have been so intertwined that it is 
already an uphill task to start to disentangle them.  
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About the topic 
The so-called problem of the arrow of time, the philosophical problem I am here mainly 
interested in, is not alien to this general landscape. In a quite comprehensive way, the problem 
concerns a simple and intuitively graspable property, to wit: 
Does time (whatever it comes to be) objectively2 instantiate the property of “having 
a privileged direction”? 
By “privileged direction” it is commonly meant that there would be a sharp distinction between 
the past-to-future direction and the future-to-past one. However, the problem is too vague and 
abstract to be researched systematically. Which would be the more appropriate way to address 
the problem? How can we come to know (or to identify) the property of “having a privileged 
direction”? Something else should be add to the formulation to narrow the problem down. 
In effect, such a problem might be investigated along different branches, ranging over 
psychology and the neurosciences, to pure metaphysics and physics. A longstanding tradition, 
tracing back to the late nineteenth century, has nonetheless addressed the problem exclusively 
within physics and the problem becomes a problem to be solved within physics ever since. In 
accordance with this, it may be broadly reworded as following. If physics is in the business of 
studying how matter moves in space-time, well, it is likely that physics has something to say 
about space-time’s structure (particularly, time’s) through this study. In accordance with this, 
it may be broadly reworded as following: 
Does time (whatever it comes to be) objectively instantiate the property of “having 
a privileged direction” according to some of our best physical theories? 
We are now getting closer to a sense of the overall problem, but we are not quite there yet. One 
of the central claims of this thesis is that such a way to pose the problem has been understood 
quite differently by many authors: Though loads of ink have been spilled since the nineteenth 
century in discussing about the (seemingly) directed nature of time, it is not often clear what 
the problem is really about. Indeed, the problem of the arrow of time seems to enclose a bunch 
of closely-related, but conceptually different problems. Literature on the problem of the arrow 
                                                          
2 My usage of the word “objectively” here refers to a mind-independent property, that is, a property that is 
instantiated by the world out there and that is independent of any subjective feature of whom knows this property. 
This is close to the Nagelian sense of objectivity: being a property of nature that remains invariant under a change 
of perspective –that is, it’s independent of a perspective (the so-known “view from nowhere”). In this case, “having 
a direction of time” would be a property that is independent of agents knowing such a property and that, at least 
in principle, it’s independent of the perspective from which they know about the direction of time. 
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of time in physics has not been always careful in keeping the scenario clear. In 1974, John 
Earman already complained about how poorly understood and how uninformative the problem 
of the arrow of time had been so far: 
[…] “very little progress has been made on the fundamental issues involved in "the 
problem of the direction of time." By itself, this would not be especially surprising 
since the issues are deep and difficult ones. (…) It seems not a very great 
exaggeration to say that the main problem with "the problem of the direction of 
time" is to figure out exactly what the problem is or is supposed to be!” (1974: 15) 
Curiously, others have also raised their voices in complaining about this uneasy situation: what 
are we really discussing when dealing with the problem of the arrow of time?  
A good part of this thesis deals with this imperative clarification: Sometimes progress, 
especially in foundational matters, can initially come from clarifying the problem at dispute.  
So as to start off on the right foot, any philosophical inquiry should be conducted in such a way 
that the problem at stake be cleared out from the outset. One should be able to put the finger 
on the problem and claim “this is what we are arguing about, and this and that have been left 
out”. By drawing a clear-cut line to identify the problem, one is able to establish if there are 
actually genuine divergent positions about the same problem, or if there are simply different 
problems on the table. I think that many divergences around the nature of time, and time’s 
direction particularly, have come up, and been intensified, because problems were not made 
clear from the very beginning. Even worse, controversies could seem taking us nowhere as 
long as they are actually talking about different topics. 
Yet, the problem ought to be fenced in even more. Current physics features many 
theories, some of them incompatible with one another. Hence, the question whether time is 
objectively directed in current physics, should be rather circumscribed to a specific physical 
theory. There are some common loci where the question has been largely investigated (e.g., 
thermodynamics and statistical classical mechanics), but others have instead been scarcely 
taken into consideration (at least comparatively). Such is the case of non-relativistic quantum 
mechanics: While issues gravitating around the direction of time have greatly involved melting 
ices, entropy-increasing systems or expanding gases in a box, few things have been said about 
quantum systems and the directionality of time. Another central claim of this thesis will be that 
non-relativistic quantum mechanics encloses many more conundrums as to time’s direction 
than usually taken. The guiding question of the thesis would thus be posed as following: 
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Does time (whatever it comes to be) objectively instantiate the property of “having 
a privileged direction” in non-relativistic quantum mechanics? 
There is yet a further point to pay attention to: As it’s widely-known, non-relativistic 
quantum mechanics is a theory of success as well as of scandals. The former is 
exemplified in the fact that no many theories have come so close to the accuracy of its 
predictions and come to be so successful in developing new technologies. The latter 
implies in practice that many philosophers and physicists have nonetheless found the 
theory (as an epistemic enterprise) deeply disappointing: Not only does it deliver no 
picture whatsoever of what the world is like according to the theory, but it is neither clear 
whether we even have a scientific theory at all. They thus found themselves in need of 
interpreting the theory, which in turn paved the way to empirically equivalent, but 
metaphysically divergent, quantum theories as well as to potentially rival quantum 
theories. All this prelude relates to my business here because any appropriate inquiry 
about the arrow of time in non-relativistic quantum mechanics must capture as much as 
possible this complexity. So, by “non-relativistic quantum mechanics” I will mean both 
its bare formal apparatus (the standard non-relativistic quantum mechanics) and its 
varied interpretations. 
About the content 
Having said what this thesis will be about, let’s now detail its content. The thesis articulates in 
three parts, where the third part supposes the second, and this in turn the first. Each part is 
organized in chapters and its headed by a brief introduction of its content. 
 The first part seeks to shed some light what the problem of the arrow of time is, first 
from a broad viewpoint and then within physics. By “shed some light” I mainly mean not only 
to elucidate many of the involved concepts, but also to disentangle and to sort out some 
subsidiary problems. That’s why I mean this part as “unpacking”. The content is organized in 
two chapters. The first one (Chapter I) deals with the problem of the arrow of time from a 
metaphysical, broad viewpoint and then introduces the relevant physical concepts to approach 
it from physics. The second chapter (Chapter II) asserts that there are, at least, two versions of 
the problem. This distinction has been largely overlooked in the literature, and the two versions 
of the distinction renders conflated. Furthermore, it will point to the relationship between both 
versions. 
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The second part focuses on standard non-relativistic quantum mechanics. The guiding 
question here is whether, and in which sense, non-relativistic quantum mechanics treats time 
as having an objectively privileged direction. By “standard” non-relativistic quantum 
mechanics I mean the partially-interpreted formalism free of any so-called interpretation. In 
such so-fenced-in terrain, the relevant question will thereby have to do with the Schrödinger 
equation and the notion of time-reversal invariance, managing without any interpretational 
matter for the time being. The part contains three chapters. The first (Chapter III) introduces, 
conceptually and formally, the standard non-relativistic quantum mechanics and its symmetry 
group –Galilean Group. The second chapter (Chapter IV) involves the notions of time reversal 
and time-reversal invariance in standard non-relativistic quantum mechanics and directly 
addresses the question of whether The Schrödinger equation is left unaltered under flipping the 
direction of time. The next chapter (Chapter V) assesses previous results in the light of the 
arrow of time discussion. 
The third and last part complexes the scenario to the extent that interpretations of standard 
non-relativistic quantum mechanics come into play. Its primary focus will be those 
interpretations that add further elements to the standard theory and how they deal with the 
problem of the arrow of time (in either of its versions). Four chapters organize this last part. 
The first (Chapter VI) overviews how various interpretations come up and in which way their 
emergence intervenes on the problem of the arrow of time in quantum mechanics. The next 
chapter (Chapter VII) focuses on the so-called Orthodox Quantum Mechanics. Here the 
Collapse Postulate is analyzed as a candidate for a quantum arrow of time. The third chapter 
(Chapter VIII) analyzes spontaneous collapse theories (like GRW-type theories) and to what 
extent they offer some grounds for a fundamental (structural) arrow of time. The last chapter 
(Chapter IX) directs its attention at Bohmian Mechanics, the problem of the arrow of time in a 
Bohmian framework and the role that time reversal plays within the theory. 
About the claims to be defended 
Introductions of each part will pose clearly the theses to be defended therein. In general, the 
thesis pursues three aims (following the chapters), articulated in the following claims 
(a) At least two distinguishable, though closely-related, problems have historically and 
conceptually been put under the label ‘the problem of the arrow of time’: the problem 
of a structural arrow of time and the problem of a non-structural arrow of time (or the 
problem of the two realms). 
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(b) The notions of time reversal and time-reversal invariance play a paramount role in 
stablishing whether a direction of time (in either sense) holds or not within a physical 
theory. 
(c) The notion of time reversal, however, entails a series of metaphysical, epistemic and 
methodological assumptions that ought to be properly unveiled. 
(d)  The orthodox way to understand and to formally define time reversal in non-relativistic 
quantum mechanics can be, I think quite soundly, challenged along with the widely-
extended claim that it turns out to be undoubtedly time-reversal invariant. 
(e) In challenging it, whether non-relativistic quantum mechanics is time-reversal invariant 
depends upon how one comes to conceptually understand and to formally represent 
time reversal within the theory. 
(f) From (e), whether standard quantum mechanics treats time as having an objective, 
privileged direction of time depends upon how one comes to conceptually understand 
and to formally represent time reversal within the theory. 
(g) From (e) and (f) follows that even standard quantum mechanics in the most elementary 
situation may reflect a structural, fundamental time asymmetry on which a structural 
arrow of time may be grounded. 
(h) Independently of the above-listed points, whereas some interpretations of non-
relativistic quantum mechanics exhibit a structural time asymmetry (paradigmatically, 
spontaneous collapse theories) by adding further dynamical elements to the standard 
version, others just manifest a non-structural asymmetry (for instance, orthodox 
quantum mechanics and Bohmian mechanics). 
About the philosophical methodology 
Some centuries ago, this thesis would have, plainly and undoubtedly, been a thesis on Natural 
Philosophy. Nowadays, the expression has lost much of its (nostalgic) appealing and would 
better be reworded as philosophy of physics, foundations of physics, scientifically-informed 
metaphysics or something like that. I feel that my thesis lies somewhere among them, in their 
interstices. The overall topic tackles a longstanding metaphysical issue to the extent to which 
it ultimately focuses on what time is, what its properties are. The research, however, doesn’t 
depart from heavenly philosophical claims or from a purely arm-chair attitude, but it by contrast 
intends to be conducted in an, so to speak, Earthlier way. And that means that it will always 
keep an eye on what current physics has to say about the matter. That is, it is to be conducted 
in a scientifically-informed manner. In doing this, it will also deal with some foundational 
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issues and physics-inner problems, combining conceptual and formal tools coming from 
quantum physics to address an iconic philosophical issue. 
I am convinced that our understanding of the natural world depends upon developing 
interdisciplinary research programs where philosophy and various scientific disciplines 
converge. This thesis tries to mirror this overarching spirit. Not only have many philosophical 
concerns experienced a renewed boost when addressed in an interdisciplinary manner, but 
some conceptual and even genuinely scientific progress has also been made when philosophy 
has intervened. If science (and physics in particular) is somehow in the business of knowing 
what the world is like, then philosophy of science, philosophy of physics and a scientifically-
informed metaphysics also contribute, actively, to this aim. I here share Hasok Chang’s words: 
philosophy is the continuation of science by other means; means not exclusively confined to 
an elucidatory, passive task. 
Let me add some words about the way in which my arguments, and my enquiry in 
general, will be ideally executed. Philosophy’s terminology is prone to be somewhat coercive. 
Philosophical arguments aim to force others to adopt a given belief. As Nozick neatly puts it 
“a philosophical argument is an attempt to get someone to believe something, whether he wants 
to believe it or not”. This explains why philosophers typically put so much efforts in producing 
knock-down arguments or to push adversaries out of rationality’s limits. I mean this research 
as an exercise in a more exploratory, so to speak, way of doing philosophy. I don’t mean at all 
that knock-down arguments shouldn’t play any role in philosophizing or that they unavoidably 
incur in some sort of coercive practice. What I rather exercise here is something that weights 
equally knock-down arguments and exploratory tasks: I don’t intend anyone to believe what I 
actually believe about the theses I will defend here, but rather to consider things from the 
perspective I will propose. Some of the claims I will argue for are not conventional and 
somewhat heterodox and I don’t expect the reader to be fully persuaded. If persuaded, good. If 
not persuaded, it’s equally valuable that she rethinks of her previously-held beliefs from a 
different viewpoint and eventually reinforce them. This, in a way or another, will push our 
understanding of the matter further. 
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Introduction 
This first part, which contains two chapters, faces the uneasy situation of not counting with a 
clear-stated formulation of the problem one is to deal with. As one gets into the literature, one 
rapidly has the felling that under the label “the problem of the arrow of time” a packed bunch 
of problems (or a “thicket of problems” as John Earman (1974) puts it) and intertwined notions 
have been indistinctly discussed in the philosophy of physics and of time. So, the first step 
towards some clarification of the problem is to unpack such a thicket. The main aim of this 
first part is to pose the problem of the arrow of time precisely, offering a rationale for why the 
problem should be primarily understood the way I shall claim it should be primarily 
understood. Along with this, there are some further general theses I would like to defend here. 
(a) How one conceives the problem of the arrow of time depends on certain metaphysical 
and epistemic assumptions with respect to the nature of time.  
When discussing the direction of time, one broadly concerns whether time instantiates the 
property of “being directed” (whatever this may be). The focal point here is that people may 
come to different understandings of what time is. Philosophical and scientific literature has 
been massive on this issue, as widely known. However, as far as I am aware, literature on the 
problem of the arrow of time has not drawn enough attention to it thus far. As it will become 
clear afterwards, divergent philosophical stances with respect to the nature of time may lead us 
to a different understanding of what the problem of the arrow of time is supposed to be. And 
this is so for a simple reason: there is no assumption-free way to understand the problem, or a 
non-trivial and comprehensive formulation thereof. My aim here is hence not to pursue this 
unattainable goal. What I do want to defend is that such commitments are constitutive of how 
the problem is to be grasped. And it is this acknowledgment which will take us to a far-reaching 
understating of it. 
There is yet another caveat regarding now the direction of time. Not only does the 
formulation of the problem depend upon our previously-taken assumptions with respect to the 
nature of time, but also upon the status of its directionality, that is, if it is either a 
contingent/non-structural property, or a necessary/structural one. As I will defend along this 
part is that there are different ways to conceive the directionality of time. 
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(b) One’s assumptions with respect to the world’s ontology, what role symmetries play in 
physics, what a law of nature is or is supposed to do, also play an active, though 
secondary, role in conceiving of the problem. 
In posing the problem of the arrow of time, or in developing the tools for addressing it from a 
physical viewpoint, the literature has frequently resorted to a panoply of expressions or images 
referring to, for instance, laws of physics’ properties (for instance, “being invariant under time 
reversal”), or to how the world’s content would look like going backward in time, or to time-
reversal invariance as symmetry of fundamental physical theories, and so forth. Of course, there 
is no univocal, straightforward way to understand all these notions or images. And these 
divergences may lead us to set the problem up differently. 
(c)  Putting some details aside, there are two ways to understand the problem of the arrow 
of time in the literature, namely, in terms of a structural arrow of time and in terms of 
a non-structural arrow of time 
Points (a) and (b) converge on (c). Actually, both ways to understand the problem embody two 
quite different projects under the same label ‘the problem of the arrow of time’. Projects that, 
at the same time, involve unalike commitments with respect to time, the sort of directionality 
they are looking into, the status of symmetries, physical theories and physical laws as 
previously mentioned. These two unalike understandings of the problem lead, I shall propose, 
to two different formulations that can be tracked in the relevant literature, to wit, the problem 
of a structural arrow of time and the problem of the two realms, as I shall call them. To fully 
display both formulations and to show their relations are the core of the second chapter. In 
relation to point (c), I shall make two points 
(i) First, though both problems should be kept conceptually apart, they are nevertheless 
related. Particularly, the problem of the two realms already implies an answer to the 
problem of a structural arrow of time. 
(ii) Second, the problem of a structural arrow of time is thereby conceptually prior to 
the problem of the two realms. Hence, the problem of the arrow of time should be 
literally and primarily understood in the structural way. 
Finally, the last thesis I would like to defend here is primarily methodological. 
(d) Certain requirements must be satisfied for the formulation of the problem to be 
philosophically meaningful. 
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Time exhibits a convoluted dual character. On the one hand, temporal notions are so deeply-
ingrained in our language, knowledge and experience of the world that, unwittingly, our inquiry 
could be being conducted in a temporally-biased way. In other words, as one regards reality 
from a temporal perspective, one could be mistakenly ascribing time objectives properties that 
it actually lacks. Huw Price (1996) warns against this sort of anthropocentric approach by 
proposing an atemporal view –the “view from Nowhen”. By adopting such an atemporal 
perspective, one guards oneself not only from subjective temporal biases, but also from falling 
into fallacies that come from there. On the other hand, there seems to be a sort of opposite 
stream within philosophers of physics’ community in demanding our theories to be maximally 
symmetric. Since symmetries are playing an increasing relevant role in physical theories, 
philosophical problems are often formulated in these terms. I contend one should be extremely 
careful in this maneuver. Unnoticeably, physicists and philosophers frequently disagree on 
what it is the epistemic and ontological status of symmetries. In order to carry out a proper 
investigation of time’s direction, some methodological requirements will thus be in order here 
too. 
To reach the aims of this first part, and to develop the above-mentioned theses further, 
the investigation will be carried out in two stages:  
• In the first chapter, I shall offer a metaphysical overview of the problem of the arrow 
of time as well as an analysis of the most relevant notions in the physics literature –
those of time-reversal invariance and (ir)reversibility. Firstly, I shall state the most 
general formulation of the problem plus two different readings of it: structural and non-
structural. Secondly, I shall disentangle the notion of time-reversal invariance from the 
notion of (ir)reversibility and will show how they can be associated with the arrow of 
time debate. Finally, I will point out that the problem of the arrow of time may be 
introduced in two conceptually different ways, namely, the problem of the two realms 
and the problem of a fundamental arrow of time.  
• In the second chapter, I shall develop further these two formulations of the problem and 
how they can be traced back in the relevant literature. The chapter will formulate both 
problems accurately and will link to the metaphysical background offered in the first 
chapter. Broadly stated, I will argue that both problems address the problem of the 
arrow of time differently, entailing different conclusions with respect to the physical 
foundations of the arrow of time. At the end of the chapter, I shall suggest that the 
problem of a structural arrow of time is prior to, and supposed by, the problem of the 
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two realms. In addition, I will point to the conceptual and formal tools one has at 
disposal to investigate each of them. 
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I. 
Unpacking the Problem of the Arrow of Time 
From Metaphysics to Physics… 
Section 1. Unpacking the problem 
What is metaphysically the quid of the problem of the arrow of time? And, what is the 
philosophical motivation of the problem as addressed in physics? Frequently, the origin of the 
problem relates to our intuitive notion of a changing world, of a becoming, of a flowing time, 
or of the passage of time. Intuitively, we believe time goes by. We feel the flow of time and 
our very experience apparently witnesses such an objective flowing time. A longstanding 
philosophical tradition inspired in Hume’s philosophy have thought that philosophy’s task is 
to offer a well-grounded and thorough explanation of our beliefs or ideas based on our 
experience. Thus, what are the grounds for our deep-seated beliefs about time?  
This is, no doubt about it, a fascinating self-contained enterprise as well as an interesting 
starting point to dig into the nature of our experience of time. However, the problem of the 
arrow of time as discussed in physics wouldn’t quite span the problem of how to explain our 
experience of time in physical terms, or to answer on which grounds our temporal experience 
arises. From that motivational starting point, the problem should be narrowed down. And this 
is due to obvious reasons: if the problem of the arrow of time in physics is, roughly, whether 
our best and fundamental physical theories are capable of picking a privileged direction of time 
(as mentioned in the Introduction), one could hardly rebuild our complex temporal intuitions 
by merely pointing out that fundamental physics somehow does pick such a temporal 
directionality. One can surely set forth a philosophical investigation from people’s temporal 
intuitions, but one also needs to disentangle the different ingredients they involve, such as that 
of a passage or a flowing time. By doing so, one will be able to single out which ingredient of 
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our experience relates to the problem of the arrow of time as understood in philosophy of 
physics. 
If one in fact has experience of the passage or flow of time, our very idea of such a 
passage is extremely complex. Setting aside any psychological or neurologically-based 
mechanism that carry out anything like our alleged experience of time, the very concept of “the 
passage of time” is philosophically convoluted. Huw Price (2012), for instance, has pointed 
out three ingredients to the complex “passage package” idea.  
(a) The first one is the idea that present is an objectively-distinguished moment that 
continually varies. This thesis is famously known as the ‘moving now’ doctrine, or 
‘presentism’.3 Peter Landsberg (1982) illustrates this idea by saying that “the time 
variable is rather like a straight line on which a point marked “The Now” moves 
uniformly and inexorably” (1982: 2).  
(b) The second ingredient is that of having a privileged directionality. This ingredient 
would allow us to objectively distinguish between the past and the future in so far 
as the past-to-future direction would look quite different with respect to the future-
to-past one.  
(c) The third element compounding the passage of time package is that of a flow, that 
is, time as intrinsically having a flow-like, dynamic character. Price stresses that the 
most particular “ingredient” of this element is that time would involve a rate of 
change as any flowing stuff does. Furthermore, the flow-like element is entangled 
to some extent with the others, as a flow-like movement logically implies a 
preferred directionality, for instance. 
Clearly, according to this conceptual reconstruction, defending the idea of the passage of time 
implies holding all their ingredients altogether. However, one could either raise various 
suspicions on them or instead defend them individually. One can, for instance, be worried about 
whether these ingredients in themselves logically make sense. For instance, some have argued 
that the idea of a flowing time (that is, the third ingredient), in so much as it implies the idea of 
a rate of change, is roundly meaningless. Price (1996) argues as follows: 
1. If time really flows, then it would make sense to say how fast time flows 
                                                          
3 Presentism also implies the ontological thesis that only the present moment is real. The ‘moving now’ doctrine 
is not actually committed to such an ontological thesis (e.g., the moving-spot light theory by Broad 1927). 
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2. Somebody could reply by saying that the idea makes perfect sense insofar as time 
flows at one second per second 
3. However, to say that time flows at one second per second is ridiculous, because one 
second per second is not, physically, a rate whatsoever because it is dimensionless. 
4. Therefore, time does not flow. 
By debunking the idea of a flow of time, Price is in the same movement undermining the whole 
idea of the passage of time (for discussion on this point, see Maudlin 2002, Raven 2010, and 
Price 2012 for a reply to Maudlin 2002). It is however clear that one could nonetheless hold 
the second ingredient and believe that time has a directionality, though it doesn’t flow in any 
relevant sense. 
Alternatively, one could object the first ingredient individually, too. Famously, John Ellis 
McTaggart (1908) argued that the idea of a ‘moving now’ is logically incoherent. McTaggart 
introduced to the philosophical literature the ‘A-theory’ and ‘B-theory’ of time as different 
theoretical frameworks to account for the nature of time. Traditionally, an A-theory is defined 
in terms of the A-series, where each instant has the monadic property of “being past”, “being 
present”, and “being future” (A-properties). Philosophers of time generally claim that 
presentism implies an A-theoretic framework, since events are ordered and located relative to 
now (see Craig 2000, Zimmerman 2008. For criticisms and discussion see Rasmusen 2012, 
Tallant 2012 and Deasy 2017). Contrarily, a B-theory holds that only B-series exists, where the 
ordering of events is based on binary relational properties, as “being earlier than” or “being 
later than” (B-properties).  
In a more liberal understanding of these theories of time, A-theory’s supporters typically 
defend a dynamic theory of time according to which time objectively flows, whereas B-theory’s 
supporters deny that such a flowing or passing be an objective feature of reality (see Baron 
2015). McTaggart’s argument seeks to show that time (or genuine change) is unreal by 
claiming that one of its essential features (its dynamic character) is self-contradictory. Though 
there are many different versions of McTaggart’s argument, the simplest one can be sketched 
as follows (see McDaniel 2016): 
1. Time is real only if genuine change occurs 
2. Genuine change occurs only if A-series exists 
3. A-series does not exist 
4. Time is unreal 
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There are many subtleties in the argument, but the point to be stressed is that an A-series exists 
only if events localized in time (or instants of time) can coherently acquire the properties of 
being past, being present and being future. The dynamics of those absolute attributes is what 
constitutes genuine change. But, in so much as those attributes are incompatible with each 
other, the very idea of an A-series is self-contradictory: times or events cannot instantiate the 
property of being future and past, for example. Naturally, many objections have been raised 
against the argument. Yet McTaggart’s argument is a well-known objection to the logical 
coherence of the moving-now doctrine, and consequently, to the whole idea of the passage of 
time. 
Above and beyond all these considerations, the most compelling reason for holding the 
idea of the passage of time is that one truly has experience of it. In general, both parties –
supporters and deniers of an objective dynamic time– agree on that everybody has genuine 
experience of the passage (see Schuster 1986, Davies 1995, Price 1996, 2012; Craig 2000, Le 
Poidevin 2007, Paul 2010, Prosser 2013). This widely-accepted intuitive advantage has been 
the workhorse for any supporter of an objective passage of time. And to explain why it is the 
case that we truly have such an experience, whereas the passage of time is not real, has been a 
hard nut to crack for any denier of the passage.  
Notwithstanding this widely-shared assumption, some philosophers have recently tried 
to undermine such a belief by arguing that one should not too easily concede to passing time’s 
advocators that one genuinely has experience of the passage. For instance, Akkiko Frischut 
(2013) claims that conceding such an intuition as obviously true “is a mistake because if we 
think carefully about what it would mean to experience temporal passage, it is not obvious at 
all that we do” (2013: 145). Christoph Hoerl (2013) has argued along the same line, though his 
arguments differ from Frischut’s slightly; Gal Yehezkel (2013) has also supported such 
conclusion but based on stronger reasons: he argues that conceiving time as perceivable is a 
categorical mistake. Clearly, they attempt to pave the way for an alternative way to debunk 
dynamical theories of time, undercutting one of the at-first-glance more compelling reasons to 
believe in it; in doing so, they argue for static accounts of time (although Yehezkel explicitly 
does not mean to discredit A-theories, 2013: 79): If, to begin with, one does not even have 
experience of the passage of time, it seems that there is nothing left to hold on for A-theory’s 
supporters, and any motivation to defend the very idea of the passage of time rapidly vanishes. 
In any case, one does not need to get that far away to debunk the plausibility of the 
passage of time. Many of the arguments raised in the philosophy of physics lie much closer to 
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us than logical or metaphysical criticisms. Maybe time passage’s ingredients are logically 
coherent, and even metaphysically possible. Probably they are genuinely part of our day-to-
day experience. And yet, such ingredients might either be purely subjective or merely apparent: 
the passage of time perhaps is not an objective feature of the natural world (or even of any 
physically possible world). Some have argued, for instance, that presentism or the existence of 
an objective moving now have no place in current physics (see Rietdijk 1966, Putnam 1967, 
Penrose 1989). For instance, Special Relativity not only treats time as a dimension of a bigger 
four-dimensional structure (the so-called space-time), but also treats present (as a location in 
time) as a frame-dependent notion. The point here is that different moving reference systems 
could disagree on what instant they call ‘now’ because of the relativity of simultaneity. 
According to this argument, presentism is not an option for anyone that believes that Special 
Relativity is (approximately) true. (For an interesting debate see Valente 2012). Therefore, the 
passage of time would not be a property of the natural world either. 
This is the sort of inquiry I am mainly interested in. Taken logical coherence and 
metaphysical plausibility for granted, one can be rather worried about whether such features 
have an objective correlate with the natural world as described by current physics. The overall 
strategy would hence consist in taking what our best and fundamental theories teach us about 
the natural world and using that evidence to argue for or against any of the features of the 
passage of time. In any case, it should be bear in mind the complexity of the notion of the 
passage of time and kept clear what features of it one is contending. Naturally, by undermining 
any of those features (a dynamic now, having a directionality or a flow-like behavior), one is 
also debunking the whole idea of the passage of time for it implies those. However, it is quite 
clear that the opposite is not true. Physics might not offer any well-grounded reason to believe 
in the passage of time as an objective feature of the natural world (for instance, there might be 
no sound reasons to hold the objectivity of a moving now), but it might well capture any of the 
other features (having a directionality, for instance).  
True. It is not so easy to figure out how to go about know this. Neither is so clear how to 
translate these concerns into physics’ language. Be that as it may, to get on the right track, I 
think that one should start off by conceptually disentangling the notion of interest from other 
related notions, and by clarifying how they all relate. This distinction will be twofold. The first 
part will concern metaphysically useful distinctions in order to narrow the problem down. The 
second part will involve physical distinctions in order to show how the problem can be 
articulated within the field of physics. 
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Section 2. Non-structural and structural metaphysical distinction between 
both time’s directions 
Having analyzed the idea of the passage of time, it is clear none of those arguments against the 
passage of time or the moving now doctrine go against the very idea of an objective direction 
of time. Neither do they deny its logical coherence or metaphysical plausibility. As mentioned 
before, even though it is true that the notion of an objective time passage implies the idea of an 
objective directionality, the converse does not follow: it is not true that the existence of a 
direction of time implies an objective becoming, or the moving-now doctrine, or any dynamical 
theory of time (i.e., A-theory). Generally, those doctrines require more structure than that 
needed to hold the existence of an objective directionality. So, it will be useful to be precise 
about how much structure is required for time to have a directionality. I will get into this next. 
On the basis of the above, it follows that an objective direction of time is compatible with 
non-dynamic theories of time. To see this, let us come back to McTaggart’s work. In his 1908 
paper, McTaggart also introduced a third series, the C-series. Whereas the relevant distinction 
between the A-series and B-series is that the former implies a dynamic of time and the latter 
does not, the difference between the B-series and the C-series is that a C-series lacks a 
privileged direction (see Farr 2012). In McTaggart’s words: “The C-series, while it determines 
the order, does not determine the direction” (McTaggart 1908: 462). The three series then 
involve a different structure of time because they equip time with either metaphysically highly-
structured or lowly-structured features. Let us systematize this. 
Suppose the following series of instants or events localized in time: 𝐴 –  𝐵 –  𝐶 –  𝐷. 
According to A-theory’s supporters such a series is dynamic in the sense that each event has 
the absolute property of being ‘the past’, ‘the present’, or ‘the future’; and that absolute 
properties’ changing is what constitutes the temporal dynamic. The series has a direction too, 
since A-properties change only in one direction, from being the past to being the future, through 
being the present. Obviously, an order is implied by the directionality. Then, 
A-theory’s structure: order + direction + dynamics (𝐴→ → 𝐵→ → 𝐶→ → 𝐷→) 
Where ‘𝑁→’ stands for an event instantiating temporal absolute properties’ changing, and ‘→’ 
stands for a privileged direction of time. 
As mentioned before, the B-series is not dynamic in this sense: there are not genuine 
absolute properties such as being past or being future. Rather, A-properties are actually 
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reducible to B-properties, so that events localized in time may be ordered according to ‘earlier 
than’, ‘later than’ or ‘simultaneous with’ relations. B-theory’s supporters give up equipping 
time with a dynamics but they do consider that time has a direction and an order 
B-theory’s structure: order + direction (𝐴 → 𝐵 → 𝐶 → 𝐷) 
Even though there is no objective passage of time within a B-theoretic framework, there are 
objective facts conforming to which time has an order and a privileged direction. In this sense, 
the B-series running as 𝐴 → 𝐵 → 𝐶 → 𝐷 would be different from the series 𝐷 → 𝐶 → 𝐵 → 𝐴. 
One could well say that they are completely different series to the extent that the relational 
properties ‘being later than’ or ‘being earlier than’ are instantiated by different events or times 
in each case. 
Finally, the minimal structure one can go with is that of the C-theory. Within a C-series 
only order is preserved since there would be no matter of fact that distinguished the 
𝐴 –  𝐵 –  𝐶 –  𝐷 from 𝐷 –  𝐶 –  𝐵 –  𝐴. One can determine that some event or time, say B, is 
between others, A and C, but not whether there is a direction: sentences like “after B follows 
C” are meaningless in a C-theory framework. Therefore, a C-theoretic framework only confers 
a “betweeness ordering” on time’s structure. 
C-theory’s structure: order (𝐴 − 𝐵 − 𝐶 − 𝐷) 
The quarrel around the direction of time thus concerns whether time comes 
metaphysically equipped with at least a B-structure. Physics comes in when such a structure 
can be reflected in any of our best physical theories, offering formally and empirically-based 
evidence for either option. So, after this brief detour, we have reached a first approximation of 
what the problem is (from a general perspective): Whether time, according to physics, has at 
least a B-structure; or, equivalently, whether the past-to-future and the future-to-past direction 
can be physically distinguished.  
How should one characterize such a distinction? What does it imply metaphysically? Let 
us take again the series 𝐴 − 𝐵 − 𝐶 − 𝐷. In order to know whether that series implies a 
direction, one has to be capable of distinguishing the 𝐴 –  𝐵 –  𝐶 –  𝐷 series from the 
𝐷 –  𝐶 –  𝐵 –  𝐴. If for any matter of fact there is an asymmetry between the two series, in the 
sense that 𝐴 –  𝐵 –  𝐶 –  𝐷 ≠  𝐷 –  𝐶 –  𝐵 –  𝐴, one is allowed to equip the series with further 
structure: the series running 𝐴 →  𝐵 → 𝐶 →  𝐷 is different from the series running 𝐷 →  𝐶 →
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 𝐵 →  𝐴. And this difference (this asymmetry) is what entitled us to ascribe it a direction: 
Events or times Bs are followed by events or times Cs, not by As. Conversely, if a symmetry 
between 𝐴 →  𝐵 → 𝐶 →  𝐷  and 𝐷 →  𝐶 →  𝐵 →  𝐴 holds (𝐴 →  𝐵 → 𝐶 →  𝐷 =  𝐷 →  𝐶 →
 𝐵 →  𝐴), then both series are identical in respect of their directionality, that is, they are said 
to be equivalent: Events or times Bs may equally be followed by either events or times As or 
Cs. Nothing in the series’ structure allows one to draw a distinction between both directions. 
The series is therefore undirected, obtaining in consequence a C-series’ structure, 
𝐴 –  𝐵 –  𝐶 –  𝐷. 
But what does it mean that both series are identical? This cannot mean that they are 
strictly identical for there would not be two series any longer in that case. Hence, one should 
preserve the idea that there are still two directions (specifically, two opposite directions), 
though identical in regarding some relevant features. This primarily means that both series 
must share some relevant properties, but not others. This reasoning follows from the well-
known Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (PII hereafter):  
PII Necessarily, for all particulars x and y, and every universal Z, if Z is instantiated 
by x if and only if Z is also instantiated by y, then x is numerically identical with 
y. 
There are some quarrels about whether PII is universally valid or whether there are sound 
convincing counterexamples (see Black 1952, Ayer 1954, Hacking 1975, Rodriguez Pereira 
2004, Forrest 2016: Section 3). There is also some controversy about what kind of properties 
should be taken into account so as to get a meaningful, non-trivial version of PII (see Rodriguez 
Pereira 2006). Notwithstanding these worries, in what follows I will assume that the principle 
is well grounded in this general sense: the best criterion one has at hand to count and 
(minimally) distinguish two particulars is by considering whether such particulars share certain 
set of relevant properties. 
Metaphysically speaking, the realm of properties is quite plentiful, and I cannot get into 
details here about its complex geography. But a useful distinction to be drawn is that of intrinsic 
and extrinsic properties. In general, entities have some properties purely in virtue of what they 
are in themselves, that is, without any relation or interaction with anything exterior. But entities 
also instantiate other sort of properties in virtue of their relations or interactions with external 
entities. The former sort of properties is generally called “intrinsic”, whereas the latter 
“extrinsic” (also, though arguable, “relational”). Some physical properties, such as having x 
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mass, or positive energy are archetypically considered intrinsic properties. Others, such as 
“being four kilometers away from Rome” or “being taller than my sister”, are typically 
regarded “extrinsic (or relational) properties”. 
In order to distinguish the above-mentioned series, one should be able to identify the set 
of shared properties (in virtue of which one can say that they are identical), and the set of non-
shared properties (in virtue of which one can claim that there are yet two series with an opposite 
direction). It is worth bearing in mind that one is mainly interested in identifying an asymmetry 
between them –asymmetry on which the directions of both series can be based. What I claim 
is that such a distinction can be drawn in two different ways.  
One promissory strategy to do the trick is relying on an external fact Z that breaks the 
identity between the two series. Even though both series are identical with respect to their 
intrinsic properties (that is, nothing in the series in themselves allows distinguishing them), 
they are different in relation to Z. Therefore, both series pick opposite directions in virtue of 
an external fact Z. Now, it is matter of empirical research to establish which one is, for instance, 
the series one lives in.  
Despite having grounded a distinction, it is quite clear that such a distinction is not 
intrinsic (indeed, one assumed that both series shared their intrinsic properties). I will call non-
intrinsic distinctions ‘non-structural’, in the sense they are not built-in the series. In some 
sense, the series in themselves would be symmetric and undirected4. And yet, one could come 
to objectively distinguish them for their relation to an external fact Z (naturally, if fact Z were 
absent, the distinction could not be carried out). The asymmetry and the direction are clearly 
introduced by Z in an otherwise completely symmetric and undirected scenario. 
Non-structural distinction Two particulars (i.e. temporal series) are non-structurally 
different when they share all their intrinsic properties but 
instantiate unalike extrinsic properties (for instance, they have 
an unalike relation to an external fact Z) 
As one here typically deals with physical evolutions ruled by dynamical laws (solutions of 
equations of motion), boundary conditions are, for instance, the kind of external facts that may 
introduce in physics a non-structural difference between two perfectly temporal symmetric 
evolutions. I will get into details about it later on. 
                                                          
4 Without any reference to a hypothetical external fact Z, the series is symmetric since 𝐴 →  𝐵 → 𝐶 →  𝐷  and 
𝐷 →  𝐶 →  𝐵 →  𝐴 are (in some relevant sense) equivalent. 
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Conversely, any structural distinction between both series’ directions will completely 
come from their intrinsic properties, regardless what sort of relations they have with any 
external fact. The series running 𝐴 →  𝐵 → 𝐶 →  𝐷 is structurally different from the series 
running 𝐷 →  𝐶 →  𝐵 →  𝐴 in virtue of their having distinct intrinsic properties.  
Structural distinction Two particulars (i.e. temporal series) are structurally different 
when they instantiate at least one unalike intrinsic property. 
The idea is that something in the inner nature of events or times is what allows the distinction 
to be drawn. As mentioned in passing before, in so far as one is dealing with physical evolutions 
ruled by dynamical laws, something inherent to dynamical laws would be the perfect candidate 
to do the job of establishing a structural distinction. 
Section 3. The direction of…what? 
I have so far remained silent about the nature of the constituents of the series, or about what is 
being ordered and directed by the series. After all, “having a direction” or “being asymmetric” 
is a property of the series, but the series is just a representation of something. Since our main 
concern is time within physics, the constituents of the series should fall under physics’ 
description range.  
The terminology immediately suggests that the issue is about time in itself. If physical 
events are temporally directed, it is because time in itself is directed. So, when one speaks of 
“the direction of time” or the “asymmetry of time”, the of-genitive is understood literally. In 
this sense, event’s behavior would supervene upon time’s properties. This might however be 
taken differently. By “the direction of time” or “asymmetry of time”, literature has often 
understood the direction of things in time, or the asymmetry of things in time. To start with, 
one should aware of being involving two different issues under the same label. Secondly, in 
order to avoid any mistake, both issues need be sharply distinguished. And finally, that any 
eventual relation or identification calls for further justifications. To my mind, the most 
straightforward way to conceptually carry out the distinction between an asymmetry of time 
and the asymmetry of things in time is through a spatial and material analogy. 
Think of the following scenario. You come into the room and find a billiard table inside. 
Imagine that most the billiard balls concentrate at one of corners, surrounding one of the holes. 
The rest are asymmetrically spread out all over the table. After looking at the properties of the 
billiard table (for example, checking whether there an inclination, or an odd geometry on the 
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surface), you get to the conclusion that the billiard table is perfectly symmetric, so such strange 
asymmetric distribution becomes puzzling. Any explanation of such an odd distribution must, 
you deduce, rely on some external facts that caused it. Maybe an external agent willingly 
arranged the balls that wat before you enter the room. Or, maybe, there is an attractor at one of 
the holes of the billiard table that pulls the balls towards it at a specific rate according to their 
distance from the hole. Had you put this scenario to move in time, you would probably see the 
billiard balls flowing towards one of the holes.  
Whatever the details of the explanation you come up with, the very properties of the table 
are generally left out in the sense that none of them would explain the distribution: the billiard 
table, you learned, is perfectly symmetric. So, any question as to the asymmetric distribution 
of billiard balls on the table is strictly a question about its causes. Clearly, it would be a mistake 
to claim that, after all, the table is asymmetric due to the asymmetric distribution of balls over 
it. Or, at least, further arguments should be provided to support such an identification. If you 
split the table in two, you would find an asymmetric distribution of balls in both halves, but no 
difference at all as to their intrinsic properties. Both halves are actually different (in the sense 
that you have the means to draw a distinction between both halves), though non-structurally 
different. 
Now think of a slightly different scenario. You enter the room and see the same curious 
ball distribution over the billiard table, except this time you find that the table’s surface has 
many irregularities. After an even more careful examination, those irregularities display a 
canal-like configuration all over the table. Additionally, you discover that table legs are not 
perfectly equal long: one of them is shorter than the others, so that the table slightly leans on 
one of its sides. Imagine that you take all the balls and arrange them differently, for instance, 
you place them at the opposite corner. With some further assumptions, what you will probably 
see is the balls finding their way to the opposite extreme. After a while, you end up with a very 
much similar configuration you start with –most of billiard balls concentrated at one of the 
billiard table corners, and the rest asymmetrically distributed all over the table. No matter how 
you set up the initial configuration, you will end up with a pretty similar final distribution. In 
this case, what rather explains such a distribution is exclusively the intrinsic properties of the 
table, and not any extrinsic factor. Furthermore, when you split the table in halves, you will 
note that both halves instantiate different intrinsic properties, regardless of the billiard balls on 
them. They are thereby structurally different. And any asymmetric distribution of the table’s 
content will supervene upon the table’s intrinsic properties. 
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Despite time and space having substantive differences, both scenarios shed some light on 
the difference between the direction of time and the direction of things in time. Even though 
one typically starts with a temporally asymmetric sequence of events, there would be two quite 
different explanations for it: the sequence is temporally directed either because time in itself is 
structurally directed (in virtue of its intrinsic properties), or because some external fact provides 
an explanation and causes a directed-like behavior (that is, because the series is non-structurally 
directed). In the first case, any temporally asymmetric, or directed, behavior of things in time 
supervenes upon time’s structure, and time is literally asymmetric or directed. In the second 
case, any temporally asymmetric or directed behavior of things in time depends on some 
external factor, and it occurs in spite of time being symmetric. In this sense, one can only speak 
of “the direction of time” merely in a metaphorical manner.  
Bearing this distinction in mind, let us consider the temporal series again. The asymmetry 
or direction of time refers to a structural difference between 𝐴 →  𝐵 → 𝐶 →  𝐷 and 𝐷 →  𝐶 →
 𝐵 →  𝐴 series. The asymmetry or direction of things in time instead refers to a non-structural 
difference between 𝐴 →  𝐵 → 𝐶 →  𝐷 and 𝐷 →  𝐶 →  𝐵 →  𝐴, a distinction relying on an 
external factor Z. It is worth stressing two points here. On the one hand, in both cases there is 
a genuine distinction, and thereby, a genuine B-series. That is, one is capable of distinguishing 
both series for there is at least some non-shared property. A structural identity (non-structural 
difference) does not entail that there is not any difference whatsoever, but it cannot be carried 
out in virtue of the series’ intrinsic properties. But, on the other hand, it is nonetheless clear 
that there are two quite different worries here, leading to different issues. Thus, one might 
introduce under the label of “the problem of the arrow of time” two distinguishable worries.  
A structural worry Whether time in itself has a structural difference between the 
past-to-future and the future-to-past direction. This worry is 
literally about the asymmetry or direction of time in itself, upon 
which any temporal asymmetric distribution of things in time 
supervenes. 
Or alternatively, 
A non-structural worry Whether a temporally asymmetric distribution or temporally 
directed behavior of things in time can be explained by a non-
structural difference given that time is structurally symmetric 
and undirected. As opposed to the first issue, the of-genitive here 
is merely metaphorical.  
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Whilst the former concerns a structural distinction mainly involving intrinsic properties, the 
latter exclusively relates to a non-structural distinction relying on relational properties (that is, 
in relation to an external fact that breaks the intrinsic symmetry). Now, putting all these pieces 
together, one can identify at least two distinguishable kinds of arrows of time, and consequently 
two different formulations of the problem of the arrow of time: 
Structural arrow of time A temporal series has a structural direction when the two 
temporally-opposed series 𝐴 →  𝐵 → 𝐶 →  𝐷 and 𝐷 →
 𝐶 →  𝐵 →  𝐴 can be distinguished by means of a 
structural distinction. 
And, 
Non-structural arrow of time A temporal series has a non-structural direction when the 
two temporally-opposed series 𝐴 →  𝐵 → 𝐶 →  𝐷 and 
𝐷 →  𝐶 →  𝐵 →  𝐴 can be distinguished by means of a 
non-structural distinction. 
Therefore, that a temporal series be said to exhibit a privileged direction may receive two 
metaphysically different, though closely-related, meanings: either it exhibits a structural 
distinction between both directions, or it exhibits a non-structural one. This will naturally have 
consequences when physics comes into play: different formulations of the arrow of time 
depend on these distinctions. But before to come to it, I shall get into some details about other 
useful metaphysical distinctions. 
Section 4. Relationalism, substantivalism and supersubstantivalism with 
respect to time 
This section focuses exclusively on the elements of the series in themselves. Elements of the 
temporal series 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶, 𝐷 were hitherto referred to as ‘times’ or ‘events’. However, the nature 
of the series may be ontologically interpreted in different ways: when referring to the direction 
of time, one might be referring either to the direction of a substance existing independently of 
its material content, or to the direction of certain temporal relations among the constituents of 
the material content of the world. These alternatives embody completely different 
metaphysical views with respect to time; views have been played out in the debate among 
relationalism versus substantivalism versus supersubstantivalism. Literature about the topic is 
massive, so I will just present the big picture and how it relates to the arrow of time debate. 
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Substantivalists with respect to time claim that time is an entity that exists independently 
of events and things placed within it. Additionally, they claim that world’s content’s temporal 
behavior supervenes upon time. Relationalists, in turn, support the idea that time is nothing 
over and above temporal relations among events and things. On the contrary, 
supersubstantivalists claim that there are no events or things in the world, but (space)-temporal 
points only. The substantivalist ontology features time and matter (whose behavior supervenes 
upon time), while the relationalist ontology features only things or events, and the 
supersubtantivalist ontology only (space)-time points. Let us spell them out in tandem. 
There are many different sorts of relationalist-like views in metaphysics and philosophy 
of physics that, in general, share the idea that time is nothing over and above temporal relations 
among events and things (Benovsky 2010: 492), though they can greatly vary on which is to 
be considered as objective and fundamental in the physical world (see Sklar 1974, Earman 
1989, Pooley 2013, for comprehensive overviews of the different kinds of relationalisms). 
Furthermore, they can also diverge on how robust the temporal structure (boiled down to 
relations among things or events) should be. For instance, Julian Barbour and Bruno Bertotti 
(1982) have argued for a Machian relationalism in physics where an absolute temporal-
ordering structure is assumed for classical mechanics (see Gryb and Thebault 2016 for a 
defense of a Machian-moderate relationalism in quantum gravity). Carlo Rovelli (2002, 2004) 
has instead argued for a radical relationalism according to which there is not even a 
fundamental time-ordering structure in quantum gravity. A more robust relationalism is 
defended by Michael Esfeld et al. as change not only exhibits a temporal order but also a 
(primitive) direction (Esfeld et al. 2018: 31).  
In any case, I will henceforth take a relationalist-like view on time as supporting two 
theses: 
R1 There are only events or physical bodies in the world (which can have intrinsic 
properties or not), and their (space) temporal relations. There is no external time. 
R2 Time is nothing but change. The sort of relation between the physical world and 
the concept of ‘time’ is that of a Leibnizian representation or a Machian 
abstraction: time is an ideal, unreal entity parasitic on events-things’ changing. 
According to these tenets, the variable t occurring in most physical theories (setting aside 
general relativity) is merely an external and unreal parameter, which should not be taken as 
representing anything with physical meaning.  
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As in the case of relationalism, there are also many versions of substantivalist-like views 
on time (see Sklar 1974, Earman 1989, Pooley 2013 for comprehensive overviews of different 
kinds of substantivalism). Tim Maudlin has famously supported a substantivalist view on space 
and time (particularly, a Galilean or Neo-Newtonian space-time, see Maudlin 1993), wherein 
the direction of time is intrinsic to space-time itself (see Maudlin 2002: 259). A sophisticated 
‘anti-haccceitist’ substantivalism has been defended by Brighouse (1994), Carl Hoefer (1996), 
Adam Caulton and Jeremy Butterfield (2012), among others, in the context of general 
relativity. Furthermore, scientific literature typically accounts for time in classical mechanics, 
special relativity, relativistic and non-relativistic quantum mechanics, and even string theory 
as a “parameter presumed by, and hence independent of, dynamics” (Huggett, Vistarini and 
Wüthrich 2012: 242). These theories are all background dependent in the sense that posit a 
space-temporal structure that lies outside the scope of dynamics5. 
I will thus take substantivalism as the position supporting the following two theses: 
S1 Time is a theoretical entity endowed with a structure that is intrinsic to it, and 
independent of change. Temporal relations among events or things are parasitic 
on this theoretical entity. 
S2 Time is not an ideal or representational notion, but it plays a physically 
meaningful role in explaining different phenomena or in defining dynamical 
variables. Time cannot thereby be eliminated or boiled down to a dynamical 
basis. 
Naturally, S1 and S2 do not entail any commitment with an observable or measurable 
entity, but regard that time plays a physical role in physical theories that must be considered to 
be prior to change, and independent of it. The structure of time is fixed absolutely, irrespective 
of changes in the world, and thus the structure of change supervenes on the structure of time. 
In this deflated sense, time can be said to be “substantival”. Notably, substantivalists do not 
claim that time is all is out there, denying the existence of chairs, particles and human beings. 
Substantivalist’s ontology is dual: time and matter (in a broad sense) exist in the world. 
Relationalists, instead, support a monistic ontology where there is only matter (with its spatial-
temporal relations). In this sense, some have argued that the real opposite extreme to 
relationalism is not substantivalism, but supersubstantivalism. 
                                                          
5 Certainly, I would be naïve to stem from these theoretical considerations that one must engage a substantivalist 
metaphysics of space-time: the structure may be otiose and, from a ‘more parsimonious’ stance in respect of 
ontology, eliminable. However, it is also true that standard formulations of those physical theories do countenance 
a substantivalist-like viewpoint. 
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In general, supersubstantivalism claims that “everything in the world is space-time” 
(Lehmkuhl 2016: 1). However, such a core claim can receive two readings: one of them states 
that space-time is the only substance in the world, in the sense of being the only fundamental 
entity of the world. The other one states that space-time is the only kind of substance in the 
world. In the latter, parts of space-time can also be proper substances. One might alternatively 
claim, in a non-relativistic universe, that space and time are the only kind of substances: space 
(extension) and time (duration). It has been claimed that Descartes and Spinoza held a 
supersubstantivalist stance with respect to space, and I do not see any reason why this doctrine 
cannot be also applied uniquely to time. In any case, supersubstantivalism’s main tenet is that 
matter does not belong to the ontology of the world (for discussion about the metaphysics of 
supersubstantivalism, see Lewis 1986, Sider 2001, and Schaffer 2009. In a relativist 
framework, see Lehmkuhl 2016). 
The relation between space-time and matter is a bit murky within the supersubstantivalist 
framework. Some have claimed that the relation is one of identity (Schaffner 2009), which 
leads to the identification of matter and space-time. Others, one of ontological priority: space-
time (or space and time) is (are) ontologically prior to matter in the sense that the existence of 
space-time (or space and time) implies the existence of matter, but not the other way around. 
So, the core claim should be slightly modified: everything fundamental in the world is space-
time (space and time). Be that as it may, different versions of supersubstantivalism have been 
discussed in the last decades, but to keep thing simple I will take it as holding the following 
two core claims: 
SS1 There is only space-time in the world as fundamental entity. Alternatively, space 
and time are the only kind of fundamental substances in the world 
SS2 Space-time (space and time) is (are) ontologically prior to matter, in the sense 
that the existence of the latter ontologically depends on the existence of the 
former. 
The lesson in the previous sections is that, when asking for the direction of time, one could be 
asking in, at least, two senses: structural and non-structural. Now, one additional lesson should 
be taken as to the direction of time: Is one actually referring to the direction of the material 
content of the world, being time an abstract representation of relations among matter or events? 
Or is one instead minding whether time, as a fundamental and ontologically prior substance, 
has a privileged direction regardless of the behavior of matter? Does the behavior of matter’s 
dynamic supervene upon time’s structure, or is it rather the other way around? The upshot is 
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that different metaphysical stances with respect to the nature of time will crucially hinge on 
how the problem of the arrow of time is to be addressed in physics. Now, the landscape greatly 
expands and gets more complex: relationalist, substantivalist and supersubstantivalist stances 
might significantly disagree on how the notion of structure should be fleshed out –the structure 
of what? Fundamental particle’s behavior? Time’s structure in itself? As I will show in 
following chapters, these positions (largely, and surprisingly, overlooked in the literature on 
the arrow of time) have strongly influenced the understanding of highly-relevant notions in the 
literature –for instance, and remarkably, the notion of time reversal. 
*** 
Through Section 1 and Section 4, I have delved into the problem of the arrow of time from a 
wide metaphysical point of view. It was shown that the problem, metaphysically, is to 
distinguish between the past-to-future and the future-to-past directions. Or, to put it differently, 
to investigate whether or not both directions turn out to be equivalent in some respect. Next, 
I’ve also shown that one could, metaphysically, be worried about such a distinction in two 
different ways: either in a structural way, that is, in searching for some intrinsic property that 
distinguishes both temporal directions, or in a non-structural way, that is, in drawing the 
distinction in term of an extrinsic or relational property. Importantly, both ways are useful to 
the distinction between both temporal directions, though they draw it differently.   
This has naturally led us to a twofold understanding of arrow of time in physics: a 
structural arrow or a non-structural one. Scenario gains complexity when previously-assumed 
commitments with respect to what time is come into play. Hence, by the ‘arrow of time’ one 
might be referring to a varied pack of closely-related, though differentiable, ideas. Physics 
enters the scene when all these considerations are reviewed in the light of our physical theories. 
Particularly, the question now is whether physics offers a non-arbitrary criterion whereby the 
past-to-future and the future-to-past directions of time were distinguished (or shown to be 
physically equivalent). And this enterprise will be shown to be non-univocal either. I shall get 
into this in Chapter 2, showing that there are actually two stories to be told about the arrow of 
time in physics, stories that instantiates the metaphysical distinctions introduced thus far. But, 
before getting into this, I shall introduce some physics on what has been said up to this point 
along with some additional distinctions. 
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Section 5. Physics comes in… 
If the problem of the arrow of time is metaphysically about how the two directions of time can 
be distinguished (or showed to be equivalent), on what should such a distinction (or 
equivalence) be physically grounded? We commonly think that our physical theories are more 
than mere ‘cook recipes’: they purport to describe the natural world in an approximately true 
manner. In this respect, if one comes to think that time’s direction should somehow be part of, 
or be reflected in, the natural world, then it is reasonably to suppose that physics is particularly 
qualified to comment on its nature and properties. Lawrence Sklar (1974) puts it in this way: 
“The usual line of attack is to try to find some feature of the material happenings 
of the world which coordinates in one way or another with temporal priority. That 
is, to find for any two events that are such that one is earlier than the other some 
other feature which relates them in an asymmetric way” (1974: 355. Italics mine) 
Sklar’s words shed some light on the matter, but not quite enough. What kind of ‘feature’ 
should one take into consideration? How should the expression ‘material happenings of the 
world’ be interpreted? One could rephrase the quote in terms of the vocabulary employed in 
previous sections: in addressing the problem of the arrow of time in physics one is worried 
about whether a series of material happenings of the world 𝐴 − 𝐵 − 𝐶 − 𝐷 instantiates some 
physical property that allows ordering them in such a way that the series displays a direction, 
that is, the material happenings of the world may be univocally ordered according to an ‘earlier 
than…’ or ‘later than…’ relation. In other words, the material happenings of the world can be 
shown to be represented univocally by the series 𝐴 → 𝐵 → 𝐶 → 𝐷 and not by the series 𝐷 →
𝐶 → 𝐵 → 𝐴, having thereby a B-structure. Besides specifying that one is now within the 
physics realm, by this rewording one has not gone much farther, and is left more or less where 
one started off at. 
Clearly, to start on the right foot, one should begin by identifying the physical properties 
that could do provide a physical foundation for the temporal asymmetry. Sklar, for instance, 
points out that there are at least two approaches to be followed: a lawlike approach and a de 
facto approach (Sklar 1974: 357-358). According to the former, it is matter of a lawlike 
property of the world that the event A in the series is prior to the event B. Hence, it is matter of 
a lawlike property that the world has the temporal structure of a B-series, 𝐴 → 𝐵 → 𝐶 → 𝐷, 
instead of the opposite, 𝐷 → 𝐶 → 𝐵 → 𝐴. In turn, the de facto approach concerns the 
identification of an asymmetry in the actual world as a matter of fact, despite the laws 
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governing it allow for a symmetric underlying scenario. According to the de facto approach, 
there is no lawlike property that distinguishes between the two series; however, a physical 
theory might offer the means to distinguish them as a matter of fact, as a matter of a non-
intrinsic, extra-nomic property. Although both 𝐴 → 𝐵 → 𝐶 → 𝐷 and 𝐷 → 𝐶 → 𝐵 → 𝐴 would 
be equally possible according to physical laws, they are nonetheless different in virtue of a (de 
facto) external property. 
Paul Horwich (1987) has also offered a systematic investigation of time asymmetry (or 
time anisotropy, in his vocabulary). He begins by pointing that the difference between the two 
directions of time should be drawn in terms of properties of elements (or of the series). When 
dealing with objects, the sort of asymmetry one looks for would be that of “asymmetric 
geometrical object”, for instance, a cylinder squeezing (1987: 39). How can a similar reasoning 
be applied to time? For any given series of physical events, he proposes three types of 
properties as candidates: 
(a) Particular properties 
(b) General properties 
(c) Nomological properties 
As to the first type, the asymmetry is introduced by claiming that the series 𝐴 → 𝐵 → 𝐶 → 𝐷 
instantiates the particular property of “the future direction goes from A to D”. This particular 
property is obviously not instantiated by the series 𝐷 → 𝐶 → 𝐵 → 𝐴. Hence, there is a 
(particular) non-shared property that distinguishes the two series, and an asymmetry is so 
introduced. Despite its effectivity, it looks very much like an ad hoc resource: it needs to rely 
on properties referring to particulars (particular events A and D), and only instantiated by that 
particular series. Also, for foundational purposes, thus-introduced asymmetry seems to be 
based on a by-pointing procedure. 
 The second type of properties avoids referring to particulars: “All events of a certain 
kind (all of As) are followed by events of the other kind (all of Bs)”. This clearly introduces a 
more general and far reaching asymmetry, but it is not substantially different from the previous 
one. Now, there would be a general property that a direction of time could instantiate that 
allows ordering kinds of events conforming to an asymmetric relation (‘being earlier than…’ 
or ‘being later than…’). This however does not bypass the fact that there is a temporally-
inverted series of events of a certain kind that is also possible and turns out, at least in principle, 
identical to the original one. Horwich adds that a so-defined general property may establish an 
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arrow of time in terms of, for instance, initial conditions for a given series of events of a certain 
kind (1987: 41). 
Finally, the last type of property is the nomological. In this case, the direction of time is 
directly related to time-asymmetric laws of nature. In Horwich’s words: “we have here a 
property that applies as a matter of physical necessity to one direction and not to the other” 
(1987: 41). Two noteworthy remarks on this. First, one of the series, say 𝐴 → 𝐵 → 𝐶 → 𝐷, 
holds by matter of the laws of physics. It is then no longer the case that both series are 
physically possible, but just one of the series is: Whereas particular or general properties allow 
distinguishing the two series (i.e. time’s directions), never do they make one of the series 
(physically) impossible. Thus, the distinction between the two series is introduced as a matter 
of physical necessity in this case. Second, Horwich claims that a nomological property 
introduces an asymmetry in time itself. Particularly, since the distinction is matter of a law of 
nature and of physical necessity, it allows one to infer an intrinsic difference between the series 
𝐴 → 𝐵 → 𝐶 → 𝐷 and the series 𝐷 → 𝐶 → 𝐵 → 𝐴 that can only depend on the series’ structure. 
Sklar’s and Horwich’s distinctions have many points in common in spelling out what 
kinds of features are to be sought out for a well-grounded physical distinction between a series 
like 𝐴 → 𝐵 → 𝐶 → 𝐷) and one like 𝐷 → 𝐶 → 𝐵 → 𝐴. Sklar’s lawlike approach is clearly quite 
similar to Horwich’s nomological properties. The de facto approach can be analogously related 
to particular and general properties in Horwich’s sense. Yet, despite having gained some clarity 
on the matter, it is still unclear how these categories should be systematically applied in 
physics. Overall, the laws of physics, and some features thereof, seem to play a relevant role 
in establishing a direction of time. But it is true that, when drawing a distinction between both 
time’s direction, other extra-nomic properties can make a good job as well. Additionally, it is 
worth noticing nonetheless that the laws of physics and extra-nomic resources, though useful 
for the pursued aim, might render a different physical foundation of the arrow of time. I will 
spell this out shortly, but it’s already evident that laws of nature seem to play a prior theoretical 
role in grounding an arrow of time in physics, whereas extra-nomic properties also do it but in 
a derivative manner. 
I shall in general follow Sklar’s and Horwich’s spirit of identifying the relevant features 
for an arrow of time in terms either of laws of nature or of extra-nomic properties. But, which 
features of physical laws should one look at? And which extra-nomic properties are the relevant 
ones for an arrow of time? In the next section, I shall answer these questions. In the philosophy 
of physics and physics literature, time-related issues are typically introduced in terms of time-
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reversal invariance and/or reversibility. This has been so for a longstanding tradition in the 
field that has regarded (ir)reversibility and (non)time-reversal invariance as conceptually 
correlated, or and even identical, notions. In one way or another, issues around the problem of 
the arrow of time has been revolving around these concepts virtually ever since its birth. In the 
following, I will make the case that a good source of the confusions gravitating around has 
come from mixing (ir)reversibility and (non)time-reversal invariance. A good deal of clarity, I 
hope, will be provided by disentangling both concepts. 
Section 6. Disentangling time reversal and (ir)reversibility 
Section 6.1. (Ir)reversibility and its many faces 
Quarrels around the problem of the arrow of time in physics have largely involved melting ices, 
gases spreading out in a box, and hot objects getting colder. Basically, discussions have 
included thermodynamic processes, since thermodynamics is the physical theory that describes 
most of the usual (and alleged) time-asymmetric behaviors one sees in the world. As 
macroscopic physical systems spontaneously evolve toward equilibrium states, but they never 
do so away from equilibrium states, thermodynamics seems to offer a suitable criterion to 
distinguish both directions of time: future-directed evolutions will be those reaching 
equilibrium states and fleeing away from the non-equilibrium. This sort of processes has been 
called “irreversible” and it has to a good extent been an essential mark of time asymmetry. 
But what does it mean that a physical system be reversible? To begin with, it is worth 
mentioning that there are several senses of reversibility floating around. Reasons for that likely 
come from the fact that the notion appears in different theoretical contexts with slightly 
different meanings and mathematical backgrounds. In general, processes or physical systems 
are the sort of things said to be reversible or irreversible, and they significantly vary across 
physical theories, so the very characterization of the notion will also probably vary accordingly. 
And even though the relation between statistical classical mechanics and thermodynamics 
seems to offer the most relevant features of what reversibility means, there is no univocal 
meaning in there either. Leaving aside any relation to the arrow of time for now, two main 
senses of (ir)reversibility can be identified within the thermodynamics literature: 
(1) (ir)reversibility in terms of (ir)recoverability 
(2) (ir)reversibility in terms of equilibrium states 
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Based on the work of Sadi Carnot (1824), the main contributions towards a unified theory of 
heat and its transmission were those made by William Thomson (alias Lord Kelvin) and by 
Rudolph Clausius. I shall not get into historical details about the development of 
thermodynamics, but the core meaning of what reversibility is and its senses (in terms of 1 and 
2) are already present in their works, so some references will be helpful here. In general, these 
different senses of (ir)reversibility relate to different interpretations of the second law of 
thermodynamics, which in its original formulation states the impossibility of performing cyclic 
processes as heat does not flow from lower to higher temperatures. 
Let us start with (ir)reversibility in terms of (ir)recoverability (1). This meaning of 
irreversibility intends to characterize a panoply of processes that, starting from an initial state 
𝑆𝑖 and ending with a final state 𝑆𝑓, cannot be undone. More specifically, given a process 𝑃 and 
its transition from the state 𝑆𝑖 to 𝑆𝑓, there is no process 𝑃′ that restores the initial state 𝑆𝑖 
completely. In an 1852 paper, Lord Kelvin proposed this notion of irrecoverability to make 
sense to his view of the second law of thermodynamics in terms of a “universal tendency in 
nature to the dissipation of mechanical energy”. In expounding this ‘tendency’, he stated that 
a reversible process implies that the mechanical energy may be restored to its primitive 
condition, and that “when heat is created by an unreversible process (such as friction) there is 
a dissipation of mechanical energy, and a full restoration of it to its primitive condition [is] 
impossible” (Kelvin 1852). 
Max Plank has also rested upon this sense of irreversibility to explain the second law of 
thermodynamics:  
“a process which can in no way be completely undone is called ‘irreversible’, all 
other processes ‘reversible’6. In order for a process to be irreversible, it is not 
sufficient that it does not reverse by itself, –this is also the case for many 
mechanical processes, which are not irreversible–, rather it is demanded that, once 
the process has taken place, there is no means (…) of restoring exactly the complete 
initial state” (Plank 1897: 112) 
In essence, irreversibility in terms of irrecoverability stablishes the impossibility to get back 
the initial state 𝑆𝑖 once the process has taken place completely. More specifically,  
Recoverability Given a process 𝑃 producing the transition (or the change of states) from 
its initial state 𝑆𝑖 to 𝑆𝑓, 𝑃 is reversible if and only if there is another 
                                                          
6 Plank employs the German words “irreversibel” and “reversibel”.  
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possible process 𝑃′ which produces the transition from 𝑆𝑓 to 𝑆𝑖. 
Otherwise, 𝑃 is irreversible. 
It is worth noticing a couple of things in this definition. First, as Planck himself noted (1897: 
109), this sense of reversibility does not imply that the process 𝑃′ must trace back step by step 
the original process 𝑃 in reverse order, going exactly through the same original states between 
𝑆𝑖 and  𝑆𝑓. Second, by the word ‘completely’ is meant that not only must the system come back 
to its original state, but also all those bodies that have interacted with the system during the 
process 𝑃. 
However, this sense of (ir)reversibility in terms of (ir)recoverability is rarely found in the 
modern literature on thermodynamics and reversibility. As Jos Uffink points out, the meaning 
of reversibility in terms of equilibrium states (2) “seems to be the most common meaning of 
the term” (Uffink 2001:317). Modern literature considers that recoverability is rather a 
subsidiary notion for it can be fully obtained from reversibility in terms of equilibrium states 
(see Bridgman 1941: 122). Overall, this meaning of reversibility “denote processes which 
proceed so delicately and slowly that the system remains close to an equilibrium state during 
the entire process” (Uffink 2001: 317). Rudolph Clausius (1864) seems to have endorsed this 
meaning of reversibility when claiming that 
“When a change of arrangement takes place in such a way that force and 
counterforce are equal, the change can take place in the reverse direction also under 
the influence of the same forces. But if a change takes place in such a way that the 
overcoming force is greater than that which is overcome, the transformation cannot 
take place in the opposite direction under the influence of the same forces. We may 
say that the transformation has occurred in the first case in a reversible manner, 
and in the second case in an irreversible manner” (1864: 251)7 
Some light is shed on the definition of reversibility by explaining that it is reached at a limit:  
“Strictly speaking, the overcoming force must always be more powerful than the 
force which it overcomes; but as the excess of force is not required to have any 
assignable value, we may think of it as becoming continually smaller and smaller, 
so that its value may approach to nought as nearly as we please. Hence it may be 
seen that the case in which the transformation takes place reversibly is a limit which 
in reality is never reached but to which we can approach as nearly as we please” 
(ibidem). 
Under this sense of reversibility, a reversible process is no longer one in which one can by any 
means come back to the initial state through a process 𝑃′, but one that may be reached by a 
                                                          
7 Original in German. English translation in Uffink 2001, p. 325, fn. 35. 
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series of processes in which the divergence from the equilibrium state becomes infinitely 
smaller. Nowadays, this definition of reversibility typically names quasi-static or adiabatic 
processes. 
Reversibility Given a process 𝑃 producing the transition (or the change of states) from 
its initial state 𝑆𝑖 to 𝑆𝑓, 𝑃 is reversible if and only if the transition from 
one state to the other involves an infinitely small negligible divergence 
from the equilibrium. If that divergence is non-negligible, then the 
process is irreversible.  
There are several obscurities in this sense of reversibility. In an already classical paper, Ernst 
Rechel (1947) denounces that the understanding of reversibility in the literature is deeply 
misguided, involving an overlooked deadly paradox: reversible processes are supposed to be 
those in which changes produce “infinitely slowly”, so that the system still remains in 
equilibrium, though it somehow changes (in virtue of these infinitely small changes). 
Remarkably, it is supposed that a “infinitely small” disequilibrium is so small that does not 
matter, but that matters enough to secure that reversible processes are still processes; that is, 
that they change, reversibly, in time. The paradox is evident: reversible processes require being 
somehow in non-equilibrium states and in equilibrium states at the same time.  
Rechel claims that this understanding of reversible processes “unfortunately contains a 
contradiction within itself” (1947: 301), and they should not be even considered theoretically 
possible, risking the very fundamental concepts of mechanics. John Norton (2016) has put 
forward a way out for this paradox, defining reversible processes differently. He claims that 
the label ‘thermodynamically reversible process’ denotes a set of irreversible processes in a 
thermal system, delimited by the set of equilibrium states in the limit of net driving forces 
going to zero. The punch line is that the “properties normally associated with a reversible 
process are recovered from the set of irreversible processes through limit operations” (Norton 
2016: 44), where the notion of ‘reversible process” must be understood in terms of an 
approximation, not in terms of an idealization (see Norton 2012 for the difference). In other 
words, the term ‘reversible process’ does not any longer refer to a theoretical process, possible 
according to the theory as an idealization, but “to a set of irreversible process”, where the 
properties “normally attributed to thermodynamically reversible processes are really borne as 
limiting properties of this set”. In other words, reversible processes are imperfect descriptions 
of real irreversible processes. 
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As one turns to statistical classical mechanics, the notion of reversibility needs to be 
revised. Now, thermodynamical systems consist of interacting particles and their mechanical 
properties, whose behavior is analyzed statistically. Thermodynamically reversible processes 
defined in terms of equilibrium states as limit cannot any longer remain eternally unchanging 
in a fundamental sense: the presence of thermal statistical fluctuations may take equilibrium 
states to non-equilibrium states spontaneously. There is naturally a difference between 
macroscopic and microscopic systems in this respect: whereas fluctuations are negligible for 
the formers, they are significantly relevant for the microscopic level. The presence of thermal 
fluctuations makes impossible any durable equilibrium state, and thereby, any reversible 
processes at the micro-level. Typically, reversible processes are now said to have pseudo-
equilibrium states at the limit (Norton 2016). 
John Earman (1986a) distinguishes four senses of reversibility that are most directly 
relevant to statistical classical mechanics and thermodynamics. The first is “the approach to 
equilibrium in the sense of the approach to the micro-canonical distribution” (1986a: 226), 
beings the one that captures to great extent what thermodynamically reversible processes are 
supposed to be when understood in terms of equilibrium states8. An isolated system is said to 
be micro-canonical when its probability density is uniform over the phase space. Hence, the 
approach of a system to an equilibrium state is its (infinite) approximation to such a uniform 
distribution. This sense of reversibility is commonly said to imply that irreversible processes 
are those having a limit state it cannot escape from. Along the same line, Olimpia Lombardi 
and Mario Castagnigno (2008) defines (ir)reversibility in terms of (having) lacking attractors 
in finite or infinite points of the phase space; this notion of reversibility is generalized by saying 
that an “evolution is reversible if it has no final (or initial) equilibrium states, namely, a ‘point 
of no return’” (2008: 75) 
As previously mentioned, the notion of (ir)reversibility has been largely tied to that of 
the direction of time: a reversible evolution (a sequence of states) might happen in the past-to-
future direction of time as well as in the future-to-past one. This mainly means that the sequence 
of its states might happen either as 𝐴 → 𝐵 → 𝐶 → 𝐷 or 𝐷 → 𝐶 → 𝐵 → 𝐴 . Conversely, an 
irreversible evolution has a limit state in one direction of time meaning that once the process 
has taken place, it has already reached a (limit) equilibrium state from which it cannot return 
to the original state. Note that irreversible evolutions already pick out a direction of time when 
                                                          
8 The other senses mentioned by Earman relate to finite times and transport coefficients, the approximate validity 
of the Boltzmann equation, and the asymmetry between past and future (see Earman 1986a: 226) 
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taking place: when one says that an evolution is irreversible because it has a (limit) final state 
of equilibrium, one presupposes that the final state lies in the future direction of time. And 
when one thus says that the irreversible evolution cannot happen in the opposite direction, this 
means that it cannot happen backward in time, that is, going in the future-to-past direction once 
the direction had been already fixed9. In this sense, an irreversible evolution displays a direction 
of time and it is with respect to that direction (typically the past-to-future one) that the evolution 
may not happen in the opposite sense of time. It is worth bearing in mind this remark since it 
will be crucial afterwards. 
Many of the conundrums on (ir)reversibility and its relations to the second law of 
thermodynamics within the framework of statistical classical mechanics follow from the fact 
that the underlying dynamics (i.e. equation of motion of classical mechanics) is said to be time-
reversal invariant, notion that will be introduced in the following sub-section. 
Section 6.2. Time-reversal invariance 
The other key notion is that of time-reversal invariance. The literature about its meaning and 
implications is abundant, and a good deal of this thesis will deal with the puzzling nature of 
time reversal in the quantum theory. The seemingly theory-dependent nature of time reversal 
in physics makes it hard to formulate a single characterization of it, but at least some general 
things can be said about. Notwithstanding, some fruits can be picked from the tree in order to 
get some grasp of time-reversal invariance in general and to differentiate it from reversibility. 
To begin with, time-reversal invariance is a property of physical laws. Usually, physical 
laws are mathematically represented by (differential) equations of motion, which renders a set 
of solutions standing for evolutions of physical systems. The term ‘time-reversal invariance’ 
expresses, properly, a formal feature of an equation of motion, to wit, whether its structure is 
left unchanged after applying a time-reversal transformation upon it. So, ‘time reversal’ can be 
defined as a formal transformation acting upon dynamical equations, and ‘time-reversal 
invariance’ as a property that may be instantiated by those dynamical equations – particularly, 
the property of being left unchanged after the application of the time-reversal transformation. 
                                                          
9 Strictly, and from a ‘nowhen viewpoint’ one should reword this remark as saying that one presupposes that the 
final state lies either in the future direction of time or in the past direction. And when it is said that the irreversible 
evolution cannot happen backward in time, this means that it cannot happen backward (forward) for a complete 
evolution that has already taken place either in the past-to-future direction or in the future-to-past one. 
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Yet this characterization is too vague. What does it mean that the equation is left 
unchanged? Plus, what is time reversal supposed to conceptually represent and to do? An 
intuitive picture of time reversal and time-reversal invariance is typically introduced as 
following: Suppose one records some process on film, say a full period of a simple harmonic 
oscillator. Then, one plays the film backward. Does the played-backward sequence look the 
same according to physics? If it does, the sequence is said to be time-reversal invariant in the 
sense in which the direction of time seems to play no role in the physical description of the 
system’s behavior. If the inverted sequence does not look the same, then it is non-time-reversal 
invariant. 
Though intuitive and appealing, this characterization of time-reversal is highly confusing, 
and somehow misguided. To start with, (non)time-reversal invariance should be predicated of 
the dynamical equation ruling the system’s behavior, and not of the system itself. Additionally, 
what is properly inverted by time reversal is not the particular sequence of states of a given 
evolution (say, the simple harmonic oscillator recorded in the forward direction of time), but 
the dynamical equation in itself, that is, parameters, observables and operators that appear in 
there. But such an equation has that evolution as one of its multiple solutions. Time-reversal 
invariance in consequence has nothing to do with a particular solution of a dynamical equation 
but with the dynamical equation’s structure and with the class of solutions allowed by it. In 
accordance with this, a time-reversal invariant equation of motion will thus render solutions 
that can be divided into two complementary subclasses, which are symmetric one another 
regarding the direction of time. This does not mean that all allowed solutions have the same 
form or features, but that exists a transformation that turns solutions into solutions and non-
solutions into non-solutions for either direction of time (or direction of playing the film). 
Let us put it more formally. Classical physical theories commonly employ a phase state 
Γ containing all possible states of a physical system. An instantaneous state is thus represented 
by a point in Γ. Any physical evolution ℰ will be represented by a time-parametrized curve in 
Γ.  
 
ℰ = {𝑠𝑡 ∈ 𝛤 ∶ 𝑡𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 ≤  𝑡𝑓} (1.1 ) 
The class of evolutions allowed by a physical law ℒ represents the class of its possible 
worlds Ⱳ, that is, those worlds wherein ℒ is (approximately) true. The question whether or not 
a dynamical equation ℒ is time-reversal invariant is the question of whether Ⱳ can be 
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partitioned into two symmetric subclasses,  Ⱳ𝑓 and Ⱳ𝑏. If ℒ is time-reversal invariant, then 
the time-reversal transformation T maps solutions in Ⱳ𝑓 onto solutions in Ⱳ𝑏. The existence 
of the bijective map ℰ →𝑇  ℰ𝑇 then secures that Ⱳ𝑏 includes also physically equivalent 
possible worlds10 of ℒ. It follows from this that for any evolution ℰ ∈ Ⱳ𝑓 going forward in 
time there exists a time-reversed evolution ℰ𝑇 ∈ Ⱳ𝑏 going backward  
 
ℰ𝑇 = {𝑇𝑠𝑇𝑡 ∈ 𝛤 ∶ −𝑡𝑓 ≤ 𝑡𝑛 ≤  −𝑡𝑖} (1.2 ) 
Note that whether or not this partition is possible will strongly depend on structural features of 
ℒ: this dual structure of Ⱳ = Ⱳ𝑓 + Ⱳ𝑏 is produced by the formal features of the dynamical 
equation. Mario Castagnino, L. Lara and Olimpia Lombardi (2003), and Castagnino and 
Lombardi (2009) have called this phenomenon “time-symmetric twins”, in the sense that the 
dynamical equation produces a par of temporally-mirrored solutions, ℰ ∈ Ⱳ𝑓 and ℰ𝑇 ∈ Ⱳ𝑏. 
 From all this, time-reversal invariance can be broadly defined as: 
Time-reversal invariance A dynamical equation ℒ is time-reversal invariant (i.e. invariant 
under a transformation T) iff the class of its allowed solutions 
can be partitioned into Ⱳ𝑓; Ⱳ𝑏, where if ℰ ∈ Ⱳ𝑓, then ℰ𝑇 ∈
Ⱳ𝑏, the bijective map ℰ →𝑇  ℰ𝑇 exists. 
A similar definition can be also introduced by adopting the model-theory vocabulary: 
A law ℒ is T-invariant iff, if 𝑚 is a model of L, then the time-reversed model 
𝑇(𝑚) exists and is also a model of L. 
This way to pose the meaning of time-reversal invariance is just one among numerous manners 
to define a symmetry in a physical theory. The above-mentioned definition focuses on whether 
ℒ produces time-symmetric twins under the application of T. It was mentioned in passing that 
this is because T leaves the form of ℒ unchanged: If the form of the equation of motion is left 
unaltered under the application of the transformation T, then it is expected that it also produces 
solutions when so transformed. In this sense, ‘the form of the law’ refers to its functional form, 
expressed in terms of the independent and the dependent variables. The transformation 
                                                          
10 The notion of “physical equivalence” is too vague. One could say that two models, related by a symmetry 
transformation, are representationally equivalent, in the sense that both are apt to represent a physical situation. 
In this sense, the models would be equivalent. One could even give a step further and claim that they are then 
indistinguishable. I’m not giving such a step further, and I will just claim that a symmetry yields at least two 
models that can be used equally to describe the same physical situation (for discussion see Ismael and van Fraassen 
2003, Belot 2013, Wallace 2019) 
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typically leads one to a formally different, though structurally equivalent, mathematical 
expression that also yields solutions. There is much discussion in the literature on symmetries 
gravitating around what “equivalence” means in this context, what notion of physical (if any) 
is involved here, if a symmetry transformation is expected to do something else than merely 
leaving the form of the equation unchanged, or what one is supposed to understand by ‘the 
form of the law’. I shall get into some details of these issues afterwards, but, for the meantime, 
what has been said so far is helpful enough to characterize time-reversal invariance in general. 
There is no much debate in the philosophy of physics literature on what time-reversal 
invariance means (at least no further debate besides how symmetries in general should be 
interpreted). Yet, in so much as the time-reversal invariance is a symmetry under an operator 
that stands for a change of direction of time, a good deal of what time-reversal invariance 
means is encoded in how the action of time reversal is characterized. In general, this is given 
by the sort of actions that a time-reversal operator is supposed to formally carry out when 
applied to an equation of motion. The philosophical literature usually sets forth a general time-
reversal operator (T henceforth) that is essentially the mapping 𝑇: 𝑡 → −𝑡. Most people agree 
on such general characterization. Yet, differences branch out from here on. Should the time-
reversal operator feature additional transformations? Does the mapping 𝑇: 𝑡 → −𝑡 have any 
physical meaning as it stands? Is there a general, all-embracing definition of the time-reversal 
transformation? Or is the notion rather intrinsically theory-relative? More on this afterwards, 
too. 
How does the notion of time-reversal invariance relate to the direction of time? I will in 
the next chapter show (Section 2) that time-reversal invariance allows for certain kind of 
inferences with respect to time’s structure framed in the so-known “symmetry-to-reality 
inference”. But let’s leave this aside from the moment. In general, a time-reversal invariant law 
ℒ produces sequences of states (evolutions) both in the past-to-future direction and in the 
future-to-past one. If ℒ rules the transition of states 𝐴 → 𝐵 → 𝐶 → 𝐷 with +𝑡 , the time-
reversed law ℒ T rules a physically equivalent transition 𝑇𝐷 → 𝑇𝐶 → 𝑇𝐵 → 𝑇𝐴 with – 𝑡, where 
𝑇𝐷, 𝑇𝐶, 𝑇𝐵 and 𝑇𝐴 stand for the time-reversed states corresponding to D, C, B, and A, 
respectively. If ℒ is time-reversal invariant, and [𝐴 → 𝐵 → 𝐶 → 𝐷] ∈ Ⱳ𝑓, then [𝑇𝐷 → 𝑇𝐶 →
𝑇𝐵 → 𝑇𝐴]  ∈ Ⱳ𝑏. Therefore, the class of solutions of ℒ is equal to  Ⱳ = Ⱳ𝑓 + Ⱳ𝑏. The 
upshot for the arrow of time debate is that the law ℒ in itself offers no means whereby the past-
to-future direction of time can be distinguished from the future-to-past one.: the law is ‘blind’, 
so to speak, to the direction of time. 
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A failure of time-reversal invariance in this sense naturally leads one to the opposite 
conclusion. Suppose that ℒ is non-time-reversal invariant. This means that ℒ does not produce 
time-symmetric twins, that is, that the class of solutions allowed by ℒ is either Ⱳ = Ⱳ𝑓 or 
Ⱳ = Ⱳ𝑏, but not both. This means that ℒ is asymmetric under the transformation: Given two 
series of states like 𝐴 → 𝐵 → 𝐶 → 𝐷 with +𝑡 and 𝑇𝐷 → 𝑇𝐶 → 𝑇𝐵 → 𝑇𝐴 with – 𝑡, ℒ has 
uniquely one of the series as solution. Once one of the solutions is taken, the transformation T 
takes a solution of ℒ and turns it into a non-solution according to ℒ. What this primarily means 
is that the chosen direction of time matters in the sense of delimitating what kind of evolutions 
(physically possible worlds) are allowed by the law. If the problem of the arrow of time in 
general is how temporally-mirrored series of states can be distinguished, non-time-reversal 
invariance offers a knock-down criterion: only one of the series is nomologically allowed. 
Section 6.3. Distinction between both concepts 
It becomes evident that there are visible differences between time-reversal and reversibility. 
I’m going to single them out clearly. 
To start with, it must be highlighted that (ir)reversibility and (non)time-reversal 
invariance are properties predicated of different kinds of items. Whereas (ir)reversibility is a 
property that evolutions (or their mathematical representation, solutions) instantiate, (non)time-
reversal invariance is a property of physical laws (or their mathematical representation, 
equations of motion). In the case of (non)time-reversal invariance, as pointed out by Castagnino 
and Lombardi, it is a fortiori a property of the class of solutions of a dynamical equation 
(Castagnino and Lombardi 2005: 75), in particular, that it can be divided into two symmetric 
subclasses (Ⱳ = Ⱳ𝑓 + Ⱳ𝑏) as stated before. (Ir)reversibility is rather a property of a single 
physical evolution, and its origin might naturally come from any of the features characterizing 
that single evolution (for instance, boundary conditions). 
In the second place, they significantly differ in their modal force. The claim of (non)time-
reversal invariance is a claim about the class of possible worlds of a physical theory. Non-time-
reversal invariance hence means that the past-to-future direction (future-to-past direction) is 
necessarily11 different from the future-to-past direction (past-to-future direction) in the sense 
that given a world with a fixed direction of time, a physically equivalent possible world with 
the inverted direction of time is impossible according to a theory’s law describing the former. 
                                                          
11 To be clear, I’m here referring to physical necessity as defined by John Earman (1986), that is, what is allowed 
by the laws of physics of the actual world. Therefore, I’m not talking about logical or metaphysical necessity. 
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This explains why a claim of non-time-reversal invariance in a theory’s laws is modally 
stronger: It bans any (physically equivalent) possible world with an inversed direction of time. 
(Ir)reversibility’s modal scope is much weaker in as much as (ir)reversibility circumscribes 
itself to a single complete evolution, i.e., to a single possible world of the theory. Thus, that a 
single evolution be irreversible says nothing about the rest of the possible evolutions according 
to a given law, whether they should or not be irreversible. The property of being (ir)reversible 
need thus not come from an equation of motion but it might easily come from any of the extra-
nomic features that characterize a complete single evolution. 
Third, one of the most spread notions of reversibility, in terms of equilibrium states, 
crucially depends on considering it as a limit of a series of processes. As briefly mentioned, 
this may lead to various puzzling issues around the very definition of the term (see Rechel 
1947, Norton 2016). Be that as it may, the definition of reversibility, at least in one of its senses, 
openly relies on an approximation or idealization upon irreversible processes. Nothing similar 
happens with (non)time-reversal invariance: as shown, the term is commonly defined within 
the vocabulary of symmetries and it has nothing to do with particular evolutions, their 
behaviors or whether they tend to certain states or not. 
Though conceptually different, one could come to think that, anyway, both concepts are 
correlated: Whenever one gets an irreversible evolution, one also gets a non-time-reversal 
invariant laws underlying, and whenever one gets a reversible evolution, one gets an underlying 
time-reversal invariant law as well. However, time-reversal invariance and reversibility are not 
even accidentally or weakly correlated: combination of the four possibilities can be obtained 
(though some of them are rather unusual). This point has been technically put forward by Aiello 
et al. (2008: 261-263) (see also Castagnino and Lombardi 2009, fn. 3). Let us take just two 
cases: one in which there is an irreversible solution, but a time-reversal invariant law describing 
it, and one in which there is a reversible solution, but a non-time-reversal invariant law. 
Following Aiello et al. (2008), an evolution (i.e. a solution of an equation of motion) is 
said to be reversible when having no attractors in finite or infinite points of the phase space. 









𝑐𝑜𝑠𝜃 (1.3 ) 
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The equation ruling pendulum’s behavior is clearly time-reversal12 invariant as it produces 
classes of symmetric solutions with respect to the Ѳ-axis. Trajectories within the separatrices 
are reversible to the extent that they are closed curves. But the trajectory corresponding to the 
(upper) lower separatrix is irreversible since it tends to 𝜃 =
𝜋
2
, 𝑝𝜃 = 0 (𝜃 = −
𝜋
2
, 𝑝𝜃 = 0) as 
𝑡 → ∞ (𝑡 → −∞). 
Let us now consider the opposite case: a reversible solution and an underlying non-time-








𝐾(𝑝)2𝑞2 (1.4 ) 
Where 𝐾(𝑝) = 𝐾+ = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 if 𝑝 ≥ 0, and 𝐾(𝑝) = 𝐾− = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 if 𝑝 < 0. As Aiello et al. show, 
if 𝐾+ ≠ 𝐾−, the dynamical equation is clearly non-time-reversal invariant, but each single 
evolution is closed, so it is reversible. 
In a more intuitive picture, Huw Price (1996) neatly illustrates this point by using an 
attractive analogy. Suppose a corkscrew factory that produces equal amounts of left-handed 
and right-handed corkscrews. Corkscrew factory’s production is symmetric with respect to the 
classes of produced corkscrews: for each left-handed corkscrew there is a right-handed 
corkscrew. However, each corkscrew is clearly either right-handed or left-handed. Then, the 
analogy runs: time-reversal invariant dynamical equations are like such a symmetric corkscrew 
factory as long as they produce temporally-mirrored classes of solutions, even though each 
single solution may be irreversible in itself. 
Finally, it is worth noticing that (ir)reversible evolutions already suppose a chosen 
direction of time. Claims about irreversible systems tending to equilibrium states previously 
assume that such states lie in the future. And when asking whether a physical system can 
“escape” from a certain equilibrium state (and if it can thus trace its steps back to the past), one 
asks whether it can do it given a fixed direction of time13. (Non-)time-reversal invariance does 
not need to presuppose any direction of time. In fact, the question of time-reversal invariance 
                                                          
12 The equation is time-reversal invariant under a time-reversal operator T defined as performing the 
transformations 𝑞 → 𝑞, 𝑝 → −𝑝 and 𝑡 → −𝑡. 
13 Cf. Footnote 9 in this chapter. 
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is whether the dynamical equation remains unchanged, or structurally the same, after formally 
changing the direction of time, whatever it comes to be. 
*** 
To sum up the chapter. If the problem of the arrow of time is a packed cluster of closely-related, 
though conceptually distinguishable, problems, the first step towards a sharper understanding 
of it is to unpack it, outlining some different ways in which it can be philosophically 
understood. I first went through a general metaphysical analysis of the problem stated in 
general (Sections 1 to 4), and then through an analysis of the most relevant physical notions 
typically involved in the discussion (Sections 5 to 6). Some take-home messages from the 
chapter: 
• Metaphysically, the problem of the arrow of time is about how the past-to-future 
direction can be distinguished from the future-to-past one, which was identified with 
having a B-series structure. 
• Metaphysically, such a distinction can be successfully carried out by two means: 
structural or non-structural 
• Hence, the notion of direction can be understood in, at least, two different way: either 
in terms of a structural arrow of time or in terms of a non-structural arrow of time 
• Metaphysically, the notion of the direction of time can also be interpreted variedly as 
the concept of time has received unalike ontological interpretations. Substantivalists 
and supersubstantavilists will consider that the temporal series stand for an absolute 
substance upon which material content’s changing supervene. Relationalists will deny 
it: they just stand for temporal relations held by the material content, 
• In the philosophy of physics literature, the notions of time-reversal invariance and 
reversibility have shown to be crucial. Both notions were carefully distinguished as well 
as their different philosophical implications with respect to the direction of time were 
clearly depicted. 
In the next chapter, I will show how the problem of the arrow of time can be articulated 
differently in the light of these metaphysical distinctions and physical notions. In a nutshell: I 
will suggest that two stories can be told about the arrow of time in physics, stories leading to 
alternative formulations of the problem. One of the stories mainly concerns the notion of 
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reversibility and its relationship with time-reversal invariance and seeks for a non-structural 
arrow of time. This sets forth the problem of the two realms, as I shall call it. The other primarily 
concerns time’s structure and whether it is symmetric under time reversal. This sets forth what 
I will call the problem of a structural arrow of time. 
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II. 
Unpacking the Problem of the Arrow of Time 
From Physics Back to Metaphysics… 
So far, I have put forward the metaphysical structure of the problem of the arrow of time 
(Chapter I, Sections 1-4), and have introduced some key notions in order to address it within 
physics (Chapter I, Sections 5-6). But I have not stepped into a proper formulation of the 
problem in physics yet. All what is known up to this point is that the notions of (ir)reversibility 
and (non)time-reversal invariance play a relevant role when physics comes in the discussion. 
In the following, I will show how this philosophical problem has been discussed in physics and 
how such notions relate to each other to formulate the problem in two alternative ways. 
The problem of the arrow of time in physics is relatively recent. It was born in the late 
nineteenth century, going hand-in-hand with the development of thermodynamics and 
statistical mechanics. Indeed, many of its features have been greatly associated with specific 
issues laying on the relation between both theories. For many, the problem of the arrow of time 
is merely yet another chapter in the lengthy efforts to reduce thermodynamics to statistical 
classical mechanics. However, from the midst of the twentieth century on, the very formulation 
of the problem started off branching out, and alternative viewpoints of what the problem is 
began to come up. I will along this chapter suggest that two stories can be told about what the 
problem of the arrow of time in physics is supposed to be. I will call one of them “the problem 
of the ‘two realms’”, and the other one “the problem of a structural arrow of time”. An in-
depth characterization of these views, just as their differences, their commitments and their 
relations, will be the focus of this chapter14. 
                                                          
14 Part of the material for Section 2 was published in López, C. (2018). “Seeking for a fundamental quantum arrow 
of time: time reversal and the symmetry-to-reality inference in standard quantum mechanics”. Frontiers in 
Physics, doi: 10.3389/fphy.2018.00104 
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Section. 1. A shattered picture of reality –the problem of the two realms 
One of the stories goes as follows. Plenty of phenomena seem to occur only in one direction of 
time, and never in the opposite. For centuries, people knew, for example, that heat flowed from 
hot bodies to cold bodies, whatever their understanding of ‘hot’ or ‘body’ were. This kind of 
phenomena would indicate a directed flow of time, intrinsically correlated, or even identified, 
with the directed natural behavior of phenomena. Even though those phenomena got several 
types of explanations throughout the centuries, they were overall partial and isolated: a more 
comprehensive explanation of those phenomena remained concealed up to well into the 
nineteenth century. 
By the early nineteenth century, a unifying theoretical framework entered the European 
scientific scene: Thermodynamics. Its development during the first decades offered a well-
articulated explanation of a panoply of phenomena involving heat flowing, energy, work and 
so on. Nicolás L. Sadi Carnot (1796-1832), William Thomson (alias Lord Kelvin, 1824-1907), 
Rudolf Clausius (1822-1888), among others, were the first to put forward the principles of a 
unified theory of energy, heat and their transmission. The principles of thermodynamics 
(particularly, the Second Principle) as well as certain notions to describe thermodynamics 
systems’ behavior will play a crucial role in the discussion of the arrow of time from here on. 
According to thermodynamics there seems to exist a universal tendency in Nature that 
explains all sort of irreversible processes one has experience of. Rudolf Clausius associated 
this universal tendency with a quantity called entropy, giving shape to the famous second law 
of thermodynamics. Roughly, it states that the entropy of any properly isolated system will 
always increase until reaching the state of equilibrium; from it on, entropy would remain 
constant ad aeternum. ‘Equilibrium’ is also another crucial notion in this story. It is worth 
noticing that the notion of equilibrium and the Second Law were here introduced in a plain 
time-asymmetric way: equilibrium states, at first glance, only lie in one of the extremes of a 
thermodynamic evolution (typically, in the future), inexorably guided by this universal 
tendency. This feature would allow grounding any temporally asymmetric behavior in physics: 
the direction in which entropy increases is the future direction of time.  
The idea that the second law of thermodynamics physically grounds the arrow of time 
has been largely endorsed. It would give us, in principle, a physical criterion to distinguish the 
past-to-future direction from the future-to-past one. Certainly, there are various interpretations 
of what the second laws is supposed to mean, and not all of them relate to the arrow of time 
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equally (see Uffink 2001, for instance). But, overall, the explanation was based on the 
nomological feature of entropy-increasing processes, that is, irreversible processes in terms of 
equilibrium states. Arthur Eddington (1935) and Hans Reichanbach (1956) are iconic 
advocators of this thermodynamical arrow of time. In 1928, Sir Arthur Eddington wrote: 
“Time's Arrow. The great thing about time is that it goes on. But this is an aspect 
of it which the physicist sometimes seems inclined to neglect. In the four-
dimensional world . . . the events past and future lie spread out before us as in a 
map. (…) We see in the map the path from past to future or from future to past; but 
there is no signboard to indicate that it is a one-way street. Something must be 
added to the geometrical conceptions (…) (Eddington 1928: 34) 
This is how the expression ‘time’s arrow” entered the literature. Here there are already two 
useful elements to start setting (one version of) the problem out. On the one hand, the daily 
impression that time seems to pass by –that time “goes on”, or that time “flows”, or that it exists 
a sort of objective “becoming” (Edington frequently uses these expressions interchangeably, 
see Price 2010. See Chapter I, Section 1 to see the differences among those notions). On the 
other hand, that a justification of such an impression is missed in any fundamental physical 
description of such a world. Eddington also thought that such an arrow could be found in the 
increase of entropy in isolated systems, claiming that the Second Law of Thermodynamics 
“holds the supreme position among the Laws of Nature” (Eddington 1928: 74).  
In short, Eddington claimed that the “going on” of time is physically explained by this 
asymmetry at the core of thermodynamics. But he was deeply puzzled by the fact that, within 
physics, some of these basic elements were missing in different theories –in the above-quoted 
fragment he explicitly refers to special relativity, but the same rationale can be extended to 
other theories like statistical classical mechanics. The problem is then that there seems to be a 
gap in reality –A gap between our daily experience of (temporally) irreversible phenomena and 
thermodynamics, and the rest of our best physical theories (special relativity and/or statistical 
classical mechanics, for instance). For Eddington, physics’ task was hence to try to put them 
back, taking thermodynamics as a guide. 
Hans Reichenbach has also developed an account of the arrow of time in thermodynamic 
terms. He claims that by definition one can identify the future direction of time with the 
direction in which entropy increases: 
“It follows that a time direction can be defined only for sections of the total entropy 
curve. Here the inequality (14, 6) applies and allows us to give the definition: 
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DEFINITION. The direction in which most thermodynamical processes in isolated 
systems occur is the direction of positive time” (1956: 127) 
Eddington’s and Reichenbach’s approaches to the arrow of time are clearly a type of “lawlike 
approaches”, in the sense that the distinction between both directions of time is grounded on a 
physical law (see below, Section 2). Nevertheless, one should be a bit cautious here. On the 
one hand, the notion is not necessarily coextensive with that of time-reversal invariance. The 
second law is not a dynamical equation of motion, so time reversal can hardly be applied 
therein. It is true that it seems to display a time asymmetry, but it is not clear at all where it 
comes from. On the other, the conflict between the two sides of the gap seems to be that of 
having time-reversal invariance laws on the one side, and irreversible processes on the other. 
The feature of the world that explains those irreversible processes in the thermodynamic 
framework is the second law, but it is not strictly a break of time-reversal invariance, but one 
of a lawlike irreversibility as Sklar names it (1974: 357). 
Given a series of time instants 𝐴 → 𝐵 → 𝐶 → 𝐷, this thermodynamic approach to time 
claims that such a series can be by definition correlated with the thermodynamic series of 
states 𝑆(𝑎) → 𝑆(𝑏) → 𝑆(𝑐) → 𝑆(𝑑), where the transition between states is always, as a matter 
of law, an entropy-increasing transition 𝑆(𝑎) →𝐿 𝑆(𝑏) →𝐿 𝑆(𝑐) →𝐿 𝑆(𝑑). So, given that  𝐴 →
𝐵 → 𝐶 → 𝐷 is the past-to-future direction of time and holds if an only if 
𝑆(𝑎) →𝐿 𝑆(𝑏) →𝐿 𝑆(𝑐) →𝐿 𝑆(𝑑) holds, it follows that if 𝑆(𝑑) →𝐿 𝑆(𝑐) →𝐿 𝑆(𝑏) →𝐿 𝑆(𝑎) 
(that is, an entropy-decreasing process) does not holds, then 𝐷 → 𝐶 → 𝐵 → 𝐴 (that is the 
future-to-past direction of time) does not hold either. The antecedent is just expressing the core 
of the second law of thermodynamics. As stressed before, the application of time reversal to 
the second law is not matter of routine as the second law is not an equation of motion (see 
Uffink 2001: 315), so one is dealing with a kind of transitions between thermodynamic states 
that are forbidden by the theory, but not with a genuine case of non-time-reversal invariance. 
Many writers have supported the idea that entropy-increasing processes are the sort of 
adequate sought-for-foundation features for the temporal directionality (famously, Eddington 
1928, Reichenbach 1956, Prigogine 1980). Notwithstanding this, the works of Ludwig 
Boltzmann and James Clerke Maxwell by late nineteenths radically shook the very basis of 
physics and of any intended thermodynamic arrow of time. Thermodynamics dealt with a 
remarkably diverse range of macroscopic phenomena, from diffusion processes and phase 
transitions of diverse objects subject to quite varied external conditions to gases’ and magnetic 
systems’ behavior. This wide range of macroscopic phenomena displayed the same universal 
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tendency towards equilibrium states. Based on the original attempt to reduce macroscopic 
thermodynamic phenomena to their microscopic mechanical constituents, the “Boltzman-
Maxwell Program” was a milestone in the history of physics, which leads to the development 
of a fully-blooded mechanical theory of thermodynamic process –statistical classical 
mechanics.  
Statistical classical mechanics was overall a result of a strongly reductionist attempt to 
account for macroscopically observable phenomena in terms of the laws of Newtonian 
mechanics plus statistical reasoning. The point to be stressed here is that the constituting 
microphysics (ruled by Newton’s law), to which macroscopic phenomena allegedly reduce, did 
not display any universal tendency towards anywhere. Any micro-process described by 
statistical classical mechanics looks rather perfectly reversible. But, when large ensembles of 
mechanical micro-processes were considered, such universal tendency was partially recovered. 
In any case, it was no longer true that always thermodynamic systems approach to equilibrium 
states.  
More fundamentally, the underlying dynamics (basically, Newton’s law) are in fact time-
reversal invariant. As explained in Chapter I, Section 6.2, this mainly means that they produce 
a pair of time-symmetric twins, that is, that the structure of their solutions has the form 
 Ⱳ = Ⱳ𝑓 + Ⱳ𝑏, and for any Newtonian evolution ℰ𝑁 if ℰ𝑁 ∈ Ⱳ
𝑓, then there exists a ℰ𝑁
𝑇  ∈
Ⱳ𝑏. Naturally, many paradoxes started cropping out in the field, undermining the alleged 
successful reduction of thermodynamics to classical statistical mechanics. The two most 
famous ones were the Loschdmidt’s paradox (Loschdmitdt 1876/1877) and the Recurrence 
Paradox by Ernst Zermelo (1896). There are several details to look into here (for discussion 
and details, see Sklar 1993, Uffink 2001, 2007), but what should be kept in mind is that these 
paradoxes bring together many of the elements that will set one of the most spread versions of 
the problem of the arrow of time in physics. In some sense, the problem of the arrow of time 
has greatly been taken as giving an answer to these paradoxes. 
Even though the main aim of the paradoxes was to put into question the allegedly 
successful reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics by the Boltzmann-Maxwell 
program, they have had critical consequences for the thermodynamic arrow of time as well. As 
stated by Lord Kelvin and Clausius, the second law of thermodynamics was an exceptionless 
principle: entropy always increases toward the equilibrium. When correlated with the direction 
of time, this idea naturally captured a privileged, and exceptionless, temporal direction. Yet, as 
the statistical reasoning applied to thermodynamics entered physics, the exceptionless feature 
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of the second law of thermodynamics came to be considerably weaker –entropy-decreasing 
processes would be, at least theoretically, possible. 
In regarding an ideal gas as viewed by statistical classical mechanics, its seeking-
equilibrium behavior could be explained in terms of the collision of its constituent particles 
plus their probable distribution. The link between the second law of thermodynamics and the 
statistical mechanics became established by the well-known H-theorem in 1872 (Boltzmann 
1872). The Newtonian particles constituting any sample of gas will naturally have a certain 
distribution and Maxwell had few years before showed how to derive various macroscopic 
features of the sample from the distribution of particles’ velocities. Particularly, he derived a 
distribution from which the system cannot depart, and his insight was to relate such 
distributions to equilibrium states. The so-called ‘Maxwell distribution’ was thereby related to 
equilibrium states. What the H-theorem showed was that the distribution of particles’ velocities 
of any sample of a gas will either tend to the Maxwell distribution (that is, an equilibrium state) 
and remain in it when reached. This result was derived considering only the effects of the 
mechanical collision of particles plus the statistical reasoning. 
In the light of this, what Franz Loschmidt observed was that, given that the underlying 
Newtonian dynamics governing particles’ behavior is time-reversal invariant, for every 
entropy-increasing mechanical process  ℰ𝑆+ , there is also an entropy-decreasing process ℰ𝑆− 
that is also a solution of the (time-reversed) Newton’s laws. This is actually a two-faced result: 
the Loschmidt’s paradox (or Reversibility objection as it came to be famously known too) 
entails that 
(1) for any given example of a gas, there is another time-reversed gas experimenting 
an entropy-decreasing evolution or departing from equilibrium if already there, 
(2) entropy is not only expected to increase towards the future, but also towards the 
past. 
Let us spell these points out a bit. Suppose a system S in a micro-state a at 𝑡1. The system will 
evolve to a micro-state b after some time, say, 𝑡2. According to thermodynamics, 𝑆(𝑏) should 
be a state of higher entropy than 𝑆(𝑎). The reversibility objection puts the finger upon the time-
reversal invariance feature of the underlying laws governing the evolution from 𝑆(𝑎) to 𝑆(𝑏): 
by reversing the direction of time (which Loschmidt interpreted as reversing the velocity of the 
system) what one gets is a time-reversed evolution 𝑇ℰ𝑆− evolving from a state 𝑇𝑆(𝑏) to 𝑇𝑆(𝑎), 
where the entropies of 𝑇𝑆(𝑏) and 𝑇𝑆(𝑎) are naturally equal to those in b an a respectively. 
58 | P a g e  
 
Clearly, 𝑇ℰ𝑆−  is an anti-thermodynamic behavior (that is, an entropy-decreasing evolution), 
but one in complete agreement with the underlying mechanical laws. An alternative, though 
equivalent, way to see at the results is in terms of entropy-increasing processes in both 
directions of time: if at 𝑡1 there is an entropy-increasing evolution towards the future (one 
evolving from 𝑆(𝑎)  →  𝑆(𝑏)), there is (by time-reversal invariance) then a temporally-




The paradox is indeed shocking. Not only does it directly follow from it that the thermodynamic 
irreversible behavior cannot be fully captured by classical mechanics plus the statistical 
reasoning, but also that any intended foundation of the direction of time in thermodynamics is 
seriously unwarranted. Boltzmann’s answer, as well known, was to explain that though 
different micro-states may realize the same macro-state, some of them can be realized in more 
many ways than others: equilibrium macro-states can notably be realized by much more 
different arrangements of the constituent particles than non-equilibrium macro-states. It 
follows from this that equilibrium macro-states are far more likely than non-equilibrium macro-
states. In accordance with it, transitions from states of lower entropy to higher entropy are much 
more likely than transitions from states of higher entropy to lower. And the explanation given 
becomes just matter of statistics. 
 Boltzmann’s answer doesn’t seem to cut the Gordian knot though. On the one hand, it 
doesn’t completely avoid entropy-decreasing processes (these are just much less likely, but not 
impossible). On the other hand, and probably more important, it is now a mystery why there 
are (and there were) low entropy states at all, if they are so unlikely. The most likely scenario 
would be that of a Universe in thermal equilibrium, since it is simply its most likely state. To 
put it differently, Boltzmann’s answer explains why if there is a gradient of entropy, the 
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overwhelming majority of processes will be entropy-increasing processes. But it doesn’t 
explain why there exists such a gradient to begin with!15 
There was another fundamental objection to Boltzmann’s explanation of irreversibility: 
The Recurrence Paradox. This objection was raised by Henri Poincare and Ernst Zermelo in 
late nineteenth century. In 1889, Poincaré showed that entropy-decreasing behaviors are not 
only possible, but inevitable given an enough amount of time. Poincaré’s result pointed to the 
fact that, excepting a “vanishingly small” number of initial states, a system starting off in a 
particular mechanical state at 𝑡1, it is bound to return to such an initial state (or to an arbitrarily 
close one) after enough time. Few years later, Erns Zermelo applied Poincaré’s theorem to 
Boltzman’s H-theorem: any system starting off in a non-equilibrium state will eventually return 
to it, despite having reached an equilibrium state during its evolution. Boltzmann’s monotonic 
approach to equilibrium was once again pushed up against the wall. 
Both the Reversibility and the Recurrence paradoxes aimed at challenging the very 
viability of Boltzmann’s project. On the one hand, the second law of thermodynamics was no 
longer an exceptionless principle, but a statistical one: it is true in the overwhelming majority 
of cases, but not always, challenging the universality of H-theorem. On the other, the 
asymmetry of thermodynamics was completely lost in the middle. And these results came to 
set one of the more puzzling conundrums in physics, to wit, that features of the macro-level do 
not seem to be fully compatible with those of the micro-level. The natural world was thus left 
somehow split into two ‘realms’: the unobservable reversible micro-physics and the observable 
irreversible macro-physics. The properties of each world seemed to be at odds with the 
properties of the other. Even worse, the macroscopic realm was claimed to be reduced to the 
microscopic one.  
Making sense to this shattered picture of reality and closing the “gap” between those two 
realms have demanded tireless efforts by natural philosophers and physicists up to present. In 
his task, many foundational and conceptual problems in philosophy of physics have risen. 
Among them, the problem of the arrow of time; or better, one of the most popular ways to 
introduce it. The punch line is that if the direction of time is by definition the direction in which 
entropy increases, the paradoxes showed that for any entropy-increasing behavior towards the 
future, there is also a temporally-inverted increasing-entropy behavior towards the past, wiping 
off any distinction between the past-to-future direction and the future-to-past one. Furthermore, 
                                                          
15 A partial and debatable solution to this is to postulate an incredibly low entropy state in the past, tracing back 
to the origin of the Universe (the so-called Past Hypothesis, see Albert 2000). 
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the entropy-based direction of time turned out to be matter of probability lacking thereby any 
forceful foundation. 
Hans Reichenbach (1956) offered not only a full-fledged theory of the arrow (or 
direction) of time in terms of thermodynamics, but also one of the most complete and precise 
formulations of what the problem is supposed to be. For Reichenbach, the problem of the arrow 
of time is mainly about a structural distinction between past and future (1956: 27). As he 
thought that the answer should be nonetheless found in thermodynamics, and that the positive 
direction of time was the direction in which entropy increases (ibidem. 54), he considered that 
the major problem to be solved by physicists was the following: 
“The elementary processes of statistical thermodynamics, the motions and 
collisions of molecules, are supposed to be controlled by the laws of classical 
mechanics and are therefore reversible. The macro-processes are irreversible, as 
we know. How can this irreversibility of macro-processes be reconciled with the 
reversibility of micro-processes? It is this paradox which the physicist has to solve 
when he wishes to account for the direction of thermodynamical processes and for 
the direction of time” (1956: 109. Italics mine) 
In light of this, the problem of the arrow of time has directly to do with the very 
foundations of statistical classical mechanics and thermodynamics. Reichenbach’s proposal 
consisting in a thermodynamic structure of branching systems aims at solving the problem in 
these terms (see Reichenbach 1956, Grünbaum 1963. Earman 1974 and Sklar 1993 for 
criticisms). 
The structure of the formulation in terms of a ‘tension’ between what is given by 
experience and what is dictated by fundamental physics has also been extended to other 
theoretical frameworks. And this formulation got canonical in the literature. And philosophers 
and physicists have largely worked on the problem under this formulation. Much work has 
been done in the last fifty years in that direction, and naturally, the very formulation of the 
problem has enormously gotten more accurate. In any case, the problem has crucially depended 
in every detail on notions like “reversibility”, “entropy”, “micro-evolutions vs macro-
evolutions”, “equilibrium”, and so forth. And the essence of the problem has been to face the 
existence of such a gap, such a division in the natural world. And the essence of any solution 
to the problem has been to explain the gap. And to make it disappear. Somehow. 
Some modern references to the problem typically refer to this gap or apparent 
contradiction between having time-reversal invariant laws on the one side, and an irreversible 
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or temporally-asymmetric behavior on the other. Huw Price (1996) synthetizes clearly the 
question of the arrow of time in a general way as following: “why the physical world should 
be asymmetric in time at all, given the underlying physical laws seem to be very largely time 
symmetric” (1996: 6). 
Craig Callender, in a paper titled “What is the ‘problem of the direction of time’”? says: 
“Concisely put, the problem is that given a non-equilibrium state at 𝑡2, it is 
overwhelmingly likely that (a) the non-equilibrium state at 𝑡2 will evolve to one 
closer to equilibrium at 𝑡3, but that due to the reversibility of the dynamics it is also 
overwhelmingly likely that (b) the non-equilibrium state at 𝑡2 has evolved from 
closer to equilibrium at 𝑡1” (1997: S225) 
This is essentially the Reversibility Paradox as was explained above. According to Callender, 
then, the problem is that statistical classical mechanics makes a prediction that is radically 
falsified (1997: S226), so the real problem is how to get rid of option (b). As Price did, 
Callender assumes that the underlying dynamics is time-reversal invariant, and that one only 
has powerful evidence for predictions like (a). 
David Albert (2000) has also pointed out that there is a tension in the discussion on the 
arrow of time in physics: that between fundamental microscopic physical theories and the 
everyday macroscopic human experience. Even though Albert thinks that fundamental physics 
is non-time-reversal invariant (what could give us a hint for a structural arrow of time as I will 
show shortly), he does think that Newtonian mechanics is fully time-reversal invariant and that 
our macroscopic experience of time has fundamentally to do with this tense relation between 
thermodynamics and Newtonian mechanics. Hence, the real puzzle about time is to come up 
with an explanation of why our daily experience looks so temporally asymmetric, whereas the 
underlying dynamics (as far as Newtonian mechanics is concerned at least) is temporally 
symmetric. Indeed, Albert has proposed one of the most spread solutions for this tension up to 
now: the Past Hypothesis (Albert 2000. See also Callender 2004a-b. For discussion, see Price 
1996, Earman 2006, Wallace 2011, Goldstein et al. 2016).  
The Past Hypothesis, briefly, claims that the entropy of the universe at the beginning was 
extraordinarily tiny. It mainly avoids absurd predictions about the past just as it discards option 
(b) in the Callender’s quote for instance. The motivation for such a (seemingly) ad-hoc resource 
seems to fit, for instance, in a broader philosophical and scientific framework about how 
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physics explains the actual world: the Mentaculus16, proposed also by David Albert (see Albert 
2015. See also Loewer 2012). And the upshot, as Barry Loewer puts it, is that “if we take the 
statistical mechanical probability distribution realistically (…) then we need to posit the past 
hypothesis for those probabilities to also ground inferences from the present to the past” 
(Loewer 2012: 126). I shall spend some words on this solution at the end of this chapter. 
To sum up. One of the versions of the problem of the arrow of time in physics has its 
origin in the puzzling relation between thermodynamics and statistical mechanics, and 
essentially takes the form of providing a way out to the Reversibility paradox. The real issue 
here is there is not smooth continuity between the micro-world and the macro-world –the 
existence of the gap between two realms. 
The problem of the ‘two realms’ (a) Given that the underlying fundamental dynamics of 
the world is temporally symmetric, why does our world 
look so temporally asymmetric? 
 (b) There is hence a gap between the micro-world and the 
macro-world. 
 (c) the problem at stake is then to close the gap or to bring 
this shattered picture of reality together. 
Note that the first part of (a) is a crucial premise in this formulation of the problem of the arrow 
of time: though it is not frequently made explicit, the formulation already assumes that there is 
a sense in which there is no arrow of time in physics given that the fundamental laws are time-
reversal invariant. This is the origin of the gap and why one is in need of coming up with an 
explanation that harmonizes such a shattered picture. To put it informally, this formulation 
requires an explanation of why it seems that there is an arrow of time, despite knowing that 
there is a sense (a fundamental one) in which there is not. 
This is the origin of the most widely-spread versions of the problem of the arrow of time 
in philosophy of physics: the problem of the ‘two realms’. It has involved many clever people 
                                                          
16 The ‘Mentaculus’ provides a kind of probability map of the universe entailing a probability distribution over 
the set of all possible micro-histories of the universe compatible with a given initial state (Past Hypothesis). Hence, 
the Mentaculus is a recipe for a fundamental physical theory that explains the reversibility paradox and the second 
law of Thermodynamics. In a nutshell, the Mentaculus comprehends three ingredients: 
(1) The fundamental dynamical laws of physics (in this case, the time-reversal invariant classical laws of 
physics), 
(2) The Past Hypothesis, 
(3) A law specifying a uniform probability over the micro-states that realize the very tiny low entropy state 
at the beginning. 
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and has undeniably brought about loads of priceless philosophical and scientific work. 
Notwithstanding this historical fact, others have argued that this formulation of the problem of 
the arrow of time does not deserve such a name. The real problem has been to a large extent 
missed: thermodynamics and statistical classical mechanics deal at best with the nature of 
irreversible processes, but it would be an unjustified jump to draw conclusions about the nature 
of time from it. In this sense, the project of basing the arrow of time on thermodynamics and/or 
classical statistical mechanics is too narrow, if not simply off the right track. So, in order to 
address the problem of the arrow of time appropriately, some philosophers have reformulated 
it in different terms.  
Section 2. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus –A structural 
arrow of time 
Concisely put, the starting point is that so-introduced formulation of the problem of the arrow 
of time is subsidiary. The problem of the arrow of time in itself is conceptually prior and 
completely independent from any formulation within the framework of thermodynamics and 
statistical classical mechanics. It would therefore be better introduced it independently of 
notions such as reversibility, equilibrium states or entropy. Probably, the origin of this 
alternative proposal is the Time Direction Heresy, promoted by John Earman in his 1974 paper. 
Earman claimed therein that the arrow of time “does not hinge as crucially on irreversibility as 
the reductionist would have us believe” (1974: 20), but it is rather an “intrinsic feature of space-
time which does not need to be and cannot be reduced to non-temporal features” (1974: 20).   
This heretic proposal is a powerful reaction to an already deeply-ingrained dogma in the 
literature: the problem of the arrow of time is the problem of the two realms, and consequently, 
it crucially depends on issues around the foundations of thermodynamics and classical 
statistical mechanics. John Earman understood that his way to look at the issue minds a literal 
interpretation of the general problem as posed in Chapter I: when asking whether time has a 
direction or not, one is asking whether time in itself has a fundamental direction or an intrinsic 
asymmetry. Any other sense of temporal asymmetry or time’s direction will thus be 
metaphorical, or secondary. 
In his 1974 paper, Earman unfolds several problems related to his heretic understanding 
of the arrow of time. They mostly have to do with determining what the topological structure 
of space-time is like (whether it is time-orientable, whether it is equipped with a time 
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orientation, whether time itself is anisotropic, and so on). Hence, if one comes to understand 
the problem in terms of two opposite realms, one is simply missing the point: the problem of 
the arrow of time is about the intrinsic properties of space-time itself, regardless the nature, and 
the behavior, of its material content. Much of this problem crucially hinges upon how one could 
come to know what the properties of space-time are, particularly, in its temporal dimension. 
Some authors have followed Earman’s heretic spirit, focusing on space-time’s properties 
instead of the relation between the micro-realm and the macro-realm. Tim Maudlin (2002), and 
Mario Castagnino and Olimpia Lombardi (2009) have more recently approached the problem 
of the arrow of time in those terms. For instance, Castagnino and Lombardi propose a ‘global 
non-entropic approach’ to the arrow of time, which mainly consists in looking into space-time’s 
topological properties so as to establish a privileged direction of time capable of accounting for 
the intuitive asymmetry between past and future. They firstly aim to specify the conditions 
under which a global arrow of time can be properly settled, mainly based on geometrical 
properties of space-time as a whole. Then, Castagnino and Lombardi’s approach transfers this 
global feature to the local level, where the arrow of time looks like a non-spacelike local energy 
flow (2009: 2). In any case, what bears metaphysical priority in the approach is the fact that the 
arrow of time has primarily to do with intrinsic properties (topological properties) of space-
time. So, the problem must be introduced independently of any reference to irreversibility, 
entropy-increasing processes, and the gap between two realms. Neither does the problem have 
to do with the concept of time-reversal invariance, even though they argue that the notion of 
time-reversal invariance and irreversibility should be carefully distinguished from one another. 
In turn, Maudlin claims that  
“the passage of time is an intrinsic asymmetry in the structure of space-time itself, 
an asymmetry that has no spatial counterpart and is metaphysically independent of 
the material contents of space-time. It is independent, for example, of the entropy 
gradient of the universe” (2002: 259) 
In essence, Maudlin considers that the problem of the arrow of time is the problem of picking 
a temporal orientation in a time-orientable space-time. But, unlike Earman’s and Castagnino 
and Lombardi’s proposals, Maudlin contends that time-reversal invariance does play a relevant 
role in picking an arrow of time in so far as the notion allows linking a temporal orientation (a 
topological feature of space-time) to a property of physical theories’ dynamics –whether it is 
symmetric under time reversal. By testing time-reversal invariance, one gets some information 
about a temporal orientation. Maudlin is not quite clear as to how time reversal works and what 
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the link between geometry and dynamics is supposed to be. However, a previous work by Paul 
Horwich (1987) may shed some light on the matter since he also links time-reversal invariance 
with the direction of time. Particularly, with an intrinsic property of time in itself. 
Paul Horwich starts off by pointing out a distinction I made before: that of between an 
asymmetry of time and asymmetries in time. The distinction allows raising the following 
question: there are indeed many asymmetries in time, but “do they indicate that time itself is 
asymmetric?” (1987: 1). Perhaps, time itself is perfectly symmetric and the asymmetries in 
time are caused by other physical elements that do not bear on the nature of time itself. In a 
broad sense, the problem of the arrow of time mainly concerns the properties of time itself, 
particularly, if there is an intrinsic similarity between the past and the future directions –
intrinsic similarity that must be sharpened in terms of having “the same intrinsic properties 
expressed as nomological properties” (Horwich 1987: 41; see Chapter I, Section 6). Horwich’s 
idea is that any intrinsic or fundamental difference between past and future would manifest 
itself in some time asymmetry within the laws of physics. And this explains why the notion of 
time-reversal invariances becomes quite informative. 
Doubtlessly, there is plenty of differences among all these heretic-like proposals. For 
instance, whereas Earman virtually identifies irreversibility and time-reversal invariance as part 
of the dogma on the arrow of time, the rest of the authors are prone to carefully distinguish 
them (particularly, Castagnino and Lombardi –who in turn based the distinction on Price 1996). 
However, whereas Castagnino and Lombardi consider that time-reversal invariance does not 
play any role in picking an arrow of time, Maudlin and Horwich think that it does. Particularly, 
Horwich offers a more robust explanation of how the link is supposed to work than Maudlin. 
Notwithstanding these differences, all of them share the same basic idea: the philosophical 
inquiry about the arrow of time is primarily about the properties of time itself, regardless (prima 
facie) its material content. These formulations (either in terms of a time orientation in a 
relativistic space-time, or its topological properties or its links to time-reversal invariance) are 
metaphysically and conceptually prior to any formulation in terms of foundations of 
thermodynamics and classical statistical mechanics, irreversibility or entropy increasing. 
However, it is not completely clear so far how this approach to the arrow of time is 
supposed to work. Neither how the different elements of those proposal are linked to one 
another. On the one hand, Earman’s main lesson is that only properties of space-time matter 
when the problem of the arrow of time is at stake. On the other, it is not so clear how one can 
come to know them. With respect to the latter, Horwich mentions in passing that symmetries 
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of a theory’s dynamics allow one to infer certain properties of the underlying space-time. This 
idea also underlies the formulation of problem of the arrow of time when introduced in terms 
of the problem of the ‘two realms’, giving some hints on how this inferential mechanism is 
supposed to work. For instance, consider Price’s sentence: “to a very large extent, then, the 
laws of physics seem to be blind to the direction of time – they satisfy T-symmetry, as we may 
say” (1996: 116, italics mine). In virtue of this, Price repeatedly claims that there is no objective 
direction of time: the non-objectivity of the direction of time seems to somehow rest on what 
he calls “T-symmetry”, that is, time-reversal invariance. Though Maudlin (2002) doesn’t share 
the same stance, he does share a similar diagnosis, and resort to the underlying inferential 
mechanism. He says 
“The usual approach sets the problem as follows: the fundamental physical laws 
have a feature called 'Time Reversal Invariance'. If the laws are time-reversal 
invariant, then it is supposed to follow that physics itself recognizes no 
directionality of time” (Maudlin 2002: 266) 
In my introduction of the problem of the arrow of time in terms of the problem of the ‘two 
realms’, point (a) evokes the feature of time-reversal invariance at the level of the physical laws 
already: it says something about the nature of time, in particular, that in some sense there is no 
direction of time. Therefore, the implication could be phrased as follows: 
If a physical law L is time-reversal invariant, then that physical law does not pick, 
in some sense, a direction of time 
If one comes to discover that all (or, at least, almost all) fundamental laws of physics are time-
reversal invariant, it could be entailed that 
If all our physical laws are time-reversal invariant, then there is no, in some sense, 
a direction of time (according to physics) 
And it is for this sort of inferences that the problem of the ‘two realms’ comes up as described: 
there is gap because one is in some sense allowed to draw some conclusions about time’s 
features from the fact that physical laws (in particular, the micro-dynamics underlying the 
macroscopic behavior) are time-reversal invariant. I think that the underlying premise putting 
to work this inferential mechanism is the following: symmetries, in particular, space-time 
symmetries, would shed some light on what the space-time’s structure is. Hence, by looking 
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into dynamic’s symmetries, one can infer space-time’s symmetries, and thereby, the space-
time’s structure. Hence, the inference should be reworded as following 
If a physical law L is time-reversal invariant, then that physical law does not pick 
a structural direction of time 
If all our physical laws are time-reversal invariant, then there is no structural 
direction of time (according to physics) 
This inferential mechanism is not novel, but it has been frequently used in the philosophy 
of physics and the metaphysics of science for a long time. As well known, symmetries are 
playing an increasingly paramount role not only in physical theories, but also in facing many 
fundamental philosophical problems in philosophy of physics and metaphysics (see for 
instance, Brading and Castellani 2003, 2007; Baker 2010, Dasgupta 2015, 2016, Caulton 
2015). Time symmetry (or time-reversal invariance) is just an instance of this general 
symmetry-based inference. So, in introducing the problem of the arrow of time as mainly 
concerning space-time’s structure or intrinsic properties of time in itself, the notion of time 
reversal and time-reversal invariance play the role of testing whether time, according to a given 
theory, instantiates the property of having a structural direction –where the law does not 
distinguish, neither ought we to distinguish. 
There are plenty of references in the relevant literature about the relation between 
dynamics’ symmetries and space-time’s structure. H. Mehlberg (1961) says: 
“In mathematical parlance, temporal isotropy in scientific contexts is, therefore, 
tantamount to the covariance of laws of nature under time reversal. This amounts 
to asserting that within science time’s arrow will have to be rejected if the laws of 
nature remain unaltered and valid in a universe whose past and future are 
interchanged with ours”. (Mehlberg 1961: 108) 
And Paul Horwich (1987) again: 
“In addition, the account should help us to understand why the existence of time-
asymmetric laws [i.e. non-time-reversal invariant laws in my vocabulary] is 
generally taken to guarantee time’s anisotropy” (1987: 39). 
Lawrence Sklar (1974) is much clear about this link: 
“Some of the important symmetries of physical laws are the invariance of laws 
under translation in space, invariance under translation in time, invariance under 
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spatial rotation, invariance under change of inertial frame, invariance under spatial 
reflection, and so-called time-reversal invariance. All of these invariance principles 
are intimately related to the structure of the spacetime in which the material 
happenings of the world occur” (Sklar 1974: 359) 
In his famous 1989 book, World Enough and Space-time, Earman formulates two symmetry 
principles working as “adequacy criteria” so as to link the theory’s dynamics on one side, and 
the space-time’s structure in which such a dynamics fits, on the other (Earman 1989: 46). 
SP1  Any dynamical symmetry of T is a space-time symmetry of T 
SP2  Any space-time symmetry of T is a dynamical symmetry of T 
Where ‘T’ is a physical theory. The motivation for introducing such principles is “the 
realization that laws of motion cannot be written in the air alone but require the support of 
various space-time structures” (1986: 46). And the point just comes down to the sort of relations 
among dynamics’ space-time symmetries, space-time’s symmetries, and its structure.  
Jill North (2008, 2009) has devoted considerable efforts to unfold the notion of “physical 
structure” and its relationship with the symmetries of a given theory. Taking the structure of 
the space and the space-translation symmetry, she says: 
In applying any transformation to a theory, we hope to learn about the symmetry 
of the theory, and of the world that theory describes. We do this by comparing the 
theory with what happens to it after the transformation. If the theory remains the 
same after the transformation—if it is invariant under the transformation—then it 
is symmetric under that operation. This indicates that the theory ‘says the same 
thing’ regardless of how processes are oriented with respect to the structure 
underlying the transformation. We conclude that a world described by the theory 
lacks the structure that would be needed to support an asymmetry under the 
operation. For example, from the space-translation invariance of the laws, we infer 
that space is homogeneous, that there is no preferred location in space (North 2008: 
202) 
In a paper exclusively devoted to the notion of structure in physics, she rephrases Earman’s 
adequacy criteria in terms of a methodological principle guiding our understanding of the 
structure and the ontology of any physical theory: 
“Yet we tend to infer that there is no more structure to the world than what the 
fundamental laws indicate there is. Physics adheres to the methodological principle 
that the symmetries in the laws match the symmetries in the structure of the world. 
This is a principle informed by Ockham’s razor; though it is not just that, other 
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things being equal, it is best to go with the ontologically minimal theory. It is not 
that, other things being equal, we should go with the fewest entities, but that we 
should go with the least structure. We should not posit structure beyond that which 
is indicated by the fundamental dynamical law” (North 2009: 65. Italics mine) 
The idea of “going with the least structure” in order to underpin our ontological commitments 
by means of symmetries has been neatly explained in detail by Shamik Dasgupta (2016). This 
inferential mechanism going from symmetry to the structure of space-time has been called by 
him “the symmetry-to-reality inference” 17. The scheme of the argument as presented by 
Dasgupta is the following: 
(1) Laws L are the complete laws of motion governing our world 
(2) Feature X is variant in L 
(3) Therefore, feature X is [interpretational link] 
(4)  Ockham’s razor applied to X 
(C) Therefore, X is not real 
Let us spell this scheme out. The first premises claim that a symmetry, in a formal and general 
sense, holds for a given set of physical laws (mathematically, dynamical equations of motion). 
The second premise, particularly indicates, that the physical laws involve a property whose 
values can vary freely without altering the laws’ structure. These are the formal premises of 
the symmetry-to-reality inference. The variant property has then to be interpreted (premise 
three): variant features can be considered as redundant or superfluous (Earman 1989, North 
2009, Belot 2013), non-objective (Weyl 1952, Nozick 2001), or undetectable (Robert 2008, 
Dasgupta 2016). Premise four is an epistemic premise claiming that it is an epistemic vice to 
posit a variant feature as part of the theory’s structure. From the formal premises, the 
interpretational link, and the epistemic premise, one is entitled to conclude that the variant 
feature X is not real (or better, fundamental. See fn. 17) in the sense that it is not part of the 
structure of the reality (or space-time) according to a previously-given set of physical laws –
one’s metaphysics shouldn’t therefore contain variant features as structural or fundamental. 
This scheme is general and can be multiply instantiated by specifying the feature X one 
is interested in. Clearly, one of the instances of this argument is its application to the problem 
                                                          
17 Dasgupta puts the argument in terms of “reality”, but I would rather call it “the symmetry-to-fundamental” 
inference. It seems to me that the argument points out to what one should accept as part of what’s fundamental or 
structural for a physical theory, and not to what is real: there might be real things that aren’t fundamental or 
structural for a physical theory. If one only accepts as real things what falls into the argument as posed it, then 
one’s ontology would be extremely minimal, dooming many non-fundamental things to unreality 
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of the arrow of time in term of time-reversal invariance. The argument would thus run as 
follows 
(1) Laws L are the complete laws of motion governing our world 
(2) The direction of time (+𝑡 or – 𝑡) is variant in L 
(3) Therefore, the direction of time (+𝑡 or – 𝑡) is [interpretational link] 
(4)  Ockham’s razor applied to the direction of time 
(C) Therefore, the direction of time is not fundamental 
Premises 1 and 2 basically say that a given set of laws of motion are time-reversal invariant, 
that is, they are invariant under changing the direction of time, 𝑡 → −𝑡 (in the sense specified 
in Chapter I, Section 6.2.) Again, this is a formal result stemmed from applying the time-
reversal operator upon such a set of laws. Hence, the direction of time is said to be a variant 
feature in L. Based on premise one and two, premise three claims that the direction of time is 
redundant or superfluous (Earman 1989, North 2009, Belot 2013), non-objective (Weyl 1952, 
Nozick 2001), or undetectable (Robert 2008, Dasgupta 2016). As one should go with the least 
structure according to premise four, one concludes that the direction of time is not part of the 
structure of space-time according to the set of laws L. 
My claim is that the symmetry-to-fundamental inference for the arrow of time backs up 
any inference of the type  
If a physical law L is time-reversal invariant, then that physical law does not pick 
a structural direction of time 
Yet, I think one should be in extremely cautious here, particularly, in evaluating the limits and 
the scopes of the symmetry-to-fundamental inference. To begin with, such an implication is 
true only when one is interested in looking for a structural arrow of time. Quoting Sklar: 
“Do the proponents of this position really wish to allege that if the laws of nature 
all do turn out to be time-reversal invariant, our whole impression that the world 
of events is a world in which an asymmetric temporal priority relates event to event 
is an illusion?” (Sklar 1974:399) 
Even though many have claimed that from time-reversal invariant laws one can conclude that 
there is no direction of time whatsoever, I think that, when correctly understood, the symmetry-
to-fundamental inference just authorizes us to claim that the space-time assumed by a given 
theory is not equipped with an arrow of time, and not that there is no arrow of time in any 
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sense. Or, to put it differently, that the direction of time is not a structural or fundamental 
property of the world, but a secondary, derivative or an emergent one (Loewer 2012 argues for 
an emergent arrow of time given that time-reversal symmetry generally holds. See also 
Callender 2010). In fact, this is what the problem of the two realms assumes: given that there 
is no structural or fundamental arrow of time (because laws of nature all turn out to be time-
reversal invariant), it must come from elsewhere, for instance, from the initial conditions of the 
early universe.  
To get things straight, I shall introduce, and briefly analyze, the implications derived from 
the symmetry-to-fundamental inference. First, the symmetry-to-reality inference clearly allows 
us to conclude that 
(a) If the set of laws L belonging to a theory T is non-time-reversal invariant, then there is 
a structural arrow of time according to T. 
In Maudlin’s words: “If laws are non-T-invariant, then the space-time must be equipped with 
an orientation” (Maudlin 2002: 269). Therefore, time-asymmetric laws are a sufficient 
condition for a structural arrow of time. 
 The converse logically follows from (a) 
(b) If there is no structural arrow of time according to T, then the set of laws L belonging 
to a theory T is time-reversal invariant. 
This implies that time-reversal invariant laws are a necessary condition for a non-structural 
arrow of time, as (b) points out that the structure of space-time is temporally symmetric. As 
mentioned above, the (non-structural) arrow of time must then be found elsewhere. 
Now, one is left with two further options 
(c) If there is a structural arrow of time according to T, then the set of laws L belonging to 
a theory T is non-time-reversal invariant. 
Though persuasive at first glance, this implication could however be false. Firstly, one can 
suppose that future physics could show that there is a structural arrow of time with time-
reversal invariant laws. After all, time-reversal invariance is just a mean that triggers the 
inference, but there might be others: the implication would be true only if time-reversal 
symmetry is the unique way to dig into space-time’s property, but this is a highly debatable 
supposition. Secondly, the implication is false in General Relativity, where the space-time’s 
geometry is strongly related to mass and energy’s distribution (I shall add some further words 
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about it afterwards). From (a) and (c) it follows that non-time-reversal invariance is only a 
sufficient condition for a fundamental arrow of time, but not a necessary one. At least, in 
general. 
Finally, the implication I started with, 
(d) If the set of laws L belonging to a theory T is time-reversal invariant, then there is no 
structural arrow of time according to T. 
This inference, the converse of (c), is true so long as one looks for a structural arrow of time. 
It shouldn’t be taken valid as an inference against an arrow of time in a broader sense (for 
instance, against a non-structural arrow of time). 
To sum up. There is an alternative formulation of the problem of the arrow of time that 
does not hinge crucially upon notions like reversibility, entropy increasing or upon the 
foundations of statistical classical mechanics: the problem of a structural arrow of time. Even 
though there are different ways to introduce this problem, in general all of them agree on that 
the problem of the arrow of time is mainly about whether space-time in itself is temporally 
asymmetric. This claims rests on one what I called the “symmetry-to-fundamental” inference. 
In this respect, the notion of time-reversal invariance becomes crucial to infer space-time’s 
structural properties from dynamics’ space-time symmetries. 
The problem of a 
structural arrow of time 
(a) Does time have in itself the property of being 
asymmetric/directed? 
 
(b) Considering the laws of physics belonging to a theory 
T, is the structure of the space-time supposed by those 
laws equipped with a time-orientation? 
 
(c) In being backed up by the ‘symmetry-to-fundamental’ 
inference, the question is: Is there any non-time-
reversal invariant law in physics? Or, is there any 
physical law that does not produce a par of time-
symmetric twins? 
It is worth remarking some things before moving on to the comparison between both 
formulations of the problem of the arrow of time. First, I have mentioned that certain type of 
implication (in particular (c)) does not work in general relativity. The reason is that in general 
relativity different solutions to Einstein’s field equations entail different space-time’s 
geometrical structures, since they connect with the distribution of mass and energy. And this is 
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so because the matter-energy distribution is the space-time geometry. In these cases, any 
structural temporal asymmetry of space-time along its temporal dimension does not depend 
only on a formal symmetry but also depends on such a distribution of matter and energy: any 
variation in the distribution of matter and energy is also a variation in the structure (in the 
geometry) of space-time in itself18. Note that this is not the case in the rest of physical theories, 
where the structure of space-time on which their laws are written down remains fixed in all its 
models, and any variation on the matter and energy distribution introduces a variation in how 
the content is distributed without altering the structure of the space-time in itself. 
Second, note that this formulation and way to approach the problem of the arrow of time 
focuses mainly on non-time-reversal invariant laws. The overall idea is that pointed out in (c) 
above: non-time-reversal invariant laws does not produce a pair of time-symmetric twins. That 
is, the physical laws belonging to a given theory T do not say the same when running in the 
backward direction of time or in the forward direction of time (where ‘not say the same’ might 
mean that they say nothing whatsoever in one of them). Alberts puts it neatly in saying that  
“(…) if any theory whatsoever offers us both predictive and retrodictive 
algorithms, and if those two algorithms happen to be identical, and if the theory in 
question entails that a certain process can happen forward, then it will necessarily 
also entail that the process can happen backward. That’s what I’ll mean, then, from 
here on, when I speak of a theory as being invariant under time-reversal. (2000: 
14) 
Therefore, the question of the structural arrow of time is whether the series 𝐴 → 𝐵 → 𝐶 → 𝐷 
and 𝑇𝐷 → 𝑇𝐶 → 𝑇𝐵 → 𝑇𝐴 (a pair of time-symmetric twins) are produced by the same 
algorithm. So, there are, at least conceptually, alternative ways to get non-time-reversal 
invariant laws. For instance, both series could be models of a physical theory but produced by 
different algorithms: in time reversing a dynamical equation of motion, one gets to a different 
equation that produces the temporally-inverted series. Or, it could be also the case that by time 
reversing the original dynamical equation one gets to a different equation that does not produce 
any physical solution according to the theory (for instance, the so-obtained solution contradicts 
other postulates of the theory). Overall, the idea is the same: non-time-reversal invariant laws 
naturally and by their own means distinguishes a sequence going backward in time from a 
                                                          
18 This fact explains why, for instance, Castagnino and Lombardi (2005, 2009) were able to develop a geometrical 
approach to the arrow of time in general relativity, and to ground a structural (non-reductive) arrow of time, 
despite the time-reversal invariance of the Einstein’s field equations. 
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sequence going forward in time, where the parlance ‘running backward’ and ‘running forward’ 
only makes sense in relation to a time-reversal transformation 𝑇: 𝑡 → −𝑡 acting upon an 
equation of motion. 
Third. This formulation of the problem requires further conditions to be philosophically 
meaningful. This will be left fully clear in the following chapters, when addressing a particular 
case, but it is worth introducing it at this point. There are at least three conditions that should 
be met in order to formulate the problem in a meaningful manner: (a) the fundamentality 
condition, (b) the contingency condition, and (c) the co-extensity condition. Let us address 
them in tandem. 
Some philosophers, worried about the problem of the (structural) arrow of time, usually 
bring up a condition that would make the problem philosophically interesting: only 
fundamental dynamical laws are relevant for the debate. This “fundamentality condition” (as I 
call it) aims at setting aside a huge amount of uninteresting non-time-reversal-invariant laws, 
and only focusing on force- and interaction-free laws. For instance, Craig Callender (1995) 
claims that “when asking if the universe is TRI [time-reversal invariant], we desire to know 
whether it is at bottom TRI” (Callender 1995: 333). Though this could steer the view to an 
unjustified distinction between “phenomenological laws” and “fundamental” ones (see 
Hutchinson 1993), the search for a structural arrow of time has in general endorsed the 
fundamentality condition as good enough. Indeed, the widely-held claim that physics is blind 
to the direction of time is primarily grounded in that fundamental dynamical laws are time-
reversal invariant. This condition also links to the symmetry-to-fundamental inference: in 
discovering the structure of space-time, the relevant laws in premise (1) are only those free of 
any interaction and force. I think that the reason is clear: a violation of time symmetry in a free-
interaction or free-force law can only come from the very structure of space-time.  
For the question to be conceptually meaningful, a structural arrow of time must also meet 
another condition: “contingency”. The formulation of the problem has to assume that there 
might be non-time-reversal-invariant fundamental laws. It must not be the case that every 
fundamental law is necessarily time-reversal invariant, otherwise, the question pursued by the 
problem of a structural arrow of time would make little sense. If fundamental dynamical laws 
must be time-reversal invariant, then it is completely pointless to ask whether a non-time-
reversal fundamental law exists in physics. To be clear: contingency does not mean, obviously, 
that there must exist at least one non-time-reversal invariant fundamental law (a world where 
all our fundamental laws are actually time-reversal invariant is perfectly conceivable, and the 
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question of the arrow of time would still be philosophically interesting), but that contingency 
requires that must be at least possible that some fundamental law is non-invariant19. 
Finally, there must be co-extension between the concept of time reversal (and time-
reversal invariance) and its mathematical representation by means of a time-reversal operator, 
T. By co-extension I mean that there should be only one mathematical representation of the 
concept of time reversal within a theory. In short: a physical law L is time-reversal invariant if 
and only if it is T-invariant. This condition avoids multiple, and divergent, mathematical 
representations of the same concept of time reversal. In some respect, the very concept of time 
reversal is completely exhausted by its mathematical representation –time reversal is what T 
does. It would be devastating if a physical law L is T-invariant, but is not, say, T’-invariant, 
where T and T’ intend to mathematically represent the same concept, time reversal. The reason 
is quite simple: if co-extension fails (that is, if there are at least two formal representations for 
the concept of time reversal) the sentence “A theory S is time-reversal invariant” might be true 
and false at the same time and in the same respect. If two time-reversal operators claim to 
formally represent time reversal in the same respect and one states that the theory S is time-
reversal invariant (under its representation of time reversal, T), and the other that it is not (under 
its representation of time reversal, T’), then there would not be any way to define whether the 
sentence is true or false: it would be true if one chooses one of those operators, but false if one 
chooses the other. The solution is co-extensivity: one concept, one mathematical representation 
within a theory (at least). Consequently, one should discard one of the time-reversal operators 
as a fair representation of the concept of time reversal –it might rather be representing a 
different symmetry transformation. 
Section 3. Differences between the two approaches to the problem 
I have so far argued that there exist two alternative formulations of the problem of the arrow 
of time in physics: the problem of the two realms and the problem of a structural arrow of time. 
With these under our belts, let us now stress some differences. The main point I want to make 
                                                          
19 I’m here assuming, partially, what John Earman holds about symmetries in general, to wit, that the usual 
understanding of symmetries principles in physics is that they are contingent (Earman 1989: 121). I don’t know 
if this is actually the “usual understanding” in our days, but I do think that some metaphysical problems demand 
a contingency condition when posed in terms of symmetries. The problem of a fundamental arrow of time is one 
instance of this. 
76 | P a g e  
 
is that though both formulations give genuine arrows of time, they are quite different in some 
relevant features. 
To begin with, they are obviously after two quite different kinds of arrows of time. This 
point links with what was said in Chapter I. The problem of the two realms concerns the 
physical bases of a non-structural arrow of time, in the sense that it is after some non-intrinsic 
physical property to distinguish between both time’s directions. So-introduced difference 
typically has relied upon some extra-nomic property that characterizes a single solution (for 
instance, a highly unlikely initial condition). In general, this extra-nomic property overcomes 
the gap and explains why one observes what one actually observes. Instead of that, the problem 
of a structural arrow of time exclusively focus on intrinsic properties of space-time and 
concerns the whole class of solutions of a set of dynamical equations. 
Secondly, there is also a modal difference between both approaches to the problem. This 
modal difference naturally follows from how time-reversal invariance and reversibility have 
been characterized in Chapter I. In short, whereas the problem of the two realms allows 
defining a physically possible arrow of time, the problem of a structural arrow of time seeks to 
stablish a physically necessary arrow of time. Let’s take a closer look at this.  
It is typically said that the content of a physical theory is given by the set of possible 
worlds of which the theory is true. Each possible world is a solution of the dynamical equations 
of the theory. There is some debate about how to zone the space of physically possible worlds 
according to a theory (see Ruetsche 2013: Chapter 1), but it is standardly assumed that physical 
laws do the job adequately (see Earman 1986b: 13). Hence, one can define physical possibility 
as follows 
A possible world W is physically possible according to a given theory T if the laws 
of T are satisfied in W 
According to the possible-world semantics, a sentence is possibly true if it is true in at least 
one possible world, while is necessarily true if it is true in all its possible worlds. Mutatis 
mutandis, this supplies the basis for defining physical possibility and physical necessity as 
follows: 
p is physically possible according to a given theory T if and only if it is true in at 
least one physical possible world of T 
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p is physically necessary according to a given theory T if and only if it is true in all 
physically possible worlds of T 
Frequently, the truth-makers of physically possible descriptions are extra-nomic features of a 
theory that vary from solution to solution. That is, they are descriptions that are true only under 
certain extra-nomic conditions (for instance, special initial conditions) and only in some 
physically possible worlds that instantiate them. Differently, the truth-makers of physically 
necessary descriptions are generally nomic features. When a physical description is physically 
necessary, one is claiming that its truth stems from the physical laws of the theory at stake. 
Let us now bring these pieces together. By a modal difference between both approaches 
to the problem I mean the following. The problem of a structural arrow of time seeks for a 
necessary arrow of time in the sense that all models (all possible worlds) of a dynamical 
equation exhibit a direction of time. The class of possible worlds Ⱳ (the content of a theory) 
where a non-time-reversal invariant law L is true includes either worlds wherein the direction 
of time goes from past-to-future (Ⱳ𝑓) or worlds wherein it goes from future-to-past (Ⱳ𝑏), but 
not both. This amounts to claiming that a privileged direction of time is a necessary feature of 
a dynamical law L as it must hold, once picked it out, in all its possible worlds.  
The problem of the two realms rather starts off assuming that the space of possible worlds 
of a theory has the structure Ⱳ = Ⱳ𝑓 + Ⱳ𝑏, so that it is physically possible the theoretical 
existence of time-reversed worlds where the same time-reversal invariant laws hold. But, as 
repeatedly remarked, this does not imply that there is no way of distinguishing both directions 
of time in a single world, say, 𝑤21, yielding that an arrow of time is physically possible 
according to a theory T. Such a distinction is not matter of the laws, but it might be matter of 
extra-nomic conditions of the physically possible world 𝑤21. 
All this clearly leads to consider that, though both formulations of the problem allow 
distinguishing between the past-to-future direction and the future-to-past direction, they do not 
do it in the same modal respect. The problem of the two realms seeks for the foundations of a 
physically possible non-structural arrow of time that at least holds in a single solution of the 
dynamical laws at stake (for instance, the actual world), regardless if there exists an alternative 
physically possible world, with unalike extra-nomic conditions, where there is no direction of 
time. The problem of a structural arrow of time is rather after a physically necessary structural 
arrow of time as it holds in all the physically possible worlds of a given law L; in virtue of this, 
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the problem of the structural arrow of time is modally stronger that the problem of the two 
realms. 
Another difference between both approaches concerns the status of physical laws in the 
argumentation. In brief, the problem of a structural arrow of time seems to be prone to adopt 
an ontologically more robust account of physical laws (non-Humean account) than the problem 
of the two realms. I would like to be quite cautious here: I’m not claiming that there is a closely-
knit correlation between a structural arrow of time and non-Humean accounts of laws, and 
between a non-structural arrow of time and Humean accounts. What I do claim is that there 
seems to be certain affinity between those pairs of philosophical stances. This claim is not 
completely new. In a 2012 paper, Barry Loewer argues that there are two views on laws and 
on the arrow of time that go hand-in-hand: Maudlin’s non-Human and non-reductionist account 
of laws and the search for a structural (or ‘metaphysical’ in Loewer’s vocabulary) arrow of 
time; and Albert’s Humean-Lewisian account of laws and the entropic explanation of the arrow 
of time (via The Mentaculus). Loewer’s association is a particular case involving only two 
positions. What I’m arguing for is that it can be generalized involving alternative ways in which 
the problem of the arrow of time can be introduced and addressed in physics. Let me explain it 
a little bit further. 
It is well known that accounts of laws of nature are quite varied, and literature is massive 
about it. Broadly speaking, those accounts can be divided into Humean (or regularist) and non-
Humean (or realist-neccesitarist). According to the former, there is no fundamental 
nomological modalities in the world, but just a “vast mosaic” of categorical properties and/or 
relations instantiated by primitive entities (particles, space-time points or fields) dwelling (or 
being) the whole space-time. This distribution is typically called the ‘Humean mosaic’ and 
what one calls ‘laws of nature’ is merely an epistemic systematization of its distribution and 
regularities (see Lewis 1973, 1994; Swartz 1985). Non-Humean philosophers rather claim that 
there is nomological necessity20 in the world. All nomological relations displayed in our best 
physical theories manifest an intrinsic necessity in the natural world (Carroll 1994, Lange 2000, 
Maudlin 2007 for instance): whereas for Humeans laws of nature supervene upon the Humean 
Mosaic, for non-Humeans laws of nature govern and constrain matter and events. 
                                                          
20 Non-humeans can also claim that necessity in the world actually resides in dispositional properties or causal 
powers (see Shoemaker 1980, Mumford 1998, Bird 1998). But I’m here mainly interested in laws of nature, so I 
won’t consider that account. 
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One possible way to look at the relation between the formulations of the problem of the 
arrow of time and the status of laws of physics is the following. A non-structural arrow of time 
follows from, for instance, a particular distribution or conditions of a given Humean mosaic 
(as Albert’s proposal in general holds). The same laws of nature are however able to 
systematize varied information compatible with other Humean mosaics, where a non-
fundamental arrow of time might not be well-defined. That’s why laws of physics do not play 
any relevant role in the problem of the two realms besides setting the starting point: they are 
compatible with situations one could not be interested in. Humeans usually want to explain 
what it is going on in the actual world, regarding this Humean mosaic, with this particular 
distribution, boundary and initial conditions: why do daily-experienced regularities look so 
temporally asymmetric? Well, Humeans –as Albert does– will come up with an explanation of 
this actual fact based on physics. Regardless what our systematization of such regularities may 
say to one about other possible world. 
Contrarily, a structural arrow of time is not just a property of the actual world, but a 
property of all possible worlds wherein the laws of physics hold. For non-Humeans, necessary 
nomic relations between particulars are fundamental, so if those laws fail to be invariant under 
time reversal, that fact is also giving crucial information about what sort of nomic relations 
holds in the class of possible worlds of a given theory. Taking Maudlin’s wording (Maudlin 
2007), if laws of physics produce following states, producing a physical evolution, a failure of 
time-reversal invariance says that those laws are unable to produce states (evolutions) in both 
directions of time. To be clear, given as system s in a state 𝐴(𝑠), a law of nature under 
Maudlin’s account takes such a state and transforms it producing a new state 𝐵(𝑠), 
𝐴(𝑠) →𝐿 𝐵(𝑠). The ′ →𝐿 ′ transition says something fundamental about how things in the world 
behave necessarily according to a theory to which  ′ →𝐿 ′ belongs. Therefore, if the law L is 
unable to produce the time-reversed transition (that is, to produce the time-reversed next state,  
𝑇𝐵(𝑠) →𝑇𝐿 𝑇𝐴(𝑠)), then the law is also telling us that the picked direction of time necessarily 
matters in specifying the sort of states, transitions and evolutions that are possible for the 
theory. In this sense, the chosen direction of time is structural or intrinsic to the transition. A 
deflated account of laws would fall short in providing a rationale like this. 
There are surely many nuances to be explained in more details. I shall come back to this 
point when addressing a particular case in quantum mechanics, so I shall now move onto a 
fourth difference. 
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One might think that both formulations of the problem run in parallel, and one can equally 
go with any of them conforming to one’s philosophical tastes. Yet, as I have already mentioned 
in passing, there is a strong relation between both formulations: one of them already assumes 
an answer to the other, and thereby, it depends on it. In this sense, one of the problems is prior 
to, and conceptually more fundamental than, the other. At this point, it should be quite clear 
that the problem of the two realms already supposes that there is no structural (necessary, 
objective, fundamental, or intrinsic) arrow of time to the extent that the underlying dynamics 
is taken to be time-reversal invariant. Notwithstanding this, a distinction between the past-to-
future direction and the future-to-past one can be drawn by other means. The problem is thereby 
to specify those other means, and solutions should come up with a theory of why experience 
looks so temporally asymmetric despite having a time-symmetric structure underlying. This 
amounts to a (negative) answer to the problem of a structural arrow of time. That’s why I claim 
that the problem of a structural arrow of time is prior: whatever be the reason one comes to 
think that the philosophically interesting problem is to provide explanation that closes the gap 
between the micro-dynamics and the macro-dynamics, the very existence of such a gap (or 
tension) crucially depends upon having time-reversal invariant laws at the lower level, and 
therefore, lacking a structural arrow of time. 
Final Remarks 
The moral of this chapter can be put as following: when asked whether time is physically 
directed or not, one should be warned that this can be said in at least two ways: Is one asking 
whether time is structurally (intrinsically, fundamentally) directed? Or, is one rather asking 
whether physics, despite time in itself being symmetric, provides the mean to distinguish the 
two directions of time? Along this chapter, I’ve argued why these problems should be carefully 
distinguished, how they should be distinguished and on which grounds, and under which 
assumptions, they should be distinguished. 
Nevertheless, all this has been so far conducted in a rather abstract, lofty way. To ask 
whether physics somehow distinguishes between two time’s directions is more or less as asking 
whether Argentina is cold or warm. Well, it depends where. The question in physics is 
analogously meaningless if a particular theory is not previously singled out. The proper 
question should rather be whether this particular theory exhibits in one sense or the other a 
temporal asymmetry. The following chapters dive into these queries within non-relativistic 
quantum mechanics. 




82 | P a g e  
 
Introduction 
The last chapter introduced and developed two different approaches to the problem of the arrow 
of time, where one of them emerged as more conceptually prior than the other –the problem of 
a structural arrow of time. As exposed, this problem mainly concerns whether a given 
dynamical equation is time-reversal invariant. Or, to put it slightly differently, whether it 
manifests any preference for one direction of time instead of the opposite. 
Nonetheless, so formulated the problem cannot take one too far: it needs be zoned and 
formulated within a concrete theoretical framework: Does this dynamical law L belonging to 
this theory T exhibit a preference for one direction of time since it turns out to be non-invariant 
under time reversal? This chapter seeks to focus such a question on the quantum realm, in 
particular, on what I shall call standard quantum mechanics (SQM henceforth). As the question 
of a structural arrow of time aims one’s attention at dynamical equations of motion, the question 
then becomes whether SQM’s set of dynamical equations is time-reversal invariant or not. 
As widely known, there is no agreement upon what the content of such a set of equations 
actually is. This is mainly due to long-standing interpretative issues gravitating around the so-
called measurement problem of quantum mechanics. Quantum mechanics comes equipped 
with a formalism that, by itself, is incapable of providing a clear-cut picture of what’s going on 
when one carries out measurements involving quantum states. In particular, the wonderfully-
designed piece of mathematics entails the existence of quantum systems in a superposition of 
states (that is, a linear combination of the eigenstates of a given observable) that evolve 
unitarily and deterministically according to the dynamical postulate of the theory. However, 
when measured, such states seem to undergo a different evolution as one always gets defined 
states and never states in a superposition. To come up with an explanation of what’s going on 
when quantum systems are measured has proven to be one of the most intractable problems of 
quantum mechanics. Solutions of the measurement problem are often called “interpretations 
of quantum mechanics”. They greatly vary in many aspects but, in general, they have followed 
two different paths. Many, on the one hand, believe that the mathematical formalism was 
incomplete, and thereby, it should be supplied with further dynamical conditions so as to get 
an appropriate physical theory accounting for the relationships between what is obtained after 
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running an experiment and what is predicted by the SQM. Others rather think that SQM was 
overall right and wasn’t in need of any further addition. 
One could thus divide the set of dynamical equations of quantum mechanics into two 
subsets: those belonging to SQM properly, and those belonging to some interpretation that 
considers SQM to be incomplete. In this part, I will exclusively deal with SQM’s dynamics 
putting aside any interpretation-dependent dynamics for the time being, which will have to wait 
to Part 3. Hence, I will circumscribe myself to the dynamical postulate of the theory shared 
common to all interpretations – the Schrödinger equation. It follows that if SQM exhibits any 
temporal biase, then it should be mirrored in the formal features of such an equation. Therefore, 
the question of a structural arrow of time becomes “whether the Schrödinger equation is time-
reversal invariant”. 
This Part 2 is organized as follows. Chapter III begins by laying out the basics of SQM. 
By this, I will basically understand the formal machinery composed by the Schrödinger 
equation (the main dynamical postulate of the theory) and Born’s rule (through which 
probabilities enter the theory), plus some basic required assumptions as to how to represent a 
quantum system, a state and the observables within a formal framework. Next, I will present 
the symmetry group of the theory –the Galilean group. One of the ways to assign fundamental 
dynamical variables to the mathematical formalism is by considering what quantities remain 
invariant under Galilei continuous space-time transformations. In this way, physical content 
goes into SQM and the kinematics is set. This presentation also seeks to get some acquaintance 
to symmetry-based reasoning and space-time transformations within quantum mechanics 
Chapter IV is entirely devoted to the notion of time reversal in SQM. According to a 
widely-extended position in the field, time reversal must be formally implemented in terms of 
an anti-unitary, anti-linear time-reversal operator. SQM turns out to be invariant under thus-
specified time-reversal operator, so it wouldn’t exhibit any structural preference either by the 
past-to-future direction or by the future-to-past one. The general aim of this chapter is to put 
forward a quite different picture of what’s really going on. I will first show that there are 
actually two alternative ways to formally implement time reversal in quantum mechanics: an 
orthodox way and a heterodox one. My overall argument is that, against the widely-extended 
belief, both approaches can be rightfully defended, though on different grounds. My final aim 
is to show that the formal implementation of time reversal in standard quantum mechanics 
presupposes (i) a certain metaphysical background that determines what time reversal is 
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supposed to be in general, and (ii) a certain view of what role symmetries are supposed to play 
in physical theories. My argumentation will be threefold 
(a) The orthodox view endorses a relationalists metaphysics of time, and consequently, 
represents time reversal in terms of motion reversal.  
On this metaphysical ground, the orthodox approach emerges more naturally as the right way 
to formally implement time reversal in SQM. But, 
(b) Alternatively, a heterodox approach can be defended as one shifts gears to a 
substantivalist metaphysics of time 
On this view, time reversal is formally represented as a geometrical reflection of time in itself, 
fully captured by the unitary transformation 𝑡 → −𝑡. 
(c) Whereas orthodox view concludes that SQM is structurally time-reversal invariant, 
the heterodox view rather concludes that SQM is non-time-reversal invariant 
It follows from this that both approaches draw incompatible conclusions as to whether SQM 
exhibits a structural preference for either one direction of time. 
Chapter V addresses the relationship between these approaches to time reversal and the 
problem of a structural arrow of time. I will claim here the orthodox approach’s inner 
mechanism of justification doesn’t quite meet some required conditions for the problem of a 
structural arrow of time to be philosophically meaningful. Thus, the following question arises: 
could the orthodox approach address the philosophical problem of a structural arrow of time? 
I will claim that philosophers of time and philosophers of physics face a complex scenario in 
SQM, where something should be abandoned. To start with, they should endorse either the 
orthodox approach or the heterodox one. But, (a) if they go with the orthodox, some conditions 
to formulate the problem of a structural arrow of time are at risk; (b) if they go with the 
heterodox view, they should conclude that SQM is non-time-reversal invariant, thus standing 
at odds with what’s been mostly held in the field and also upholding that there is indeed a 
structural arrow of time. 
  
85 | P a g e  
 
III. 
Standard quantum mechanics (SQM) 
SQM’s formalism and symmetry group 
Quantum mechanics intends to describe the natural world at a small scale. A really small scale. 
In this attempt, it is one of the most successful physical theories we have ever had. Its success 
eminently relies on the accurate description and prediction of physical systems’ behavior at the 
atomic level, and thanks to this, on the enormous technological developments it made possible. 
But, the same time, quantum mechanics is extremely challenging and puzzling –if physical 
theories not only attempt to describe and to control the natural world, but also to know it in any 
relevant sense, quantum mechanics has hindered any unified view of what the natural world is 
like at the atomic scale. For this reason, deep philosophical issues gravitate around quantum 
mechanics since its first formulations, forcing us either to change our previously-conceived 
beliefs about the natural world, or to think through if something is not going fatally wrong at 
the very conceptual and formal foundations of the theory. 
Though philosophers of physics strongly disagree on how the theory should be properly 
understood, physicists have been using quantum mechanics for almost a century. They daily 
learn how to apply it efficiently, how to make predictions and experiments with it. They have 
developed undreamed technology based on its principles, and also pushed the theory itself 
forward beyond its limits. So, despite some fierce divergences regarding what sort of world the 
theory portrays, there are nowadays some broadly-shared tenets that identify the formal 
machinery of the theory, though in a quite restricted sense. I will refer to this minimal formal 
machinery as standard quantum mechanics (SQM hereafter), but people also frequently refer 
to it as ordinary quantum mechanics (Ruetsche 2013), bare quantum mechanics (Wallace 
2007) or simply minimal quantum mechanics (Schlosshauer 2006). These names try to 
highlight a pristine sense in which all we can talk about a non-relativistic version of quantum 
mechanics by referring to its formal apparatus, so that one can more or less get an univocal 
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definition of quantum state, how to formally represent various elements of the theory, what is 
theory’s logical structure, its symmetry group and so forth. This is perfectly fine as long as it 
is recognized that such a mathematical formalization (plus a minimal interpretation) remains 
absolutely silent about crucial aspects a full-blooded physical theory should say something 
about. This minimal sense of scientific theory says nothing, for instance, about what the 
quantum state refers to, neither about in which way the state of a quantum system relates to 
measurements’ outcomes. To provide an answer to these questions, interpretations of such a 
silent formalism ought to come in. In any case, one is rapidly stepping beyond SQM’s 
framework. 
In this chapter, I shall review some basics elements of SQM without mentioning 
interpretational issues. It should be clear from the beginning, on the one hand, that such a 
minimal sense of theory doesn’t constitute in any relevant sense a full-blooded physical theory 
attempting to know what the natural world is like. Notwithstanding, I believe that SQM is 
already a developed-enough theory that poses some highly relevant, and puzzling, questions 
about time’s direction that have been largely overlooked in the specialized literature. 
Additionally, it should be also clear that SQM is not a completely interpretation-free formal 
apparatus. To begin with, quantum mechanics’ formalism attempts to be physical after all, so 
it is already partially interpreted. This interpretative core may be generally uncontroversial, but 
already set some basic elements to constitute a minimal notion of what is meant by physical 
within the theory. It is not the case that anything goes within the theory, or that anything is 
equally allowed. This minimal sense of physical theory already gets rid of some formal 
elements in order to delimitate what is physical and what is physically possible according to 
the theory. 
The chapter is articulated in two sections. In Section 1, SQM’s formal apparatus is 
succinctly introduced. In Section 2, SQM’s symmetry groups are laid out and used as a 
methodology to assign fundamental variables to items in the formalism (particularly, to self-
adjoint operators). The notion of symmetry and space-time transformation is also presented. 
Section 1. SQM’s formalism 
To understand the conceptual structure of quantum mechanics one needs to firstly see how 
notions as “state of a system” and “observable quantity” are represented within the theory, and 
secondly, what laws describe their behavior. That is, to specify its kinematics and its dynamics. 
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Unfortunately, there are some controversies around the dynamics of the theory across its 
different interpretations, so it cannot be univocally established within SQM. Despite this, all 
interpretations agree to at least include the Schrödinger equation in the list. 
Though historically quantum mechanics came up in two versions (originally considered 
as rival theories), there are nowadays several formulations of the formal apparatus of quantum 
mechanics. Daniel Styer et al. (2002) identify such nine formulations, including the historical 
matrix mechanics of Heisenberg (Heisenberg 1925) and the wave mechanics of Schrödinger 
(Schrödinger 1926). There are also different approaches so as to obtain a quantum mechanics. 
For instance, one might start off either by quantizing a classical system, which primarily 
consists in turning classical variables into operators and finding their canonical commutation 
relations (the so-called canonical quantization, see Dirac 1965), or by defining the set of 
quantum observables in an algebraic fashion (von Neumann 1932/1955, Haag 1992). Be as it 
may, all these formulations were shown to be unitarily equivalent by John von Neumann (1931) 
and Marshall Stone (1930)21, so their physical content is empirically equivalent. According to 
the so-called Stone-von Neumann theorem, they all are, so to speak, different formal ways to 
represent the same theory.  
As just mentioned, quantum mechanics came up in two different ways. The early-twenty-
century born theory aimed to provide a unified explanation of varied phenomena that didn’t fit 
in a classical framework, like atomic spectra, radiation phenomena or scattering experiments. 
In 1925, Werner Heisenberg presented the first attempt towards that direction: the matrix 
mechanics. Seeking to recover Bohr-Sommerfeld’s conditions for quantization, Heisenberg’s 
proposal represents position and momentum by means of Hermitian matrices, Q and P 
respectively, based on the Poisson bracket formulation of classical mechanics. In this picture, 
observables (represented by matrices) play the leading role as they evolve in time while the 
state is left static. Few months later, in 1926, Erwin Schrödinger put forward a different theory 
aiming to reach the same goals than Heisenberg’s: the wave mechanics. In contrast with the 
matrix mechanics, Schrödinger placed great emphasis on the evolution of the state, instead of 
measurable quantities (observables). He rested upon two differential equations, the time-
independent and time-dependent Schrödinger equation, the latter describing the evolution of a 
                                                          
21 To be precise, the Stone-von Neumann theorem showed that Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics and Schrödinger’s 
wave mechanics were two equivalent representations of the same theory (of the canonical commutations 
relations). Many other formulations appeared ever since, all of them equivalent thanks to the same theorem. 
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complex-valued wave function 𝜓 (𝑥). In order to solve the equations, a differential operator H 
(the Hamiltonian) was introduced in the theory. 
Setting aside historical details on its birth, present-day textbooks often introduce quantum 
mechanics in “wave-mechanics fashion”, based mainly on the Hilbert space formalism and on 
the “Schrödinger picture”, in which the notion of “quantum state” and its dynamical evolution 
play the leading role in the behavior of quantum systems. The Hilbert space formalism has a 
long story that goes back to von Neumann’s and Dirac’s world and has come to be frequently 
considered the formalism of quantum mechanics (see Redei 1998). Therefore, to start 
specifying a quantum-mechanical description of a physical system one has to provide, at least, 
three elements: (1) a formal representation of the physical system and its states, (2) some further 
structure on that representation in order to describe the physical system, and (3) a dynamics 
determining how the system evolves in time. I will take the formal apparatus of SQM as 
respecting the following tenets  
• Any quantum physical system is formally represented by a complex vector space 
equipped with an inner product, and which is also complete: any converging 
sequence of vectors in the space converges to a vector in the space. This space is 
called the Hilbert space ℋ. 
• Any quantum physical system has associated a state bearing information about the 
quantum system. 
• A quantum state is represented by means of a density operator 𝜌, which inhabits the 
Liouville Space ℒ = ℋ ⊗ ℋ 
• Some quantum states are pure states. A pure state is represented by a state vector 
|𝜓⟩ ∈ ℋ, such that the corresponding density operator is  
 
𝜌 = |𝜓⟩⟨𝜓| (3.1 ) 
• Any pure state |𝜓⟩ (the so-called the wave-function) evolves according to the 





 (3.2 ) 
Therefore, for any initial state |𝜓(0)⟩, it will evolve to |𝜓(𝑡)⟩ 
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 |𝜓(𝑡)⟩ = 𝑒−𝐻𝑡|𝜓(0)⟩ (3.3 ) 
where H is the Hamiltonian operator.  
• Generic quantum states evolve according to the von Neuman’s version of the 
Schrödinger equation 
 |𝜓(𝑡)⟩ = 𝑒−𝐻𝑡|𝜓(0)⟩ (3.4 ) 
• Any state vector |𝜓⟩ can be represented in different bases of ℋ (i.e. a set of basis 
vectors from which is possible to form all possible finite linear combinations of 
state vectors). Hence, any state vector |𝜓⟩ can be written down in terms of the basis 
{|𝑎𝑖⟩} of ℋ 
 
|𝜓⟩ = ∑ 𝛼𝑖|𝑎𝑖⟩
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (3.5 ) 
Where the 𝛼𝑖 are complex numbers. 
• Any physical magnitude O, called observable, is represented by means of a (linear) 
self-adjoint operator ?̂?, which is a map acting on ℋ, ?̂?: ℋ → ℋ such that for any 
|𝜑⟩, |𝜓⟩ ∈ ℋ and any 𝛼𝑖, 𝛽𝑗 ∈ ℂ 
 
?̂?(𝛼|𝜓⟩ + 𝛽|𝜑⟩) = 𝛼(A|𝜓⟩) + 𝛽(A|𝜑⟩) (3.6 ) 
Given an operator ?̂?, an eigenket of ?̂? is a ket |𝛼⟩ in ℋ upon which ?̂? acts by 
 
?̂?|𝑎⟩ = 𝛼|𝑎⟩ (3.7 ) 
Where the complex number 𝛼 is the eigenvalue of |𝑎⟩. Self-adjoint operator’s 
eigenvalues represent the possible values of the magnitude. 
• Two observables 𝑂1 and 𝑂2, represented by the self-adjoint operator ?̂? and ?̂? 
respectively) are said to commute if for any |𝜓⟩ ∈ ℋ 
 ?̂??̂?|𝜓⟩ = ?̂??̂?|𝜓⟩ (3.8 ) 
The same can be also expressed by means of the commutator  
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[?̂?, ?̂?] = ?̂??̂? − ?̂??̂? = 0 (3.9 ) 
If ≠ 0, they are said to not commute. 
• In SQM, there are some quantities that are canonical conjugated one another (to put 
it differently, one is the Fourier transformed of the other), and thereby they don’t 
commute. The relations between these quantities have come to be known as the 
canonical commutation relations (CCRs), where for two canonical conjugated 
quantities ?̂? and ?̂? 
 
[?̂?, ?̂?] = 𝑖ℏ (3.10 ) 
This has been frequently interpreted in terms of mutually incompatible quantities 
or as representing incompatible experimental situations. 
• In 1926, Max Born proposed a purely statistical interpretation of Schrödinger’s 
wave-function. Beyond interpretation-dependent debates, his work gave rise to the 
Born’s rule, whereby statistics enters quantum theory. Born’s rule aims at 
calculating the probability of getting a certain outcome if an experiment were 
carried out, where such a probability is equal to the modulus square of the wave-
function. In the Hilbert space formalism, the probability 𝑃𝜓(𝑎𝑖) of obtaining the 
eigenvalue 𝑎𝑖 of the self-adjoint operator ?̂? can be computed through 
 
𝑃𝜓(𝑎𝑖) = |⟨𝑎𝑖|𝜓⟩|
2 (3.11 ) 
Where |𝑎𝑖⟩ is the eigenvector of ?̂? corresponding to the eigenvalue 𝑎𝑖. For the case 
of a generic state 𝜌, the probability 𝑃𝜌(𝑎𝑖) is given by 
 
𝑃𝜌(𝑎𝑖) = 𝑇𝑟(𝜌Π𝑖) = 𝑇𝑟(𝜌|𝑎𝑖⟩⟨𝑎𝑖|) (3.12 ) 
These tenets constitute SQM’s formal apparatus. However, as Ballentine stresses (1998: 63), 
it has by itself little physical content until dynamical variables of the systems are identified 
with items in the mathematical formalism, particularly, with self-adjoint operators. Much has 
been written about it, but one way to do it is based on the relations between some fundamental 
physical variables and space-time symmetries. Any physical theory has its own group of 
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symmetries, that is, a set of transformation that leaves the structure of the theory unaltered 
(invariant). So, symmetry transformations serve to the purpose of identifying which items in 
the mathematical formalism (which operators) correspond to the relevant physical properties 
of systems (dynamical variables).  
Section 2. Galilei Group and SQM’s physical content 
Laws of physics are believed to be symmetric under certain space-time symmetry 
transformations. These typically include displacing the system in the space or in time, or 
spatially rotating it. Under such transformations, fundamental quantities of the theory are 
expected to remain invariant, that is, they shouldn’t suffer any change depending on which 
coordinate system one uses to describe them. This belief supposes that a coordinate system is 
a piece of surplus structure (Baker 2010) and shouldn’t alter what is supposed to be objective 
(or fundamental), coordinate-independent features of physical systems. Physical quantities that 
do vary under a symmetry transformation are rather surplus structure, which depends on the 
coordinate system used to describe the system (for instance, by Belot 2001). 
In this light, the strategy to identify fundamental quantities consists in formally 
representing these geometrical transformations and in testing how a physical theory’s structure 
behaves under their application. Hence, each space-time symmetry operation g will correspond 
with a transformation of observables (𝑔: 𝐴 → 𝐴′) and of states (𝑔: |𝜓⟩ → |𝜓′⟩). Under such a 
transformation g, an equation of motion is said to be g-invariant (g-symmetric) when the truth 
of the law is preserved by the transformation (Baker 2010, Dasgupta 2016), that is, when g 
never takes a model in which the law is true as input and returns a model in which it is false as 
output (Earman 1989, Roberts 2008, Belot 2013). The concept of group, originally proposed 
by Galois in early nineteenth century, comes in to supplement the notion of symmetry: a group 
clusters different transformations into a specific structure22.  
Let’s put it more formally. Consider a set 𝒜 of objects 𝑎𝑖 ∈ 𝒜, a group 𝒢 of 
transformations 𝑔𝛼 ∈ 𝒢 , where 𝑔𝛼: 𝒜 → 𝒜 acts upon the 𝑎𝑖 as 𝑎𝑖 → 𝑎𝑖
𝑔𝛼. 
                                                          
22 Technically, a group (𝒢, → ) is a finite or infinite set 𝒢 of elements with a binary operation * (the group 
operation) that satisfies the following four axioms: 
• Closure: For all 𝑔𝛼 and 𝑔𝛽 in 𝒢, the result of 𝑔𝛼 → 𝑔𝛽 is also in 𝒢. 
• Associativity: For all 𝑔𝛼, 𝑔𝛽 and 𝑔𝑘 in 𝒢, (𝑔𝛼 → 𝑔𝛽) → 𝑔𝑘 = 𝑔𝛼 → (𝑔𝛽 → 𝑔𝑘) 
• Identity element: There exists an element I in 𝒢 such that for all 𝑔𝛼 in 𝒢, 𝐼 → 𝑔𝛼 = 𝑔𝛼 → 𝐼 = 𝑔𝛼. 
• Inverse element: For each 𝑔𝛼 in 𝒢, there exists an element 𝑔𝛽 in 𝒢 such that 𝑔𝛼 → 𝑔𝛽 = (𝑔𝛽 → 𝑔𝛼 = 𝐼 
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Def. 1.  An object 𝑎𝑖 ∈ 𝒜 is invariant under the transformation 𝑔𝛼 if 𝑎𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖
𝑔𝛼  
In introducing the notion of group, one obtains 
Def. 2.  An object 𝑎𝑖 ∈ 𝒜 is invariant under the group of transformations 𝒢 if it is 
invariant under all the transformations 𝑔𝛼 ∈ 𝒢 
In physics, the objects to which transformations apply are typically those representing states s, 
observables O (represented by self-adjoint operators ?̂?) and differential operators D. Each 
transformation, in turn, acts upon them in a particular way, and each symmetry transformation 
will be defined depending on how it acts upon those objects.  
Dynamical laws of physical theories are often represented in terms of differential 
equations, which combine the aforementioned objects. So, a dynamical law 𝐿 is then 
represented by an equation 𝐸(𝑠, 𝑂𝑖, 𝐷𝑗) = 0 . It follows from what was said above, that a 
symmetry transformation 𝑔𝛼 will act upon the equation by transforming 𝑔𝛼 ∶ s → s
𝑔𝛼 , 
𝑔𝛼: 𝑂𝑖 → 𝑂𝑖
𝑔𝛼 , and 𝑔𝛼: 𝐷𝑗 → 𝐷𝑗
𝑔𝛼 . Therefore, based on Def.1 and Def. 2, the following 
definitions can be introduced: 
Def. 3. A dynamical law L is 𝑔𝛼-symmetric (i.e. invariant under the transformation 𝑔𝛼) 
if 𝐸(s𝑔𝛼 , 𝑂𝑖
𝑔𝛼 , 𝐷𝑗
𝑔𝛼) = 0 
Def. 4. A dynamical law L is symmetric under the group 𝒢 if it is invariant under all the 
transformations 𝑔𝛼 ∈ 𝒢 
On this basis, the symmetry group of the theory can be thus defined as: 
Def. 5.  A group 𝒢 of symmetry transformations is said to be the symmetry group 
of a theory if the laws of the theory are invariant under 𝒢 
In the model-theoretic vocabulary, John Earman (2004) defines a symmetry in terms of the 
models of a theory. Let ℳ be the set of the models of a certain mathematical structure, and 
ℳ𝐿 ⊂ ℳ the subset of the models satisfying the law L . Then, in Earman’s model-theoretical 
terms, 
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Def. 6.  A symmetry of the law L  is a map 𝑔𝛼 ∶ ℳ → ℳ,   that preserves ℳ𝐿, that is, 
for any 𝑚 ∈ ℳ𝐿,  𝑔𝛼(𝑚) ∈ ℳ𝐿 and  𝑔𝛼(𝑚) = 𝑚.
23 
When represented by a differential equation 𝐸(𝑠, 𝑂𝑖, 𝐷𝑗) = 0, each model 𝑚 ∈ ℳ𝐿 is 
represented by a solution 𝑒 = 𝐹(𝑂𝑖, 𝑠0), corresponding to a possible physical evolution of the 
system. It follows that  
Def. 7. If L is 𝑔𝛼-symmetric (Def. 3), then if 𝑒 = 𝐹(𝑂𝑖, 𝑠0) is a solution (possible 
evolution) of L, then 𝑒  𝑔𝛼 = 𝐹 𝑔𝛼(𝑂𝑖
 𝑔𝛼 , 𝑠0) is a solution (possible evolution) of 
L and 𝑒 = 𝑒  𝑔𝛼. 
These definitions capture the more intuitive notion of symmetry in terms of preserving the truth 
of the law, or in terms of transforming solutions into solutions as mentioned above. 
Putting aside for the moment any interpretational discussion about the dynamics of 
quantum mechanics, in SQM the evolution of a quantum state (|𝜓⟩) is given by the Schrödinger 
equation as mentioned early, so the above-mentioned definitions have to be now expressed in 
quantum-mechanical terms. Abstractly, one defines a generic symmetry transformation 𝑔𝛼 
acting upon the objects of the dynamical equation as 𝑔𝛼 ∶ |𝜓⟩ → |𝜓⟩









, and 𝑔𝛼 ∶ 𝑖 → 𝑖
𝑔𝛼 . One thereby obtains that  
Def. 8. The Schrödinger equation is invariant under the transformation 𝑔𝛼 (it is 𝑔𝛼-
symmetric) if  𝐻|𝜓⟩ = 𝑖ℏ
𝜕|𝜓⟩
𝜕𝑡
  is equal to 
 𝐻𝑔𝛼|𝜓𝑔𝛼⟩ = 𝑖𝑔𝛼ℏ
𝜕|𝜓⟩𝑔𝛼
𝜕𝑡
   
Therefore, 
Def. 9. The Schrödinger equation is symmetric under the group 𝒢 if it is invariant under 
all the transformations 𝑔𝛼 ∈ 𝒢 
SQM’s symmetry group is the Galilean group 𝒢, which basically consists of a set of 
continuous space-time transformations (time-displacement, space-displacement, space-
rotation and boost) that leaves the theory unaltered. In interpreting SQM’s formalism, one of 
                                                          
23 It’s worth warning the following. Literature is sometimes ambiguous about what one should demand to a 
symmetry. In some occasions, it’s required the original model and the 𝑔𝛼-transformed one to belong to the set of 
solutions (possible evolutions) of a given equation. But, frequently, something else is also demanded: that the 
original model and the 𝑔𝛼-transformed one be equals. Note that the former is weaker than the later. I will here 
deal with invariance exclusively. For further details, see López and Lombardi (2019) where we distinguish both 
notions by calling the former requirement ‘covariance’ and the latter ‘invariance’.  
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the Galilean group’s utilities is that it serves to endow SQM with physical meaning by 
identifying those 𝒢 -invariant objects with fundamental physical quantities.  Representing time 
by the variable 𝑡 ∈ ℝ and position by 𝑟 = (𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧) ∈ ℝ, the Galilean group 𝒢 = {𝑇𝛼} is a group 
of continuous space-time transformations 𝑇𝛼: ℝ
3 × ℝ → ℝ3 × ℝ such that 
Time displacement   𝑡 → 𝑡′ = 𝑡 + 𝜏 
Space displacement   𝑟 → 𝑟′ = 𝑟 + 𝜌 
Space rotation   𝑟 → 𝑟′ = 𝑅𝜃𝑟 
Velocity boost   𝑟 → 𝑟′ = 𝑟 + 𝒖𝑡 
Where 𝜏 ∈ ℝ is a real number representing a time interval 𝜏 = ∆𝑡, 𝜌 = (𝜌𝑥, 𝜌𝑦, 𝜌𝑧) ∈ ℝ
3 is a 
triple of real numbers representing a space interval, 𝑅𝜃 ∈  ℳ
3×3 is a 3 × 3  matrix representing 
space rotation by an angle  , and , 𝒖 = (𝑢𝑥, 𝑢𝑦, 𝑢𝑧) ∈ ℝ
3 is a triple of real numbers 
representing a constant velocity. 
Since the Galilean group 𝒢 is a Lie group, the Galilean transformations 𝑇𝛼 can be 
represented by unitary operators 𝑈𝛼 over the Hilbert space ℋ, with the exponential 
parametrization 𝑈𝛼 = 𝑒
𝑖𝐾𝛼𝑠𝛼, where 𝑠𝛼 is a continuous parameter and 𝐾𝛼 is a Hermitian 
operator independent of  𝑠𝛼 and the generator of the transformation 𝑇𝛼. Thereby, 𝒢 can be also 
defined by ten generators (𝐾𝛼) of the group 
• One time displacement 𝐾𝜏 
• Three space displacements 𝐾𝜌 (one for each coordinate) 
• Three space rotations 𝐾𝜃 
• Three velocity boosts 𝐾𝑢 
The Galilean group can consequently be defined by the commutation relations between its generators 
(a) [𝐾𝜌𝑖 , 𝐾𝜌𝑗] = 0 
(b) [𝐾𝑢𝑖 , 𝐾𝑢𝑗] = 0 
(c) [𝐾𝜃𝑖 , 𝐾𝜃𝑗] = 𝑖 𝑖𝑗𝑘𝐾𝜃𝑗 
(d) [𝐾𝜃𝑖 , 𝐾𝜌𝑗] = 𝑖 𝑖𝑗𝑘𝐾𝜌𝑘 
(e) [𝐾𝜃𝑖 , 𝐾𝑢𝑗] = 𝑖 𝑖𝑗𝑘𝐾𝑢𝑘 
(f) [𝐾𝑢𝑖 , 𝐾𝜌𝑗] = 𝑖𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑀 
(g) [𝐾𝜌𝑖 , 𝐾𝜏] = 0 
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(h) [𝐾𝜃𝑖 , 𝐾𝜏] = 0 
(i) [𝐾𝑢𝑖 , 𝐾𝜏] = 𝑖𝐾𝜌𝑖 
Where 𝑖𝑗𝑘 is the Levi-Civita tensor and M is the mass operator 𝑀 = 𝑚𝐼 (I is the identity 
operator and m the mass).  
What has been presented so far is just the geometrical significance of the operators 𝐾𝜏, 
𝐾𝜌, 𝐾𝜃, and 𝐾𝑢 as generators of the symmetry transformations in a Hilbert space. However, no 
physical meaning has been introduced yet. This is done by ascribing to each operator  𝐾𝛼 the 
representation of a dynamical physical magnitude. This methodology was first introduced by 
T. F. Jordan (1975) in replacement of the old “canonical quantization” based on the Poison 
brackets formulation of classical mechanics. For this symmetry-group-based methodology, the 
dynamics of a closed, constant-energy system free of any external field (i.e. a free particle) is 
the starting point as it turns out to be fully symmetric under the Galilean Group, being enough 
to identify operators with fundamental dynamical variables in the following way (for details, 
see Ballentine 1998: Chapter 2-3): 
Energy      𝐻 = ℎ𝐾𝜏 
Three momentum components    𝑃𝑖 = ℎ𝐾𝜌 
Three angular momentum components   𝐽𝑖 = ℎ𝐾𝜃 
Three boost components     𝐺𝑖 = ℎ𝐾𝑢 
Therefore, the commutation relations are now reworded as: 
(a) [𝑃𝑖, 𝑃𝑗] = 0 
(b) [𝐺𝑖, 𝐺𝑗] = 0 
(c) [𝐽𝑖, 𝐽𝑗] = 𝑖 𝑖𝑗𝑘𝐽𝑘 
(d) [𝐽𝑖, 𝑃𝑗] = 𝑖 𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑃𝑘 
(e) [𝐽𝑖, 𝐺𝑗] = 𝑖 𝑖𝑗𝑘𝐺𝑘 
(f) [𝐺𝑖, 𝑃𝑗] = 𝑖𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑀 
(g) [𝑃𝑖, 𝐻] = 0 
(h) [𝐽𝑖, 𝐻] = 0 
(i) [𝐺𝑖, 𝐻] = 𝑖𝑃𝑖 
It is worth mentioning one further condition to get an adequate interpretation of dynamical 
variables in SQM. The Hamiltonian represents the energy of the system and is the responsible 
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of generating the (infinitesimal) time translation. The spectrum energy is supposed to be always 
positive, so the Hamiltonian must be bounded (from below), that is, 𝐻 ≥ 0. It has been largely 
argued that negative energy states remain undetected and that their existence would necessarily 
turn matter unstable: physics wouldn’t be any longer possible. The Hamiltonian is thus required 
to be bounded, and to remain bounded after any symmetry transformation, if one wish to get a 
transformed quantum mechanics state. 
Having said that, the rest of the physical magnitudes can be straightforwardly defined 
from those basic ones. For instance, 




Three orbital angular momentum components 𝐿𝑖 = 𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑄𝑗𝑃𝑘 
Three spin components    𝑆𝑖 = 𝐽𝑖 − 𝐿𝑖 
 All this has to be now applied to the Schrödinger equation. The action of 𝑔𝛼 ∈ 𝒢 upon 
states and observables in the Hilbert formulation can be alternatively expressed as  
 
𝑔𝛼 ∶ |𝜓⟩ → |𝜓⟩
𝑔𝛼 = 𝑈𝑠𝛼|𝜓⟩ = 𝑒
𝑖𝐾𝛼𝑠𝛼|𝜓⟩ 
(3.13 ) 
 𝑔𝛼: 𝑂𝑖 → 𝑂𝑖
𝑔𝛼 = 𝑈𝑠𝛼𝑂𝑈𝑠𝛼
−1 = 𝑒𝑖𝐾𝛼𝑠𝛼𝑂𝑒−𝑖𝐾𝛼𝑠𝛼 (3.14 ) 
Where the invariance of an observable O under a Galilean transformation amounts to the 
commutation between that observable O and the corresponding generator 𝐾𝛼. 
From all this, one can somehow easily check in which way the Schrödinger equation 
turns out to be invariant under Galilean group’s transformations. One typically begins by (1) 
pre-multiplying the two members by 𝑈 = 𝑒𝑖𝐾𝑠, (2) by adding and subtracting (
𝑑𝑈
𝑑𝑡
) |𝜓⟩ to the 
first member, and (3) by using the property 𝑈−1𝑈 = 1. Hence, one writes the Schrödinger 











𝑈−1𝑈|𝜓⟩ = 𝑈𝑖𝑈−1𝑈𝐻𝑈−1𝑈|𝜓⟩ (3.15 ) 
And after applying any of the Galilean transformations as specified above (and recalling the 






𝑈−1|𝜓⟩𝑔𝛼 = −𝑖𝑔𝛼𝐻𝑔𝛼|𝜓⟩𝑔𝛼  (3.16 ) 
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𝑈−1    
𝑑|𝜓⟩𝑔𝛼
𝑑𝑡
= −𝑖𝑔𝛼𝐻𝑔𝛼|𝜓⟩𝑔𝛼  (3.17 ) 
This means that the transformed differential operator 
𝑑𝑔𝛼
𝑑𝑡
 is an invariant time-derivative 𝐷/𝐷𝑡, 
which make the Schrödinger equation Galilean-invariant as defined above. 
 In a closed, constant-energy system free from any external fields, H is time-independent 
and 𝑃𝑖 and 𝐽𝑖 are constants of motion (see g, h above). Thus, one gets 






= 0  














The time-derivative turns out to be invariant under all these transformations and, consequently, 
the Schrödinger equation does too. 
 For boost transformation the argument needs some adjustments (see Lombardi, 
Castagnino and Ardenghi 2010 for a careful discussion about this). Briefll, the invariance of 







would in turn entail that its invariance under boosts amounts to a sort of “non-homogeneity” 
of time. So, to get a valid boost-invariant the Schrödinger equation, the transformed time-
derivative needs be adjusted so as to compensate the time-dependent transformation of the 
state. 
*** 
This brief analysis of SQM and its symmetry group showed how some space-time symmetries 
can be heuristically used to physically guide theory construction. One started off by considering 
some geometrical transformations already present in Hamiltonian classical mechanics under 
which the physics should remain invariant. These assumptions not only set elemental features 
of SQM, but also some basic features of space-time’s underlying structure. In particular, the 
invariance under some space-time symmetry transformations was required so as to derive basic 
operators (standing for basic dynamical variables) of the theory. Hence, the Schrödinger 
equation must remain invariant under those Galilean transformations. Furthermore, space-time 
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should be equipped with a structure conforming to those symmetries. So, one is entitled to 
consider that space is homogeneous as the Schrödinger equation is invariant under space 
translations. And so is time as long as the theory was imposed to be time-translation invariant. 
Relations of commutation or certain conservation principles also follow from taking the theory 
to be Galilean invariant (see Ballentine 1998: Chapter 3).  
Therefore, the assumption of Galilean invariance seems to play a crucial role in the 
construction of SQM. If you have an isolated physical system, you require the physics 
describing it to remain invariant under displacing the system a couple of hours (days, years or 
whatever) forward in time. In fact, you expect your physics to work equally well today and in 
four weeks in the future, or here at your home as well as there in a lab placed in Hong Kong. 
Those assumptions seemed also to be defensible to the extent that, for instance, temporally or 
spatially displaced experiments have generated similar results (putting aside, naturally, 
different boundary conditions, the presence of external fields, and so on). 
Basically, the symmetry group of SQM amounts to the equivalence among inertial 
reference frames (time-translated, space-translated, space-rotated or uniformly moving with 
respect to each other). In other words, Galilean transformations do not introduce any 
modification to the physical situation, but only express a change in the perspective from which 
the system is described. From a broader perspective, as viewed in the Part 1, this relates to the 
issue of what is the structure of a physical theory, that is, what is objective within the theory, 
and what elements would represent redundant structure. For the symmetry group of a theory, 
there seems to be intertwined criteria where certain (space-time) symmetries must be imposed 
beforehand so as to link basic dynamical variables with the mathematical formalism, while, 
simultaneously, a certain space-time’s structure is being introduced to the theory. All this to 
get the basic pieces of a viable physical theory. 
The symmetry group of a theory seems, certainly, to be necessary to construct the theory, 
that is, to define the fundamental physical magnitudes and to build the dynamical laws24. There 
are however many other symmetries that don’t belong to the symmetry group of quantum 
mechanics. Neither do they share some of their formal properties. For instance, Galilei group’s 
symmetries are continuous, but there are some other symmetries that are rather discrete. Must 
they be treated equally? Time reversal is one of those cases, so most of what has been just said 
about symmetries doesn’t straightforwardly apply to it. While the above-mentioned 
                                                          
24 Some have even argued that the symmetry group of the theory is a priori (see Dürr and Teufel 2009: 
43-44). 
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explanation seemed to rightly underpin assumptions on Galilei group’s symmetries, I think 
they shouldn’t be straightforwardly and uncritically applied to time reversal as well. 
Importantly, time reversal encloses even subtler features as it somehow relates to the 
nature of time and its unavoidable differences with respect to space: whereas one can move 
freely in all directions of space, it seems that one “moves” in just one direction of time, from 
past-to-future and never the other way around. Additionally, it is not easy to have a grip on its 
geometrical (and most intuitive) meaning. In the case of the symmetries considered above their 
respective transformations were given an intuitive geometrical meaning that was formally 
represented theoretically –one more or less knows what moving in time or space means. But, 
what does it mean to move backward in time? Particularly, what could mean inverting a 
quantum system backward in time? In the next chapter, I will get into these questions. 
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IV. 
The Physics and Metaphysics of Time Reversal  
Is the Schrödinger equation time-reversal invariant? 
This chapter deals with time reversal in SQM. In particular, it addresses the following question: 
is the Schrödinger equation time-reversal invariant? According to the current leading approach, 
the answer is emphatically positive. Furthermore, the leading approach continues, one is 
advised that the formal representation of time reversal (the quantum mechanical time-reversal 
operator), besides transforming the variable 𝑡 by −𝑡, must meet some further conditions. This 
is typically condensed in the following dictum: time reversal in SQM can only be implemented 
by an anti-unitary, anti-linear time-reversal operator. So, according to this orthodox approach 
(OA hence after), the Schrödinger equation is time-reversal invariant because is invariant under 
a so-specified time-reversal operator. 
Along this chapter, I will show that an alternative approach to time reversal in quantum 
mechanics can be coherently and soundly defended. This heterodox, or heretic, approach (HA 
from now on) rather holds that the Schrödinger equation is non-time-reversal invariant because 
it is non-invariant under a unitary, linear time-reversal operator. The theoretical viability of 
such an approach lies on the metaphysical considerations underlying the construction of the 
time-reversal operator. What I will, accordingly, argue is that OA heavily relies on a 
relationalist metaphysics of time plus some extra assumptions about time reversal and the role 
of symmetries in physics. Being all of these assumptions revisable, when one shifts gears and 
changes the metaphysical background or comes along with an unalike view on symmetries, OA 
loses much of its persuasive force. Consequently, HA significantly gains relevance, coherence, 
and feasibility. 
The final aim of this chapter is thus to show that there at least exist two opposite 
approaches to time reversal in SQM, both equally plausible and equally defensible. One’s 
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inclinations for either one or another greatly rely upon one’s metaphysical sympathies with 
respect to time, one’s general view on time reversal, and one’s considerations of the role of 
symmetries in physical theories. The chapter is thus organized as follows. Section 1 introduces 
OA and HA. In Section 2, I will present the most common and relevant arguments to support 
OA. Furthermore, I will argue that a relationalist metaphysics of time underlies them. In 
Section 3, I will develop HA further and will argue that, when one turns to a substantivalist 
metaphysics of time, OA’s arguments can be neutralized25. Finally, in Section 4, I will explore 
some further assumptions that feed each approach. In particular, I will show that a particularist, 
theory-dependent account of time reversal plus a view taking symmetries as guides to theory 
construction greatly underpin OA, whereas a universalist, theory-independent account of time 
reversal plus a view of symmetries as contingent properties of the dynamics strength HA. 
Section 1. Orthodoxy and Heresy in SQM: Two approaches to time reversal 
The orthodox story typically runs as follow. Most physics textbooks (see for instance Gibson 
and Pollard 1976, or Ballentine 1998) commonly start off warning against, so to speak, classical 
expectations that time reversal be implemented by means of a unitary time-reversal operator 
(𝑇𝑈 henceforth), merely mapping 𝑡 → −𝑡. In considering the Schrödinger equation (equation 
3.1), textbooks typically bring up an anti-unitary operator (𝑇𝐴) that not only does it flip t’s sign, 





→  𝐻|𝜓⟩ = −𝑖ℏ
𝜕|𝜓⟩
𝜕𝑡
 (4.1 ) 





 (4.2 ) 





 (4.3 ) 
                                                          
25 Part of the material for Section 2 y 3 was published in López, C. (2019). “Roads to the past: how to go and not 
to go backward in time in quantum theories”. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 9: 27. 
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Evidently, the Schrödinger equation is time-reversal invariant if one takes 𝑇𝐴 as the adequate 
time-reversal operator since 3.1 and 4.3 are symmetric. Note that this quantum-mechanical 
time-reversal operator is no longer a mapping from 𝑡 to – 𝑡 but it features an anti-unitary 
transformation as well. The explicit factor i in the Schrödinger equation plus the requirement 
that it should leave the modulus of the overlap of two state vectors invariant would, prima facie 
explain, its anti-unitary form. Hence,  𝑇𝐴 can be given with the so-called standard form  𝑇𝐴 =
𝑈𝐾, where 𝑈 is a unitary operator (more on this below) and K the complex conjugation, 
𝐾𝑧𝐾−1 = 𝑧∗, with respect to a standard representation. Notably, in the position representation, 
the time-reversal operator is formally nothing but the complex conjugation operator  𝑇𝐴 = 𝐾. 
It is worth explaining a few things further here. First of all, 𝑇𝐴 is also demanded by 
definition to change the sign of momentum,   𝑇𝐴𝐏𝑇𝐴
−1 = −𝐏. For instance, Leslie Ballentine 
(1998) while introducing time reversal transformation in quantum mechanics, says 
“The effect of the time-reversal operator T is to reverse the linear and angular 
momentum while leaving the position unchanged. Thus we require, by definition, 
𝑇𝐐𝑇−1 = 𝐐                    
𝑇𝐏𝑇−1 = −𝐏               
𝑇𝐉𝑇−1 = −𝐉        
(Ballentine 1998: 377-378. Italics mine) 
One should bear in mind that such a stipulation establishes a smooth continuity between the 
formal representations of time reversal in classical mechanics and in quantum mechanics: not 
only does the time-reversal operator transform magnitudes similarly, but it also keeps their 
fundamental equations of motion invariant. Indeed, the features of the unitary operator U are a 
consequence of the classical conditions for time reversal, namely,  𝑇𝐴𝑋 𝑇𝐴
−1 = 𝑋,  𝑇𝐴𝐏 𝑇𝐴
−1 =
−𝐏 and  𝑇𝐴𝜎 𝑇𝐴
−1 = −𝜎 (see Sachs 1987: 3426). 
Secondly, a so-defined time-reversal operator is clearly anti-linear and anti-unitary as it 
takes the complex conjugation and its inverse (𝑋−1) exists. Therefore, it preserves 
 
⟨ 𝑇𝐴𝜓| 𝑇𝐴𝜑⟩ = ⟨𝜓|𝜑⟩ (4.4 ) 
                                                          
26 T is instead of  𝑇𝐴 in the original 
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I will analyze some relevant arguments in favor of an anti-unitary representation shortly, but 
in general the literature repeats in different ways the same reasons and requirements an 
implementation of time reversal should meet. 
Finally, under 𝑇𝐴 the Schrödinger equation turnouts to be time-reversal invariant. 
Conforming to my explanation of time-reversal invariance (Chapter I, Section 6.2), this means 
that the class of solutions of the Schrödinger equation has the structure Ⱳ = Ⱳ𝑓 + Ⱳ𝑏, that 
is, it produces pairs of time-symmetric evolutions. In particular, if there exists a quantum state 
evolving forward in time (|𝜓⟩ ∈ Ⱳ𝑓), then there must exists too an evolution going backward 
in time |𝜓⟩𝑇 ∈ Ⱳ𝑏, which is actually an evolution where 𝑡 has been re-parametrized as 𝑡 →
−𝑡, and |𝜓⟩𝑇 is the complex conjugated state evolving backward, (|𝜓⟩∗). 
In light of this result, it is commonly claimed that the Schrödinger equation in its simplest 
form (free fall particle, for instance) does not pick up a structural arrow of time and, thereby, 
one is allowed to conclude that, in SQM (at least when interpretations are set aside), time’s 
structure is temporally symmetric. This conclusion straightforwardly follows from an instance 
of the symmetry-to-reality inference as explained in Chapter II, Section 2: 
(1) the Schrödinger equation (SE) is the (unique) law governing the quantum world 
(2) The direction of time (+𝑡 or – 𝑡) is variant in SE 
(3) Therefore, the direction of time is [interpretational link] 
(4)  Ockham’s razor applied to the direction of time 
(C) Therefore, the direction of time is not a structural property of the quantum 
world 
Note that premise (2) is backed by the choice of 𝑇𝐴 as a genuine formal representation of time 
reversal in quantum mechanics 
So, I will take OA to time reversal in SQM as holding the following theses 
OA 
(a) Time reversal in SQM must be represented by a time-reversal operator 
whose form is given by the 𝑇𝐴-operator 
(b) The Schrödinger equation is time-reversal invariant because is 𝑇𝐴-
invariant 
(c) Through the symmetry-to-reality inference, the Schrödinger equation 
is time-reversal invariant (𝑇𝐴-invariant), it does not pick up a structural 
arrow of time. 
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There is however an alternative view on time reversal that characterizes it in terms of a 
unitary and linear time-reversal operator, 𝑇𝑈 hereon. According to this approach, a time-
reversal operator for quantum mechanics (and likely in any other physical theory) should not 
involve any other property over and above that of turning t’s sign around, 𝑡 → −𝑡. This view 
typically comes up in the literature in either a negative or positive way:  
(a) as an unacceptable way to formally represent time reversal in quantum theories, which 
has to be dismissed in favor of the orthodoxy (see for instance Gasiorowicz 1966: 27), 
or  
(b) as a positive defense of a “more genuine” and “broader” way to formally represent time 
reversal in physics, and thereby in quantum theories (see Albert 2000, Callender 2000. 
Costa de Beauregard 198027 also defends such a view in quantum field theory).  
So, according to HA, when one applies to the Schrödinger equation a unitary time-reversal 
operator 𝑇𝑈 that solely changes the sign of t and of all those quantities expressed as first-time 
derivative (or non-basic magnitudes, in Albert’s vocabulary, see Albert 2000), one obtains the 
equation (1) again  
 𝑇𝐻|𝜓⟩ = 𝑖ℏ
𝜕𝑇|𝜓⟩
𝜕𝑇𝑡
→  𝐻|𝜓⟩ = −𝑖ℏ
𝜕|𝜓⟩
𝜕𝑡
 (4.5 ) 
Where 𝑇 = 𝑇𝑈. And that is all what one should expect time reversal to carry out. Period. 
A couple of clarifications are in order here. To begin with, as opposed to OA, this 
heterodox way to define a time-reversal operator does not take into account whether it must 
change the sign of momentum or not. In fact, it does not, as I will explain shortly.  
In the second place, the time-reversal operator is now a unitary and linear operator, 𝑇𝑈, 
as it does not take the complex conjugation on states. This feature is particularly problematic 
here for it is what produces a minus sign on the right side of the equation. In other words, as 
𝑇𝑈 is a unitary-linear operator, then 𝑇𝑈𝐇𝑇𝑈
−1 = −𝐻, entailing that if |𝜓⟩ is an eigenstate of 
the Hamiltonian with energy 𝐸, then the temporally mirrored eigenstate 𝑇𝑈
−1|𝜓⟩ should 
involve negative energies – 𝐸. It is quite easy to see that there is an obvious asymmetry in (4.5) 
                                                          
27 Beauregard also cites Watanabe 1965, and Jauch and Rohrlich 1955 as forefathers of the idea. 
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(indeed, a very deep and radical one) as one obtains no solution at all when time direction is 
thus-inverted.  
Finally, it follows from above that the Schrödinger equation is non-time-reversal 
invariant, if  𝑇𝑈 is taken as the right time-reversal operator. In contrast with OA, the class of 
solutions of the Schrödinger equation Ⱳ now has either the structure Ⱳ = Ⱳ𝑓 or Ⱳ = Ⱳ𝑏, 
but not both. This means that if |𝜓⟩ is a solution evolving forward in time (|𝜓⟩ ∈ Ⱳ𝑓), then 
|𝜓⟩𝑇 is not a solution of the Schrödinger equation as  |𝜓⟩𝑇 ∈ Ⱳ𝑏. The explanation is quite 
simple: since  𝑇𝑈 inverts the sign of the Hamiltonian ( 𝑇𝑈𝐇 𝑇𝑈
−1 = −𝐻), if |𝜓⟩ ∈ Ⱳ𝑓 features 
a Hamiltonian bounded from below (interpreted as within the positive spectrum of energy), 
then its time-reversed wave function |𝜓⟩𝑇 ∈ Ⱳ𝑏 will feature a Hamiltonian unbounded from 
below (interpreted as within the negative spectrum of energy). But as the Hamiltonian’s 
spectrum must only feature positive energies, and thereby be bounded from below (or rather, 
have some bound), the  𝑇𝑈-transformation necessarily transforms solutions into non-solutions 
(see Chapter III, Section 1). 
In this way, the Schrödinger equation, by its own, manifests a clear preference for one 
direction of time since it yields solutions either with time increasing or time decreasing, but 
not with both. As explained in Chapter II, this amounts to a claim for a structural arrow of time: 
the direction of time is not a variant feature in the Schrödinger equation to the extent to which 
the transformation from 𝑡 to – 𝑡 does not leave the equation unchanged. Therefore, the 
symmetry-to-reality inference inevitably arrives at a positive conclusion: the direction of time 
is a structural property of the SQM in as much it is no longer the case one is positing redundant 
or non-objective structure. 
I will thus take HA as claiming that 
HA 
(a) Time reversal in quantum theories must be represented by a time-
reversal operator whose form is given by the 𝑇𝑈-operator 
(b) The Schrödinger equation is non-time-reversal invariant as long as is 
non-𝑇𝑈-invariant 
(c) By (b) and through the symmetry-to-reality inference, the Schrödinger 
equation does manifest a structural arrow of time 
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At first glance, it seems that both approaches hold contradicting theses in so far as they are 
predicating contradictory properties of the same mathematical object. In fact, the Schrödinger 
equation cannot be at the same time and in the same respect time-reversal invariant and non-
time-reversal invariant. If one wants to make sense to the idea of time reversal when applied to 
SQM, one of these approaches must be necessarily dropped. 
I think that this is however too quick a conclusion and misses. To see why, recall that the 
time-reversal operator plays the role of implementing the concept of time reversal in a formal 
way. And this concept is intended to be spelled out in the way the time-reversal operator acts 
upon states and observables. Having said that, it is clear that both theses strictly resort to unalike 
mathematical representations of the action of inverting the direction of time. To put it in other 
words, they are not actually leading to contradictory theses; rather, they aim at reversing time 
in different ways. So, the true point of divergence is thesis (a) in each case: how the concept of 
time reversal must be formally implemented in SQM.  
Formulated in this way, the apparent contradiction fades away, at least, taken in absolute 
terms. In some sense, both approaches express different things by ‘time reversal’, which is 
reflected by their formal implementations (𝑇𝑈 and 𝑇𝐴). Furthermore, the crucial point is now 
which operator entails a better representation of the concept of time reversal. I think that this 
point has been largely overlooked in the literature, and it is worth bearing it in mind through 
the following sections. 
Section 2. Underpinning OA 
Most reasons to hold OA rely upon giving further arguments to believe in its first thesis (a): 𝑇𝐴 
is the fairest way to formally realize time reversal in SQM. Despite OA being well-seated in 
the modern treatment of time reversal in SQM, a thorough analysis of its conceptual grounds 
is rarely found (exceptions: Sachs 1987 and Roberts 2017). The literature typically addresses 
the topic already assuming its obviousness. This section thus reconstructs some of the reasons 
to take OA (particularly, its (a) thesis) as the adequate approach to time reversal in SQM. In 
supporting (a), one is by the same maneuver grounding (b) and (c) as well. 
I think there are at least three closely-related arguments to underpin OA, and to thereby 
cast HA aside. Indeed, the three share a reductio ad absurdum structure, differing in one of the 
premises. The first argument has been famously introduced by Eugene Wigner in 1932, and I 
will call it “two-time-evolution argument”; the second argument relies on the fact the 
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Hamiltonian’s spectrum must remain bounded from below (that is, it must not involve negative 
energies), which I will call “the Hamiltonian-based argument”; and the third one establishes 
that momentum (in this case, the momentum operator, ?̂?) must change its sign under time 
reversal, and I will refer to it as “the momentum-based argument”. 
2.1 The ‘two-time-evolution’ argument (or Wigner’s general criterion for time-reversal) 
Wigner’s introduction to time reversal begins by posing a general criterion stating that time 
reversal is a transformation such that, when the following operations are sequentially 
performed, one obtains the identity. Informally,  
 
time displacement by t  time reversal  time displacement by t  time reversal = I       
And more formally, 
 
𝑇[𝑈∆𝑡2𝑇(𝑈∆𝑡1𝑠0)] = 𝑠0 (General criterion) 
Where 𝑠0 is the initial state, and ∆𝑡1 = 𝑡1 − 𝑡2 = −𝑡2 − 𝑡1 = ∆𝑡2 
In general, this statement (as it stands) has been taken as claiming that the time-reversal 
transformation is an involution. That is, when applied twice it is equal to the identity. This 
mathematical sense of involution is naturally met by any operator that satisfies 𝑋2 = 𝐼. 
However, OA is not just supposing that the time-reversal transformation is an involution in this 
sense, to the extent to which the original state is expected to be obtained after two time 
displacements (or time evolutions). To put it differently, OA (i.e. Wigner) expects the time-
reversal transformation to obtain the original state one started with after producing a time 
evolution going in the future direction of time and producing a time-reversed evolution going 
backward in time. What this means is that time reversal ought to generate the second time 
evolution, that is, a moving-backward evolution, through which one should obtain the initial 
state again. And this is a stronger requirement that a time-reversal operator should satisfy. 
So, an appropriate time-reversal operator in quantum mechanics must involve the 
adequate transformation to meet Wigner’s general criterion for time reversal. More 
emphatically, to be a time-reversal operator is to be an operator that generates such a second 
time evolution going backward as specified above. Additionally, Wigner establishes that any 
so-defined T has to preserve transition probabilities as well (otherwise, the second time 
evolution would no longer be possible)  
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|⟨𝜓|𝜑⟩| = |⟨𝑇𝜓|𝑇𝜑⟩| 
(Preservation of 
transition probabilities) 
There is not much justification in the standard literature on time reversal in SQM of why time 
reversal ought to preserve the transition probabilities. In general, Wigner postulated that the 
transition probabilities between two states has an invariant physical sense, so any symmetry 
should preserve them. That is, if a symmetry holds, then transition probabilities must be 
preserved by the symmetry transformation. And in this line, Wigner argues that time-reversal 
invariance, if it holds, must preserve transition probabilities, too.  
This condition is one of the ingredients to prove his famous theorem, which in an 
informal formulation states that a symmetry transformation is either unitary or anti-unitary. 
However, it has been pointed out that Wigner’s overall proof of his theorem was “incomplete” 
(see Chevalier 2007: 429) and that a correct proof is given by U. Uhlhorn in 1962, who also 
generalizes the condition of preserving the probabilities. In a nutshell, Uhlhorn’s proof replaces 
the preservation of the transition probabilities by the preservation of orthogonality, that is, that 
any pair of orthogonal states ⟨𝜓, 𝜑⟩ = 0 remains orthogonal under a symmetry transformation 
S, ⟨𝑆𝜓, 𝑆𝜑⟩ = 0. It follows from this that ⟨𝜓, 𝜑⟩ = ⟨𝑆𝜓, 𝑆𝜑⟩ (see Chevalier 2007, Section 5, 
for a proof of Uhlhorn’s theorem). For Chevalier, Uhlhorn generalizes Wigner’s proof as he 
shows that a symmetry transformation preserves the logical structure of a quantum theory, as 
Uhlhorn himself states in the Introduction of his book.28 
 Following the same logic as before, if time-reversal invariance holds, then any 
orthogonal pair of states remains orthogonal under time reversal, that is, if ⟨𝜓, 𝜑⟩ = 0, then 
⟨𝑇𝜓, 𝑇𝜑⟩ = 0. Roberts (2017) notes that Uhlhorn’s theorem provides a general answer to why 
transition probabilities must be preserved under time reversal. His argument is quite simple: 
orthogonality has nothing to do with time reversal as it just relates to “what is possible in an 
experimental outcome, independently of their time development” (Roberts 2017: 321. 
Emphasis mine). So, why should one expect that something not related whatsoever to time (as 
two states being mutually exclusive) be modified by time reversal? As Roberts correctly points 
                                                          
28 “We shall replace the requirement of the invariance of transition probabilities by the requirement that orthogonal 
vector rays are transformed into orthogonal vector rays, that is, incoherent states are transformed into incoherent 
states. By this definition, a symmetry transformation is a mapping preserving the logical structure of quantum 
mechanics, whereas the definition stated above corresponds to a mapping preserving the probabilistic structure of 
quantum mechanics” (Uhlhorn 1962: 308) 
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out, there is no reason for this. Therefore, time reversal ought to preserve orthogonality, and 
thereby, transition probabilities as well. 
 Importantly, Roberts stresses that the preservation of orthogonality and transition 
probabilities should be guaranteed by either an anti-unitary (like 𝑇𝐴) or a unitary time-reversal 
operator (like 𝑇𝑈). As was mentioned above, the idea is quite simple: if any of these operators 
bears any relation with time reversal, it shouldn’t change a condition that is independent of 
time. In principle, I completely agree with this suggestion and I cannot think of any reason why 
a unitary time-reversal operator would contradict this. However, there are at least two 
assumptions in Robert’s argument: first, and this one comes from Wigner himself, transition 
probabilities (or orthogonality in Uhlhorn’s version) are preserved if the law is invariant under 
the symmetry transformation; (b) that the symmetry transformation still produces a quantum 
mechanical state. With respect to the former point, of course, a unitary symmetry 
transformation might still preserve orthogonality even if the time symmetry doesn’t hold. With 
respect to the latter, in some very particular cases, it’s not just the case the symmetry doesn’t 
hold, but the symmetry transformation doesn’t even produce quantum-mechanical states after 
being applied. And I suspect that something like this is going on here with 𝑇𝑈: the time-reversed 
state (𝑇𝑈|𝜓⟩) is physically meaningless. Or differently, it’s not even a quantum mechanical 
state. So, why should orthogonality be preserved if the very notion of quantum mechanical 
state is not even conserved?  
To be clear, I think Roberts is quite right in pointing out that (i) if time-reversal 
symmetry holds, then orthogonality must be preserved, (ii) this is a more general justification 
of why time reversal must preserve transition probabilities, and (iii) preservation of 
orthogonality has nothing to do with time, so there would be, in principle, no reason to expect 
that time reversal changes this. However, time reversal does have to specify how states 
transform upon application and, in this particular case, 𝑇𝑈 doesn’t transform quantum 
mechanical states into quantum mechanical states. And one of the main reasons for this is given 
by the “Hamiltonian-based argument”. I will come back to this in Section 3.1. 
Let’s briefly sum up the “two-evolution-based argument”. Beyond this characterization 
of the T-operator in quantum theories, Wigner has so far just specified the general requirements 
a time-reversal operator must accomplish, but he has remained silent about the specific form 
of T. His famous theorem, as mentioned before in its general form, then proves that T must be 
either unitary (𝑇𝑈) or anti-unitary (𝑇𝐴). As 𝑇𝑈 fails to satisfy Wigner’s general criterion for time 
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reversal, time reversal must be represented by 𝑇𝐴 –tertium non datur. To be clear: 𝑇𝑈 is 
discarded as an appropriate representation of time reversal just for it does not satisfy the very 
definition of time reversal expressed in the above-mentioned conditions. The structure of this 
reductio ad absurdum argument can be then sketched as follows: 
(1) Assume that 𝑇𝑈 fairly represents time reversal. 
(2a) If 𝑇𝑈 fairly represents time reversal, 𝑇𝑈 must generate a second time evolution going 
backward (meeting the general criterion) 
(3a) As matter of fact, 𝑇𝑈 does not generate the second time evolution in Wigner’s 
general criterion for time reversal. 
(C) 𝑇𝑈 does not fairly represent time reversal 
As long as the form of 𝑇 can only be either unitary or anti-unitary, it straightforwardly follows 
that only 𝑇𝐴 represents time reversal. 
2.2. The Hamiltonian-based argument 
Let’s move on to the Hamiltonian-based argument. This argument relies on an already-
mentioned natural assumption (see Chapter III: Section 2): the Hamiltonian’s spectrum must 
remain bounded from below (that is, it must not involve negative energies). Schematically 
represented, 
(1) Assume that 𝑇𝑈 fairly represents time reversal 
(2b) If 𝑇𝑈 fairly represents time reversal, 𝑇𝑈 must keep the Hamiltonian invariant 
(3b) As matter of fact, 𝑇𝑈 does not keep the Hamiltonian invariant as  𝑇𝑈𝐇𝑇𝑈
−1 = −𝐻  
(C) 𝑇𝑈 does not fairly represent time reversal 
Let me spell premises (2b) and (3b) out. One of the reasons of why the Hamiltonian must 
remain invariant under time reversal is that, otherwise, an time-reversed evolution would no 
longer be possible: in order to be able to represent a quantum system in a backward-moving 
evolution, its Hamiltonian must remain within the positive spectrum at any cost (just to provide 
some references, see Gasiorowicz 1966: 27, Gibson and Pollard 1976: 78, Sachs 1987: 36). As 
mentioned early, quantum states are said to be “physically meaningless” (in the light of SQM’s 
principles) when they are eigenstates of the Hamiltonian whose spectrum is “unbounded” from 
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below. Putting it drastically, unbounded-from-below Hamiltonians must not even be 
considered as quantum-mechanics systems. In a classical textbook, Stephen Gasiorowicz says 
“...we find that [the Schrödinger equation of motion] can be invariant only if 
𝑇𝐻𝑇−1 =  − 𝐻 
This, however, is an unacceptable condition, because time reversal cannot change 
the spectrum of H, which consists of positive energies only. If T is taken to be anti-
unitary [….] the trouble does not occur.” (1966: 27).  
It is worth clarifying that the predicates “positive” or “negative” for the energy spectrum, or 
“unbounded from below/from above” for Hamiltonians are actually a matter of convention. So, 
the argument could not hinge on which predicate one adopts to describe the system properly. 
The real problem is not exactly whether the Hamiltonian is unbounded from below. The 
problem is if one starts with a Hamiltonian unbounded from above (but bounded from below) 
and ends up with a Hamiltonian unbounded from below (but bounded from above) after a 
transformation. In some sense, the problem is whether there is a bound at all. More precisely, 
a specific Hamiltonian must be bounded (either from above or from below), and the problem 
would come up if one adopts a transformation that turns a Hamiltonian unbounded from above 
(bounded from below) into a Hamiltonian unbounded from below (bounded from above), so 
that Hamiltonians (in general) could adopt either of the bounds. 
I will take for granted that a Hamiltonian unbounded from below (but bounded from 
above and typically interpreted as within the negative spectrum of energy) is physically 
meaningless, as it is a sort of principle of SQM. As 𝑇𝑈 inevitably transforms the system’s 
energy as 𝑇𝑈𝐇𝑇𝑈
−1 = −𝐻, it follows that it fails to represent time reversal as specified by OA. 
Roberts (2017) offers more solid grounds for accepting premises (2b) and (3b). He begins 
by claiming that “all known Hamiltonians describing realistic quantum systems are bounded 
from below, which we will express by choosing a lower bound of 0 ≤ (𝜓, 𝐻𝜓)”  (2017: 326), 
and this fact seems to be promoted to a general condition that a time-reversal operator must 
meet in order for its acceptability, meaning that ⟨𝜓, 𝐻𝜓⟩ and ⟨𝑇𝜓, 𝑇𝐻𝜓⟩ are both non-
negatives. Later on, Roberts demands that there is at least “one realistic dynamical system” that 
satisfies time-reversal invariance in the sense that satisfies 𝑇𝑒𝑖𝑡𝐻𝜓 = 𝑒−𝑖𝑡𝐻𝑇𝜓. Roberts makes 
the point that the time-reversal operator is demanded to be anti-unitary in order to meet these 
requirements, so for reduction, he assumes that such an operator is unitary. This leads to 𝑖𝑡𝐻 =
−𝑖𝑡𝑇𝐻𝑇−1 and thus to 𝑇𝐇𝑇−1 = −𝐻. What one finally gets is 0 ≤ ⟨𝜓, 𝐻𝜓⟩ = −⟨𝑇𝜓, 𝑇𝐻𝜓⟩  ≤
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0 and this result leads to either accept that the Hamiltonian is unbounded from below (what he 
had previously ruled out) or that the Hamiltonian is the operator zero, which renders triviality. 
Therefore, by reductio, the time-reversal operator cannot be unitary but anti-unitary. 
2.3. The momentum-based argument 
Finally, the momentum-based argument concerns how time reversal is supposed to act upon 
certain operators, in particular, the momentum operator. It can be sketched as follows 
(1) Assume that 𝑇𝑈 fairly represents time reversal. 
(2c) If 𝑇𝑈 fairly represents time reversal, 𝑇𝑈 must transform momentum as 𝑇𝐏𝑇
−1 = −𝐏 
(3c) As matter of fact, 𝑇𝑈 leaves momentum invariant,  𝑇𝑈𝐏𝑇𝑈
−1 = 𝐏  
(C) 𝑇𝑈 does not fairly represents time reversal 
For the most part, the reasons why the sign of momentum should change under time reversal 
is somewhat unclear in the literature29. On the one hand, the reasoning seems to take roots in 
an analogy with time reversal in classical mechanics. Robert Sachs for instance imposes that 
“[time reversal must] conform to the requirements of the correspondence principle –namely, 
operators representing classical kinematic observables must transform under T in a manner 
corresponding to classical motion reversal.” (1987: 34). For Leslie Ballentine, as was shown, 
time reversal flips the sign of momentum in quantum mechanics by definition (1998: 377-378), 
and, in the same vein, Albert Messiah (1966) simply defines time reversal as transforming 𝑟 
(position) and 𝑝 (momentum) into 𝑟 and – 𝑝 respectively (see Davies 1974: 24-25 for an akin 
definition).: 
“We are thus led to define a transformation of dynamical variables and dynamical 
states, which we shall call time reversal, in which 𝑟 and 𝑝 transform respectively 
into 𝑟 and −𝑝. ... [ 𝑇𝐴 ] obviously satisfies [the] relations. Therefore, we may take 
[ 𝑇𝐴 ] as our time reversal operator” (Messiah 1966: 667). 
Roberts mentions that “there is a natural perspective on the nature of time according to which 
quantities like momentum and spin really do change sign when time-reversed” (2017: 317, 
italics mine). 
                                                          
29 Although Bryan Roberts (2017, 2018) has recently offered a thorough justification for this argument. I’ll 
present it and discus it later on (Section 3.3). 
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Let’s take granted for now that it is indeed natural (or intuitive) that the momentum 
operator changes its sign under time reversal in SQM. In Section 3.3 I will come back to this 
with a more careful analysis and some philosophical discussion. 
2.4. An underlying relationalist metaphysics of time 
The above-introduced arguments intend to establish the form of T mainly based on formal and 
physical reasons. Next, I will show that metaphysical commitments with respect to the nature 
of time underlie and support them as well. Metaphysics comes first in the sense that determines 
not only what time reversal actually is but also upon what it is supposed to act. And this fact, 
to my knowledge, has been to great extent overlooked in the current literature on time reversal. 
In Chapter I, I introduced three metaphysical views about the nature of time that would 
play an active role in determining what the problem of the arrow of time is supposed to be 
about. I will now argue that a relationalist metaphysics of time (as described in Chapter I) 
underlies OA and its arguments. Recall that I have taken relationalism as holding the following 
theses: 
R1 There are only events or physical bodies in the world (which can have intrinsic 
properties or not), and their (spatio) temporal relations. There is no external 
time. 
R2 Time is nothing but change. The sort of relation between the physical world and 
the concept of ‘time’ is that of Leibnizian representation or Machian-
abstraction: time is an ideal, unreal entity parasitic on events-things’ changing. 
Therefore, according to these tenets, the variable t occurring in the majority of physical theories 
(setting aside general relativity) is merely an external unreal parameter, which should not be 
taken as representing something with physical meaning. I am particularly interested in showing 
how this metaphysical background underlies the defense and characterization of time reversal 
as 𝑇𝐴 in SMQ. 
To start with, the 𝑇: 𝑡 → −𝑡 transformation must not be taken too seriously. It would be 
naïve to take 𝑡 → −𝑡 as performing a physically relevant action upon dynamical equations. 
Instead, time reversal should be considered as a “shortcut” standing for a bunch of dynamically 
relevant transformations. As one is mainly interested in equations of motion, the physical 
meaning of time reversal is entirely exhausted by the dynamically relevant transformations 
relating to the motion of a system. In a nutshell, time reversal is nothing but motion reversal, 
and thereby the time-reversal transformation should be explicated as a bunch of dynamically 
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relevant transformations that reverses the original direction of the motion. Think of a classical 
particle moving from point 𝑥1 to 𝑥2 in the time interval ∆𝑡 = 𝑡2 − 𝑡1. Saying “I will time 
reverse the system by applying T” is simply a shortcut for “I will reverse the motion of the 
system by applying a bunch of dynamically relevant transformations that take the system back 
to the initial state”. Assuming that the underlying dynamics in this toy example is classical 
mechanics, the T-operator should be properly spelt out into the momentum 
transformation 𝑃: 𝑝 → −𝑝, and the position transformation 𝑋: 𝑥 → 𝑥. The transformation 
𝑇: 𝑡 → −𝑡 is physically meaningless, and must be merely regarded as a simple re-
parametrization of the variable t. The physically relevant content of time reversal is fully 
exhausted by the momentum transformation and the position transformation as specified above. 
In the light of this, the theory-dependent nature of the time-reversal operator becomes 
clearer. The dynamically relevant variables related to motion change from theory to theory, so 
the features of T must also change accordingly. That is why the mathematical form of T must 
be in each case figured out by identifying the adequate magnitudes related to spatial and 
temporal translation so as to reverse them properly (i.e. so as to get the state one began with). 
The defense of 𝑇𝐴 in SQM is just an instance of this broader perspective. Thus, a time-reversal 
operator from a relationalist metaphysics of time is defined in general as follows 
𝑇𝑅𝑒𝑙  (a) A physically meaningless re-parametrization of t by 𝑇: 𝑡 → −𝑡 
(b) A change of all dynamically relevant magnitudes so as to generate a moving-
backward system (a time-reversed evolution going backward to the original 
state), which is expressed by extensionally specifying the bunch of dynamically 
relevant transformations. 
This relationalist metaphysical background undoubtedly underlies Wigner’s general criterion 
for time reversal. According to it, a fair characterization of the T-operator crucially depends on 
changing the dynamically relevant variables so as to guarantee the existence of the second time 
translation after applying the first time-reversal transformation. Any intended time-reversal 
transformation that fails to yield the second time translation will by definition be flawed, 
precisely because it fails to generate a backward-headed movement. The very existence of the 
second time translation is what precisely ensures that one is really applying a time (motion)-
reversal transformation correctly. Therefore, the metaphysical reason to discard 𝑇𝑈 as a time-
reversal operator is that it fails to generate the existence of the second time translation, and to 
thereby reverse motion. In other words, 𝑇𝑈 fails to be a time-reversal operator because it fails 
to be a motion-reversal operator. Most specialized textbooks take this point for granted in 
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claiming that time reversal is nothing but motion reversal. Wigner in passing says that “reversal 
of the direction of motion” would be a more felicitous expression than time reversal (Wigner 
1932: 325). Along the same line, Gibson and Pollard (1976) clarify 
“In this approach we see that no metaphysical notion of reversal of the direction of 
the flow of time is involved. We are led to consider time reversed processes but 
not reversal time itself. Although motion reversal and motion reversal invariance 
would be better names, we shall adhere to the accepted, if imprecise, usage” (1976: 
177) 
In a modern textbook on quantum mechanics, Ballentine categorically affirms  
“The term “time reversal” is misleading, and the operation that is the subject of this 
section would be more accurately described as motion reversal. We shall continue 
to use the traditional but less accurate expression “time reversal”, because it is so 
firmly entrenched” (1998: 377) 
Strictly speaking, the notion of time reversal is neither misleading, nor metaphysically 
misguided: as time is just an abstraction at which one arrives by means of motion (paraphrasing 
Mach’s expression, 1919: 224), time reversal is simply an abstraction of motion reversal. For 
the relationalist, there is no time reversal symmetry besides motion reversal, but time reversal 
and motion reversal are one and the same thing. 
What about time-reversal invariance? The symmetry of time reversal sheds light on the 
structure of the change in physical theories: there is no further structure of time outside of the 
structure of change. Time-reversal invariance mainly regards whether physical theories imply 
that change (as governed by a dynamical law) is necessarily directed. As was shown before, 
relationalism does not commit a priori to a particular time structure, but this should be unveiled 
by means of varied time symmetries (time translation, time reversal, time relabeling, and so 
on). Yet, the central point to be stressed here is that previously-assumed metaphysical 
commitments with respect to the nature of time are what prescribe upon what time reversal is 
supposed to act so as to generate a moving-backward time translation. As time is considered 
non-physical, the time-reversal transformation has to act upon dynamically relevant 
magnitudes in a certain way, and the time-reversal operator is essentially the bunch of 
dynamically relevant transformations that guarantee a reversion of the direction of motion. 
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Section 3. Shifting gears: a substantivalist metaphysics of time for HA and 
how to overcome OA’s arguments. 
If someone wants to bring HA back, she firstly ought to neutralize the three arguments 
presented in the last section. A plausible strategy would be to put forward an alternative 
metaphysical background: if a relationalist metaphysics underlies, and motivates, OA’s 
arguments, one could instead evaluate them from a different metaphysical stance. In particular, 
she needs to show that her definition of time reversal is not necessarily committed to accept 
either (2a), (2b) or (2c), and an alternative metaphysics of time could well do the job. To be 
clear, what has been proved so far is that if a time-reversal operator meets the aforementioned 
requirements, then it must be an anti-unitary time-reversal like  𝑇𝐴. However, this is a 
conditional statement: no reasons have been so far provided (beyond the relationalist 
motivation) to support the requirement that any time-reversal operator in SQM must satisfy 
premises (2a), (2b) and (2c), but if it does, then it is anti-unitary. 
Hence, HA’s supporters might complain and argue that such assumptions are not 
legitimate. In this section, I shall introduce some arguments that HA’s supporters might put 
forward in order to neutralize OA’s. The maneuver is, I think, primarily metaphysical: If a 
relationalist metaphysics of time underlies OA’s arguments for 𝑇𝐴, when one shifts gears and 
turns to an alternative metaphysical background, OA’s arguments could in fact lose its 
dispositive force. This section aims to explore such an alternative scenario: Suppose now that 
one has sound reasons to decline a relationalist basis for time. How should time reversal be 
now metaphysically and formally characterized? Particularly, as long as the metaphysical 
background changes, do OA’s arguments still stand or rather fall along with it? 
In this section, I will argue that the substantivalist may endorse a different 
characterization of time reversal, and thereby, an alternative formalization thereof.  As exposed 
in Chapter I, I will take substantivalism as the position supporting the following two theses: 
S1 Time is a theoretical entity endowed with a structure that is intrinsic to it, and 
independent of change. Temporal relations among events or things are 
parasitic on this theoretical entity. 
S2 Time is not an ideal or representational notion, but it plays a physically 
meaningful role so as to explain different phenomena or to define dynamical 
variables. Time cannot thereby be boiled down to a dynamical basis. 
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In the light of this view, how must time reversal, thus, be characterized? On the one hand, 
as time stands by itself, there are no metaphysical reasons for time reversal to be explicated as 
a bunch of dynamically relevant transformations; quite to the contrary, time reversal is 
metaphysically and conceptually prior to any other dynamically relevant transformation, and 
the latter must be specified in function of the former. In which way other magnitudes behave 
under time reversal follows from what sort of physical and formal relations they hold with time 
within a specific theory (e.g. whether they are either a first- or second-time derivative, and so 
on). On the other, as time is now a physically meaningful external parameter, an inversion of 
the direction of time must mainly mean an inversion of the external parameter itself. This view 
of time reversal seems to be what Jill North has in mind when she claims: 
“What is a time reversal transformation? Just a flipping of the direction of time! 
That is all there is to a transformation that changes how things are with respect to 
time: change the direction of time itself” (North 2009: 212. Emphasis added) 
The meaning of time reversal is therefore completely exhausted by the transformation 𝑇: 𝑡 →
−𝑡; and, as said above, the rest of dynamical transformations supervene on it. By assumption, 
this transformation has physical relevance and is not to be considered a non-physical re-
parametrization as the relationalist does. A substantivalist time-reversal operator can then be 
defined as follows 
𝑇𝑆𝑢𝑏  (a) A change of the direction of time 𝑇: 𝑡 → −𝑡 
(b) A change of all magnitudes that are expressed or represented in function of 
time within the theory 
The property (a) is all what one expects a time-reversal transformation must perform from a 
substantivalist stance. The property (b) is a corollary of (a): whenever you find a magnitude 
expressed o represented as a first-time derivative within the theory, change its sign accordingly. 
This property would have two reasons: first, it straightforwardly and formally follows from 
applying the transformation 𝑡 → −𝑡 wherever a t appears in an equation of motion. If my 
physical theory involves a magnitude where time is a first-derivative, then it does not matter 
what the magnitude is and how it can be interpreted: the transformation 𝑡 → −𝑡 would induce 
that such a magnitude switches its sign accordingly. Second, if a magnitude is expressed in 
function of time, it means that the theory supposes that such a magnitude and time stand in a 
close relation and, thereby, any change of the direction of time should have some effect on that 
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magnitude30.  This last point may be also expressed in terms of supervenience: any change in 
the variable’s sign supervenes upon 𝑡 → −𝑡. 
What about time reversal in SQM? To begin with, the T-operator should no longer be 
required to produce an evolution going backward in time to the original state. Metaphysically, 
this is clear from a substantivalist metaphysics as defined above: if time is prior and 
independent of change (or movement), then a specific behavior of change (as a moving-
backward physical system) cannot define, or be equivalent to, a reversion of time. The situation 
is indeed the opposite: time reversal is expressible independently of an inversion of the 
direction of motion. To define the direction of time in terms of the direction of motion would 
be as putting the cart before the horse. Under specific circumstances, an inversion of the 
direction of time may lead to a time-reversed evolution that restores the original state; for 
instance, when the dynamically relevant magnitudes that define the state and/or the direction 
of motion are first-time derivatives (as velocity in Newtonian classical mechanics). But this is 
not a desideratum to be held universally and necessarily. It might be the case that time reversal 
fails to generate such a moving-backward evolution, and then that a change of the direction of 
time would not lead to an inversion of the direction of motion (as it happens in SQM with  𝑇𝑈). 
Consequently, most reasons to hold (2a), (2b), and (2c) look less compelling. Let’s address 
each argument in tandem 
3.1. Neutralizing the two-time-evolution argument 
Under a substantivalist view, the two-time-evolution argument no longer runs so smoothly as 
before. Particularly, because the premise (2a) does not hold to be true in the light of any 
instantiation of  𝑇𝑆𝑢𝑏. According to Wigner’s general criterion for time reversal, the existence 
of the second time translation must be guaranteed to set the form of the time-reversal operator 
properly. One of the reasons to discard 𝑇𝑈 was exactly it failed to meet such a criterion, but 
this rationale no longer runs when a substantivalist view on time is assumed instead. In some 
sense, 𝑇𝑆𝑢𝑏 is at odds with Wigner’s overall characterization of time reversal because it 
demands further actions and structure to represent time reversal which are actually necessary 
                                                          




From here, one can infer that, whatever a velocity is, it has some relation with time. So, now one is told to perform 
the operation t → −t. What would one expect to happen with v after the transformation? By just following the 







−𝑣. I think this is the intuition behind the substantivalist definition of time reversal and how it should transform 
other magnitudes. The point is that magnitudes should only switch their sign if there is an explicit relation with 
time in its formal expression within a specific theory.  
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conforming to S1, S2 and 𝑇𝑆𝑢𝑏. Under this view, time reversal looks much more like a reflection 
than a mechanism to generate a time evolution going backward towards the initial state. Even 
though any instantiation of 𝑇𝑆𝑢𝑏 (as 𝑇𝑈) would be an involution in the mathematical sense, this 
doesn’t imply that any application of an involution must also yield an identity when there are 
two temporal evolutions in the middle. To guarantee this, further structure ought to be imposed 
on the time-reversal transformation, and that’s why any relationalist imposes further conditions 
on time reversal. But, and this is the point of my argument, the substantivalist might be wary 
that a reflection needs those requirements. Hence, 𝑇𝑈 can be re-established on the proper 
metaphysical grounds to the extent that fairly represents such a reflection (see Arntzenius 1997 
and Savitt 1996: chapter 1 for time reversal as a reflection). 
Let me put it a bit differently. Wigner’s argumentation invokes two explicit premises: 
that a suitable time-reversal transformation must be able to restore “the system to its original 
state” (1932: 326), and that time inversion must flip the direction of motion to compensate for 
the twofold application of T. But there is also one implicit assumption in requiring that time 
reversal meets Wigner’s general criterion: for a time-reversal operator to be well-defined, the 
second time translation (from 𝑡2 to 𝑡1) must also evolve according to the Schrödinger equation. 
Now, suppose that a quantum state |𝜓⟩ evolves from 𝑡1 to 𝑡2, according to the Schrödinger 
equation (first time translation in Wigner’s general criterion). At 𝑡2, time reversal is applied 
upon, according to Wigner, the evolved state. If the time-reversal transformation is well-
defined, then the time-evolved and time-reversed state should evolve from 𝑡2 to 𝑡1 conforming 
to the Schrödinger equation (second time translation with |𝜓∗⟩), which would intuitively be 
equivalent to making the system evolve back with – 𝑡. According to Wigner, the operation to 
be applied at  𝑡2 must be of such a kind that yields a physically meaningful moving-backward 
evolution, otherwise, it wouldn’t be a solution of the Schrödinger equation. 
Yet, is such a structure required to formally represent time reversal? The answer is “Yes” 
if time reversal means motion reversal; but the answer might rather be “No” if one believes 
that there is no reason to assume that time reversal necessarily means or involves motion 
reversal. In fact, Wigner’s characterization of time reversal is actually a characterization of 
motion reversal as he mentions himself (1932: 325). An HA’s substantivalist supporter could 
argue that demanding time reversal to feature the required structure to represent motion reversal 
is excessive because time reversal is just supposed to perform the reflection  𝑡 → −𝑡, and not 
to grant that the system goes back to its initial state. 
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So, an available strategy for HA’s supporters is that 𝑇𝐴 is actually representing a different 
symmetry transformation than that of time reversal, which is properly represented by 𝑇𝑈. But 
this strategy introduces a clear-cut distinction between motion reversal and time reversal, which 
could only rely on a substantivalist background. In this light, a definition of time reversal 
cannot be boiled down to an inversion of the order of events (or motion). 
To sum up. One available strategy to neutralize the two-time-evolution argument is by 
distinguishing between motion reversal and time reversal at a formal level: 𝑇𝐴 simply fails to 
represent time reversal because it represents a different symmetry transformation –motion 
reversal. The legitimacy of HA (and thereby of 𝑇𝑈) could start to be considered seriously on 
this ground. Let’s now move on the next argument. 
3.2. Neutralizing the Hamiltonian-based argument  
As to the demand of preserving the Hamiltonian’s energy within the positive spectrum, the 
HA’s counter-argument runs similarly. The essence of such premise is, putting it simply, that 
the Schrödinger equation generates a physically meaningful solution upon change in the 
direction of time. So, it is a fundamental feature of 𝑇𝐴 in SQM that it precludes negative energy 
solutions. It would be no possible to generate the second time translation in Wigner’s general 
criterion if the time-reversal operator changes the Hamiltonian’s sign. 
However, from HA and 𝑇𝑆𝑢𝑏, any sign’s changing follows from whether physical 
magnitudes are expressed as time derivative or not (Thesis 𝑇𝑆𝑢𝑏-b). The relation between time 
and a system’s energy has been largely puzzling in non-relativistic quantum mechanics. This 
relates to the viability of a time operator in SQM and how to interpret energy-time uncertainty 
relation, issues that track back to the work of Wolfgang Pauli (see Pauli 1980 [1958]: 63, fn.2. 
See also Busch 1990a-b). Undoubtedly, the theory sets up a closely-knit, though unclear, 
relation between them, and I think the debate around a proper characterization of time reversal 
is just one of its multiple dimensions. Putting this aside, 𝑇𝑆𝑢𝑏 demands any observable to 
change sign under time reversal if it takes time as its first-time derivative. In its simplest form, 





 (4.6 ) 
From 𝑇𝑆𝑢𝑏, the Hamiltonian’s sign is directly inverted under time reversal because it is defined 
in function of time. Arguing that the time-reversal operator should leave invariant certain 
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quantities in SQM misses the point, since the proper definition of 𝑇𝑆𝑢𝑏 and the metaphysical 
background of HA do not reflect such a concern. To be clear: the change of Hamiltonian’s sign 
is just what it is meant to do according to 𝑇𝑆𝑢𝑏 and HA, and this change is just a particular case 
of a general rule that is supposed to be applied wherever 𝑇𝑆𝑢𝑏 holds. 𝑇𝑈 is just therefore 
expressing such characterization. 
An HA’s defender could also pose the following argument. One of the motivations for 
not regarding 𝑇𝑈 as a well-behaved time-reversal operator is that it renders no solution when 
the direction of time is inverted. Conversely, the legitimacy of 𝑇𝐴 is grounded on the fact that 
it does turn solutions into solutions. But this requirement only makes sense if time reversal 
aims at generating the second time evolution in Wigner’s general criterion for time reversal. 
As mentioned above, the generation of such a second time evolution is a sine qua non condition 
for representing time reversal properly as far as 𝑇𝑅𝑒𝑙 is taken; thereby, the second time 
translation must also be a solution according to the dynamical equation. But, from 𝑇𝑆𝑢𝑏, time 
reversal is not demanded to meet Wigner’s general criterion, so the argument is neutralized. 
It is worth stressing that SQM is consequently non-invariant under 𝑇𝑈, that is, non-time-
reversal invariant from 𝑇𝑆𝑢𝑏 and HA’s perspective. At first glance, this seems to be 
scandalously problematic, and a compelling reason to throw the whole package away. I think, 
however, things must be approached from the appropriate angle. The fact that SQM is non-𝑇𝑈-
invariant by no means implies that it is not motion-reversal invariant or 𝑇𝐴-invariant. The theory 
is as motion-reversal invariant as it was from 𝑇𝑅𝑒𝑙 and OA. The point is that 𝑇𝐴 can no longer 
stand for time reversal because, according to 𝑇𝑆𝑢𝑏 and HA, time reversal and motion reversal 
are two quite different transformations, and thereby lead to different symmetries. What gets 
broken is the link between 𝑇𝐴 and the concept of time reversal, and not the fact that SQM is 𝑇𝐴-
invariant. For the substantivalist, 𝑇𝐴 should be rather associated with a different concept, and 
therefore, with a different symmetry. 
The rationale is mainly conceptual: HA does not preclude finding a way to represent 
motion reversal (and 𝑇𝐴 is likely the best candidate for it), nor does it argue that 𝑇𝑈 is actually 
motion reversal. This would be a rotund non-sense. The philosophical claim is that time and 
motion have to be distinguished, and thus that an inversion of the direction of time not 
necessarily collapses with an inversion of the direction of motion. Furthermore, if physical 
theories are (for any reason) demanded to be motion-reversal invariant (e.g., it could reasonably 
be a condition one wishes to preserve in any physical theory), and time is nothing but motion, 
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then this directly entails that theories must be time-reversal invariant as well. But the 
implication heavily relies on taking the conjunction as true, and clearly 𝑇𝑆𝑢𝑏 and HA might 
remain reluctant to accept it. Under 𝑇𝑆𝑢𝑏, it makes full sense that SQM be simultaneously 
motion-reversal invariant and non-time-reversal invariant31. HA seems to lead us to such a 
scenario. 
3.3. Revisiting the momentum-based argument 
As it was mentioned in Section 2.3, the transformation rule for momentum as 𝑇𝐏𝑇−1 = −𝐏 is 
typically introduced in non-relativistic quantum mechanics by appealing to its obviousness and 
to the necessity for correspondence with classical mechanics. And this seems to explain why 
some definitions of time reversal are sometimes expressly introduced in terms of changing 
momentum (Messiah 1966, Davies 1974, Sachs 1987) or why it is so “natural” to expect 
momentum to change its sign under time reversal (Earman 1974, Roberts 2017). 
 But this argument can be analyzed further by identifying at least two distinct questions 
therein:  
(a) why does momentum change its sign under time reversal in classical mechanics?  
And 
(b) why must one do the same for the momentum operator in SQM?  
The recent philosophical discussion around these questions has been quite subtle, so let’s 
proceed with caution. These questions have been given different answers. Moreover, the 
question (b) has been impugned by Craig Callender (2000) and David Albert (2000): one must 
not do the same for the momentum operator in SQM. Curiously, Callender backs this claim in 
Newtonian classical mechanics. As this is one strategy available to HA, let’s start with his 
argument. 
Callender claims that there is no need to switch the sign of momentum in SQM because 
momentum is not a time-derivate magnitude in the theory, but a spatial one. Why does one 
switch the sign of momentum in a classical context? Callender says that momentum in classical 
mechanics is defined as a time-derivative magnitude, and the necessity of switching its sign 
                                                          
31 An akin point seems to have been suggested by David Albert, though his reasons are not completely clear for 
me. In the case of the Schrödinger equation, Albert says that it is non-time-reversal invariant (2000: 14), though 
a curious vestige of time-reversal invariance still survives: there is a transformation that “recalls” time reversal 
though it is not (15). This “partial time-reversal transformation”, as he calls it, only concerns particles’ position 
and its invariance is preserved in the vast majority of physical theories. This transformation looks, as far as I can 
see, pretty much like motion reversal. 
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follows logically (Callender 2000: 263) from it. Let’s clarify the argumentation. First of all, 
Callender refers to Newtonian classical mechanics. As any Newtonian state is completely 
defined in terms of position 𝑥 and velocity 𝑣, the way time reversal should transform the state 
follows from the fact that the time-reversal operator flips the sign of velocity because velocity 
is a first-time derivate magnitude. The explanation is that when one transform 𝑡 → −𝑡, velocity 
directly transforms as 𝑣 → −𝑣. This is an effect (so to speak) of transforming 𝑡 → −𝑡.  Thus, 
as long as momentum is defined within the Newtonian classical mechanics as 
 
𝑝 = 𝑚𝑣 = 𝑚
∆𝑥 
∆𝑡
 (4.7 ) 
it follows that momentum must also change its sign under time reversal. The reason is the same 
as that for velocity: the transformation 𝑡 → −𝑡 induces the transformation 𝑝 → −𝑝, because it 
is what happens when you replace 𝑡 by −𝑡 in eq. 4.7. Momentum in SQM is defined differently: 





 (4.8 ) 
As matter of fact, momentum is no longer a time-derivative quantity, but is a space-derivative 
one that plays the role of being the generator of an infinitesimal spatial translation (like in 
classical mechanics). The Fourier transform of momentum in SQM is, indeed, the position 
operator, and one can easily transform the momentum-basis into the position basis by the 
Fourier transform. 
Callender’s argument relies on two more or less explicit assumptions. The first one is the 
idea that the definition of time reversal should not involve any reference to how a specific 
dynamical magnitude must transform under its application. And from this follows the rule that 
time reversal should only change first-time-derivative magnitude. So, why should one expect 
a space-derivative magnitude to change sign under T? That is the reason why it looks a bit 
unnatural to reverse the sign of the momentum operator in SQM according to this view: it does 
not represent a time-derivative magnitude and it is thus out of the range of the time-reversal 
transformation. The second assumption is Callender’s distinction between TRI (time-reversal 
invariance) and WRI (Wigner reversal invariance): necessitating that time reversal switch the 
sign of momentum would blurs the difference. 
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It’s easy to see that Callender’s account fits pretty well with my distinction between 𝑇𝑆𝑢𝑏 
and 𝑇𝑅𝑒𝑙: what he calls TRI is just 𝑇𝑆𝑢𝑏 and WRI, 𝑇𝑅𝑒𝑙. So a defender of HA could challenge 
the momentum-based argument based on Callender’s argument. If Callender is right, the 
substantivalist argument would run as follows: one shouldn’t demand time reversal to either 
involve a reversion of the direction of motion or indicate how a dynamical magnitude 
transforms under its application. 𝑇𝑆𝑢𝑏 only commits to such a minimum time-reversal operator 
which acts just like a reflection, and the rest of transformations simply follows depending on 
their relationship with time (like velocity and momentum in Newtonian classical mechanics in 
Callender’s argument). A switch of the sign of momentum is in fact required to represent 𝑇𝑅𝑒𝑙. 
But, for the substantivalist, 𝑇𝑅𝑒𝑙 represents a different symmetry transformation (as WRI with 
respect to TRI). As 𝑇𝑈 is the formal realization of time reversal in SQM and an instance of 
𝑇𝑆𝑢𝑏, it follows that 𝑇𝑈 must not switch the sign of the momentum operator in SQM. And, 
obviously, to claim that such a reflection is physically meaningless is to accept neither S1 nor 
S2. 
It is worth noticing an additional argument that Callender provides for why the sign of 
momentum does change in SQM (Callender 2000: 264-266), which is based on Ehrenfest’s 
theorem, and wasn’t mentioned in Section 2.3. The theorem aims to ground the correspondence 
between quantum mechanics and classical mechanics by stating that “the centroid of the 
quantum mechanical probability distribution will follow a classical trajectory” (Callender 
2000: 265), which establishes a link between the classical and the quantum probabilities, what 
makes that the classical equations holds for average quantum values. It follows from this that 
if one wants to guarantee such a correspondence, momentum should transform under time 
reversal, because otherwise the time-reversal invariance no longer holds, and the 
correspondence is lost. In Callender’s terms: “Switching the sign of the quantum momentum, 
therefore, is necessitated by the need for quantum mechanics to correspond to classical 
mechanics” (Callender 2000: 266). 
This explanation, however, requires one to firstly have a good understanding of the rule 
for momentum in classical mechanics to apply it to quantum mechanics. This is noted by 
Roberts (2017: 324). If quantum mechanics is supposed to be a more fundamental theory than 
classical mechanics, it is in fact a bit deceptive this way of justifying the rule for momentum 
in SQM. But, more importantly, Callender’s usage of Ehrenfest’s theorem seeks to justify why 
WRI should switch the sign of momentum in SQM and not why TRI should do the same. So, 
mutatis mutandis, this discussion would at best offer some grounds why 𝑇𝑅𝑒𝑙 must switch the 
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sign of the momentum operator, and not why 𝑇𝑆𝑢𝑏 should. And, of course, the argument, at 
least as it stands, not only says nothing about how 𝑇𝑆𝑢𝑏 should work, but it also assumes 
Wigner’s general criterion for time reversal (as it is valid for WRI, but not for TRI), which the 
substantivalist might not accept. 
But let’s come back to Callender’s previous argument based on Newtonian classical 
mechanics against the idea that time reversal (in the sense of TRI) must change the sign of the 
operator momentum in SQM. This argument evidently relies heavily on that eq. 4.7 is general 
enough to provide a well-grounded understanding of momentum in Newtonian classical 
mechanics and why its sign changes under time reversal. But, unfortunately, such a definition 
is not as general as it could be, since it only holds for a free Newtonian particle32. This might 
not be so devastating from Callender’s viewpoint: free particles are exactly the kind of entities 
(and the kind of framework) philosophers are interested in when defining properties at a 
fundamental level (and, also, physicists, see Ballentine 1998: 77). Also, as I mentioned before, 
these very simple cases are those of interest when asking whether a theory is structurally time 
symmetric or not. But there is something even more problematic: this argumentation 
completely overlooks Hamiltonian classical mechanics. And, if the general argument for 
switching the sign of the momentum operator is based on the correspondence between quantum 
mechanics and classical mechanics, it seems plausible to think that it is Hamiltonian classical 
mechanics where one should look into. 
So, one has to rephrase question (a): why does momentum change its sign under time 
reversal in Hamiltonian classical mechanics? To begin with, Hamiltonian classical mechanics 
is formulated in a different space: an 2𝑛-dimensional manifold with a symplectic form Ω33, 
which is often called ‘phase space’. States of systems are points in the phase space (𝜀 ∈ Ƥ), 
where 𝜀 = (𝑞𝑖 …, 𝑞𝑛;  𝑝𝑖, … 𝑝𝑛). That is, states of physical systems are specified in term of the 
components 𝑞 and 𝑝. Then, a dynamical trajectory 𝑠(𝑡) is a curve on the phase space that 
                                                          
32 The reason is that in Hamiltonian classical mechanics momentum and position are now generalized coordinates 
(the generalized position 𝑞𝑖 and the generalized momentum 𝑝𝑖  ). As generalized coordinates, they need not be the 
ordinary position and the ordinary momentum. In particular, 𝑝𝑖  might not match the definition of ordinary 
momentum of mass times velocity. 
33 A symplectic manifold (Ƥ) is a manifold equipped with a symplectic form (Ω), which is a closed non-degenerate 
2-form. Non-degeneracy establishes that the top exterior power of the symplectic form is a volume form, so the 
symplectic manifolds are necessarily even-dimensional and orientable. Closedness establishes that all symplectic 
manifolds are locally indistinguishable: they all locally look like an even-dimensional Euclidean space equipped 
with the ∑ 𝑑𝑥𝑖˄ 𝑑𝑦𝑖  symplectic form. (for details, see Ana Canna da Silva 2006: Chapter 3) 
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satisfies the Hamiltonian equations of motion, for some smooth function ℎ: Ƥ → ℝ, called the 
Hamiltonian. 
One of the issues is how components 𝑞 and 𝑝 must be interpreted. Usually, there are 
thought of as representing position values and momentum values respectively. In that case, the 
time-reversal transformation is supposed to transform, 𝑇: 𝑞 → 𝑞 and 𝑇: 𝑝 → −𝑝. This 
automatically time reverse the trajectories by reversing the states. In the time-reversed 
trajectory 𝑠𝑇(−𝑡), the same positions are occupied, but with the instantaneous momentum 
inverted, 𝜀𝑇(𝑞𝑘, −𝑝𝑘). However, as Roberts points out, this depends on interpreting the 
components 𝑞 and 𝑝 as usual, but this might not be strictly necessary (see Roberts 2018: Section 
2.3.2). If this is so, one would firstly need to interpret the components 𝑞 and 𝑝 so as to have a 
clear understanding of how time reversal must act upon them.  
One way to avoid this is by viewing the time-reversal transformation as some 
antisymplectic bijection (this has been proposed by Roberts 2018, based on Abraham and 
Marsden 1978, eq. 4.3.12). Here goes how it would work: by assuming that time reversal is an 
antisymplectic transformation, one assumes that its application induces a change in the sign of 
the symplectic form. In better terms, the push-forward of 𝑇, 𝑇∗, induces the transformation 
 𝑇∗𝛺 = −𝛺. And here the trick comes in: changing the sign of momentum, 𝑇: 𝑝 → −𝑝, is a 
case of an antisymplectic transformation, and it leads to 𝛺 → −𝛺. So, the overall argumentation 
seems to be the following: time reversal must change the sign of momentum, if time reversal 
is an antisymplectic transformation (this is assumed). In this case, the form of the time reversal 
transformation depends on the symplectic form of Hamiltonian classical mechanics. 
This is indeed a solid answer to question (a). Now, one has to provide an answer to the 
question (b): why must one do the same for the momentum operator in SQM? The answer to 
this question is actually similar to that given previously. Roberts (2018) says: 
“If we interpret 𝑄 and 𝑃 as the ‘position observable’ and ‘momentum observable’, 
respectively, then the time reversal operator is defined by 𝑇𝜓(𝑥)  =  𝜓(𝑥)∗ , and 
the time reversal transformation is given by: 𝜓(𝑡) →  𝜓(−𝑡)∗. One can check that 
transformation has the effect of preserving position and reversing momentum: 
𝑇𝑄𝑇−1 = 𝑄 and 𝑇𝑃𝑇−1 =  −𝑃” (Roberts 2018: 8. Emphasis mine). 
So, Roberts says that if one interprets 𝑄 and 𝑃 as position and momentum respectively, then 
the time reversal operator is given by (𝑇𝐴). And this transformation has the effect of 
transforming 𝑇𝑃𝑇−1 = −𝑃. But, at this point, a defender of HA might complain: one first 
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needs some reliable identification of what the observables represent. And this could not always 
be the case. She can thus argue that the formal implementation of time reversal would not only 
depend on how certain observables transform under its application (which is a relationalist 
assumption as it was argued previously), but also that the identification of those observables 
with momentum and position is based on a convention; convention that no longer runs in some 
contexts. This observation was made by Biedenharn and Sudarshan (1994). They propose a 
basis-free approach to time reversal that does not depend on the convention of interpreting 
operators 𝑄 and 𝑃 as position and momentum respectively. As Roberts mentions, some cases 
“do not even admit such operators, in the sense that they do not admit a representation of the 
canonical commutation relations” (2017: 324). The defender of HA could rhetorically ask: why 
would the definition of time reversal in general depend on how people agree on identifying 
certain observables? This sounds pretty much to a theory-relative way to define time reversal, 
something that the defender of HA could reject. 
In his 2018 paper, Roberts seems to take a step further. Though one is not forced to 
interpret Q and P as position and momentum respectively in SQM, “it is generally assumed 
that all time reversal operators share a property, which is that of being antiunitary” (2018: 8. 
Emphasis in the original). And, “once we are convinced that time reversal preserves Q and 
reverses P, then it follows that T must be antiunitary. And, in an irreducible representation of 
the canonical commutation relations in Weyl form, this T is in fact the unique antiunitary 
operator (up to a multiplicative constant) that preserves Q and reverses P (Roberts 2017, 
Proposition 2)” (Ibidem). The footnote 6 in the same page proves that if one assumes that time 
reversal preserves Q and reverses P, then T cannot be unitary, but anti-unitary. So, the property 
of being “anti-unitary” seems to play a similar role in SQM, as the property of being 
“antisymplectic” in Hamiltonian classical mechanics, mutatis mutandis34. So, in this case, anti-
unitarity would play the role of giving some sort of “persuasive force” to the whole 
argumentation: one expects that 𝑄 and 𝑃 follow the same transformation rule for time reversal 
as in Hamiltonian mechanics. The issue is that those formal operators don’t need to be 
interpreted as position and momentum respectively. But one knows that time reversal is usually 
assumed to be anti-unitary (this is the property that all time-reversal operators are supposed to 
share). So, it turns out that 𝑇𝐴 fits perfectly well with what one was expecting: that time reversal 
(now given by 𝑇𝐴) preserves 𝑄 and reverses 𝑃.  
                                                          
34 “However, as in classical Hamiltonian mechanics, it is generally assumed that all time reversal operators share 
a property, which is that of being antiunitary” (Roberts 2018: 8. Emphasis added) 
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 Two remarks are in order here. First, the defender of HA could argue that any appeal 
to anti-unitarity is not allowed: one of the main reasons to formally represent time reversal in 
terms of 𝑇𝐴 is that the Hamiltonian must be preserved under the transformation (that is, it must 
still be a bounded-from-below Hamiltonian). But, as I argued previously, HA is not committed 
to this. So, when it is said that it’s generally assumed that all time-reversal operators share the 
property of being anti-unitary, this claim is supported by the Hamiltonian-based argument. And 
if the defender of HA is right and not committed to assume this, then she is not committed to 
assume that anti-unitarity is a shared property of all time-reversal operators. Removing such 
an assumption, she might conclude, the momentum-based argument loses some persuasive 
force. To put it differently, the momentum-based argument seems to articulate very well with 
other claims or beliefs about time reversal in SQM to make its case. However, when one of 
those beliefs is put into question, the argument demands some adjustments. 
 The second remark is that the defender of HA would still ask for a conceptual argument 
to link the transformation 𝑃 → −𝑃 with time reversal. Why does one expect momentum to 
switch the sign under time reversal? According to her, observables must transform under time 
reversal if they have some formal relation with, or dependency on, time. For the substantivalist, 
any other expectation would be hiding a relationalist-like stance: the expectation seeks to 
represent motion reversal. Consequently, such an expectation could be rejected. And, at least 
so far, OA didn’t offer an argument in favor of why one should have such an expectation. What 
it was suggested by OA was that (a) there is some reasonable symmetry transformation that 
preserves 𝑄 and reverses 𝑃 (and, of course, this is true), (b) that this symmetry transformation 
must be anti-unitary, (c) that this transformation keeps invariant the Hamiltonian (and this 
justifies why T must be anti-unitary), (d) finally, that such a quantum symmetry transformation 
goes along with the classical correspondence of quantum mechanics (and this may be justified 
by looking at the symplectic form in Hamiltonian classical mechanics and then the case in 
SQM). However, the defender of HA could still insist: why is one allowed to call this 
transformation ‘time reversal’? She can recognize that this is a reasonable symmetry 
transformation (probably even more interesting than time reversal for practical purposes), but 
that this is just formally implementing motion reversal, and not time reversal. For her, as it was 
explained before, the collapse of the notion of time reversal and motion reversal should be very 
well argued because they are metaphysically different transformations. Defenders of OA have 
in favor that tradition has called this sort of transformation ‘time reversal’, but, of course, 
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defenders of HA can well argue that tradition is not source of normativity and doesn’t allow 
solving (or dissolving) a metaphysical difference. 
An analogous argument can be put forward for time reversal in Hamiltonian classical 
mechanics. After all, the form of T relies on the assumption that the transformation is 
antisymplectic and that the transformation 𝑝 → −𝑝 leads to an antisymplectic transformation. 
So, why should one assume that this formal transformation deserves the name of ‘time 
reversal’? But I think there is a difference: Hamiltonian classical mechanics is a formulation of 
classical mechanics. And it is generally assumed that Hamiltonian classical mechanics is 
equivalent to any other formulation of classical mechanics, as Newtonian classical mechanics 
or Lagrangian quantum mechanics (though there is some discussion about this, see North 2009 
and Curiel 2014). So, in this case, one could have strong reasons to demand that certain 
quantities transform in a certain way based on what one knows to happen in other cases, though 
in a particular formulation the reasons to do that are not so evident (See Curiel 2014: 266-267 
for explanation about the physical meaning of momentum in Hamiltonian classical mechanics 
and its relation with Newtonian classical mechanics). But, one needs some further justifications 
to jump from here to SQM, which is a completely different theory. 
The momentum-based argument is probably the trickiest one for a defender of HA, 
perhaps because the argument is interweaved with other assumptions and beliefs about time 
reversal in the traditional literature. Assumptions and beliefs that are in turn based on different 
arguments. This yields a complex structure hard to dismantle. The defender of HA could 
neutralize the argument by raising some doubts on some of these assumptions and/or beliefs 
about time reversal. In fact, when one changes the perspective and turns to a substantivalist 
view of time reversal, there are some questions that remain unanswered: why should one 
beforehand expect that a certain magnitude behaves in a specific way, independently of its 
relationship with time? Or, why should one expect a space-derivative magnitude to change sign 
under T?  𝑇𝑆𝑢𝑏’s definition refers intensionally to how other magnitudes behave under time 
reversal: wherever you find a time-derivative magnitude in a theory, invert its sign accordingly. 
In this particular case, there is no argument against this principle. And probably the most 
promissory counter-argument is to point out that her metaphysical picture of time is just wrong. 
In any case, this is enough to make my point: previously-assumed commitment with respect to 
time matter to formally define the time-reversal transformation.  
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*** 
This section laid out two accounts for time reversal in SQM –OA and HA. According to the 
former, time reversal must be formally implemented by an anti-unitary time-reversal operator 
( 𝑇𝐴). It follows from it that the Schrödinger equation is time-reversal invariant because turns 
out to be  𝑇𝐴-invariant. I’ve therein pointed out that a relationalist metaphysics of time underlies 
OA in so far as it aims to represent time reversal in terms of motion reversal, metaphysically 
identifying both concepts –to be a time-reversal operator is to be a motion-reversal operator, 
and only  𝑇𝐴 fulfils the requirement within SQM. Regardless how widely spread this account 
has been up to the present, an alternative account, HA, was also presented as feasible. 
According to it, in taking a substantivalist view of time, time reversal would be better 
represented by a unitary time-reversal operator in SQM,  𝑇𝑈. As a consequence, the 
Schrödinger equation turns out to be non-time-reversal invariant because it is non- 𝑇𝑈-
invariant. Under this heretic account, motion reversal and time reversal should metaphysically 
be distinguished: whereas  𝑇𝑈 is the appropriate representation of time reversal,  𝑇𝐴 stands for 
motion reversal. 
In the following, I’d like to point to two further views that also bear on the way time 
reversal should be formally implemented in SQM, though they can be easily generalized to the 
whole of physics. In general, these views chiefly mind the status of symmetries in physics, and 
the role they play in physical theories. To wit: (a) whether symmetries must be conceived and 
defined universally and in a theory-independent manner, or are rather forcefully bonded to a 
particular and theory-dependent view; and (b) whether symmetries are guides to theory 
construction, constraining theory’s dynamics, or contingent properties of theories’ dynamics 
instead. Even if taking side in this issue does not directly and specifically circumscribe the form 
of the time-reversal operator in SQM, it does become a sort of background that contributes to 
motivate either OA or HA. In the following section, I will expose and analyze them in tandem. 
The point I will make along the rest of the chapter is that OA is favored by a view of symmetries 
that is particularlist, theory-dependent and that considers them as guides to theory construction. 
Alternatively, a universalist, theory-independent view plus considering symmetries as 
contingent properties of theory’s dynamics work out well for HA. 
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Section 4. Time reversal: theory (in)dependency and the role of symmetries 
in physics 
In a 2015 paper, Daniel Peterson arises two questions as to the notion of time reversal: 
(1) What does the time reversal operator look like? 
(2) Which physical theories are time-reversal invariant? 
The first question mainly concerns how states should transform under time reversal, and 
implicitly assumes that it can receive an answer posed in such a general form. The second 
question concerns which physical theories turn out to be time-reversal invariant under a 
previously-given characterization of the time-reversal operator. Peterson argues, on the one 
hand, that the above-mentioned questions go, somehow, hand-in-hand: an answer to one of the 
questions determines the answer of the other. On the other, he presents two accounts of time 
reversal that answer those questions, and justify them, differently: an intuitive account and a 
theory-relative one. Conforming to the former, any account of time reversal in physics should 
starts off giving an answer to the first question. The second question will hence be worked out 
from it. Conforming to the latter, any account of time reversal begins by assuming that a given 
theory is time-reversal invariant and, from it, the properties of the time-reversal operator for 
that theory are determined. 
I think Peterson is quite on the right track in distinguishing two accounts of time reversal 
in physics: it successfully captures the main features of two broad criteria so as to characterize 
the time-reversal operator in different physical theories. Nonetheless, I don’t fully agree with 
him on how both accounts are overall characterized. To my mind, both criteria follow not only 
from taking a decision as to whether the time-reversal operator is theory-relative or not, but 
also from deciding what heuristic role time-reversal symmetry plays in physics. This aspect, as 
far as I am aware, is missed in Peterson’s analysis. Furthermore, I do not believe either that the 
name “intuitive” be the more accurate one, as it conceals on how much classical-mechanics-
based intuitions the theory-relative account is based. Therefore, I will introduce such criteria 
differently: a universalist, theory-independent account versus a particularist, theory-dependent 
account. Importantly, I will also show how both accounts are articulated along with two general 
views on symmetries in physics: whether they are guide to theory construction or contingent 
properties of dynamics. 
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Section 4.1 A universalist, theory-independent account versus a particularist, theory-
dependent account of time reversal. 
That the time-reversal operator is theory relative is the current leading view in physics. By 
‘theory relative’ is typically meant that the specific properties of the time-reversal operator 
have to be worked out within the framework of a physical theory. In some sense, then, the 
question “how the time-reversal operator is characterized” is pointless, since supporters of this 
view believe that there exists nothing as a general, all-embracing insight of time reversal in 
physics, at least in a meaningful sense. That’s why any particularist, theory-relative account of 
time reversal will refuse to give an answer to Peterson’s first question –it simply does not have 
any. 
One can use the abstract notion of ‘time reversal’ in general as a shortcut to refer to a 
class of particular instances of time-reversal transformations which one must spell out within 
each theoretical context. The tenet guiding this account would be that any meaningful definition 
of time reversal cannot be achieved in isolation from a theory’s details –the time-reversal 
operator is built up from “geographical” considerations of a physical theory, and never in 
isolation from them. By “geographical” or “particular” considerations I mean those taking into 
account the role that variables play in the physical laws, how states and observables are defined 
within the theory, and the physically possible solutions of a theory’s dynamical equations.  
The account is thus particularist in the following sense: these geographical details of 
physical theories matter in the sense that they play an active role in the time-reversal operator 
construction. When testing whether a given physical theory is time-reversal invariant, one is 
never in the situation in which a fully-fledged time-reversal operator is available beforehand 
and can straightforwardly be applied; rather, one has to firstly work it out from the very theory 
under scrutiny. 
But, on which grounds is the time-reversal operator then worked out according to this 
particularist, theory-dependent view? My claim is that this account is prone to conceive that 
time reversal is actually motion reversal, and the time-reversal operator ought to specify the 
conditions to reverse motion. That’s why particularist, geographical considerations are so 
crucial: they determine the very conditions of motion, which significantly vary across theories.  
And this account goes quite much along with OA. 




(a) The time-reversal operator must be worked out 
within a theoretical framework 
(b) There is no general, all-embracing view of what 
time reversal is in physics, but it depends on a 
theory’s particular features. 
(c) Those particular features are in general associated 
with the conditions for motion. Hence, the time-
reversal operator aims at representing the required 
formal features to reverse motion. 
Supporters of the universalist, theory-independent account of time reversal would rather 
be committed to offer a general characterization of time reversal independently of any 
theoretical framework. That is, one would in principle be able to get some grasp on time 
reversal before stepping into a physical theory. In this sense, our understanding of time reversal 
is theory independent –though one needs physics to understand what time reversal is, it applies 
equally through any particular physical theory. The account seems to be thus guided for lofty 
concerns about time reversal conducted in abstract, regardless of worldly, particular details 
about physical theories.  
In contrast with the particularist, theory-dependent account, Peterson’s first question is 
utterly meaningful for the universalist, theory-independent view: if one wants to know whether 
a theory is symmetric under a certain operation, the very operation should then be defined 
beforehand. Upon which grounds such a transformation is based could be controversial. 
Peterson thinks that the starting point is our intuitions with respect to how states must transform 
under time reversal in each case. Though I’m partially sympathetic with his point, I believe 
that intuitions only offer a partial answer: I think that our previously-assumed commitments 
about time play a guiding role in figuring out how observables and states must transform under 
time reversal. That is, there is already a metaphysical election when one chooses to go either 
with  𝑇𝑅𝑒𝑙 or with  𝑇𝑆𝑢𝑏. Whereas, it seems to me, the former will necessarily lead one to take 
a particularist, theory-dependent account (for, as stated before, the conditions for movement 
change across theories, and with them, the time(motion)-reversal operator), the latter would 
pave the way for taking a universalist, theory-independent account.  
For the universalist, theory-independent account, one wants to know whether a given 
physical theory is invariant under a previously-defined operation that all we agree to call ‘time 
reversal’. And when two physical theories are, for instance, time-reversal invariant, they are 
invariant under the same time-reversal operator. Hence, the time-reversal operator is theory 
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independent and unique in the straightforward sense that its formal definition remains 
unchanged across different theories. This view goes along with HA to the extent to which it 
represents univocally time reversal as 𝑡 → −𝑡 regardless whether or not it guarantees motion 
reversal. 
Universalist, theory-independent  
account 
(a) The time-reversal operator must be worked out 
independently of any physical theory 
(b) There is a general, all-embracing view of what 
time reversal is in physics. 
(c) The form of the time reversal operator could 
come out from different sources, but in general they 
would tend to represent the time-reversal 
transformation independently of motion reversal. 
Contrasting both accounts, at least two features are noteworthy. First, the universalist, theory-
independent account preserves the unity of the notion of time reversal because its mathematical 
representation and definition is always the same regardless of the theory. What the account 
aims to represent is the very action of inverting the direction of time, and as long as both the 
representation and the action remain the same across theories, unity is preserved. The 
particularist, theory-dependent account alternatively reaches certain unity because its different 
formal representations share a Wittgenstenian “family resemblance”, given by the re-
parametrization of the time coordinate and, more importantly, because they overall aim to 
reverse the direction of motion. Clearly, what gives unity to all time-reversal operators under 
this notion is no longer a homogeneous transformation, but certain effects, generally 
understood as a reversion of motion and its invariance, whatever it means within each specific 
theoretical framework. Remarkably, the very action (that is, what a time-reversal operator is 
supposed to do) shifts to the background whereas the physical representation of a past-headed 
physical solution is brought to the foreground. 
Second, there is an interesting sort of trade-off: with the universalist, theory-independent 
account, while one gains universality in time-reversal operator’s definition, one resigns 
universality in the results: physical theories in fact turn out to be either time-reversal invariant 
or non-time-reversal invariant under such a way to reverse time. In some cases, a reversion of 
the direction of motion is produced as an effect of time reversal, but this shouldn’t be taken as 
necessary at all. Conversely, if one believes that one should go with a particularist, theory-
dependent account, one renounces to universality in the time-reversal operator’s definition 
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while gaining universality in the results –perhaps surprisingly, virtually all physical theories 
turn out to be time-reversal invariant under such an account of time reversal. 
To sum up. My point here is that OA and HA take different sides in the opposition 
regarding general features of time reversal in physics. They assume different starting points as 
to how characterize time reversal formally. For this reason, the problem is not so much whether, 
for instance, a proper characterization of time reversal in SQM should be conducted in a theory-
independent fashion or not. The issue is much broader: should the time reversal operator always 
be built up either from a lofty, universalist view or from a theory-dependent particularist one? 
4.2. Symmetries as guides to theory construction versus contingent properties of the 
dynamics 
Whereas the first bone of contention is whether time reversal can be meaningfully defined in a 
full-fledged manner out of particularist considerations of a theory’s dynamics, there is a 
different issue underlying and steering some choices in these accounts. This issue concerns 
how symmetries are regarded in general. Particularly, what heuristic role they are supposed to 
play in physical theories: either they play the role of guiding the theory construction in 
constraining the dynamics or they are rather contingent properties of the dynamics. Time-
reversal symmetry may fall into either view. My claim will be that a particularist, theory-
dependent account is heavily supported by the first view. The second one, though compatible 
with both, is required by a universalist, theory-independent account. 
The current mainstream takes symmetries to be principles guiding theory construction. 
It demands physical theories to be a priori symmetric under a given symmetry transformation. 
The trend seems to have been initiated by Albert Einstein in formulating Special and General 
Relativity and followed by Eugene Wigner (see Wigner 1967. Brading and Castellani 2007: 
5.2 offer an in-deep analysis of this view). In analyzing the “theory-relative” accounts, Peterson 
seems to suggest an akin point in saying 
“These accounts proceed in two seemingly simple but technically complex steps 
by (1) singling out a particular physical theory which intuitively seems time 
reversal invariant and (2) determining what features the time reversal operator 
would need to have in order for the given theory to be time reversal invariant” 
(2015:47) 
I don’t think that intuitions play any relevant role in the theory-relative account (except under 
a very precise sense I will mention shortly). Instead of that, I do think that the account proceeds, 
greatly, by decree: at the fundamental level, equations of motions must be symmetric under 
136 | P a g e  
 
various space-time transformation because the space-time must be maximally homogeneous 
and isotropic. As any deeply-ingrained assumption, it is not easy to find pure instances of it in 
the literature but here goes some examples. 
In inquiring time reversal in classical electromagnetism, Frank Arntzenius and Hillary 
Greaves describe a “text-book account” of time reversal, according to which time-reversal 
invariance is previously assumed in order to specify the form of the time-reversal operator 
within each physical theory. They say 
“Next let us consider the electric and magnetic fields. How do they transform under 
time reversal? Well, the standard procedure is simply to assume that classical 
electromagnetism is invariant under time reversal. From this assumption of time 
reversal invariance of the theory (…) it is inferred that the electric field E is 
invariant under time reversal (…)” (Arntzenius and Greaves 2009: 6. Italics mine) 
According to them, the specific form of the time-reversal operator will then follow from 
assuming that the equations of motion (and the theory as a whole) are time-reversal invariant. 
By the ‘specific form of the time-reversal operator’ is meant how it transforms states and 
observables in an equation of motion. 
In exposing the foundations of Bohmian Mechanics, Detlef Dürr and Stephan Teufel 
(2009) address time-reversal symmetry in the following way (also taking classical 
electromagnetism as an example): 
The primitive variables usually remain unchanged, while secondary variables, 
those whose role is “merely” to express the physical law for the primitive variables, 
may change in a “strange” way. A well-known example is Maxwell–Lorentz 
electrodynamics. The state is 𝑋 =  (𝒒, ?̇?, 𝑬, 𝑩) and 
(𝒒, ?̇?, 𝑬, 𝑩)∗  =  (𝒒, −?̇?, 𝑬, −𝑩) , 
(…). It is clear that ?̇? → −?̇?, but then B must follow suit to make the equation time-
reversal invariant. The lesson is that some variables may need to be changed in a 
strange way for the law to be invariant. But as long as those variables are 
secondary, there is nothing to worry about. (2009: 47. Italics mine) 
 
This is just a faithful exposition of Arntzenius and Greaves’ text-book account of time reversal. 
For Dürr and Teufel, the ‘*’ denotes an involution, that is, “a representation of time reversal”. 
There are many aspects to look into here. To start with, their mention to primitive variables 
should be handle with care, for it seems there is no univocal division between “primitive” and 
“secondary” variables. For instance, for David Albert, the magnetic field is a basic property of 
classical electromagnetism, and therefore, it should not change sign under time reversal (2000), 
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𝑇: 𝐵 → 𝐵. It seems that Dürr and Teufel think differently as they do consider that the magnetic 
field changes its sign under time reversal. The discussion now changes the angle: it is not 
anymore on time reversal but whether certain magnitudes should be considered as 
primitive/basic or secondary/non-basic. Secondly, they notably mention that, in some cases, 
secondary variables might change “in a strange way”. But, “strange” with respect to what? 
More importantly, why do they change in a “strange” way? A few lines below one finds the 
answer: for the law to be (time-reversal) invariant. So, it seems there is an entire physical and 
formal mechanism aiming to specify the form of the time-reversal operator in order to maintain 
the equation of motion at issue invariant. 
More suggestively, Dürr and Teufel add: 
“Let us close with a final remark on time-reversal invariance. One should ask why 
we are so keen to have this feature in the fundamental laws when we experience 
the contrary. Indeed, we typically experience thermodynamic changes which are 
irreversible, i.e., which are not time reversible. The simple answer is that our 
platonic idea (or mathematical idea) of time and space is that they are without 
preferred direction, and that the “directed” experience we have is to be explained 
from the underlying time symmetric law. How can such an explanation be 
possible? This is at the same time both easy and confusing. Certainly, the difference 
in scales is of importance. The symmetry of the macroscopic scale can be different 
from that of the microscopic scale, if the “initial conditions” are chosen 
appropriately”. (2009: 47) 
And let me link this paragraph to one on pages 43-44 
“A symmetry can be a priori, i.e., the physical law is built in such a way that it 
respects that particular symmetry by construction. This is exemplified by 
spacetime symmetries, because spacetime is the theater in which the physical law 
acts (as long as spacetime is not subject to a law itself, as in general relativity, 
which we exclude from our considerations here), and must therefore respect the 
rules of the theater”. (2009: 43-44) 
Dürr and Teufel refer to “our platonic idea” of a perfectly symmetric space-time as the reason 
for assuming, for instance, time-reversal invariance as an a priori symmetry fixing the 
properties of the “theater”. Furthermore, the dynamics ought to respect the rules of the theater, 
that is, the space-time’s symmetries. I’m not saying that most physics and philosophers of 
physics presuppose a “platonic space-time” as the theater of physics, or that they come to 
conceive space-time symmetries in the same terms. But I do believe that Dürr and Teufel make 
very explicit an underlying tendency in physics and philosophy of physics, to wit, that the 
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structure of the space-time shouldn’t manifest any privileged direction of time or intrinsic 
asymmetry. I will come back to this point afterwards. 
Finally, Robert Sachs (1987) imposes as a condition for any time-reversal transformation 
that 
“In order to express explicitly the independence between the kinematics and the 
nature of the forces, we require that the transformations leave the equations of 
motion invariant when all forces or interactions vanish” (Sachs 1987: 7) 
For him, time-reversal invariance is a powerful tool in elucidating the nature of the interactions 
between newly discovered physical systems, and that’s why it must be presupposed 
beforehand: its assumption plays a heuristic role since it leads us to study the nature of forces 
and interactions and their relations with temporally-asymmetric behaviors of physical system. 
Anyway, the point to be stressed here is, once again, that time-reversal invariance is established 
by decree. Interestingly, Peterson’s second question (“which physical theories are time-reversal 
invariant?”) becomes uninteresting from this viewpoint, to the extent that its answer is, well, 
all of them. In so far as time-reversal symmetry is imposed a priori and by decree, all physical 
theories will trivially be time-reversal invariant.  
As I mentioned above, such view, in general and in degrees, pervades philosophy of 
physics and physics communities. There is however an alternative view which claims that 
symmetries are, by contrast, a contingent property of dynamics. In this view, whether a 
symmetry holds mainly depends on details of the theory’s dynamics, which is prior to the 
symmetry. To rephrase Dürr and Teufel’s wording: the rules of theater are discovered a 
posteriori, once the characters are on the scene. This is not equivalent to say that, as in General 
Relativity, matter and energy shape space-time’s structure, but that space-time’s structure, 
though fixed and independent of the dynamics, shouldn’t be settled from a priori 
considerations, but its structure is sound by dynamics.  
John Earman puts it in the following way. In discussing active and passive transformation 
within a relationalist framework, he in passing mentions 
“If all these descriptions are equally accurate, it would seem that the symmetry 
transformation could not fail to be a true symmetry of nature, contradicting the 
usual understanding that symmetry principles are contingent, that is, are true (or 
false) without being necessarily true (or false)” (1989: 121) 
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The risk of the symmetry-as-guide-to-theory-construction view is that it would make time-
reversal invariance a necessary symmetry, at least so far as fundamental equations of motion 
are concerned. The symmetry-as-contingent-property view instead leaves the way open to non-
time-reversal invariant equations of motion; non-time-reversal invariance might not 
exclusively depend upon interactions, boundary conditions or forces. Hence, this view takes 
symmetries as contingently resulting from the dynamics. 
Consequently, the space-time structure is no longer an a priori fixed scenario resulting 
from our idealizations about space-time’s structure. The rules of the theater (space-time’s 
symmetries) arise from the characters’ properties (the laws of physics’ symmetries): the 
formers are discovered by the latter. This view has been also defended by Harvey Brown (2005) 
and his dynamical approach to Lorentz covariance in special relativity, for instance. In this 
light, it makes fully sense to ask which theories are time-reversal invariant, since time-reversal 
invariance is not any longer demanded as an a priori condition. 
There is certainly an acute mystery looming over here. No doubts that space-time’s 
symmetries and dynamics’ symmetries are somehow correlated, and that Earman’s adequacy 
principle (see Chapter II, Section 2) should generally hold. But the mystery lays on which one 
is more fundamental or prior, or which one explains the other. Literature on this topic is 
abundant and has been drawing philosophers’ attention lately (for some discussion see Brown 
2005, Lange 2007, Janseen 2009, Acuña 2016, Hicks 2019), and to go deep into it would lead 
us beyond the topic. Nevertheless, I believe that not only are both views well testified in the 
literature and that the tension is still quite alive, but also that such a tension has significant 
impact on other philosophical issues. Time-reversal invariance is, I think, one of them.  
*** 
Let me now bring all the pieces together. I have presented two broad accounts of time reversal 
in physics: particularist, theory-dependent and universalist, theory-independent. After that, I’ve 
suggested that these accounts articulate in different ways to unalike views on symmetries in 
physics: symmetries as guides to theory construction, on the one side, and symmetries as 
contingent properties of the dynamics, on the other. What I suggest is that all these elements 
feed many of the OA’s and HA’s assumptions on time reversal in SQM. In particular, OA’s 
assumptions are to great extent guided by a particularist, theory-dependent spirit along with 
considering time-reversal symmetry as an a priori symmetry guiding theory construction. 
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Differently, HA’s assumptions seem to go along with a universalist, theory-independent 
account plus a view taking symmetries as contingent properties of the dynamics. They thus 
form sorts of packages of assumptions that, even though imperfectly instantiated, frequently 
appeared together and provide a background explanation for 𝑇𝐴 and 𝑇𝑈 particularly. 
As argued in Section 2.4, a relationalist metaphysics of time underlies OA, wherein 𝑇𝐴 is 
simply a realization of 𝑇𝑅𝑒𝑙 in the quantum domain. The specific form of 𝑇𝐴 is however 
influenced as well by a particularist, theory-dependent account (as was showed before) along 
with considering symmetries as a priori. In other words, 𝑇𝐴 transforms observables and states 
in the Schrödinger equation as it does because it aims to maintain the theory time-reversal 
invariant. That’s what it is for. Rephrasing Arntzenius and Greave’s words: the form of 𝑇𝐴 
follows from, firstly, assuming that the Schrödinger equation is time-reversal invariant and, 
secondly, figuring out how observables must transform to keep it invariant –time-reversal 
invariance acts like a regulative horizon at which one ought to look when investigating time-
reversal transformation’s properties. 
HA is, contrarily, able to escape from this circle. To start with, HA plus a universalist, 
theory-independent account of time reversal steer to conceive a single time-reversal 
transformation that applies everywhere in the same way. Naturally, theories may turn out to be 
either time-reversal invariant or non-time-reversal invariant under such a transformation. It 
would be virtually impossible to come to work out a universal time-reversal operator that keeps 
all fundamental dynamical equations time-reversal invariant. According to its tenets, time-
reversal invariance should be considered not as necessary but as contingent. Therefore, the 
Schrödinger equation may unsurprisingly fail to be time-reversal invariant. And, in fact, it’s 
what actually happens. In this case, the regulative idea is that time reversal aims to represent a 
theory-independently-devised action (that of reversing time), regardless its potential 
consequences when applied to each case. 
Summing up and what comes next 
Along this chapter I’ve defended the legitimacy of two approaches to time reversal in quantum 
mechanics, each of them standing on quite different metaphysical grounds with respect to time 
and taking different assumptions with respect to general features of the time-reversal 
transformation in physics and the role that symmetries should play in physical theories. 
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Remarkably, I’ve shown that each approach leads to divergent conclusions as to whether the 
Schrödinger equation is time-reversal invariant: 
(a) According to OA, the Schrödinger equation is time-reversal invariant because it is 𝑇𝐴-
invariant, where time reversal is motion reversal 
(b) According to HA, the Schrödinger equation is non-time-reversal invariant because it is 
non-𝑇𝑈-invariant and it is motion-reversal invariant because it is 𝑇𝐴-invariant. 
As a result, I’ve also mentioned that OA would, via the symmetry-to-reality-inference, preclude 
any structural arrow of time in SQM, whereas HA could solidly defend that the Schrödinger 
equation does exhibit a privileged direction of time. In a nutshell: for OA, time in quantum 
mechanics is structurally time-symmetric; for HA, contrarily, time in quantum mechanics is 
structurally time-asymmetric. 
This leaves one in an uneasy situation. Philosophers of physics and philosophers of time 
could draw any metaphysical conclusion with respect to whether quantum mechanics exhibits 
a structural arrow of time or not, depending upon one’s various commitments with respect to 
time, time reversal and symmetries in general. Though uneasy, this is not rare whatsoever. 
Frequently, such assumptions conduct our inquiries towards certain direction, aiming to reach 
a specific goal or departing from an uncritically-adopted starting point. Certainly, explanations 
must stop and get somewhere. Nonetheless, such assumptions shouldn’t be overlooked. Neither 
should they block the viability of other paths. Having said that, there is a dimension I didn’t 
take seriously into account so far. After all, time reversal is just a formal device that can be 
used variedly. That time reversal may be useful to sound time’s properties is something one 
came to assume within the problem of a structural arrow of time and the symmetry-to-reality 
inference. Plus, I’ve argued in Chapter II, Section 2, that any approach to the problem must 
meet some requirements for the problem to be philosophically meaningful. Though I did say 
that both approaches arrive at divergent conclusions as to whether SQM is structurally time-
asymmetric, it has not been showed that both approaches be equally useful and viable for 
addressing the problem of a structural arrow of time. Slightly differently, it has not been 
showed that each of them goes along with the conditions for the problem of the structural arrow 
of time. I will address this issue in the next chapter. 
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V. 
The Arrow of Time and SQM at the Crossroads  
The Orthodoxy, Time reversal and Time-reversal symmetry  
In Chapter II, I formulated the problem of a structural arrow of time as mainly concerning 
whether a given dynamical equation is time-reversal invariant. As I’ve repeatedly stressed, 
being time-reversal invariant is being invariant under an operator formally representing time 
reversal. In Chapter IV, I put forward two approaches to work out the right form of the time-
reversal operator within SQM. It was in passing suggested therein that OA would arrive at the 
conclusion that the Schrödinger equation is time-reversal invariant (under 𝑇𝐴), and thereby, that 
SQM doesn’t exhibit any structural difference between both directions of time. Or, differently, 
that SQM is structurally time-reversal symmetric. By contrast, HA would arrive at the opposite 
conclusion to the extent that the Schrödinger equation is non-time-reversal invariant (under 
𝑇𝑈). This chapter exclusively deals with the links between the problem of a structural arrow of 
time, as stated in Chapter II, and the two approaches of time reversal, as laid out in Chapter IV. 
This short chapter will be guided by the following recommendation: be cautious when 
drawing metaphysical conclusions from a formal result. In particular, the aim of the chapter is 
to argue that the mechanism to justify OA involves some implicit premises that conceptually 
conflict with some of the conditions that make the problem of a structural arrow of time 
philosophically meaningful in terms of time reversal. This should discourage the drawing of 
metaphysical conclusions about time (for instance, whether it is structurally directed or not in 
SQM) from the claim that the Schrödinger equation is time-reversal invariant (that is, 𝑇𝐴-
invariant). Conversely, HA seems to be in a better position to address the problem of a 
structural arrow of time from as it was formulated (Chapter II). The upshot of this chapter is 
that this situation sets out a complex scenario where some decisions need to be made. 
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The chapter is organized as follows. First, I will briefly recall the requirement to 
formulate the problem of a structural arrow of time. Next, I will reword OA in terms of three 
conditions (or implicit assumptions) that a time-reversal operator must satisfy in quantum 
mechanics: physical meaningfulness, kinematic admissibility and reality. In Section 3, I will 
argue that these three conditions clash the requirements for a structural arrow of time. In 
particular, I’ll argue that OA’s conditions and some conditions for the formulation of the 
problem of a structural arrow of time (particularly, contingency and fundamentality) cannot fit 
together. If this is true, then philosophers and physicists face a complex scenario where 
something has to go or be reformulated. I’ll lay out this scenario, along with some alternative 
options, in Section 4. Final remarks at the end. 
Section 1. Recalling the three conditions for a structural arrow of time 
In Chapter II, the problem of a structural arrow of time was introduced as follows,  
(a) Does time have in itself the property of being 
asymmetric/directed? 
(b) Considering the laws of physics belonging to a theory T, is 
the structure of space-time supposed by those laws 
equipped with a time-orientation? 
(c) In being backed up by the ‘symmetry-to-reality inference’, 
the question thereby is: Is there any non-time-reversal 
invariant law in physics? Or, is there any physical law that 
does not produce a par of time-symmetric twins? 
To put it simpler, the question for a structural arrow of time in physics mainly concerns whether 
a physical theory’s dynamical equations are time-reversal invariant or not. As mentioned, non-
time-reversal invariant laws would structurally (by their own means) distinguish between past-
headed solutions and future-headed ones in so far as the class of their solutions have the form 
either Ⱳ = Ⱳ𝑓 or Ⱳ = Ⱳ𝑏, but not Ⱳ = Ⱳ𝑓+Ⱳ𝑏. 
In order to formulate this “whether-problem”, three further conditions must be met: 
(a) the fundamentality condition,  
(b) the contingency condition, 
(c) the co-extensity condition. 
The first condition demands that only fundamental equations should be taken into 
consideration. If the space-time’s structure presupposed by a theory manifests a temporal 
The problem of a 
structural arrow of time 
144 | P a g e  
 
orientation, then it should be reflected in free-interaction laws. The second condition requires 
that it is not the case that a given dynamical equation must be necessarily time-reversal 
invariant35. As to the third, it imposes that there should be only one mathematical representation 
of the concept of time reversal within a theory. 
In order to formulate the problem of a structural arrow of time within SQM, one can then 
say that the problem is about whether the Schrödinger equation is time-reversal invariant, and 
that (a) the Schrödinger equation in its fundamental form should only be taken into account, 
(b) it must not be the case that the Schrödinger equation is necessarily, or a priori, time-reversal 
invariant, and (c) the Schrödinger equation should not be time-reversal invariant under a certain 
time-reversal operator, and non-time-reversal operator under a different time-reversal operator 
(if this is the case, one of them is not genuinely representing time reversal). If, and only if, the 
three conditions are satisfied, one can thus give an answer to the whether-question, and 
consequently, draw metaphysical conclusions as to whether time is structurally directed within 
SQM. 
Section 2. OA’s three conditions 
For OA, as analyzed in detail previously, a time-reversal operator must be a motion-reversal 
operator plus a re-parametrization of the variable 𝑡 (𝑡 → −𝑡). I’m going now to reword the 
approach as relying on three assumptions demanding three conditions for time reversal. 
The first condition strongly relates to Wigner’s presentation of time reversal as a 
transformation that must generate an evolution going backward to the original state (second 
time evolution in the Wigner’s general criterion for time reversal). It follows from this that the 
second time displacement is also an evolution according the (time-reversed) dynamical 
equation. Therefore, the second time displacement is necessarily also a solution of the 
Schrödinger equation. For this to be so, the time-reversed Hamiltonian cannot change its sign 
when time reversed: on the one hand, it would fail to generate a time-reversed quantum 
mechanical evolution, and it wouldn’t lead to a time(motion)-reversed solution of the 
Schrödinger equation, on the other. For this, OA seems to require that the time-reversed 
dynamical equation must yield a physically meaningful evolution within a quantum-mechanics 
framework. That’s why I call this first condition “physical-meaningfulness condition” 
                                                          
35 See footnote 19 on page 79. 
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The second condition follows from Sachs’ presentation of time reversal. According to 
him, the time-reversal transformation, when applied to fundamental dynamical equations, must 
yield them invariant in order to accomplish a “kinematic-admissibility condition”. Sachs writes 
that 
“In order to express explicitly the independence between the kinematics and the 
nature of the forces, we require that the transformations leave the equations of 
motion invariant when all forces or interactions vanish” (Sachs 1987: 7). 
Moreover, it is also required the time-reversal transformation has to “conform to the 
requirements of the correspondence principle –namely, operators representing classical 
kinematic observables must transform under T in a manner corresponding to classical motion 
reversal” (Sachs 1987: 34).  
These two requirements should guide the characterization of the time-reversal operator 
within any theoretical framework. In general, they express a “kinematic-admissibility 
condition”, which is instantiated here in the requirement that the Schrödinger equation must be 
kept time-invariant in the absence of any force or interaction, and in taking the results obtained 
in classical mechanics as a starting point for developing concepts in the quantum realm (1987: 
9). 
In a recent paper, Bryan Roberts offers a careful justification of the orthodox approach 
to time reversal in quantum mechanics. In his argumentation, he seems to bring up a slightly 
different condition for time reversal in quantum mechanics. I will call this third condition “the 
reality condition”. In brief, Robert’s argument supposes that there is at least one realistic 
Hamiltonian that is invariant under time reversal. But, 𝑇𝑈 fails to guarantee this assumption. 
Therefore, via Wigner’s theorem, the time-reversal operator must be given by 𝑇𝐴. 
Section 3. OA and the problem of a structural arrow of time: contingency 
and fundamentality at risk 
In Chapter IV I have set out two cogent ways to formally represent time reversal in SQM –𝑇𝐴 
and 𝑇𝑈. My central claim now is that philosophers of physics, philosophers of time and 
metaphysicians should be cautious when drawing metaphysical conclusions about the direction 
of time (that is, about whether time is fundamentally, structurally directed or no) from the fact 
that SQM is 𝑇𝐴-invariant, therefore, time-reversal invariant. And the problem here is that 
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Wigner’s, Sachs’ and Roberts’ justification of an anti-unitary time-reversal operator 
(underpinning OA) rests upon certain assumptions and conditions that don’t seem to fit well 
with the conditions for a philosophically interesting formulation of the problem of a structural 
arrow of time.  
To be clear, my concern is not whether 𝑇𝐴 is the correct representation of time reversal 
or not. My question is whether 𝑇𝐴 and, in particular, the claim of 𝑇𝐴-invariance, is a 
metaphysically substantial claim about the arrow of time in SQM. And on this I will cast some 
doubts. So, according to my stance here, philosophers and physicists that engage with OA 
would have two options at hand: either they refrain from drawing metaphysical conclusions 
about the arrow of time in SQM from OA’s conclusions about time-reversal invariance, or they 
revise the formulation of the problem of the arrow of time and its conditions. Either option 
comes with a cost. In the following, I will back up these claims. But the general moral of the 
chapter should be read in the following way: the claim that the Schrödinger equation is time-
reversal invariant because is 𝑇𝐴-invariant shouldn’t be taken metaphysically too seriously. But, 
if one wants to take it seriously, one should either decline OA or revise the formulation of the 
problem. 
I 
Recall Wigner’s definition of time reversal. He invokes two explicit premises:  
(a) that a suitable time-reversal transformation must be able to restore “the system to its 
original state” (1932: 326), 
(b) and that time inversion must flip the direction of momentum to compensate for the 
twofold application of T in Wigner’s general criterion.  
But there is also one fundamental implicit assumption in requiring time reversal to meet 
Wigner’s general criterion: 
(c) for a time-reversal transformation to be well-defined (and to exist at all), the second 
time translation (from 𝑡2 to 𝑡1) must also be physically possible.  
To see how this last assumption works let’s suppose that a quantum state |𝜓⟩ evolves from 𝑡1 
to 𝑡2, according to the Schrödinger equation (first time translation in Wigner’s general criterion 
for time reversal). At 𝑡2, time reversal is applied upon the Schrödinger equation. If the time-
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reversal transformation is well-defined, then the time reversion of the time-translated state |𝜓⟩ 
should evolve from 𝑡2 to 𝑡1 also conforming with the Schrödinger equation (second time 
translation), which would intuitively be equivalent to making the system to evolve again but 
with – 𝑡. And here the implicit assumption comes in. According to Wigner, the operation to be 
applied upon the state at  𝑡2 must be of such a kind that yields a physically meaningful moving-
backward evolution. To put it differently, the transformation must generate a time translation 
(moving backward) that be also an equivalent model of the Schrödinger equation. Otherwise, 
the transformation would fail to take the quantum system back to its original state, and it will 
thereby be ill-defined. 
The point is a bit subtle: Wigner’s definition of time reversal necessarily implies the 
existence of a (allegedly) temporally-mirrored model of the Schrödinger equation; if such a 
model does not exist, then T would not be a time-reversal transformation. Assume that, at 𝑡2, 
one applies 𝑇𝑈 instead of 𝑇𝐴. As remarked above, the Schrödinger equation will not temporally 
translate the system back. In fact, it could be argued (and I would agree) what one obtains in 
that case is not a physical meaningful solution of the Schrödinger equation whatsoever. 
However, to the extent that this way of reversing time demands beforehand a temporally-
mirrored model of the Schrödinger equation to exist, it supposes that the class of solutions of 
the Schrödinger equation under time reversal has a structure like  Ⱳ = Ⱳ𝑓 + Ⱳ𝑏, wherein 
solutions for the first time translation belong to  Ⱳ𝑓, and solutions for the second time 
translation to Ⱳ𝑏. The time-reversal transformation thus plays the role of finding what sort of 
solutions live in Ⱳ𝑏. But this clearly amounts to beforehand demanding that the Schrödinger 
equation remains invariant under the transformation (it presupposes, at least, that such time-
reversal solutions exist, to begin with). In other words, it amounts to demanding that the 
Schrödinger equation is necessarily time-reversal invariant. And this, evidently, clashes the 
contingency condition for the problem of a structural arrow of time. 
I think that two quite different motivations and concerns diverge at this point: Whereas 
the problem of a structural arrow of time mainly concerns whether a fundamental dynamical 
law is time-reversal invariant or not (which explains why demanding contingency is so 
important), Wigner’s justification of 𝑇𝐴 seems to be guided by a quite different concern: how a 
fundamental dynamical equation turns out to be invariant under a transformation that one will 
call ‘time reversal’. What Wigner is really pursuing by this how-question is a transformation 
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that necessarily guarantees the existence of the temporally-mirrored model, and not whether 
such model exists or not. Wigner closes his presentation of time reversal in this way 
 “Naturally, the considerations of this section do not prove that the quantum 
mechanical equations are invariant under the operation of time inversion. They do 
show, however, that if they are, the time inversion operator 𝑇𝐴 must be given” 
(1932: 333). 
My point here is that a whether-or-not question (as that motivating the problem of a structural 
arrow of time) is at odds with Wigner’s aims in justifying an anti-unitary time-reversal 
transformation: Is the aim to figure out the way to take the system back by means of a physically 
possible evolution according to the dynamical law? Well, if that is the case, then the whether-
or-not-question doesn’t make sense: the dynamical equation will always be time-reversal 
invariant. Is the aim to know whether or not there is a model for the fundamental dynamical 
law when the direction of time is inverted? Well, then the how-question is not the right one. 
Note that a how-problem entitles one to rely on whatever be necessary in order to achieve 
what one is after. The time-reversal transformation, therefore, will be whatever be necessary 
in order to get the Schrödinger equation time-reversal invariant. Along this line, Paul Roman 
(1950) says 
“For the reasons stressed in the introduction to this Section, we should like, even 
if only by some artifice, to achieve full covariance [time-reversal invariance]”. 
(Roman 1961: 267. Italics mine) 
The reasons Roman mentions swing from experience-based lessons about invariances to 
Pythagoras-inspired wishes of perfect mathematical symmetries (see Roman 1961: 216-217). 
There is nothing per se wrongheaded with this.  The issue, I think, is twofold. On one side, if 
one wills to accept that any artifice deserves the name of time reversal in order to fulfill a 
previously-assumed philosophical view on what symmetries are and what role they should 
play. In the previous chapter, I’ve shown that there is no consensus around these questions. On 
the other, if one wills to accept metaphysical conclusions about time’s structure drawn from a 
goal-oriented artifice. And this is what I think one shouldn’t. 
For these reasons, if 𝑇𝐴 is the time-reversal operator that must be given in SQM and it 
was built up under the assumption that the theory remains invariant under its application, then 
the problem of a structural arrow of time in terms of (a) whether-or-not question and (b) 
assuming the contingency condition cannot be addressed –the answer is necessarily determined 
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by construction since the Schrödinger equation couldn’t be non-time-reversal invariant in this 
respect. 
II 
One could reach the same conclusion by an alternative path. All our experiments run always in 
one direction of time (positive or negative, but not both) and physical theories receive empirical 
confirmation with increasing (decreasing) 𝑡. The direction of time cannot be, in reality, inverted 
to see what happens with our experiments and with our physical theories when time runs 
backward. Intuitively, this does not happen with spatial transformations since one can freely 
move things in space along its three dimensions and, from this, deduce what would happen if 
fields, for instance, were removed. With time, one is rather left clueless. So, to figure out what 
would happen if the direction of time were inverted, philosophers and physicists must of course 
make some assumptions. The question as to which assumptions one is willing and entitled to 
accept then becomes relevant. However, I am afraid that OA’s conditions for time reversal in 
SQM make more suppositions that the formulation of the problem and its conditions can 
tolerate. Roberts’ argument for an anti-unitary time-reversal operator in SQM based on a 
“realistic condition” helps explain the last claim, so let’s look at this argument more closely. 
Overall, the argument depends on assuming the (possible) existence of at least one 
realistic time-reversed Hamiltonian. Roberts starts off his argument by assuming that one 
knows almost nothing about the specific form of T, only that it is either unitary or anti-unitary. 
Then, he poses the main premise of his argument 
“There is at least one realistic dynamical system that is T-invariant” (Roberts 2017: 
326. Emphasis added) 
Clearly, the relevant word here is ‘realistic’. For a system to be realistic, a Hamiltonian with 
the following features is required: 
(a) It is positive, that is, 0 ≤ (𝜓, 𝐻𝜓) 
(b) It is not the zero operator 
This is the definition of ‘being realistic’. Why should one accept it? Well, Roberts gives two 
reasons: first, “all known Hamiltonians describing realistic quantum systems are bounded from 
below, which we will express by choosing a lower bound of 0 ≤ (𝜓, 𝐻𝜓)” (Ibidem. Emphasis 
added), which backs feature (a). Second, the zero operator would be trivial since it implies that 
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“no change would occur at all” (Ibidem), which in turn backs feature (b). So, the complete 
assumption is the following 
“At least one of those [realistic] Hamiltonians satisfies the T-invariance property that 
𝑇𝑒𝑖𝑡𝐻𝜓 = 𝑇𝑒−𝑖𝑡𝐻𝑇𝜓” (Roberts 2017: 326) 
This implies that there exists at least a realistic Hamiltonian that is invariant under time 
reversal. The most promissory candidate for this, though Robert’s argument doesn’t hinge upon 
it in any sense, is the free-particle Hamiltonian. 
 So, from assuming that (1) there exists at least one realistic quantum system (positive 
and non-trivial) and (2) it is time-reversal invariant, one can determine whether T is unitary or 
anti-unitary. Roberts claims that these assumptions imply that T must be anti-unitary, 
supporting OA, consequently. The proof runs as following: 
(i) Let’s suppose that there exists at least one realistic Hamiltonian that is time-reversal 
invariant (the main assumption) 
(ii) The definition of being ‘realistic’ is that (a) the Hamiltonian is positive and (b) non-
trivial. 
(iii) Suppose now that ‘time reversal’ is given by 𝑇𝑈 (assumption for reductio ad 
absurdum) 
(iv) This implies (as shown before and as Roberts mentions in his proof) that the 
Hamiltonians transforms under time reversal as 𝑇𝐇𝑇−1 = −𝐻 
(v) The fourth step in turn implies that there would exist a realistic Hamiltonian that is 
non-positive, and that ⟨𝜓, 𝐻𝜓⟩ = ⟨𝑇𝜓, 𝑇𝐻𝜓⟩ = −⟨𝑇𝜓, 𝐻𝑇𝜓⟩; or that the 
Hamiltonian is the zero operator. 
(vi) But this is impossible: premise four is in contradiction with the first and second 
premises. In particular, a so-transformed Hamiltonian is not realistic since it has to 
be either negative or the zero operator. 
(vii) Also, if the Hamiltonian is negative, then it is non-time-reversal invariant, violating 
premise (i) again. 
(viii)  Therefore, T is not 𝑇𝑈 but can only be 𝑇𝐴  
Roberts seems to demand very little. Certainly, if one wants to represent a quantum dynamical 
system moving backward in time, one has to at least generate the conditions for such system to 
exist (or to be representable) within a quantum-mechanical framework. And those conditions 
seem to be well captured by the idea of “being a realistic Hamiltonian”. What such a definition 
does is to guarantee that Hamiltonians (as one knows them) are still representable when 
temporally reversed. And the transformation should capture this. 
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 However, the assumption might look a bit excessive: it might be the case that what it’s 
at stake is whether such a representation is possible and whether it’s legitimate to assume it 
beforehand. Let me go slower. As it was mentioned before, Roberts starts his argument by 
supposing we might know almost nothing about time reversal, only that it is either unitary or 
anti-unitary. But, if one follows Roberts’ argumentation, one implicitly knew something else 
about time reversal: whatever the form of 𝑇 comes to be (either 𝑇𝐴 or 𝑇𝑈), one knew that 
𝑇: 𝐻𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 → 𝐻𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙. In words, that the time-reversal transformation maps realistic Hamiltonians 
into realistic Hamiltonians, this is, it guarantees that the property of “being realistic” is 
preserved under its application.  
A defender of HA might find this implicit assumption a bit excessive and might go on to 
reject it. Indeed, the implicit assumption that 𝑇: 𝐻𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 → 𝐻𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 can be deemed false to the 
extent that one technically doesn’t know how past-headed Hamiltonians behave (whether time-
reversed Hamiltonians are realistic or not). One doesn’t even know if even one realistic 
Hamiltonian is time-reversal invariant. On this basis, the defender of HA can reject Robert’s 
argument by saying that one is not entitled to assume that the time-reversal transformation 
preserves “reality”. Neither would one be entitled to assume that one of those Hamiltonians is 
time-reversal invariant (the defender of HA might ask: where does such an assumption come 
from?). From a relationalist metaphysics of time, Robert’s assumption looks in fact natural: 
relationalists have a clear metaphysical picture of what going backward in time means 
(condensed in Wigner’s general criterion). And requiring that the second time translation 
involves realistic Hamiltonians would be crucial for having a meaningful representation of 
time reversal (otherwise, how would the system go back to the original state?). Also, in order 
to build the time-reversal transformation up, one can well assume that at least one realistic 
Hamiltonian be time-reversal invariant. 
However, from a substantivalist view, this is not so clear. To begin with, the second-time 
evolution is not required for time reversal to be well defined.  The relevant transformation is 
the inversion of the direction of time (a reflection), 𝑇: 𝑡 → −𝑡; how observables transform 
under such a transformation will depend on the physical theory at stake and how they relate to 
time therein. Consequently, in this picture, it might be excessive to assume that 𝑇: 𝐻𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 →
𝐻𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙. And if one revises Robert’s proof from HA’s perspective, that is, without being 
committed to premise (i), one would arrive at the following conclusion: there would exist no 
realistic Hamiltonian when time reversal is applied; even in the simplest cases. The time-
reversal transformation wouldn’t preserve the property of “being realistic” (since 𝑇𝑈: 𝐻𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 →
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𝐻𝑈𝑛𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙), and the Schrödinger equation is not thereby time-reversal invariant since it fails to 
generate bounded-from-below Hamiltonians when 𝑇𝑈-reversed.  
Note that the point is not actually that the theory simply fails to yield a realistic dynamical 
system; rather, the theory does not even yield a quantum dynamical system. Unbounded-from-
below Hamiltonians are, in Roberts’ words, “physically implausible”. To begin with, “being 
physically implausible” is generally framed within a physical theory (many events are 
physically implausible in the light of a certain theory but perfectly plausible within another), 
so by “physically implausible” I will understand “quantum-mechanical implausible”. 
However, one knows about what’s plausible and what’s not from “known Hamiltonians” (as 
one knows that actual Hamiltonians are always bounded from below), and from more general 
and well-grounded quantum principles that establish that matter would be unstable if 
Hamiltonians were different (for instance, unbounded from below). To the extent that matter 
around us seems to be quite stable, then one can fairly conclude that any quantum system’s 
Hamiltonian should be bounded from below. 
But, what a defender of HA would argue with all this information is that the Schrödinger 
equation is non-𝑇𝑈-invariant in such a radical way that it does not even leave room for a realistic 
Hamiltonian to exist with decreasing 𝑡. In order words, the class of solutions of the Schrödinger 
equation involves either  
(a) bounded-from-below/unbounded-from-above (positive spectrum of energy) 
Hamiltonians in, say, Ⱳ𝑓. 
 or  
(b) unbounded-from-below/bounded-from-above (negative spectrum of energy) 
Hamiltonians in Ⱳ𝑏.  
As solutions of the Schrödinger equation must only involve Hamiltonians like either (a) 
or (b), but not both, one of the two subclasses does not truly represent physical solutions within 
SQM. Hence, one obtains either Ⱳ = Ⱳ𝑏 or Ⱳ = Ⱳ𝑓, but not Ⱳ = Ⱳ𝑓+Ⱳ𝑏. Therefore, the 
Schrödinger equation is simply non-time-reversal invariant. This, of course, does not mean that 
𝑇𝑈 must be then given; rather. But the point is whether or not one has philosophical reasons to 
reject Robert’s main assumption. If one has them, then 𝑇𝑈 may be given, accepting its 
consequences. 
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Now, Roberts recognizes that this conclusion could be drawn in denying his assumption 
when he says that 
“Denying that time reversal is antiunitary means that a nontrivial realistic quantum 
system is never time-reversal invariant, under any circumstances whatsoever. Even 
an empty system with no interactions would be asymmetric in time” (Roberts 2017: 
328) 
And a few lines below 
“There is little practical use in identifying time reversal with a transformation that 
does not make any distinctions at all, not even between a free particle and one 
experiencing an important time-directed process like a weakly interacting meson” 
(Roberts 2017: 328) 
Recall that one of the conditions for the problem of a structural arrow of time (one that has 
been brought up by Callender) is fundamentality. Robert’s first quote seems to be reluctant to 
give the way open for a violation of time-reversal invariance even in those simple cases (those 
cases described by fundamental dynamical laws). But, a structural arrow of time would only 
manifest in those simple cases, and that’s why the fundamentality condition is relevant to 
formulate the problem: the question whether time-reversal invariance holds or not must be 
aimed at those simple cases. Furthermore, the contingency condition is required there: it must 
be the case that even those simple cases might be non-time-reversal invariant. And this shows 
(again) why OA and the problem of a structural arrow of time seems to not fit together. 
The second quote points to a sort of pragmatic stance. At the end of the day, one requires 
time-reversal transformation to draw distinctions between what seems to be “different sorts of 
time-reversal violations”. This is also aligned to Sachs’ kinematic-admissibility condition: in 
order to identify emergent cases of time-reversal violation, one requires that the simplest cases 
remain time-reversal invariant. Two remarks to this: first, this position is again at odds with the 
fundamentality condition. Second, it assumes that it is the time-reversal transformation what 
makes it possible to draw the differences. I’m not completely sure of this, at least, not in such 
a general way. A defender of HA could argue that it is actually the theory what should trace 
the differences between different levels of time-reversal violation. What 𝑇𝑈 reveals is just that 
even in the simplest cases (which is a metaphysical possibility that should be left open) time-
reversal invariance fails because time is structurally asymmetric. And this manifests in a “pure 
way” (so to speak) in the simplest cases. One can retort by saying that OA is unable of capturing 
any structural or fundamental violation of time reversal. And, again, people interested in the 
debate on a structural arrow of time could be wary that 𝑇𝐴 does the work they require. 
154 | P a g e  
 
 Earlier I introduced the distinction between a how-question and a whether-or-not 
question. Whereas the realistic condition seems to provide an answer to a how-question, it is 
somewhat at odds with the contingency condition for the problem of a structural arrow of time 
–a whether-or-not question. In particular, I believe that the reality condition applies information 
that can only be obtained from systems actually evolving in one direction of time (say, with 
𝑡 increasing) to the opposite direction of time (say, with 𝑡 decreasing). To be clear: this is a 
perfectly legitimate maneuver for addressing a how-question like how the Schrödinger equation 
is left invariant under time reversal. The problem nonetheless arises when a view like OA is 
endorsed to draw metaphysical conclusions about a structural arrow of time in quantum 
mechanics, conclusion that answers a whether-or-not question. This is also a point that 
defenders of HA could bring on the table against OA. 
Finally, premise (i) and (ii) in Robert’s proof seem to assume certain “stability” in SQM 
under time reversal: by imposing that the time-reversed evolution and the original one share 
some properties (like in the case where, 𝑇: 𝐻𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 → 𝐻𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙, and consequently both Hamiltonians 
are bounded-from-below), one is “leaking” temporally-biased information about future-headed 
evolutions into past-headed ones; in other words, one is assuming that the theory, to some 
degree, should work with – 𝑡 as it does with +𝑡. But it is at least imaginable that this be not the 
case (again, for reasons derived from the contingency condition). The question thus is: How 
entitled is one to assume about past-headed systems in virtue of one actually knows about 
future-headed ones? To assume the realistic condition seems to be a sort of violation of Huw 
Price’s nowhere viewpoint (1996), a meta-principle in the arrow of time discussion: the world 
might be such that matter is only stable when time runs forward but becomes unstable if time 
runs backward. One should not assume –a priori– that matter behaves equally in both direction 
of time when one actually only knows how it behaves when time runs forward. One shouldn’t 
even assume that there must be past-headed matter at all. Otherwise, one would be nullifying 
one metaphysical possibility by imposing that what is actually given is necessarily the case in 
any other possibility. And allowing for metaphysical possibility is essential to the formulation 
of the problem of a structural arrow of time. 
III  
There is yet a third short argument against drawing metaphysical conclusions about time from 
endorsing OA and its conditions. Now I want to show that the fundamentality condition is also 
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at odds with OA –which brings one back to Sachs’ requirement. Indeed, Sachs’ requirement 
entails that any asymmetry of time must somewhat emerge from interaction and forces. 
According to Sachs, the purpose of defining time reversal is to understand the intertwined play 
between dynamics and kinematics, and to explain how a temporally asymmetric world emerges 
from a temporally symmetric basis. And the explanation in general involves the dynamic’s 
role. This is an assumption that not only already takes for granted that physical laws at the 
fundamental level are time-reversal invariant, but also that any asymmetry of time can only 
come from forces and interactions. Not only does this establish by decree that there is no 
structural arrow of time, but also contradicts directly the fundamentality condition, which seeks 
to set aside equations of motion involving forces and interactions. In brief, if OA has any 
philosophical implication with respect to the direction of time, it must also decline the 
fundamentality condition. 
IV 
My last argument is more general and seeks to show how the role of (a structural) arrow of 
time is diminished by OA in assuming that time-reversal invariance must overall hold. The 
point I want to make is that any justification of OA (and thereby of 𝑇𝐴) implicitly regards that 
a change of the direction of time is, at least, innocuous enough to maintain certain features of 
a physical theory unchanged. Or, to put it differently, that a change of the direction of time 
(under some assumptions) would go unnoticed. And this would amount to considering that the 
word ‘structural’ is rather superfluous. 
One of the ways to see the symmetry-to-reality inference is by considering that if time-
reversal invariance overall holds, then the direction of time would be undetectable across 
temporally-switched scenarios. This argument concludes that the direction of time is 
epistemically inaccessible: one would be unable to decide in which scenario one lives. Hence, 
to any epistemic purpose, a structural arrow of time would be absolutely irrelevant as long as, 
if real, it turns out to be out of our epistemic accessibility. To make the point clearer, consider 
the following argument, which was raised by Donald C. Williams (1951) and Huw Price 
(1996). 
Suppose that one lives in a world with a structural direction of time. Also, suppose that 
the laws governing the world one lives in are, overall, time-reversal invariant. It follows from 
this that for any physical state S, there is a one-to-one mapping to a time-reversed state 𝑆𝑇 (this 
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is what time-reversal invariance assures). Consequently, for a person 𝑃, there exists her time-
reversed Doppelgänger, 𝑃𝑇. From time-reversal invariance and the existence of the mapping 
𝑃 → 𝑃𝑇 , it follows that the 𝑃𝑇 would surely have qualitatively identical experiences to P, only 
with the whole process oppositely oriented in time. Therefore, 𝑃𝑇 experiences her own life 
stages in the same order as P but observing everything around moving backward from the grave 
to the cradle. So, she has the same organic and mental processes but oriented differently in time 
(the infant stage is now the future, instead of being the past). The problem is: how does P know 
that she is not actually 𝑃𝑇, and she was all long mistaken about the direction of time? Given 
the physical possibility of the existence of such a Doppelgänger, the direction of time seems to 
be epistemically inaccessible: both have exactly the same evidence about the direction of time. 
Therefore, it would be better to discard any structural direction of time of our set of beliefs. 
Maudlin has, correctly to my mind, replied this argument. In general, Maudlin’s reply 
considers that the argument uncritically presupposes that one can be sure that time-reversed 
processes will produce the same states (just temporally inverted) as ordinary processes do. And 
this is not obvious at all: time-reversed processes could turn out to be quite unalike that our 
processes. The argument aims to show that any structural arrow of time would be inaccessible 
for us, but one can only achieve this if it is assumed that 𝑃𝑇 will still be having organic 
processes and mental processes as one knows them despite being temporally inverted. In some 
sense, then, a structural direction of time is not so relevant in defining the viability or not of 
those processes. One does know, for instance, that certain mental processes produce mental 
state in one direction of time, but why should one be so sure that time-reversed mental 
processes will equally produce mental states whatsoever? 
If the argument aims to show that a structural direction of time is epistemically 
inaccessible, and therefore dispensable, then it commits a petitio principii –it shows that a 
structural direction of time is epistemically inaccessible but thanks to guarantee this does not 
play any relevant role in the very existence of physical and mental states. To put it differently, 
in imagining time-revered processes and states, the change of the direction of time is innocuous 
enough in so far as such time-reversed processes and states are expected to behave as they do 
in the ordinary direction of time. My point is that OA commits the same sin: it uncritically 
presupposes that the inversion of the direction of time shouldn’t transform certain observables 
for, otherwise, time-reversed states couldn’t be produced. This would amount to assuming that 
a structural arrow of time wouldn’t be structural (or fundamental) enough to stablish which 
states are possible and which ones are not. 
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Here a more precise case that was analyzed before: in demanding that realistic 
Hamiltonians must exist in the backward direction of time, one is also assuming that the 
property of being “realistic” keeps invariant under time-reversal transformation. But that 
property might easily be one of those that one loses if a structural arrow of time genuinely 
exists. To put it in other way, by assuming that time-reversed Hamiltonians must be realistic 
(or bounded from below), or that a time-reversed the Schrödinger equation must generates a 
time-reversed series of quantum-mechanics states, one is not only assuming that certain 
familiar properties of quantum systems when regarded in one direction of time are equally 
instantiated in the opposite direction, but also that the direction of time is not structural or 
fundamental enough to define what is a well-behaved quantum-mechanics Hamiltonian, or 
which the very conditions for its existence are. The presupposition could be harmless when 
inquiring the emergence of non-structural arrows of time, or non-fundamental temporally 
asymmetric quantum processes. But in inquiring whether the Schrödinger equation manifests 
a structural preference for one direction of time instead of the other, such an assumption 
imposes a bias in favor of a negative answer. 
Let me now address the same point from a theoretically broader viewpoint. One has a 
theory that, let’s suppose, works astonishingly well as it stands: SQM. Empirical confirmation 
for that theory comes always from future-directed experiences (by convention). And the theory 
in itself has been built up in the light of how things behave in, say, the future direction of time 
(by convention again). One can raise at least two questions regarding SQM and the direction 
of time: 
(a) Is there any acceptable and workable version of SQM with 𝑡 decreasing? 
(b) Is 𝑇(𝑆𝑄𝑀) an acceptable and workable version of SQM? 
With some caveats and some assumptions, one could with conviction claim that there is in fact 
an acceptable and workable version of SQM with 𝑡 decreasing: the one that is obtained by 
applying a transformation like 𝑇𝐴. 
 𝑇𝐴(𝑆𝑄𝑀, 𝑡) = 𝑆𝑄𝑀
∗, −𝑡 (5.1 ) 
And one gets it by relying upon some artifices (to borrow Roman’s expression) that transforms 
wave-functions and SQM’s self-adjoint operators in such a way that the equivalence is 
satisfied. But, note that one starts with the following situation 
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? (𝑆𝑄𝑀, 𝑡) = 𝑆𝑄𝑀?, −𝑡 (5.2 ) 
Where one knows that the equivalence must be satisfied, and that 𝑡 now goes decreasing, but 
one knows nothing about which transformation meets the equivalence and how a time-reversed 
SQM satisfying the equivalence looks. That is what one has to work out so as to answer the 
first question.  
 Yet, the second question is entirely different in nature. What is at issue now is 
 𝑇(𝑆𝑄𝑀, 𝑡) ?  𝑆𝑄𝑀
𝑇 , −𝑡 (5.3 ) 
That is, the equivalence is not taken for granted but quite the opposite: it’s what is actually at 
stake. There is naturally a tension here: what is the form of T? But the very question demands 
its form (whatever it come to be) to be theory-independent. And for this, one shouldn’t assume 
that 𝑆𝑄𝑀𝑇 will be an acceptable and workable physical theory like SQM: the property of 
“being a workable theory” could fail to be instantiated by a time-reversed version of SQM. In 
fact, everything may go fatally wrong when time is reversed: one gets to a theory that doesn’t 
make any physical sense. For instance, one knows that a certain kind of Hamiltonians belongs 
to SQM (those bounded-from-below/unbounded-from-above). In assuming that that kind of 
Hamiltonians also belongs to  𝑆𝑄𝑀𝑇 is like assuming that the time-reversed theory makes just 
about much sense as SQM. But this is going too far in one’s assumptions: one knows nothing 
about what SMQ looks like.  
Similarly, in assuming that time-reversed 𝜓 represents a quantum-mechanical state, one 
is going too far: 𝜓𝑇 belongs to 𝑆𝑄𝑀𝑇 but not to SQM. Whether there is a mapping from 𝜓 -
solutions to 𝜓𝑇-solutions is what one is investigating. And the point is, and from here non-
time-reversal invariance comes out, that whereas SQM is an astonishingly successful theory, 
𝑆𝑄𝑀𝑇 is rather an entirely useless one. Only by asking for 𝑆𝑄𝑀𝑇 to be as acceptable and 
workable as SQM, one gets to 𝑆𝑄𝑀∗. But, by this maneuver, one is going too far in one’s 
assumptions about what 𝑆𝑄𝑀𝑇 looks like. 
Section 4. What the scenario looks like so far? 
In the previous sections I showed in which way OA’s conditions for time reversal and the three 
conditions for the problem of a structural arrow of time (particularly, contingency and 
fundamentality) do not fit together. I believe that, at this point, one is compelled to draw the 
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following skeptic conclusion: by endorsing OA, one is unable to say whether the Schrödinger 
equation picks a structural arrow of time (if one believes that the claim “the Schrödinger 
equation is time-reversal invariant” is philosophically interesting). Remarkably, not only does 
this preclude any answer to the problem of a structural arrow of time, but also it seems to 
undermine the very formulation of the problem of the two realms since it presupposes that there 
is no structural arrow of time in SQM given that the Schrödinger equation is time-reversal 
invariant. However, as argued, one is not even entitled to claim that the Schrödinger equation 
is univocally time-reversal invariant. One is not entitled to draw such a conclusion with respect 
to the direction of time either. From OA’s position, one can only remain silent. This is so 
because OA offers no reliable way to argue for or against a structural arrow of time. 
And here is how the scenario looks so far for philosophers and physicists willing to engage 
in the debate on a structural arrow of time. They either:  
(a) accept OA but decline to address the problem of a structural arrow of time and remains 
reluctant to draw any metaphysical claim about whether time is fundamentally 
asymmetric or symmetric in SQM (e.g., by claiming that the sentence “the Schrödinger 
equation is time-reversal invariant” is not metaphysically interesting) 
Or 
(b) abandon OA and turns to an approach like HA in order to provide an answer to the 
problem, which leads to concluding that the Schrödinger equation is non-time-reversal 
invariant, and therefore it does manifest a structural arrow of time.  
But, is there any other option for OA’s defenders willing to address the problem of a 
structural arrow of time without abandoning their position? One could think that OA’s 
defenders will always have the option of challenging the formulation of the problem, which 
amounts to challenge some of its conditions. However, some of them are conceptually more 
essential than others. Particularly, I cannot devise any viable formulation of the problem that 
circumvents the contingency condition, so this doesn’t seem to be the condition one would 
want to drop. Neglecting the co-extensivity condition would drive one to similar results: if one 
allows for many representations of time reversal, then there wouldn’t be any matter of fact 
about whether an equation is time-reversal invariant, a property that becomes relative to the 
chosen representation (this is roughly the current state of affairs in physics). 
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A more plausible way out for OA’s defenders would be to decline the fundamentality 
condition. For example, arguing that it is too strong, or even worse, that is misguided. So, one 
could decline that only fundamental physical laws are those relevant for addressing the problem 
of a structural arrow of time, and this may be given by other means. Keith Hutchison (1993, 
1995) has followed this path for classical mechanics. In fact, the distinction between 
“fundamental laws” and “non-fundamental or phenomenological laws” can be put into 
question: physicists and engineers routinely apply and deal with “non-fundamental” dynamical 
equations; physics students have to master calculations featuring “imperfect” springs or 
different kinds of interactions; most real physical systems are described by non-fundamental 
laws in this sense. Fundamental laws, as Hutchison argues, are laws that merely describe 
highly-idealized models that share some properties with realistic models but clearly not share 
many others. To take them as more fundamental or ontologically prior is to condemn 
physicists’ real work to a sort of apparent reality. Intending to find a structural arrow of time 
in any relevant sense in such platonic models is, at best, excessive or, at worse, misguided.  
Probably, this is the easiest (if not the only) way out for OA’s supporters. Nonetheless it 
implies deadly consequences for time-reversal invariance: as mentioned above, the 
overwhelming majority of non-fundamental dynamical laws are categorically non-time-
reversal invariant. Classical mechanics (paradigmatically, a time-reversal invariant theory) 
would also fail to be symmetric under time reversal if, for example, one includes dissipative 
forces in the relevant dynamical equations (this is precisely Hutchison’s conclusion). Declining 
the fundamentality condition would amount to claiming that any dynamical equation is equally 
good enough to ground a structural arrow of time, which could result not so intuitive. 
Furthermore, instances of non-time-reversal invariant equations would start to come up and 
one would be forced to consider all them as relevant for the problem of a structural arrow of 
time. Thus, the distinction between a structural and a non-structural arrow of time rapidly blurs 
out.   
So, if one workable way around the problem was to decline the fundamentality condition, 
this maneuver would however imply that there would be as several instances of structural 
arrows of time as many instances of (non-fundamental) time-reversal invariant physical laws. 
This doesn’t look like a quite promissory scenario for philosophical inquiry around the 
foundations of time. Thereby, when inquiring whether time is structurally directed according 
to a given physical theory, OA seems to lose, again, its obviousness and persuasive force. So, 
why don’t get rid of OA once and for all? 
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This would be equivalent to endorse HA. In contrast with OA, HA doesn’t presuppose 
any violation to the conditions for formulating the problem of a structural arrow of time. It 
doesn’t assume that fundamental dynamical equations are a priori and necessarily time-reversal 
invariant, so that the contingency condition is preserved. Neither does it need assume that all 
dynamical equations are on equal foot: the distinction between fundamental and non-
fundamental laws still runs and can well serve to ground a structural arrow of time. Blatantly, 
co-extensiveness is also preserved as long as HA claims that only 𝑇𝑈 truly represents time 
reversal within SQM, whereas 𝑇𝐴 rather stands for motion reversal. 
In endorsing HA, the straightforward consequence is that the Schrödinger equation turns 
out to be non-time-reversal invariant, and thereby, to exhibit a structural preference for one 
direction of time. Moreover, one would, too, be precluding an overarching attitude in physics 
in respect of the time-reversal operator, to wit, it must be theory relative. Under HA, the time-
reversal operator is no longer theory relative, but it instead tries to capture all-sharing, global 
features of time reversal condensed in the role that the variable 𝑡 plays in physical theories. 
Though time reversal can only mean to invert 𝑡’s sign, the consequences will greatly vary 
depending on the relation between theory’s dynamical variables and time. Difficulties for 
endorsing HA hence follow from casting away deeply-ingrained suppositions about time 
reversal in physics and from being mostly inspired in a substantivalist stance with respect to 
time. 
Final Remarks 
In this chapter, I have linked what was said about time-reversal and time-reversal invariance in 
the previous chapter with the problem of a structural arrow of time within SQM. I have argued 
that OA’s inner mechanism of justification (which has some assumptions and imposes some 
conditions) and the very formulation of the problem conflict one another. Therefore, and this 
is the moral of the story, a cautious attitude should prevail in drawing any metaphysical 
conclusion from time-reversal invariance in SQM. Philosophers of physics and time faces 
thereby the following scenario. They must either  
(a) consider the claim “the Schrödinger equation is time reversal invariant (because it is 
𝑇𝐴-invariant)” as metaphysically uninteresting, implicaturing that OA is not a useful 
view for shedding light on a structural arrow of time in quantum theories. By doing this, 
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they preserve the orthodox approach to time reversal in SQM and its consequence about 
time-reversal invariance. 
Or, 
(b) decline OA and address the problem of a structural arrow of time in terms of HA. By 
doing this, any claim about (non)time-reversal invariance in SQM would be 
metaphysically interesting. By doing this, they will be rejecting OA’s consequences 
about time-reversal invariance in SQM as long as SQM turns out to be non-time-
reversal invariant because it is 𝑇𝑈-invariant. 
However, there is a third option for OA’s defenders that want to (i) preserve OA as it stands, 
and (ii) engage in the debate on a structural arrow of time. They may also 
(c) decline that the very formulation of the problem of a structural arrow of time be the 
right one. 
I have nonetheless argued that this third option doesn’t look, at least at first glance, too 
promissory. 
I have not argued that either OA or the very formulation of the problem of the arrow of 
time are misguided views taken by themselves. On the one hand, OA has steered physicists to 
a deeper understanding of symmetries in quantum theories and to valuable empirical research. 
No doubts about it. On the other hand, this formulation of the problem, along with its 
conditions, has successfully managed to pose the problem of the arrow of time in a systematic, 
clearer way. However, each view seems to be guided by unalike aims and motivations, and this 
imposes certain limits when addressing philosophical issues. I think that the possibilities for 
formulating a philosophically interesting notion of time reversal in physics from which one can 
learn about time’s properties is one of the challenges philosophers of time and of physics should 
focus on in the future, particularly, in quantum theories. 
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Introduction 
Part 2 left us with two take-home messages as to the relation between physics and metaphysics 
when dealing with the problem of the arrow of time: 
(a) An eye should always keep on how physical and formal notions are defined within a 
theoretical framework since they might trivialize a philosophical problem. In this case, 
the orthodox definition of time reversal is not conceptually useful to address the 
philosophical problem of a structural arrow of time. So, one must be cautious with the 
sort of metaphysical claims about the nature of time being drawn from the often-
repeated claim that SQM is time-reversal invariant. 
(b) But, going deeper, the very formal definition of time reversal is crucially determined 
by one’s previously-assumed metaphysical and epistemic commitments. This was fairly 
clear when distinguishing  𝑇𝑅𝑒𝑙 from 𝑇𝑆𝑢𝑏 and their instances. In other words, 
metaphysics plays a central role in determining how time must be reversed and how 
one comes to formally represent it; role that has been largely overlooked in the 
literature. Even though the labor of theoretically defining a time-reversal operator is to 
good extent formal, one decides to call that piece of mathematics “time reversal”, to 
connect it with a previously-devised concept of what time is and what its reversion 
amounts to. 
It’s clear at this point that physics (or mathematics) alone is not only unable to provide an 
exhaustive answer to the problem of the arrow of time (whichever version one likes to take), 
but is also unable to set the problem up, even in the very basic sense of getting the relevant 
notions univocally defined. Neither is it the case that one was given a univocal and clear-cut 
physical and formal basis one then has to interpret so as to strengthen our conceptual 
understanding of the matter, as if philosophy were the owl of Minerva, always coming too late, 
entering the scene only when the shades of night are gathering, paraphrasing Hegel’s adage. 
Contrarily, philosophy comes first in the fundamental sense of, for instance, bridging the gap 
between a piece of mathematics and what its intended referent is supposed to be. 
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And yet, there is one further sense in which metaphysics plays a crucial role in addressing 
the problem of the arrow of time in quantum mechanics. One is probably more familiarized 
with this third sense, though it has been scarcely addressed in the literature, to the best of my 
knowledge, in relation to the arrow of time. This third sense, which I’d like to think through 
along this third part, has to do with the so-known interpretations of SQM. It has been already 
mentioned in passing that one doesn’t get yet any full-fledged physical theory with SQM as it 
stands; though partially interpreted, SQM is still just a powerful piece of mathematics lacking 
the relevant elements to get any connection with the physical world out and down there. Before 
getting ahead ourselves, let’s see briefly how this issue pops up. 
If one stops for a while and think of SQM as a scientific theory, one should be able to at 
least give an answer to the following question: SQM is a theory…of what? Is it merely a theory 
about outcomes in measurements? Is just a powerful and complex algorithm to work out 
statistical correlations? If this is so, and I can imagine that many physicists would come along 
with it, then SQM is merely a “cook book” (to use John Nash’s witty expression) that one 
doesn’t really understand and, let me add, one is not supposed to understand. Nonetheless, all 
this may turn out to be a bit disappointing if one takes SQM to be a scientific theory. And if 
one comes to agree that a scientific theory is not merely a repertoire of procedures and rituals 
providing useful and practical calculations, but it is rather somehow in the business of rendering 
some understanding of what’s going on out there in the natural world, the answer should then 
be entirely different.  
In particular, the answer must involve the necessary elements to bring up a picture of 
what the world is like according to SQM. But in providing such an answer, one is readily 
stepping beyond SQM and getting into the realm of its various interpretations. If one stops 
here and think of SQM thoroughly, what one merely knows about it thus far is, first, that SQM 
is a powerful tool for predicting results in measurements and for accounting for statistical 
correlations checked by highly-tuned experiments; second, that some no-go theorems have 
been proved in the last decades constraining,  if you’ll pardon the repetition, what things don’t 
go within the theory –but remaining absolutely silent about what things do go; and, third, that 
a persistently puzzling issue lies at the core of the foundations of SQM –the so-called 
measurement problem, also popularly known as Schrödinger’s cat problem. Interpretations of 
SQM might be different attempts to overcome the measurement problem and, in this, to tell 
one a complete scientific story about what’s going on at the quantum scale. 
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And all this is crucial for the problem of the arrow of time in the quantum realm because 
many of the divergent proposals to overcome the measurement problem have modified, or 
added stuff to, SQM. In this enterprise, new temporally-asymmetric elements (in any of its 
versions) might enter the theory. Hence, I shall take for a quantum theory to be a full-fledged 
quantum theory, it ought to feature, or make explicit, the following points:  
(a) SQM’s formalism (what was already analyzed in Part 2) and to reproduce usual 
quantum-mechanical predictions and results. 
(b) A claim about whether any modification of, or addition to, SQM is required. 
Different interpretations can be thus aligned in two sides as to whether SQM is 
complete or incomplete. 
Some have argued that these two points aren’t enough. In order to know what a physical theory 
is really and fundamentally about, and in order to rightly read off the metaphysics from the 
physics, one needs to postulate a “primitive ontology” (PO) for thus-interpreted quantum 
theory. Thereby, I shall take for a quantum theory to be a full-fledged quantum theory it ought 
to also feature 
(c) A claim making explicit whether so-interpreted quantum theory has a PO or not. 
Along this third part, I shall deal with the problem of the arrow of time (either of its versions) 
in the framework of some interpretations of SQM. As it is well-known, several foundational 
problems around how SQM must be interpreted arose a few years after the mathematical 
formalism were consolidated, and plenty of interpretations have appeared in the field ever 
since. I don’t have enough room to get into much details about them, so I will just consider the 
most relevant ones in the current literature and those that explicitly modify SQM’s formalism. 
This third and last part of the thesis is organized as follows. After a brief detour through 
the measurement problem and how interpretations of SQM appear (Chapter 6), I shall consider, 
in Chapter 7, a first minimal extension of SQM proposed by Paul Dirac (1930) and John von 
Neumann (1932), which mainly consists in adding an extra dynamical postulate to SQM, the 
so-called “Collapse Postulate” (either considered as a physically real process or seen 
instrumentally as non-physical). This formerly extension of SQM (SQM+CP henceforth) has 
been so widely-extended in the field that is often confused with SQM itself. This orthodox 
interpretation of SQM (OrQM) has been target of several criticisms and has been ultimately 
abandoned in the philosophy of physics community, though it is still quite extended in the 
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physicists’ community (wherein the collapse postulate is generally seen as instrumental). 
Furthermore, it has been claimed that SQM+CP provides the means to establish an objective 
quantum arrow of time. Therefore, it will be useful to introduce the idea of “collapse of the 
wave function” and whether it delivers a quantum-mechanical base for an arrow of time as a 
starting point. 
In Chapter 8, I shall introduce a more elegant and refined family of collapse theories, the 
so-called “spontaneous collapse theories”. In this chapter, I will exclusively focus on the 
version originally proposed by Giancarlo Ghirardi, A. Rimini and T. Weber (1985, 1986), and 
P. Pearle (1989), the so-called “GRW interpretation”. Conforming to it, quantum systems not 
only evolves according to a deterministic and linear equation of motion (the Schrödinger 
equation), but they also undergo some spontaneous and indeterministic quantum jumps: Given 
a certain amount of time, a quantum system evolving according to the Schrödinger equation, 
whose state is represented by a bell-shaped wave function, is bound to undergo a quite different 
evolution that will localize the system in the space, destroying its bell-shaped probability 
distribution. In this framework, I shall analyze whether this non-linear and indeterministic 
dynamical evolution offers the grounds for a structural arrow of time. 
Finally, in Chapter 9, I shall address one of the most radical modifications of SQM, 
Bohmian mechanics. Like GRW, Bohmian mechanics considers that SQM’s dynamics should 
be modified. In order to do this, Bohmians introduce the “guidance equation”, so that quantum 
mechanics involves two dynamical laws: the Schrödinger equation, on the one side, and the 
guidance equation, on the other. But, in contrast with any other interpretation, Bohmian 
mechanics claims that the quantum state is not fully given by the wave-function alone, but also 
include particles’ positions: quantum mechanics is a theory about particles that always have 
perfectly defined positions. In some respects, Bohmian mechanics provides a picture of the 
world that recalls some aspects of classical physics (though, of course, diverges from it in many 
relevant and deep points): particles with definite positions, following definite trajectories. And 
both dynamical equations just aim at describing how particles’ positions change as time goes 
by.  I shall analyze how Bohmian Mechanics deals with temporal asymmetries within its 
framework and what role time reversal plays in building up the theory. 
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VI. 
Towards a full-blooded quantum theory  
The measurement problem and interpretations 
The measurement problem can be posed in the following plain way: SQM involves an intrinsic 
paradox that seems to be unsurmountable from SQM’s means alone, namely, that what SQM’s 
dynamics predicts is flagrantly in contradiction with what one observes in experiments. So, it 
seems that the theory is in need of further resources to escape the paradox; otherwise, it is 
completely off the right track –its dynamics just yields wrong predictions. Let’s get deeper into 
this. 
Section 1. The measurement problem and interpretations of SQM 
The paradox arises from SQM’s dynamics, what it predicts for following times, and what one 
gets when experiments are carried out. Tim Maudlin (1995) has proposed three ways of 
understanding the measurement problem: “the problem of the outcomes”, “the problem of 
statistics” and “the problem of effect”, the first being the most widely extended. According to 
Maudlin the measurement problem involves three mutually inconsistent assumptions: 
A1. The wave-function of a system is complete. 
A2. The wave-function always evolves in accord with a linear dynamical equation (the 
Schrödinger equation). 
A3. Measurements have always determinate outcomes. 
How these assumptions are mutually incompatible can be seen in the following familiar 
example. 
Suppose that one conducts an experiment to measure an electron’s z-spin, which can 
adopt any of two values: either z-spin up | ↑⟩ or z-spin down | ↓⟩. Suppose one also has a 
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(macroscopic) device configured to measure z-spin, a “z-device”.  Measuring the z-spin of the 
electron mainly means that it passes through the z-device, and that at the end of the experiment 
one gets a definite answer about whether the electron is either in a z-spin up or in a z-spin down 
state. For instance, this can be straightforwardly realized by a pointer pointing out to the 
obtained value, “z-spin up” - “z-spin down”, on the device’s display. So, if the z-device 
measures z-spin up, the pointer will point “z-spin up”, and likewise when measuring z-spin 
down. This means that measure device’s states (either having a pointer pointing to “z-spin up” 
or to “z-spin down”) get correlated with electron’s state and its z-spin’s value. This is, roughly, 
how a well-behaved z-device should ideally work and how a well-configured z-experiment 
should ideally run. 
In order to carry out the experiment, the electron must be firstly prepared in some state. 
One doesn’t know in which z-spin state the electron is, but one knows that it was prepared in 
a, say, x-spin up state. So, the quantum state of the electron before entering the z-device is 
|𝜓(𝑡0)⟩𝑥 =  | ↑⟩ in the x-spin coordinate. From SQM’s formalism, one well knows that a state 
written down in a x-spin basis can be rewritten as a superposition of states in a different spin 
basis. In particular, the state of an electron in some eigenstate of the observable x-spin can be 
also expressed as being in a superposition of states in the z-spin basis, 
 
|𝜓(𝑡0)⟩𝑧 =  √
1
2
(|↑⟩𝑧 + |↓⟩𝑧) (6.1 ) 
In this way, so-prepared electron enters the z-device at 𝑡0 in a superposition of z-spin states. 
Additionally, the z-device has to be also prepared in an initial state, typically called it a “ready 
state”. When the electron enters the z-device one gets the composite system consisting of the 
electron in x-spin up state correlated with the z-device in a ready state 
 





𝐷) (6.2 ) 
After running the experiment, as mentioned before, one expects that the final z-spin state 
of the electron gets correlated with the device’s pointer pointing to either “z-spin up” or “z-
spin down”. That is, one expects that the composite system at 𝑡1 evolves into either 
|↑⟩𝑧|"𝑧 𝑢𝑝"⟩
𝐷 or |↓⟩𝑧|"𝑧 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛"⟩
𝐷. This is to be expected simply because that is how 
experiments have been working so far: pointers have always pointed to definite values 
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(assuming that the measurement device was rightly set up, the experiment carefully carried out, 
and so forth). And, in fact, one is completely right in assuming it: after running the experiment, 
that is, after measuring electron’s z-spin, things passed off as usual: one obtained a definite 
result for the electron’s z-spin, say, a pointer pointing to, say, “z-spin up”. This is the 
assumption A3 in Maudlin’s first version of the measurement problem. 
This is what one always observes. And SQM has been proved to be an incredibly 
powerful and good piece of mathematics for predicting the probability of obtaining either “z-
spin up” or “z-spin down”. However, and this is the upshot of all this and from which the 
measurement problem arises, how things in fact end up being is not what is technically 
predicted by SQM’s dynamics. In other words, things do not turn out the way they should 
according to SQM’s dynamics. And here A2 comes in.  
The problem is that the dynamics governing the evolution of such a composite system is 
invariably unitary and linear. If one stops for a while and think carefully how the composite 
system should evolve according to SQM’s dynamics, one notes that the Schrödinger equation 
is a purely deterministic, unitary and linear differential equation. This means that if one starts 
with a state like (6.2), given the adequate interaction between the system and the apparatus, 
one should after a time interval get a state like 
 




𝐷 + |↓⟩𝑧|"𝑧 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛"⟩
𝐷) (6.3 ) 
And one should get to the same result at 𝑡2 and after three million years. In a nutshell, what 
SQM’s dynamics tells us is that, once the composite system has evolved in a superposition of 
states, nothing in the SQM’s dynamics entitles us to throw one of the terms away. Thinking of 
it in terms of macroscopic objects, this would amount to a very weird state where, in Albert’s 
words, there would be no matter of fact about where the pointer is pointing to (Albert 1992: 
76). 
It doesn’t make any difference to this result whatsoever if one intends to escape the 
paradox by introducing further stuff in the chain of superpositions: an aware, competent 
observer looking at the pointer on a display will also end up in a superposition of mental states 
according to SQM’s dynamics, and a friend in Taiwan that will eventually read an e-mail with 
the results of the experiment will also end up in a superposition according to SQM’s dynamics. 
No matter what you add to the set up, you only get a larger and larger chain of superpositions, 
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and a weirder and weirder picture of the world consequently. Therefore, something deeply bad 
underlies SQM as it stands, mainly, regarding A2 and A3. 
There are various ways to manifest what is wrong with all this. Some think that the 
problem lies in a flagrant contradiction between our observations and SQM’s dynamics (A2 
and A3). At the end of the day, besides their accurate probabilistic predictions, SQM is simply, 
and deeply, wrong because predicts states that have never been observed (see Albert 1992, Ney 
2013). Others express the problem a bit differently: though SQM provides a very effective 
algorithm to predict macroscopic phenomena, it falls short of being a proper physical theory 
explaining the success of this algorithm (see, for instance, Wallace 2007). Be as it may, the 
paradox is clear enough for one to become aware of that something must be done if SQM is, in 
any relevant sense, a scientific theory of nature, conveying positive knowledge about the 
natural world and about what happens when experiments are carried out. In other words, SQM 
has to somehow find the way of linking what is observed, on the one hand, with what its 
dynamics predicts should be observed, on the other. Both things should desirably match. 
So, something should be changed or carefully revised. To begin with, it has been 
supposed that SQM’s formalism is overall right. And probably this was a mistake and one 
should in consequence consider discarding SQM as a whole. This would however be too 
drastic: after all, it is this formalism that has proven to be amazingly successful at experimental 
predictions. So, it seems not to be a promissory way-out to completely get rid of SQM. As an 
alternative, it could be considered that experimental results were not-well-confirmed. This 
would be drastic, too, since they have been performed with higher and higher precision from 
the very outset of the theory, and superpositions have never been experimentally observed 
(though Dieks 2019 suggests something slightly different). 
So, one should think of modifying either A2 or A3. And this is what various 
interpretations of SQM basically do. First, one could claim that the quantum dynamics is not 
fully exhausted by A2: The Schrödinger equation doesn’t tell us the whole story. Second, one 
could rather suggest that A3 should be approached from the right angle, reading what the 
formalism really says. Interpretations of SQM can hence be aligned in two sides:  
(a) Those believing that SQM’s dynamics is complete (that is, there is no need to either 
modify or to add further elements to the theory) and that one should just change the 
angle from which the theory and experiments are typically regarded. They thereby 
decline A3;  
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(b) Those believing that SQM’s dynamics as stands is incomplete and must thus be 
supplemented with further elements, for instance, a new dynamical postulate. They 
thereby decline assumption A236. 
David Wallace (2007) says that people aligned with the first option propose a pure 
interpretation of the theory to the extent to which they claim that the solution of the 
measurement problem doesn’t hinge on altering the formalism. Advocators of the second side 
rather promote, according to him, a modificatory interpretation since a full-blooded quantum 
theory should feature a different dynamic that somehow includes SQM’s. 
Naturally, particular instances of these general positions come in degree as they, for 
instance, differ with respect to how much the dynamics must be changed, or how radical the 
revisions of our view of the world must be for it to harmonize with the quantum theory. 
However, most interpretations of SQM available in our days can straightforwardly be aligned 
with either (a) or (b)37. For instance, 
• Wave-function realists (Albert 1996, 2013, Albert and Loewer 1996, Ney 2012, 2013), 
Everettians (Everett 1957), many-world’s or many-mind’s defenders (Deutsch 1986, 
2002, Wallace 2012) think that SQM’s formalism is complete and indisputably right. 
The problem is in some way just apparent, since one is not considering experiments 
through the right perspective. Instead of changing the formalism, one should firstly 
learn to read the theory correctly and then come up with a story about how observations, 
as one knows them, come out from SQM. This might imply that some of our 
philosophical convictions about what the world is like ought to be radically revised (for 
instance, by accepting that there is no a single world but many, all them comprehended 
in a Multiverse; or that the real space is not three-or-four-dimensional, but higher 
dimensional). 
                                                          
36 Some of whom deny A2 also deny A1 in claiming that the wave-function doesn’t specify all of the physical 
properties of the system, so that the quantum state should be specified by adding something else to the wave-
function (e.g. particles’ position configuration). 
37 It is worth noting that there is a different general stance with respect to the nature of ψ that has paved the way 
for purely epistemic interpretations of ψ. In brief, ψ-epistemic view (as they are called) consider that ψ is not an 
aspect of the quantum reality, but it reflects a subject’s incomplete knowledge about an underlying ontic state (see 
Spekkens 2007, Harrigan and Spekkens 2010). This view paved the way for some interpretations as Quantum 
Bayesianism or Qbism, where a quantum-mechanical state is just summary of the observers’ information about 
an individual physical system. Information that changes according to how observers get new information by, for 
instance, measurements (see Fuchs 2010). Even though ψ-epistemic views have been relevant for discussing 
retrocausality (see Friederich and Evans 2019), any temporally (a)symmetry coming from there would be non-
objective, in the ontological sense in which “objectivity” for an arrow of time was defined in the Introduction. 
That’s why I won’t consider ψ-epistemic views in this thesis. 
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• Bohmians (in its different versions, Bohm 1952, Dürr, Goldestein and Zanghi 1992ab, 
1997) or collapse theories’ supporters (in any of their different kinds, von Neumann 
1932, Ghirardi, Rimini, Weber 1986, Pearle 1989) rather believe that the story told by 
SQM alone is incomplete and, when taken literally, plainly wrong. Something else must 
thus be added to SQM in order for quantum theory to be complete. And this generally 
means either to modify the dynamics or to add a new dynamical law. 
Coming back to my business here, alternative interpretations of SQM may hence come to tell 
a different story about whether a quantum theory is equipped with a structural arrow of time 
since the very dynamic varies along with them. That’s why interpretations of SQM should be 
taken into consideration to address the problem properly and to its full extent. I will come back 
to it in the following chapters. Before that, I’d like to add, and to discuss, a noteworthy 
ingredient in this picture. 
Section 2. Primitive ontology and symmetries 
There is yet a further step forward one can take. Some have proposed, and actively promoted, 
that any interpretation of a physical theory should make also explicit the fundamental ontology 
that such a theory is about. The “primitive ontology approach” (PO), as it comes to be known 
ultimately, is an attempt to bridge the gap between a physical theory’s (partially) interpreted 
formalism and the ontology of the three-dimensional objects one daily has experience of. 
Having probably its origin in the notion of “local beables” of John Bell (1987), the approach 
was firstly introduced by Detlef Dürr, Sheldon Goldestin and Nino Zanghi (1992: Section 2.2), 
and developed further by Allori et. al (2008, 2014), and Allori 2013. 
In a nutshell, the PO posits the “basic kinds of entities that are to be building blocks of 
everything else” (Dürr, Goldestin, Zanghi 1992: 29). Yet, these “building blocks” cannot be 
naively read off from a theory’s formalism or from textbooks but have to be previously 
introduced as the referential content of such a formalism. Sometimes a theory’s formalism 
involves mathematical items inhabiting in the phase space or a high-dimensional configuration 
space. But, according to PO’s advocators, it would be misleading to read off the ontology of 
the actual world from this: if physical theories intend to explain what one macroscopically 
observes (things like pointers pointing to a certain value on a display), if physical theory intends 
to provide some positive knowledge about what the three-(or-four)-dimensional world is like, 
then something else ought to be introduced in order to make completely explicit what the 
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ontology of a physical theory is: the PO is of what matter is fundamentally made, and is about 
what the physical theory is. Consequently, any suitable PO will imperiously be:  
(a) microscopic rather than macroscopic since it needs to specify the building blocks 
of the macroscopic world, 
(b)  three-(or four)-dimensional, that is, defined in a three(four)-dimensional space 
rather than in a more complicated high-dimensional space. 
This explains why the PO approach has gained so many supporters lately in the field of 
quantum mechanics: SQM, and many interpretations thereof, would suggest that the theory is 
actually, e.g., about the wave-function, but leaving completely unclear how it connects with the 
macroscopic world. To put it a bit differently, SQM somehow entails (if you take it seriously) 
that chairs, dogs, buildings, planets and eggs are fundamentally made of wave-functions. But 
wave-functions inhabit a high-dimensional space, whereas chairs, dogs, buildings, planets and 
eggs inhabit a quite different three(four)-dimensional space. As things stands, nothing in the 
theory allows one to straightforwardly and directly link wave-functions to the macroscopic 
surrounding stuff. Hence, the theory seems to be in the uneasy situation of having to overcome 
the gap between its formalism and the real world. Well, the PO approach seeks to puts theory’s 
feet back firmly on the ground by selecting which variables and which elements are to be taken 
as representing something that exists in the real world. And the theory will simply and 
ultimately be about such worldly things.  
Though the PO approach can well be considered as a useful way to do metaphysics, it 
has been also suggested that a PO has a strong influence on the relation between a theory’s 
formalism and its symmetries (Allori et al. 2008, Allori 2013), even in relation to the arrow of 
time (Allori 2019). In this sense, the PO is expected to have some influence on how one comes 
to understand temporal asymmetries within a physical theory (Allori 2019). It is worth digging 
into it a bit more deeply because the way in which PO’s supporters relate a theory’s symmetries 
to the PO could, to my mind, lead to some misunderstandings about how a symmetry 
transformation should be settled. Whereas I’d like to make the case that the PO approach could 
in fact give us some hints about how symmetry transformations must be implemented within a 
physical theory (under some assumptions), I’m afraid that the current treatment in the literature 
falls short in strongly tying theory’s symmetries and the PO.  
In the PO’s language, that a physical theory has a given symmetry means that 
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The possible histories of the PO, those that are allowed by the theory, when 
transformed according to the symmetry, will again be possible histories for the 
theory, and the possible probability distributions on the histories, those that are 
allowed by the theory, when transformed according to the symmetry, will again 
be possible probability distribution for the theory 
Let me explain the definition a little bit further (I’ll be partially following Allori et al. 2008 in 
this). “The possible histories of the PO” simply refers to the possible evolutions of the PO 
according to the laws of the theory, representing “physically possible worlds” (in the sense of 
“nomologically possible worlds”, Earman 1989) for the PO’s behavior or distribution. 
Among those possible evolutions, some will be product of a symmetry transformation, 
for instance, by temporally translating the system forward in time by 5 seconds or by reversing 
it in time. In this sense, if the symmetry holds, the original evolution 𝑒 will be linked by the 
symmetry transformation S to a S-transformed evolution, 𝑒𝑆. Allori et al (2008) says:  
“since the PO is represented by a geometrical entity in physical space (…), 
space-time symmetries naturally act on it, for example transforming trajectories 
𝑄𝑖(𝑡) to trajectories ?̃?𝑖(𝑡)” (2008: 366). 
Even though in some cases it might looks so, the remark may result a bit confusing as it could 
suggest that the symmetry transformation can be applied in isolation to a single trajectory or to 
the PO directly. The symmetry transformation acts indeed upon variables, observables, states 
and presumably upon the PO, but always within a dynamical equation of motion that, so to 
speak, generates the evolutions. And the symmetry holds if the dynamical equation of motion 
still generates evolutions (that is, series of S-transformed variables, S-transformed observables, 
S-transformed states and presumably a S-transformed PO) when so S-transformed. To put it in 
another way: the symmetry transformation doesn’t act upon, say, the trajectory 𝑄𝑖(𝑡) but upon 
the dynamical equation that produced it. If a symmetry holds, then so-transformed dynamical 
equation would produce something like ?̃?𝑖(𝑡). A fortiori, 𝑄𝑖(𝑡) will be ?̃?𝑖(𝑡) linked by a 
mapping. 
This is so because for some symmetry transformations what it is truly relevant is to 
transform the dynamical conditions (whatever they can come to be) that make an evolution be 
possible, and this comes from the dynamical equation of the theory, not from the PO (as Allori 
et al.’s remark might suggest). Given a PO, say, of a matter-density field, nothing there says 
how the PO ought to evolve in any imaginable situation because the PO is not the sort of stuff 
that bears such information. The PO left on its own is not the sort of thing that evolves in any 
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relevant sense. The conditions for its possible evolutions must rather come from elsewhere, for 
instance, from the wave-function and the dynamical laws that, so to speak, “govern” it. And all 
this altogether must be transformed for one to check whether a symmetry holds or not.  
All this matters because it should be left completely clear that the PO cannot be, a priori 
and without further assumptions, the sort of thing that would guide one to figure out how a 
symmetry transformation must be defined and applied. In some situations, as I will show later 
on, the PO could provide us some hints about how a symmetry transformation must be defined 
and applied within a fully-interpreted quantum theory with a PO, but this, I think, shouldn’t be 
regarded as an overarching rule. 
There is one further reason. At the end of the day, as Allori et al. also recognize, one has 
to figure out how the wave-function (and the Schrödinger equation consequently) must be 
transformed under a given symmetry transformation. And I’ve already showed how puzzling 
can be this in some cases, like time reversal. The authors for instance say  
Notice that 𝑄𝑖(𝑡) and ?̃?𝑖(𝑡) may arise in BM (Bohmian mechanics) from 
different wave functions. In other words, the wave-function must also be 
transformed when transforming the history of the PO. However, while there is 
a natural transformation of the history of the PO, there is not necessarily a 
corresponding natural change of the wave-function (Allori et al. 2008: 366) 
Let’s stop here for a second and think of where such histories (possible evolutions of the PO) 
come from in Bohmian mechanics (as it is the theory they are considering). As mentioned 
before, the PO, when left on its own, is unable to generate any evolution, so there is no one 
single history for the PO if the dynamics is not previously specified. In fact, it’s the dynamics 
who tells the PO how to behave. And this thereby specifies which its possible histories are: 
otherwise, the PO remains unmoving in a rather Parmenidian changeless world. Yet, those 
histories can only come from the wave-function since it is the element that plays the 
nomological role of “governing” (to use Dürr, Goldstein and Zangui’s expression) the PO’s 
behavior and of generating its histories. And therefore, there is no one single possible way to 
transform a history without specifying previously how the dynamics ought to transform, that 
is, how the wave-function transforms. What the quote seems to rather suggest is that one should 
first find the way to transform a history of the PO, which is in addition a natural way, and then 
to transform the dynamics accordingly. And this is just to put the chart before the horses. 
Let’s approach the same point through a different angle. Take a transformation like time 
reversal and suppose you start off transforming a single history of the PO, which consists of 
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particles plus their trajectories. So, what you want to know is whether for a given trajectory 
𝑄𝑖(𝑡) exists a temporally-inverted trajectory 𝑄𝑖
𝑇(−𝑡) that is also a solution of the (time-
reversed) dynamical equations that generated the first evolution. What the authors seem to 
suggest is that there is firstly a natural way of obtaining 𝑄𝑖
𝑇(−𝑡) based on the theory’s PO, 
independently of the dynamical conditions that can ever generate it. But  𝑄𝑖
𝑇(−𝑡) can only 
come from, or being produced by, either some (transformed) quantum-mechanical dynamical 
mechanism or some other (naturally-transformed) dynamical mechanism. If the latter, one 
should explain which it is and comes up with a story that doesn’t ruin things completely –a 
coherent story telling why quantum things going backward in time evolve conforming with a 
non-quantum mechanism, why this is natural, and so forth. If the former, one is taken back to 
the wave-function, because it is at least one of the ingredients that nomologically produces the 
trajectories. But, again, nothing in the PO in itself says how the wave-function or the laws 
governing PO’s evolutions should be transformed. This should come from elsewhere. 
The point I’d like to make is the following. The PO is completely inert without a dynamic 
specifying with accuracy how it behaves. The PO bears no information about its possible 
histories, but rather that a theory’s dynamics bears it. Hence, when space-time symmetry 
transformations are at issue, one should be extremely careful about the role that each element 
is playing within the theory. That is, what is after what. Suppose that world’s fundamental 
physical theory is “the theory M”, which tells one mainly two things: the world is made of 
particles and their positions (its PO), and particles behave according to a weirdly crazy law that 
prescribes that particles generally evolve according to the Schrödinger equation, but that when 
two or more particles are close enough each other (where “close enough” will amount to a new 
constant of nature), all of them disappears and re-appears in a completely different random 
place instantaneously. Suppose that one desires to know whether the theory M is temporally 
symmetric. No matter how much time one spends looking into the inner nature of particles or 
their positions: nothing there will ever say a thing about what happens with particles and their 
positions in the following ten minutes, or what happens when two or more particles come to be 
close one another. In consequence, nothing there will ever either say a thing about whether the 
theory turns out to be time symmetric or not under a given transformation. What one should 
instead look into is the weirdly crazy dynamic, which says to the PO how to behave and what 
its possible histories may ever be. 
In a recent paper, Allori (2019) directly links the PO with the arrow of time. In a nutshell, 
she proposes a PO-based approach to restore time-reversal invariance in quantum mechanics. 
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The argument runs as follows. Some have argued that quantum mechanics is not time-reversal 
invariant either by considering that the Schrödinger equation is not time-reversal invariant (she 
only quotes Callender 2000 for this case) or by considering the collapse postulate. For the first 
case (which I’ll briefly consider here), the argument can be sketched in the following way: 
1. The complete description of any system is given by its state 𝑆 (definition of state) 
2. What is in the state 𝑆 represents physical objects (ontological assumption) 
3. In SQM the wave-function provides the state 𝑆. 
4. The wave-function evolves according to the Schrödinger equation when no experiment 
is performed. 
5. The time-reversal transformation 𝑇 transforms a sequence of states (𝑆𝑖), … , (𝑆𝑓) into a 
temporally-reversed sequence and reverses states (definition of 𝑇 on sequence of 
states). 𝑇(𝑆𝑓), … , 𝑇(𝑆𝑖). 
6. 𝑇 changes 𝑡 in the state into −𝑡: 𝑇(𝑆(𝑡)) = 𝑆(−𝑡) (definition of 𝑇 on a single state: the 
ontology does not change depending on whether we look at the forward or backward 
sequence). 
7. A deterministic theory is time-reversal invariant if forward solutions are mapped onto 
backward solutions (definition of time-reversal invariance) 
8. This doesn’t happen unless we change the wave-function with its complex conjugate 
(mathematics) 
9. The wave-function is a scalar field (it is a function on configuration space) 
10. If premise 9 holds, then there is no reason why wave-function should transform into its 
complex conjugate under T (physical meaning of scalar field) 
11. Therefore, when SQM describes systems that are not observed, it is not time-reversal 
invariant. 
The argument, according to Allori, hinges upon premises 3, 5 and 6, so it can be dismantled by 
rejecting them. But, before getting into it, why shouldn’t one accept the conclusion? Allori 
seems to find radically problematic “to reject a symmetry”. She says:  
“However, I believe that also this view is difficult to defend, in fact, symmetries 
have always had an important role in theory development of new theories. Also, 
symmetries are used in theory evaluation as well (…) Thus, all other things being 
equal, rejecting symmetries seems to be an unnecessarily radical move” (Allori 
2019: 4) 
I think this is her very starting point: quantum mechanics cannot be non-time-reversal invariant, 
so time symmetry must be restored by any means. As I showed before (Chapter IV, Section 4), 
this already implies a certain view of symmetries, namely as guides to theory construction. And 
as I showed before as well, there is always a formal way to restore a symmetry: abstractly 
speaking, for any dynamical law one can put some effort to find some transformation that 
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leaves the equation invariant and call it “time reversal”. This is not bad per se, though further 
arguments should be provided for one to be entitled to call that transformation ‘time reversal’. 
When metaphysical concerns are at issue, this looks a bit unwarranted (see Chapter V). 
But let’s move on. Allori claims that tradition (basically, Wigner 1932, Earman 2002, 
Aharanov and Rohrlich 2005, and Roberts 2017) has generally rejected premises 5 and 6 in the 
above-sketched argument to restore time-reversal invariance. What does the job is to consider 
that a wave-function is a ray in Hilbert space, so that it is natural for T to act on the wave-
function taking its complex conjugate in order to make the theory time-reversal invariant. This 
approach however suffers, according to Allori, a problem: “The mismatch problem”. It says 
that the backward wave-function is actually a complex conjugated wave-function, whereas the 
forward wave-function isn’t. Therefore, if one accepts that 𝑇 changes the wave-function into 
its complex conjugated, then it changes the ontology, since both ontologies (forward and 
backward) are different (one features a wave-function, the other a complex conjugated wave-
function). 
I have already analyzed the traditional approach carefully in Part 2, so I won’t get into 
details here. But Allori puts forward a novel ontology-based argument to dismiss it. In 
particular, the complex conjugation would seem to change the ontology of the theory. Hence, 
when time reversal implies a reversion of the direction of time plus complex conjugation, the 
ontology changes in consequence depending on the direction of time. However, this is a bit 
strange. Formally speaking, the wave-function is a complex number. If the wave-function is 
somehow supposed to give us probabilities (that is, real numbers), one needs to get rid of its 
complex part. The formal procedure to achieve it is by multiplying the wave-function by its 
complex conjugate38: probabilities are given by the squared norm of the wave-function which 
is equal to |𝜓(𝑥, 𝑡)|2 = 𝜓(𝑥, 𝑡)𝜓∗(𝑥, 𝑡). But it hardly represents a change in the ontology in 
any relevant sense: a complex-conjugate wave function is in any respect equivalent to an 
ordinary wave-function. Furthermore, one can even argue that there are no two different wave-
function at all: there are rather two wave-functions and a relation holding between them, 
wherein one is the complex conjugated of the other and vice versa. 
Allori’s proposal is to rather reject premise 3: the wave-function is not physically real, 
so it solely doesn’t represent the quantum state. What is rather physically real is represented by 
                                                          
38 In general, if 𝑧 = 𝑎 + 𝑖𝑏, its complex conjugate is 𝑧∗ = 𝑎 − 𝑖𝑏, where 𝑖∗𝑖 is equal to −1. The norm of the 
complex number z is |𝑧| and is positive. Hence, the norm of 𝑧 must be real and given by |𝑧| = √𝑎2 + 𝑏2. From 
this, it follows that |𝑧|2 = 𝑧𝑧∗. 
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a spatio-temporal entity given by the PO of the theory. So, to rebut the above-sketched 
argument one should only focus on the PO and somehow figure out how it will transform under 
time reversal. Only after that, one should transform the wave-function whatever be needed to 
keep the PO invariant under time reversal. Allori says:  
“the symmetries of the theory should be determined by its primitive ontology, not 
by the wave-function. It is thus wrong to focus on the fundamental equation for 
the wave-function when looking at symmetry properties; rather, one should focus 
on the law of evolution of the primitive ontology” (Allori 2019: 6) 
As I mentioned before, the PO on its own says nothing about its possible histories, so it hardly 
says something about how the time-reversal transformation should act upon them. In any case, 
one should rather look to the dynamical law governing PO’s behavior. However, directly or 
indirectly, any so-far-proposed law for it depends on the wave-function or whether the 
Schrödinger equation is time-reversal invariant. I will come back to it in Chapter 9 when 
analyzing Bohmiam Mechanics, but it’s well-known that, on the one hand, if the Schrödinger 
equation is time-reversal invariant, then so is the guidance equation; on the other, that in order 
to write down the guidance equation one ought to take 𝑇𝐴, which is justified because it’s the 
only one that leaves the Schrödinger equation invariant (and the guidance equation 
consequently). Therefore, in one way or another, one should beforehand define how the wave-
function (and the Schrödinger equation) must transform under time reversal, which takes us 
back to Part 2. And this is reasonable because the wave-function, directly or indirectly, is what 
plays a nomological role in the theory.  
The moral of the story is the following: What generates the possible histories of the PO 
is not the PO but the theory’s dynamics. So, if one wants to know whether there exists a possible 
history for this particular PO under some circumstances (for instance, whether there exists a 
symmetric past-headed history), the question must be then aimed at the dynamics that generated 
such a history, and not at the PO in isolation. Therefore, it cannot be the case that, on the one 
hand, there exist a natural way of transforming the histories of the PO and, on the other, that 
the wave-function be allowed to “change in any way, solely determined by its relationship to 
the PO” (Allori et al 2008: 366). The only way to have a meaningful symmetry transformation 
is by primarily specifying how the dynamics transforms and then whether so-obtained history 
of the PO is symmetric with respect to the original one. 
This is so far the par destruens. This is in which way one shouldn’t think that the PO 
guides or helps the purpose of defining a symmetry transformation. The par construens, that 
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is, the sense in which I think that the PO does offer some hints, goes as follows. I mentioned 
before that Allori et al.’s rationale shouldn’t be followed to the letter as a general case. 
Nonetheless, in certain cases, the PO does provide some hints for elucidating the relation 
among symmetries, symmetry transformations and the fundamental ontology.  
To put it simply: most space-time symmetry transformations are meant to at first glance 
be transformation acting upon space-time (or space and time) in itself (themselves) –as Jill 
North vehemently puts it. Notwithstanding, it would be unpleasantly naïve to take such a first 
glance for granted: As I’ve reviewed in Part 1 and Part 2, one can stand on different 
philosophical sides as to whether time, space or space-time have an independent reality with 
physical meaning. As it was shown, substantivalists, relationalists and supersubstantivalists 
dispute about it.  
The contend is not merely verbal for whom interested in symmetry transformations since, 
as I’ve argued in Part 2, a good deal of how the symmetry transformation is to be formally 
defined depends upon which of the above-mentioned positions one embraces. And the PO 
approach, as I will detail afterwards, turns out to be relevant for relationalists with respect to 
time, space or space-time: if time (or space, or space-time) is just an abstraction, and there is 
no time (or space, or space-time) over and above world’s material content and its behavior, 
then the PO is the most promissory candidate to spell out what such material content actually 
is. Concretely, if time reversal is a reversion of the material content’s behavior in time, then 
time reversal is primarily a reversion of the PO’s behavior in time. Thus, the features of the 
symmetry transformation will be given mainly by the theory’s dynamics along with its PO 
derivatively. In particular, the PO might provide a guide to distinguish between primitive or 
fundamental variables and non-primitive or derivative variables, which could influence how a 
symmetry transformation should be applied upon them. And in doing this job, Allori et al.’s 
remark can have some grip. However, one should be cautious here and not take the approach 
beyond its capacity, as shown before. 
No every interpretation of SQM specifies a PO. On the one side, wave-function realists 
or Everettians believe that the wave-function is fundamental, that everything out there is 
fundamentally made of wave-functions. As wave-functions are not the kind of stuff inhabiting 
a three(four)-dimensional space, it doesn’t qualify as a suitable PO. More orthodox-minded 
quantum theorists (as Copenhagen’s followers) don’t qualify either as they remain, at best, 
predominantly agnostic about the fundamental entities of the quantum world. Instead, they are 
merely confident about measuring devices and their outcomes –that is, about macroscopic 
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objects. On the other side, so-called hidden variable theories (as Bohmian Mechanics) or some 
versions of collapse theories (as any GRW-type theory) do typically bring along a PO, either 
of particles or of flashes or of a density-matter field. 
*** 
The discussion here has to do with the problem of the arrow of time in a deep, fundamental 
sense. When discussing whether time is directed within a full-blooded physical theory, the 
enquiry should at least start off from having a clear understanding of which is the theory at 
issue. In the quantum case, a full-blooded theory ought to feature 
(a) SQM’s formalism (what was already analyzed in Part 2). 
(b) Any dynamical modification or complement, if one comes to think that SQM is 
incomplete. 
(c) A PO. 
If a good deal of the problem of the arrow of time relates essentially to the theory’s dynamics, 
one has to at least take into account the complete set of dynamical laws involved by the 
(interpreted) theory under scrutiny. After this brief detour for the measurement problem, one 
finds that many have though of SQM as incomplete, so the arguments in Part 2 shouldn’t be 
taken too conclusively by them: Some interpretations of SQM can bring up new elements to 
evaluate the problem of the arrow of time. In particular, they can provide further dynamical 
elements to evaluate whether the theory is non-time-reversal invariant. In the event that one 
comes to conclude that the Schrödinger equation is time-reversal invariant (for instance, if one 
assumes a relationalist approach to time and thereby formally represents time reversal through 
some instance of 𝑇𝑅𝑒𝑙), then one should carefully pay attention to other potentially time 
asymmetric elements that the interpretation may be introducing before to conclude that the 
theory (as a whole) is structurally time-reversal symmetric. 
To be clear: what has been showed in Part 2 is, to my mind, an unavoidable result that 
everyone should take seriously when thinking about the problem of the arrow of time in the 
quantum realm. In one way or the other, the Schrödinger equation plays a paramount role in 
the majority interpretations of SQM available in the market at present. As I’ve argued above, 
any possible history or evolution comes at least from there. And, insofar as the claim of time-
reversal invariance has been shown to crucially depend upon previously-assumed metaphysical 
and methodological commitments, one lacks any definite and unique answer to the question 
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whether SQM is time-reversal invariant, and thereby, whether it treats both directions of time 
differently in a structural sense. This is something, I think, anyone worried about the arrow of 
time in the quantum realm should pay attention to since it sweeps along any interpretation. 
What can be said about the arrow of time within interpretations of SQM that don’t modify 
the formalism boils down, with a few exceptions, to what has been already said in Part 2, so 
that I won’t address the problem of the arrow of time (in either of its versions) within wave-
function realism or any interpretation that takes SQM’s dynamics to be complete and that takes 
the wave-function as the fundamental stuff quantum theory is really about. Many-world 
interpretation deserves a side remark, though: there has been some discussion about whether 
the branching-world mechanism that Many-world imposes is temporally asymmetric. At first 
glance, it does seem to be asymmetric: the future of any branch (in this tree-like structure) will 
be uncertain, undetermined and multiple, while its past is certain, determined and unique. On 
a closer inspection, however, this is too quick: the tree-like structure could be just given by our 
temporary way of looking at things.  Bell, relying on De Witt, said: 
“But, if I understand correctly, this tree-like structure is only meant to refer to a 
temporary and rough way of looking at things, during the period that the initially 
unfilled locations in a memory are progressively filed, labelling the different 
branches of the tree only by the macroscopic-type variables describing the contents 
of the locations. When a more fundamental description is adopted there is no reason 
to believe that the theory is more asymmetric in time than classical statistical 
mechanics. (…) At the microscopic level there is no such asymmetry in time as 
would be indicated by the existence of branching and non-existence of 
debranching. Thus, the structure of the wave function is not fundamentally tree-
like.” (Bell 1987: 135) 
Another relevant concept in the Many-world interpretation is decoherence, which can be 
considered as fundamentally time asymmetric. For instance, Zeh says: 
“This splitting is facilitated by means of decoherence, defined as the dislocalization 
of superpositions (Sect. 4.3). Because of the locality of interactions, this process 
describes an effective dynamical decoupling (called a ‘branching’) of the global 
wave function into components that are characterized by different quasi-classical 
(robust and quasi-local) properties – including those of systems that can be 
regarded as observers. This decoherence has turned out to be the most efficient and 
most ubiquitous irreversible process in Nature” (Zeh 2001: 128) 
However, the extent to which the branching structure and decoherence should be considered as 
fundamental is not so clear in the literature. For instance, it has been argued that decoherence 
is perspectival, and thereby, non-fundamental (see Bacciagalupi 2007). Within a more 
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ambitious interpretative enterprise, David Wallace has claimed that “decoherence is an 
emergent process occurring within an already-stated microphysics: unitary quantum 
mechanics. It is not a mechanism to define a part of that microphysics” (Wallace 2010: 64) 
There sure is more to say about Many-world interpretation and the arrow of time, as it 
seems that the interpretation has introduced some potentially asymmetric mechanisms that are 
relevant to the debate on a quantum arrow of time. However, it seems to me that all these sorts 
of time asymmetries are not fundamental, at least not in the sense I have been speaking so far, 
that is, they don’t point out to an asymmetry of time in itself. After all, as Wallace mentions, 
the branching structure is not fundamental, but emergent. What is fundamental is the unitary 
quantum mechanics. So, any time asymmetry that comes out from the theory should at first 
glance be considered as emergent and non-fundamental, consequently. And all this seems to 
relate to the problem of the two realms, rather than to the problem of a structural arrow of time. 
Of course, this deserves a careful discussion that, unfortunately, I cannot give here. I’m 
particularly interested in those interpretations that add some dynamical element to SQM and in 
whether some of these elements manifest a structural asymmetry of time. 
Having said that, if one rather regards SQM’s dynamics as incomplete, any complete 
answer with respect to whether time is structurally directed or not should wait until all the 
dynamics be fully given. In the following three chapters, I shall solely focus on interpretations 
following such a path: the so-called Orthodox Interpretation of SQM, the so-called GRW-type 
theories, and Bohmian Mechanics. Also, these three interpretations have been in one way or 
another related to the problem of the arrow of time and to the notion of time reversal in the 
literature. 
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VII. 
Orthodox Quantum Mechanics  
Time Asymmetry and the Collapse of The Wave-Function  
Let’s start with one of the first attempts to overcome the measurement problem. Attempt that 
has extended widely in the field and firmly become a sort of orthodoxy in the physicist’s 
community even up to the present. 
In 1930, Paul Dirac presented one of the first extensions of SQM to bridge the gap 
between SQM’s dynamics and what is observed after experiments: “the Collapse Postulate” 
(CP henceforth), also called “Projection Postulate”. In Dirac’s original formulation, CP is 
introduced as follows: 
“When we measure a real dynamical variable ξ, the disturbance involved in the 
act of measurement causes a jump in the state of the dynamical system. From 
physical continuity, if we make a second measurement of the same dynamical 
variable ξ immediately after the first, the result of the second measurement must 
be the same as that of the first. Thus, after the first measurement has been made, 
there is no indeterminacy in the result of the second. Hence, after the first 
measurement has been made, the system is in an eigenstate of the dynamical 
variable ξ, the eigenvalue it belongs to being equal to the result of the first 
measurement. This conclusion must still hold if the second measurement is not 
actually made. In this way we see that a measurement always causes the system 
to jump into an eigenstate of the dynamical variable that is being measured, the 
eigenvalue this eigenstate belongs to being equal to the result of the 
measurement”. (Dirac 1935: 36) 
A few years later, John von Neumann (1955[1932]) proposed a model for (ideal) measurements 
that came to get canonical in the field, giving a more refined version of CP. Von Neumann’s 
main statement of collapse comes in the following way: 
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“we have therefore two fundamentally different types of interventions which can 
occur in a system S (…) first, the arbitrary changes by measurements (…). 
Second, the automatic changes which occur with the passage of time”. (von 
Neumann 1955: 351. Emphasis added) 
Both types of interventions (or processes, as he has also called them) are of a fundamentally 
different nature: whereas the former is statistical, the latter is causal. Analyzing these two types 
of processes, von Neumann claims: 
“Why then do we need the special process 1 for the measurement? The reason 
is this: In the measurement we cannot observe the system S by itself, but must 
instead investigate the system S+M, in order to obtain (numerically) its 
interaction with the measuring apparatus M. The theory of the measurement is 
a statement concerning S+M, and should describe how the state of S is related 
to certain properties of the state of M”. (Ibidem: 352) 
Dirac’s and von Neumann’s introduction of CP gave birth to the quantum mechanics’ orthodox 
formalism: SQM plus CP is basically a formal extension of SQM by introducing a postulate 
that rules a radically different sort of evolution in specific cases, namely, when a measurement 
process takes place. This reveals that quantum mechanics is somehow a twofaced theory:  SQM 
solely involves a unitary, deterministic, smooth and linear evolution given by the Schrödinger 
equation; CP rather involves a non-unitary, purely probabilistic, sharp and non-liner evolution 
given by special physical processes that collapse the quantum state into one of its eigenstates 
(Paul Dirac’s “jumps”). In this way, SQM gets its first minimal extension capable of getting 
over the measurement problem by adding an entirely different sort of evolution that quantum 
systems may undergo under certain circumstances. So, a full-blooded non-relativistic quantum 
dynamics is not given by SQM alone, but by SQM+CP. Let’s put all this more formally. 
Recall the electron entering a z-device, as exposed in the introduction. Once the electron 
is correlated with the z-device, one ended up with a chain of superpositions like (6.3). What 
Dirac’s and von Neumann’s postulate tells us is that during a measurement the quantum state 
in such a superposition of z-spin abruptly and suddenly collapses into either |↑⟩𝑧|"𝑧 𝑢𝑝"⟩
𝐷 or 
|↓⟩𝑧|"𝑧 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛"⟩
𝐷. That is, the smooth and unitary evolutions of the wave-function in such a 
superposition of z-spin state is violently interrupted by the measurement process, and the 
quantum state undergoes a radically different sort of evolution –a non-unitary, non-
deterministic and non-linear one. One hence gets an explanation of why one observes what one 
actually observes after measurements, despite SQM’s dynamics. And what one observes via 
CP also accomplishes the quantum probabilities prescribed by SQM. 
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There are a few things to note here. First, CP is fundamentally a solution to the 
measurement problem by introducing an extra axiom in the theory, so that it links SQM with 
what is observed in measurements. In other words, CP aims to explain why one observes states 
with definite values when SQM’s dynamics predicts that, in certain cases, one should rather 
end up with a superposition. If one dispenses with CP, this gives rise again to the measurement 
problem, and should thereby put forward an alternative way-out.  
Second, these “jumps” or “state-vector collapses”, though crucial for the interpretation, 
have been understood in different ways. As it was described above, when a quantum system 
interacts with a measurement device a chain of superpositions is produced. But, as it was noted 
by John von Neumann, the chain of superposition doesn’t end at the level of measurement 
devices, but it would extend to observer’s counciousnes as well (known as “von Neumann 
chain”). So, one of the bones of contention is where and under which circumstances collapses 
occur. Physicists like John von Neumann and Eugene Wigner thought that collapses were 
physically real processes that occurred under the presence of an observer’s counciousnes (von 
Neumann 1955, London and Bauer 1939. See Henderson 2010 for analysis and Becker 2004 
for discussion on whether von Neumann supports the idea that collapses were physically real 
processes) and, as in the case of Wigner, at the level of counciousnes (Wigner 1967: 171). On 
the other hand, Heisenberg believed that humans were not necessary involved in the 
measurement process. It rather involves, essentially, an interaction between the measured 
system and the rest of the world (Heisenberg 1958: 54-55). However, there is indeed an 
epistemic component in any collapse process. According to Heisenberg, the wave function is 
the sum of the total information one has about a system. Consequently, any measurement-
induced collaps relates to a sudden change in the information that an observer has about the 
system, which should be read in epistemic terms (Heisenberg 1958: 55). 
Third, the main CP’s motivation boils simply down to the special role that measurements 
play in the quantum theory. After all, quantum-mechanical results and predictions are about 
quantum systems and measurement devices (as von Neumann stresses). So, even though the 
Schrödinger equation correctly describes the evolution of any quantum state in isolation, this 
is unimportant (von Neumann 1955: 357) from the quantum mechanics’ complete viewpoint: 
the theory, as long as it involves measurements, must also provide some explanations of why 
if a quantum state was evolving in a superposition of states, it collapses into one of its 
eigenstates when measured. 
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Finally, SQM+CP is typically referred to as Orthodox Quantum Mechanics (OrQM 
hereafter) in the literature, one of the most widely-extended, and fiercely objected, 
interpretations of SQM. Technically, SQM+CP is just a formal extension of SQM by 
introducing an additional axiom in the formalism as pointed out by Dirac and von Neumann, 
while OrQM seems rather to involve further interpretational stuff and has CP at its core.  
OrQM has also been typically bound to the so-called Copenhagen Interpretation. This 
alleged relation deserves some few words. To begin with, the relation is not so straightforward: 
as the Copenhagen Interpretation has been notably multifaceted, it is not an easy task to clearly 
single its main tenets out. An explanation for this is that the interpretation has involved many 
philosophers and physicists endorsing unalike ideas, which has yielded an amalgam of unclear 
and loosely related tenets, instead of a systematic, unified corpus. Furthermore, the 
interpretation has been frequently associated with Niels Bohr’s own ideas (its first and main 
defender), though it is not at all clear either what Bohr’s ideas exactly were. For instance, Bohr 
never talked about “the collapse of the wave function” (if the wave-function is not real for him, 
how could it collapse?), whereas Heisenberg did. Nonetheless, OrQM’s and Copenhagen’s 
seem to have in general followed Heisenberg’s ideas on this, rather Bohr’s. 
In general, OrQM as well as Copenhagians swing from a hiper-operationalist and bare 
version of Bohr’s view (frequently taught in classrooms), where collapse processes are not 
physically real events, to a more robust physicalist view of the theory where the collapse of the 
wave-function is a real process and measurements play a crucial physical role in our knowledge 
of the world. Yet, despite all these divergencies and unclarities, there is at least some central 
tenets endorsed by virtually any OrQM’s supporters (including Copenhagen’s). This has been 
exhaustively discussed in the literature and a careful analysis would take us far beyond the 
scopes of this chapter (see Cushing 1994, Brock 2003, Aaserud and Heilbron 2013, and Faye 
1991, 2014 for details). But it is worth mentioning, and emphasizing, two ideas that have 
pervaded OrQM and have a “Copenhagen air”:  
(a) the inner nature of the quantum realm remains veiled to what one is able to know and 
communicate: all quantum theory is, and can only be, about measurement outcomes. 
Bohr in fact points out that “the procedure of measurement has an essential influence on the 
conditions on which the very definition of physical quantities in question rests (…), these 
conditions must be considered as an inherent element of any phenomenon to which the term 
‘physical reality’ can be unambiguously applied” (Bohr 1935: 1025). A self-proclaimed 
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Bohrian-Copenhagen defender like Anton Zeilinger showily says: “So, what is the of the 
quantum? (…) I suggest that (…) the distinction between reality and our knowledge of reality, 
between reality and information, cannot be made” (Zeilinger 2005: 743) 
(b) Any meaningful sense of reality (and thus of ontology) can only concern what is 
knowable by (classical) experiments and communicated by our (classical) language.  
This probably just expresses a pragmatic Kantian stance sponsored by Bohr (Brock 2003, Faye 
2014), though it has been often interpreted as a manifested instrumentalist (or anti-realist) 
posture with respect to quantum theory (mainly to the wave-function). The point has also paved 
the way to an informational-subjective reading of the quantum theory (being Quantum 
Bayesianism or Qbism the most serious proponent of this view, Caves, Fuchs and Schack 2002; 
Fuchs, Mermin and Schack 2014), to an informational reading (Bub 2016, 2018), or to a hiper-
operationalist reading of physics portrayed by the well-known lemma: “Shut up and calculate!” 
To come back to my business after this brief detour, the question of the arrow of time in 
the (non-relativistic) quantum realm cannot any more just involve SQM, but it must also 
include CP in the analysis. And all this is relevant for my purpose here because it has been 
suggested that CP, in any of its forms, displays a manifest time-asymmetry whereby quantum 
mechanics would sharply distinguish the past-to-future direction from the future-to-past one. 
And this would happen regardless whether SQM is time-reversal invariant or not. This 
proposal has come up in various places (it appears, for instance, in Aharanov’s critic 1964 
paper as an already widely-extended belief. See also, for instance, Healey 2002, Popper 1982, 
Penrose 1989, Price 1996, Arntzenius 1997, Lucas 1999, Atkinson 2006, Ellis 2013, Callender 
2018: 94 and references therein). For instance, Frank Arntzenius (1997) has defended that 
collapse theories introduce an arrow of time since  
“such theories say that are invariant forward transition chances for each of the 
possible initial quantum state to the possible collapsed states after the interaction 
(…). One cannot add some set of invariant backward transition chances to such 
theories, while retaining an empirically adequate theory, since the backward 
transition frequencies in the phenomena are highly non-invariant when one 
varies the frequencies with which the photons are emitted from the possible 
sources (1997: S218) 
For David Atkinson, the time asymmetry in OrQM (in a more Copenhagen guise) comes from 
‘observation’ (Atkinson 2006: 540). In any case, a collapse-induced time asymmetry has been 
probably popularized within the philosophy of physics field by Roger Penrose (1989) and a 
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quite simple thought experiment. And this is a good starting point to see how time-asymmetric 
ingredients can be introduced in the OrQM’s formalism. 
Section 2. OrQM as a time-asymmetric theory: Penrose’s thought 
experiment 
Penrose starts by recognizing that OrQM is in fact a time-symmetric theory but only regarding 
the part involving the Schrödinger equation –its unitary part (1989: 354); as for the other, its 
non-unitary part given by CP, the theory turns out to be time a-symmetric. To show this, 
Penrose brings up the following thought experiment. 
Suppose a lamp L at one extreme of the experimental arrangement, and a photo-detector 
P at the opposite extreme. Between them, a half-silvered mirror M is placed, which is tilted at 
a 45° angle to the line from L to P. Suppose now that L randomly emits a photon, which is 
aimed at P to be detected. At L, some device registers with high reliability the number of 
photons emitted given a time interval (see Fig. 7.1). 
                   
Figure 7.1. Copied from Penrose 1989, p. 357 
When a photon is emitted by L, the half-silvered mirror M can either reflects it or letting it to 
pass through. Thinking of the experiment in quantum-mechanical terms, when a single photon 
is emitted, the photon’s wave-function “impacts” the half-silvered mirror and splits in two 
parts: one part is reflected with an amplitude of √1/2  and the other passes through with an 
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amplitude of √1/2. Until an observation is eventually made, both parts of the photon’s wave-
function –Penrose stresses– must be considered as “co-existing” in the forward-time direction. 
Thanks to the statistical postulate of SQM, one knows that the probability that the photon 
reaches the photo-cell P is given by the square of the moduli of the amplitude, |√1/2|
2
= 1/2. 
After some calculations, one can easily answer the following question: “Given that L registers, 
what is the probability that P registers?” SQM+CP implies that the probability is exactly ‘one-
half’. And, after running the experiment many times, one will get that: approximately a 50% 
of the electrons passed through M and reached P, and the other 50% of them were reflected, 
reaching the laboratory wall at a point A. One can also infer straightforwardly that if P didn’t 
register, then the photon hit the mirror and bounced off toward the laboratory wall (point A). 
One has however assumed that time was running forward: the photon was firstly emitted 
by L, after a while reached the half-silvered mirror M and then split in two parts. At the (future) 
end of the experiment, the photon either reached the laboratory wall or was registered by the 
photo-cell. SQM+CP has provided the formal tools to work out the probabilities of getting a 
photon registered at P and the physical theory to explain what one eventually obtained, 
assuming that time runs forward. In order to know if SQM+CP is time symmetric, one would 
have to consider if it renders the same results (that is, if it renders the same probability 
predictions and experimental results) when time runs backward. To check this out, Penrose 
claims one should rather begin with the following (time-reversed) question: “Given that P 
registers, what is the probability that L registers?” 
Penrose says: “we note that the correct experiment answer to this question is not ‘one-
half’ at all, but ‘one’” (1989: 358), for if the photo-cell P indeed registers, then it is virtually 
certain that the photon was emitted (and thereby registered) by L. So, whenever P registers it 
logically follows that L also registered the 100% of times. This is not however what a time-
reversed version of SQM+CP retrodicts. It rather retrodicts that if one traces backward in time 
the photon’s wave-function that reached P, then it will have one-half of probability of reaching 
L, and one-half of being reflected and of hitting the laboratory wall at a point B (the opposite 
to A). In the light of this, Penrose categorically claims that “in the case of our time-reversed 
question, the quantum-mechanical calculation has given us completely the wrong answer” 
(1989: 358. Italics in the original).  
The upshot is that SQM+CP does not render the same predictions/retrodictions in both 
directions of time. Therefore, it treats the past-to-future direction and the future-to-past 
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direction differently. Particularly, one can straightforwardly deduce that SQM+CP only works 
fine in one direction of time, but it does it fatally wrong when time is reversed. Penrose puts it 
as following. “If we wish to calculate the probability of a past state on the basis of a known 
future state, we get quite the wrong answers if we try to adopt the standard R [CP] procedure” 
(1989: 359). The thing is that any measuring device capable of effecting a collapse of the wave-
function will be intrinsically time-asymmetric, altering radically any probability calculation 
when time is reversed. 
George Ellis (2013) has put forward a more general argument to show the time-
asymmetric nature of CP. Ellis’ rationale is mainly based on the fact the quantum states may 
collapse (when measured) but they never “uncollapse”. 
 
Fig. 7.2. 
The process is intrinsically time-asymmetric to the extent to which the eigenstate |𝑞𝑘⟩ occurs 
after measuring (i.e. collapsing), that is, after the superposition. Furthermore, all coefficients 
in the superposition states one started with have been lost, so the knowledge of the final state 
says nothing about the initial state. To conclude, in Ellis’ words, “the process [CP] is where the 
time irreversibility, and hence the arrow of time, is manifested at the quantum level” (2013: 
243). 
 Huw Price (1996) makes the same case in affirming that any measurement process 
would, under certain assumptions I’ll detail shortly, introduce an “objective asymmetry in the 
structure of reality” (1996: 207). Assuming OrQM, the state of a quantum system in the period 
between two measurements reflects the nature of the former instead of the latter. To put it 
simply, if an electron in a superposition of position states is spatially localized by means of a 
measurement device, then it will unitarily evolve according to the Schrödinger equation and its 
state will reflect the fact that the electron was measured and localized by a position-device. If 
one decides to a later time measure the electron’s momentum with a momentum-device, 
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electron’s state won’t reflect the nature of the second measurement (lying in its future) but that 
of former (lying in its past). 
 When the situation between two measurements is time-reversed, the result is oddly the 
contrary. What one would then see, according to Price, is the electron’s state evolving toward 
a state associated with a measurement device it is to be involved with in the future (1996: 206). 
SQM+CP ordinarily takes for granted that a quantum system’s state depends upon its past state 
and its past interactions. The fact that things look very weird when running in the backward 
direction of time would indicate that a deep time-asymmetry lies at the core of so-interpreted 
quantum mechanics. 
To sum the point up. In introducing an additional dynamical law in the SQM formalism, 
OrQM would by the same maneuver introduce a time-asymmetric ingredient in the quantum 
theory. So, one could argue that OrQM defends a structural quantum arrow of time, provided 
that OrQM is the right way to supplement and to understand SQM. In a nutshell, the thesis to 
defend is that CP turns out to be a non-time-reversal invariant law of the theory to the extent 
that  
(a) OrQM does not render the same probability predictions in both directions of time, and  
(b) quantum systems always collapse when measured, but never “uncollapse”, according 
to CP.  
To put it in the vocabulary of the Part 2, the structure of OrQM’s solutions is asymmetric under 
time reversal since the set of its possible worlds is given by either  Ⱳ = Ⱳ𝑓 or  Ⱳ = Ⱳ𝑏. In 
 Ⱳ𝑏 one should include evolutions giving us the wrong probability predictions and those 
quantum systems “uncollapsing” when time-reversed. These are disregarded by the same 
collapse’s mechanism and by the quantum-mechanical statistic one expects to get. 
To see this more clearly, take Penrose’s thought experiment again: whereas the quantum-
mechanical algorithm predicts in, say, the future direction of time that probability of registering 
a photon in P is one-half (agreeing on what one observes), the time-reversed algorithm predicts 
that probability should also be one-half, when logically follows that it would rather be one. 
Consequently, one is entitled to get rid of one set of solutions (those predicting a result that is 
a priori wrong). And the upshot, and what would explain why OrQM is structurally non-time-
reversal invariant, is that it turns out to be a predictive but not a retrodictive theory. In virtue 
of this, the theory does treat the past-to-future direction and the future-to-past direction 
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differently: the theory yields the right predictions only in one direction of time, but it flatly fails 
in the other. 
It is worth emphasizing that this result is independent of whether the Schrödinger 
equation is time-reversal invariant or not. Even though in the event that the Schrödinger 
equation turns out undisputedly time-reversal invariant (as Penrose indeed assumes), this just 
says something about the unitary part of SQM+CP. And the non-unitary part, SQM+CP, would 
nonetheless be non-time-reversal invariant. Therefore, the whole package SQM+CP will turn 
out non-time-reversal invariant as well. 
Section 3. Three strategies to debunk OrQM’s time asymmetry  
There are at least three assumptions supporting this structural time asymmetry through CP: 
(i) CP is genuinely a time asymmetric postulate. That is, CP turned out to be time 
asymmetric by means of a reliable way to test time (a)symmetry. 
(ii) CP introduces a temporal asymmetry that should be taken as structural (fundamental). 
(iii) OrQM (and principally the introduction of CP) is the right way to overcome the 
measurement problem and to get a full-blooded quantum theory. 
In accordance with these assumptions, there are at least three strategies to debunk OrQM’s 
argument for a structural arrow of time.  
(a) To argument that CP is not genuinely (or interestingly) time asymmetric. 
(b) To claim that, though temporally asymmetric, CP does not introduce a structural time 
asymmetry. 
(c) To reject CP. 
Through the first strategy, one could argue that the way in which time has been reversed is off 
the right track, consequently, CP is not genuinely time asymmetric. Through the second, one 
could rather take for granted that CP is temporally asymmetric, but so-produced time 
asymmetry is not structural in any relevant sense. Finally, one could alternatively argue that 
the introduction of CP is an unjustified ad-hoc resource, resulting in more obscurities than 
clarities. Hence, OrQM is not the right way to overcome the measurement problem, and 
thereby, to reach a quantum theory properly. Any time-asymmetry introduced by OrQM would 
by the same maneuver fall down. 
Let’s address them in order. 
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Section 3.1. OrQM is not genuinely (or interestingly) time asymmetric 
Let’s focus on Penrose’s thought experiment. There are two senses in which Penrose’s thought 
experiment results a bit confusing in showing that CP introduces a genuine and interesting time 
asymmetry. 
First of all, Penrose uses extra-quantum mechanical information when judging whether 
the theory is time symmetric39. When replying the forward-in-time answer “Given that L 
registers, what is the probability that P registers?” Penrose appeals to the usual quantum-
mechanical expectations. But, when considering the time-reversed answer “Given that P 
registers, what is the probability that L registers?” Penrose rather appeals to the non-quantum 
mechanical answer ‘one’ judged as “the correct experimental answer” (Penrose 1989: 358). 
And this seems not to be a fair movement.  
To begin with, the experiment cannot be in reality carried out in the backward direction 
of time, so one has to instead imagine what one would expect of so-settled experiment if the 
direction of time were reversed. But, in imagining the time-reversed situation, Penrose leaks 
non-quantum mechanical information when judging what would be the right answer. Clearly, 
the (backward) quantum-mechanical answer is that one would obtain one-half of chances of 
getting the electron registered at L, which is equal to that obtained in the original direction of 
time (that is, through the forward-in-time-oriented quantum theory). But such a result would 
be quite shocking, and somehow anti-intuitive for Penrose, because one already knows that L 
always registers, so the correct prediction would seem to instead be ‘one’ rather than ‘one-
half’. But where does such a knowledge come from? One knows that because one has checked 
it when running the experiment in the original direction of time and because one is using extra-
quantum mechanical information coming from what is expected in accordance with how the 
experiment was settled in the future-headed direction of time. Therefore, this asymmetry 
cannot be genuine or interesting since it is grounded on one’s temporally-biased knowledge. 
The second sense in which Penrose’s argument is confusing relates to how time is being 
inverted in Penrose’s thought experiment. The case is truly tricky because one posseses a 
sharply-refined receipt of how time reversal should be applied in abstract to dynamical 
equations of motion (as was explained in Chapter II and carefully analyzed in Chapter IV). But 
in a worldlier situation involving photo-cells or lamps emitting photons, one is left a bit clueless 
about what a time-reversed experimental setup would look like. 
                                                          
39 Craig Callender (2000) has also mentioned an akin point, though he doesn’t develop it. 
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Basically, what Penrose does in his thought experiment to reverse time is to imagine the 
same objects and the same situation but in the reverse order. Let’s call Penrose’s time-reversal 
transformation 𝑇𝑃. So, given the (relevant) sequence where the photon is emitted by the lamp 
L, hits the half-silvered mirror M, passes through it and reaches the photo-cell P 
Future-headed sequence  𝐿 → 𝑀 → 𝑃 
𝑇𝑃 produces the (allegedly) time-reversed sequence 
Past-headed sequence  𝑇𝑃(𝐿 → 𝑀 → 𝑃) = 𝑃 → 𝑀 → 𝐿 
Furthermore, the question to be responded by the quantum-mechanical algorithm must be 
temporally reversed accordingly. By simply inverting the sequence as shown above, the terms 
in the question are interchanged: “Given that L registers, what is the probability that P 
registers?” turns into the time-reversed question “Given that P registers, what is the probability 
that L registers?” 
It is clear in which sense OrQM is time-asymmetric given CP and 𝑇𝑃 . What is not so 
clear is how interesting and legitimate such an asymmetry is, which to a good extent depends 
on how the operation of time reversal has been applied in the thought experiment. Penrose does 
not discuss any other alternative, but he seems to uncritically assume that an inversion of the 
direction of time would amount to simply invert the sequence of states, and then to work out 
the corresponding probabilities (assuming extra-quantum mechanical information as was 
shown before). This could be nonetheless a bit sloppy as it has been pointed out by Steven 
Savitt (1995) and mentioned by Craig Callender (2000). I shall develop this point further. 
Savitt displays at least three very broad notions of time reversal in the literature: (i) time-
reversal1, which amounts to the mapping 𝑇: 𝑡 → −𝑡; (ii) time-reversal2, which not only maps 
𝑡 → −𝑡 but also temporally reverses the very states (and objects) of a sequence; and (iii) time-
reversal3, which captures the essential idea that time reversal is motion reversal, and in 
consequence, it must retrace the physical system’s trajectory. What Savitt concludes is that 
Penrose’s thought experiment comes out non-time-reversal invariant depending upon which 
sort of time-reversal transformation is taken. In particular, it results non-time-reversal1 
invariant, but time-reversal2,3 invariant. 
In this light, Callender asks: “why compare 𝑃(𝑆𝑖 → 𝑆𝑓) with 𝑃 (𝑆𝑓 → 𝑆𝑖) and not with 
𝑃 (𝑆𝑓
𝑇 → 𝑆𝑖
𝑇)?” (2000: 256). In other words, Callender finds suspicious that 𝑇𝑃 be the right 
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way to reverse time. And the reason is simply that 𝑇𝑃 does not transform the states themselves, 
but leaves them as in the direction of time one started with. So, according to Callender, the 
genuine time-reversed sequence of Penrose’s thought experiment is not given by 𝑇𝑃 but by 
Callender’s time-reversal transformation, 𝑇𝐶 (which is overall equivalent to time-reversal2 
transformation in Savitt’s list). 
Past-headed sequence  𝑇𝐶(𝐿 → 𝑀 → 𝑃) = 𝑃𝑇 → 𝑀𝑇 → 𝐿𝑇 
where 𝑋𝑇 is a time-reversed state or object in the sequence. Callender gives some hints about 
how this should be interpreted. He says: “if Penrose is genuinely concerned with TRI [time-
reversal invariance], he should treat the emitter as a receiver and vice versa” (2000: 256. 
Emphasis added). Therefore, the right time-reversed question to make to the quantum-
mechanical algorithm is not “what is the probability that L registers, given that P registers” but 
“what is the probability that a time-reversed L registers, given that a time-reversed P registers”. 
Penrose would thus be addressing his own thought experiment from the wrong angle. And 
when addressed rightly, time-symmetry (in particular, 𝑇𝐶-invariance) is restored. 
Savitt gives further reasons to put Penrose’s conclusion into question40. Not only does 
Penrose assumes a debatable view of time reversal (which, according to him, amounts to 
choosing the video-tape-played-backward version of the thought experiment), but he also takes 
a narrow frequentist way of determining transition probabilities, which only counts the results 
of one run instead of averaging over the set of all physically possible runs having the same 
initial (final) conditions. Savitt claims that if a time-reversal transformation like 𝑇𝐶 along with 
a broader view of determining transition probabilities is taken, then the quantum-mechanical 
algorithm yields the same probabilities both in the forward direction of time and in the 
backward one (Savitt 1995: 17-18). Therefore, Savitt concludes, Penrose’s argument only runs 
smoothly if a debatable view of time reversal plus an even more questionable way of 
determining transition probabilities are taken. In changing either of those assumptions, 
Penrose’s argument rapidly breaks down. 
Concluding, Penrose’s thought experiment holds only if, on the one hand, one accepts to 
leak non-quantum mechanical information into the argument to figure out how the time-
reversed probabilities should be worked out and, on the other, if one takes  𝑇𝑃 to be a genuine 
                                                          
40 I shall only mention here the reason related to how transition probabilities must be worked out. For further 
criticisms and details see Savitt (1995), pp. 15-18. 
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and reliable time-reversal transformation. Both assumptions are problematic: the first one may 
lead us to suspect that the source of temporal asymmetry doesn’t really come from CP but from 
the introduction, by us, of such extra non-quantum mechanical information in the time-reversed 
calculations of probabilities. In this way, the temporal asymmetry would be neither genuine or 
interesting. As for the second assumption, it’s true that Penrose introduces a time-reversal 
transformation (𝑇𝑃) without further justification. In fact, if the thought experiment is time 
reversed differently (in particular, 𝑇𝐶-reversed), Penrose’s conclusion does not run any longer 
and one gets no structural arrow of time in any relevant sense. 
Section 3.2. Though temporally asymmetric, CP does not introduce a structural time 
asymmetry 
Let’s now tackle Penrose’s argument from a different angle. Remember that the statistical 
postulate of the theory assumes that if a measurement of the observable 𝐴 is carried out, it will 
produce, with a certain probability, one of its eigenvalues 𝑎𝑖 as a result. So, if a system is in 
the state |𝜓⟩ = ∑ 𝑎𝑖|𝑎𝑖⟩, then the probability that the eigenvalue 𝑎𝑖 of 𝐴 is found when 
measured is equal to 𝑃(𝐴 = 𝑎𝑖, |𝜓⟩) = |𝑎𝑖|
2. In its logical form, the algorithm says 
FORWARD  𝑃(𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑡2 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑖 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐴, |𝜓⟩ 𝑎𝑡 𝑡1) = 𝑝 
Borrowing Albert’s words, the crucial question here is whether this algorithm (giving us the 
conditional probabilities of some later state given an earlier state) works equally well as 
FORWARD when formulated backward 
BACKWARD 𝑃(𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑡0 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑖 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐴, |𝜓⟩ 𝑎𝑡 𝑡1) = 𝑝 
However, as a matter of fact, SQM+CP doesn’t give us the probability of earlier states given 
later states for, as Callender puts it, “the theory is predictive but not retrodictive” (2000: 258). 
Something like this was probably in Penrose’s mind in drawing his thought experiment up. If 
that’s the case, he was right all along in regarding OrQM as a time asymmetric theory in so far 
as the theory is not indeed retrodictive. Satosi Watanabe has also subscribed this conclusion in 
claiming that “it is precisely irretrodictability what is related to phenomenal one-wayness” 
(1965: 56)41. Hence, the measurement process would inevitably break the time symmetry in 
                                                          
41 Even though it’s true that in general time asymmetry (or non-time-reversal invariance) and “irretrodictability” 
may come to be thought as two quite different properties, and one could consequently argue that no temporal 
directionality should be followed from irretrodictability, it has been argued that in some cases, like non-relativistic 
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the theory as the whole theory (SQM+CP) yields results directly in terms of conditional 
probabilities for states in the future, but not in the past42. 
The point I want to make here is that though a time asymmetry could be introduced by 
this mean, it fails to be a structural asymmetry. In other words, CP would be at best useful for 
defining a non-structural arrow of time, but it falls short in grounding a structural arrow of 
time. Following this line, I will put forth two arguments: first, this temporally asymmetry 
through collapse is necessarily local and cannot be applied to the universe as a whole. Second, 
it necessarily relies upon extrinsic properties of the dynamics for the time asymmetry to be 
univocally defined. 
Let’s start with the first argument. As many times repeated, OrQM assigns a fundamental 
role to measurements, and thereby, to the sort of measurement performed. In fact, quantum 
theory (as characterized by von Neumann) is, actually, a theory about the measured system 
plus the measuring apparatus. It follows from this that any temporal asymmetry induced by CP 
makes sense only if an external measurement device can be suitably defined. To put it 
otherwise, only if the system is open. However, any so-defined temporal asymmetry will 
necessarily be local since it is not possible to define it for the universe as a whole. The reason 
is quite simple: it is not possible to define a measurement device out of the universe, which is, 
by definition, a closed system. Hence, anyone looking for a global and unrestricted temporal 
asymmetry will be deeply disappointed by the CP’s temporal asymmetry. 
Furthermore, it follows from this that the wave-function of the entire universe never 
collapses but always evolves unitarily according to the Schrödinger equation. And under the 
assumption that the Schrödinger equation is time-reversal invariant, it entails that the universe 
as a whole is blind to any structural direction of time according to this approach. And this 
scenario looks quite similar to that analyzed before where only a non-structural arrow of time 
could be defined: one is left with a unharmonized dual reality, where the wave-function of the 
universe is time symmetric but where one can nonetheless define local temporal asymmetries 
within measurement contexts. 
                                                          
quantum mechanics, the implication is right. Earman for instance claims that in any statistical theory non-time-
reversal invariance directly follows from irretrodictability in the sense of BACKWARD (Earman 1974). 
42 One could come to think that by adding BACKWARD to the theory the problem vanishes. Richard Healey has 
showed that this cannot be done without trivializing the theory, if it is statistical. For further details and discussion 
about it, see Healey (1981: 103-108). 
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One can escape this argument by saying that, though the universe as a whole can never 
be measured (and thus, it does not collapse onto an eigenstate), this does not entail that the 
universal wave-function never undergoes any collapses. The idea would be that there are 
collapses of subsystems everywhere, and a fortiori the universal wave-function will change 
discontinuously. And these changes are specified as only occurring in one temporal direction
41. I have two worries with this argument. First, the idea of collapse (in the framework of 
OrQM), only makes sense when a measurement context is properly defined. One could ask: if 
the universal wave-function eventually collapses, in which basis does it collapse? This question 
remains unanswered in OrQM. Furthermore, if the universal wave-function changes, according 
to what type of mechanism does it change? Within von Neumann’s framework, there are only 
two: if the universal wave-function does not collapse, then only changes unitarily according to 
the Schrödinger equation. Any other type of change would lie out of quantum mechanics. 
Second, the approach probably falls short in setting the question properly at a cosmological 
level: when the discussion comes to consider the universal wave-function, the approach does 
not fit in. But this just solves the dispute by fiat: it is not the case that the universal wave-
function never collapses and then is temporally directionless, but it does not even make sense 
to talk about it within this framework. In any case, the approach is intrinsially local.  
The second argument concerns the collapse mechanism itself conforming with CP. The 
point I want to make is that the transition 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 →  𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 remains 
vague and undefined as long as the measuring device is not fully specified. Therefore, the CP-
induced temporal asymmetry strongly relies upon already having a fully-characterized 
measurement context. It follows from this that so-introduced arrow of time cannot be structural 
as it doesn’t depend exclusively on intrinsic properties of CP’s dynamics. 




(𝑐1|𝑎1⟩ + 𝑐2|𝑎2⟩), collapses into one of A’s eigenstates when measured by an A-device, 
|𝜓(𝑡1)⟩ =  |𝑎2⟩. This non-unitary transition would define a direction of time in so far as the 
transition always goes from “uncollapsed/undefined states” to “collapsed/defined states”, and 
never the other way around. However, as it stands, this wouldn’t be quite right since the theory 
also describes the transition from “collapsed/defined states” to “uncollapsed/defined states”, 
for instance, when a quantum system is collapsed in a different basis. To put it in other words, 
                                                          
41 Many thanks to Carl Hoefer for raising this remark. 
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the above-mentioned transition is true only if the quantum state is collapsed in the A basis, and 
one knows that only if the measuring device is completely specified beforehand. Let’s be more 
precise on this. 
Suppose that |𝑎1⟩, |𝑎2⟩ are the eigenstates of the observable A. Suppose also one designs 
an A-device (a device built to measure the observable A). One knows that in measuring the 
observable A through an A-device, the quantum state will collapse onto either of its eigenstates. 
But, by means of SQM, one knows that it is possible to write down the eigenstates of A in a 
different basis, say, B with which A doesn’t commute. So, one can rewrite each eigenstate |𝑎1⟩ 
as a superposition of B’s eigenstates, |𝑎1⟩ = |𝑏1⟩ + |𝑏2⟩, and the eigenstate |𝑏1⟩ as |𝑏1⟩ =
|𝑎1⟩ + |𝑎2⟩. And the same goes, mutatis mutandis, for |𝑎2⟩ and |𝑏2⟩. 
It is relatively easy to show that, without any specification about what the sort of 
experiment is to be run, the 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑/𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 → 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑/𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 transition 
 |𝑏1⟩ =  |𝑎1⟩ + |𝑎2⟩ →  |𝑎2 (7.1 ) 
Can be rightfully viewed as a 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑/𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 → 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑/𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 transition 
 |𝑏1⟩ →  |𝑏1⟩ + |𝑏2⟩ (7.2 ) 
where |𝑎2⟩ = |𝑏1⟩ + |𝑏2⟩. The system will thus “uncollapse”, so to speak, when measured. This 
is the case, for instance, when one prepares the state before running an experiment in a given 
basis. 
In this light, the transition 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑/𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 → 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑/𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 can be 
fixed univocally only relatively to the sort of experiment is to be run. It follows that the 
transition is not intrinsically asymmetric (that is, it doesn’t depend exclusively on the 
dynamics) but depends on the sort of experiment, which defines the basis in which the state is 
to be written down. Once this is provided, it’s true that the system won’t ever uncollapse in 
that measurement context and that basis. But, as long as the eigenstates of the system are 
expressed in a different basis, and the experiment’s configuration is modified accordingly, the 
system may undergo a 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑/𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 → 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑑/𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑 transition as 
showed before. Hence, the very collapse mechanism remains undefined without specifying the 
measurement context adequately. And so does any direction of time depending on it. 
This undermines any attempt to ground a structural, or even an objective, arrow of time 
in CP because the collapse is not intrinsic to the system, but it depends upon the chosen 
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measurement device. The approach does give the means to define a local non-structural arrow 
of time relative to a given basis and a measurement device. Let me make the case in epistemic 
terms. Suppose that the available information is that a quantum state in a superposition of 
|𝑎1⟩ + |𝑎2⟩ was measured by an unspecified measurement device (it could have been either a 
A-device or a B-device). Someone told us that the outcome was ‘𝑎2’ meaning that the quantum 
state collapsed onto eigenstate |𝑎2⟩. The CP-based temporal asymmetry would say that |𝑎1⟩ +
|𝑎2⟩ came earlier because is an uncollapsed/undefined state, whereas |𝑎2⟩ came later, after the 
measurement, because it is a collapsed/defined state.  
Nevertheless, one doesn’t know whether the measurement device was an A-device or a 
B-device. If it was an A-device, then it is possible to claim that the state collapsed onto the 
eigenstate |𝑎2⟩. And this in fact displays the right sort of temporal asymmetry one was after. 
But if one doesn’t know it, I could lawfully rewrite the states in a B-basis, and then obtain an 
“uncollapsing” scenario. Naturally, if one knows one is dealing with a B-device, it would be 
highly confusing to write the state down in a different basis. But, if one doesn’t know it, one 
could express the state in either of the bases. If one gets to an “uncollapsing” scenario, should 
one accept that the direction of time was then inverted, that the collapse/defined state was rather 
a future state and the uncollapse/undefined a past one? This hardly makes sense and seems 
more reasonable to specify in which basis the quantum state is to be measured. But, in accepting 
this, any attempt to ground a structural arrow of time by means of CP rapidly vanishes, since 
it would be relative to the (arbitrary) choice of a measurement device. And it is not clear at all 
how this choice could come to be related to an asymmetry of time in itself.  
Section 3.3. Throw CP away! 
There is yet a much bigger issue against OrQM and its alleged CP-based quantum arrow of 
time: that CP, as it stands at least, is an unsatisfactory attempt to overcome the measurement 
problem. After all, whether CP introduces a quantum arrow of time (in any of its versions) 
essentially depends on regarding CP as a fundamental physical law of quantum mechanics. 
And many authors have in fact rejected this. Literature has analyzed its issues for long, so I 
won’t get into many details here. But, in general, criticisms against CP rely upon two points: 
(a) It draws an unnatural distinction between physical systems and measuring devices. Or, 
to put it differently, it gives an unjustified special role to measurement processes. 
(b) CP entails some consequences that render an unsatisfactory picture of what the world 
is like according to quantum theory. 
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As to the first point, if CP entails that the collapse of the wave-function is a physically real 
process, then the following question arises: why are measurement so physically special that are 
capable of inducing abrupt jumps? What about other interventions one may find in nature? As 
John Bell (1990) remarks, the word ‘measurement’ is not an appropriate concept to appear in 
any formulation of a (intended) fundamental physical theory. From a broader viewpoint, if a 
measurement is a physical process like any other and quantum theory intends to be a 
fundamental theory, then it should tell us what a measure is and should describe it in quantum 
mechanical terms. However, this is not the case: the measurement process appears in the 
axioms of the SQM+CP, so SQM+CP cannot be used to explain measurements, but 
measurements rather explain what a quantum theory is! (Dickson 2007: 363).  
There are only two way-outs for any defender of CP: either she considers that quantum 
mechanics is not a fundamental theory in any relevant sense, or that the process of measuring 
is not like any other physical process. Neither do options look too appealing. Remarkably, the 
latter implies that measurements are a sort of spooky physical processes, laying beyond any 
quantum explanation. Furthermore, in relation to the arrow of time, the two way-outs are also 
puzzling. On the one hand, to the extent that the temporal asymmetry is introduced by CP, if it 
remains as an odd physical process, so does the temporal asymmetry. On the other hand, if 
quantum mechanics turns out to be a non-fundamental theory, so is the temporal asymmetry. 
In any case, the scenario doesn’t look so promissory for any intended structural or fundamental 
temporal asymmetry. An alternative option would be to discard CP and OrQM altogether. In 
doing so, the CP-based temporal asymmetry is immediately discarded as well. 
As to the second line of criticisms, SQM+CP posits further problems in itself. Not only 
is its ad hoc nature suspicious, but also the image of what the world is like according to the 
theory. For instance, David Albert claims that so interpreted, the theory issues a bewildering 
picture of the quantum dynamics. He says 
“The dynamics and the postulate of collapse are flatly in contradiction with one 
another (…); and the postulate of collapse seems to be right about what happens 
when we make measurements, and the dynamics seems to be bizarrely wrong 
about what happens when we make measurements; and yet the dynamics seems 
to be right about what happens whenever we aren’t making measurements, and 
so the whole thing is very confusing” (Albert 1992: 79) 
Beyond this oddly dual scenario, if the collapse of the wave-function is to be taken as a real 
physical process, the circumstances under which it occurs should be explained further. 
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However, as CP stands, it remains silent about the causes that produce the collapse: it just says 
that the quantum state undergoes a collapse when measured, but no mechanism is given (this 
has been pointed out, for instance, by Lombardi, Fortin, Castagnino and Ardenghi 2011). 
Further, when applied to entangled compound systems, CP entails that the collapse resulting 
from measuring upon one of the systems will instantaneously produce sharply-defined values 
for the rest of the system’s components, regardless how far away they are from one another. 
CP would hence imply some sort of action-at-distance or non-locality. 
On empirical grounds, Dennis Dieks stresses that experimental research in the last 
decades has deadly undermined any motivation of introducing CP. He points out that 
“Schrödinger cat states, i.e., superpositions of distinguishable quantum states of mesoscopic or 
even practically macroscopic physical systems are now routinely prepared in the laboratory, 
and interference between the different terms in the superpositions have abundantly been 
verified” (Dieks 2019). According to him, this diminishes inductive support to CP to the extent 
to which superpositions never really collapse.  They are just hard to detect in macroscopic 
systems. 
Section 4. Limits and scopes of OrQM’s time asymmetry and of the 
arguments against it  
In this last section I’d like to make two remarks about the arguments against the CP-induced 
temporal asymmetry. In particular, I’ll first take Savitt’s and Callender’s arguments against 
Penrose about how his thought experiment should be properly time reversed. Second, I’ll make 
some brief commentaries about OrQM (particularly on its Copenhagen face), its ontology, and 
the arguments in favor of a CP-induced arrow of time  
As to the first commentary, the point I want to make is that Savitt’s and Callender’s time 
reversal proposal not only doesn’t do the job better either, but it also begs the question if used 
to show that temporal symmetry holds. Let’s suppose that 𝑇𝐶 is the right way to temporally 
reverse Penrose’s thought experiment. As Callender suggests, it implies that one should treat 
the emitter as receiver and vice versa. To be clear, 𝑇𝐶 entails that, for instance, 
 
𝑇𝐶(𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟) = 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟 (7.3 ) 
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meaning that a time-reversed photo-cell should be treated as an emitter. Thus, the time-reversed 
sequence  
 
𝑇𝐶(𝐿 → 𝑀 → 𝑃) = 𝑃𝑇 → 𝑀𝑇 → 𝐿𝑇 (7.4 ) 
should be correctly read it as saying that a time-reversed photo-cell emits a photon at 𝑡2, shortly 
after the time-reversed photon hits the time-reversed mirror, always with t decreasing. By the 
quantum-mechanical algorithm one well knows that it has one-half chances of passing through 
the half-silvered mirrored and of reaching the time-reversed lamp, and one-half of being headed 
to the laboratory wall. Without leaking temporally-biased and extra-quantum mechanical 
information, one should note that the quantum-mechanical algorithm retrodicts that “one-half 
of photons reach the time-reversed lamp”, so the probability that the time-reversed lamp 
registers given that the time-reversed photo-cell registers is exactly the same to the probability 
that the photo-cell registers given that the lamp registers. Time symmetry is thereby restored. 
 I think this argument is flawed in two different senses:  
(a) it does not offer a more reliable way to time reverse Penrose’s thought experiment. 
Instead of that, it leads to destroy the very objects involved in the thought experiment. 
(b) It begs the question if used to claim that time symmetry holds.  
These issues follow from two possible readings of Callender’s and Savitt’s proposal of time 
reversal, particularly, of how the states in the series must be temporally reversed. 
With respect to the first sense, one might ask: how would a time-reversed photo-cell 
work? One knows how photo-cells works in the ordinary direction of time (conventionally, 
running forward), but one has no clue about how a time-reversed photo-cell would work if time 
run backward. Treating the photo-cell as an emitter doesn’t help so much for a photo-cell is not 
the sort of things that emits anything. Why is one entitled to suppose that a photo-cell will 
behave in a completely different way, capable of emitting photons and behaving as an emitter 
when temporally reversed?  
It could certainly be argued that non-time-reversed photo-cells don’t emit anything, but 
time-reversed photo-cells do it. In reply to this, one can say that in fact a time-reversed 
something is gotten, but that something won’t be a photo-cell any longer. And this is so because 
it simply doesn’t work like a photo-cell. It seems, hence, that by 𝑇𝐶 reversing the direction of 
time one is, at the same time, destroying the very objects and states involved in the sequence. 
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Photo-cells, if one wish to use the word meaningfully, cannot be the sort of things that emits 
anything in either direction of time as long as one is still dealing with photo-cells in some 
relevant sense.  
Let me put the point slightly differently. Photo-cells may come in various types and 
instantiate unalike properties, so one can imagine different modal scenarios for photo-cells, 
altering their properties and their conditions. Notwithstanding this, if one wishes to still refer 
to photo-cells properly, a certain sub-group of properties must remain fixed and some other 
properties must be necessarily excluded. Otherwise, one would be unable to identify the objects 
through different scenarios. My claim is that the property of “functioning like a photo-cell” 
(that is, the property of behaving as a receiver) must be necessarily fixed and the property of 
behaving like an emitter must be necessarily excluded. All this in order to identify photo-cells 
thought different scenarios (or in order to satisfy trans-worlds identification, if you like) and 
to keep talking about photo-cells meaningfully. 
I don’t see any reason why this should be different in a time-reversed scenario. A time-
reversed photo-cell in a past-headed experimental running should emit nothing in as much as 
a photo-cell emits nothing in a future-headed experimental running. Otherwise, one is rather 
dealing with a different sort of objects (no a photo-cell) when time is reversed. If object’s inner 
nature can freely vary when time reversed, then time-reversal invariance will practically always 
follow trivially. 
And this is how the second reading of the argument comes into play: one should make 
explicit how a photo-cell transforms into a different sort of object under time reversal. I think 
that the only possible choice is to suppose that 
 
𝑇𝐶(𝑃) = 𝐿 (7.5 ) 
that is, that a time-reversed photo-cell should be treated as though if it were a lamp. 
Analogously, 
 
𝑇𝐶(𝐿) = 𝑃 (7.6 ) 
Now it seems one is getting somewhere because a lamp is in fact the sort of thing that behaves 
like an emitter. This could be reworded as following: when time is 𝑇𝐶-reversed, the time-
reversed photo-cell is capable of emitting because it is, in the opposite direction of time, a lamp. 
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This reading, however, risks a question-beginning if what is at issue is to test whether time 
symmetry holds. And this is so because the time-reversal transformation is carefully designed 
to leave the experimental setup virtually unaltered. So, both situations are bound to be time 
symmetric because the transformation does nothing if a time-reversed photo-cell behaves like 
a lamp, and a time-reversed lamp behaves like a photo-cell: one is simply describing the same 
physical situation in other terms and using other names.  
Or, even worse: One is simply marking the states with a “T”. And it is blatant that a 
graphical mark won’t produce any physical change! Further, the direction of time is assumed 
to, so to speak, innocuous in the description of any physical situation: it just plays the role of 
adding a mark on the graphical representation of states (indicating that one should read it as 
specified above) and changes 𝑡 by −𝑡. Nothing else: a transformation of an innocuous direction 
of time will surely produce a time symmetric scenario. I’m not claiming, at all, that one should 
thus go with Penrose’s application of time reversal instead. It probably fails in many other 
respects. However, the alternative proposed by Savitt and Callender doesn’t do it better. 
Therefore, it cannot be used against Penrose’s. 
My second commentary concerns specifically what quantum theory is about according 
to OrQM. As mentioned repeatedly in previous chapters, for a temporal asymmetry to be fully 
characterized, it must be considered whether the law at stake is fundamental in some relevant 
sense, what the fundamental entities of the theory are, and so forth. In this particular case, one 
can ask: what does it mean ontologically and epistemically that OrQM is temporally 
asymmetric? Or, what features of OrQM are serious candidates for a full-blooded arrow of 
time? One could, for instance, show that a physical theory involves certain elements that 
introduce a temporal asymmetry (for instance, dissipative forces in classical mechanics). 
Nonetheless, one could also read the theory in such a way that those elements aren’t fully real, 
or at least, are non-fundamental (for instance, as Callender 1995 argues against Hutchison 
1993, 1995 with respect to introducing dissipative forces in classical mechanics’ ontology). In 
doing so, any temporal asymmetry is deflated. Naturally, one can next dispute about the 
ontological status of those elements within the theory at stake, but this is a different line of 
contend. 
It was mentioned before that OrQM includes some interpretative stuff linked to what has 
come to be known as Copenhagen interpretation. One of the essential questions for any 
interpretation of SQM is: what is the role of the wave-function in the theory? And one of the 
tenets of OrQM in relation to this question is: any meaningful wave-function talking must be 
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necessarily expressed in terms of measurement’s outcomes. In this sense, OrQM tells us that 
quantum mechanics is not a theory about an objective real world composed of particles, wave-
functions or whatever, but a theory about what you see in, and know from, the experiments you 
make. So, any relevant temporal asymmetry for OrQM should be only read off from the 
measurement’s outcomes. 
Defenders of OrQM frequently presents themselves as exclusively guided by “facts”, by 
what is known through direct experience. Hence, any claim beyond these limits is as obscure 
as any uncritical metaphysical claim.  Along this line, it has been adjudicated to Niels Bohr the 
phrase “there is no quantum world (…). It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find 
out how nature is. Physics concerns what we can say about nature” (Petersen 1963: 12), 
meaning that any question beyond what one can (classically) say just exposes our ideological 
prejudices or a metaphysical digression. The overall reasoning seems to be driven for a logical-
positivist philosophical framework, according to which the idea that meaningful assertions 
must be verifiable by direct observation is a central tenet. And, again, within the quantum 
theory, all this is only given by measurements’ outcomes. 
If OrQM is a set of ideas about how the quantum theory should be understood (regardless 
how controversial its coherence and cohesion are) and a proposal about what the world is like 
(regardless how minimal its claims are with respect to this), it is quite clear that all there is 
knowable out there, in one way or the other, boils down to measurements’ outcomes. The 
fundamental stuff OrQM talks about is entirely exhausted by measurements’ outcomes, the sort 
of relations and correlations one can discover among them, and the sort of things that bear some 
referenciality in daily communication employing natural language. Any quantum temporal 
asymmetry can by the same token be only given by an asymmetry displayed in what the 
quantum algorithm predicts and in what one obtains after measurements. There is nothing else 
where a temporal asymmetry may come out. 
And this takes one back to gravitate around the sort of thought experiments as those 
analyzed before. Any candidate for a structural arrow of time within OrQM framework has to 
be able to show that the quantum algorithm systematically fails in rendering the same statistics 
and experiments’ outcomes in both directions of time. And this should be considered 
independently of any alleged behavior of the wave-function: as long as it lies far beyond of 
what it is directly observed by measurement, any speculation about its properties or nature is 
just that, non-scientific speculation stepping beyond what knowable. So will be any temporal 
(a)symmetry coming from there as well. Pieces of mathematics, while remaining just like that, 
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are atemporal items appearing in a formal apparatus, not the sort of things that can manifest a 
temporal bias. Only those parts of the formalism linked to (knowable) stuff out there in the 
world are physically meaningful. For OrQM the only knowable stuff in the world is what one 
can directly observe: once again, measurements’ outcomes. But, as showed along this chapter, 
the kind of temporal asymmetry one may come to find in this context is, at best, a local non-
structural one. 
Final remarks 
Along this chapter, I’ve presented a proposal for a quantum arrow of time based on OrQM: a 
CP-induced temporal asymmetry. As reviewed, the asymmetry of time would enter into 
quantum theory through the collapse of the state vector: any measurement performed upon a 
superposition state forces it to collapse onto one of the components of the superposition. This 
process is not described by the Schrödinger equation but by a non-unitary and non-
deterministic evolution given by CP. In a motto: quantum states collapse but do not uncollapse. 
I’ve also put forward three lines of criticisms to this approach: 
(a) CP should not be considered genuinely (or interestingly) time asymmetric 
(b) Though temporally asymmetric, CP does not introduce a structural time asymmetry 
(c) OrQM and CP should be rejected 
The first line of argumentation focused on that OrQM turns out to be non-time symmetric only 
under a debatable time-reversal transformation. Time symmetry is easily restored when the 
time-reversal transformation is taken to also transformed the states of the series. As I argued in 
Section 4, I’ve however found this proposal flatly unsatisfactory: either it destroys the objects 
involved in the series or begs the question when used to show that time symmetry holds. In 
conclusion, I do think that OrQM offers some means to distinguish the past-to-future direction 
from the future-to-past one. However, one can thus wonder: in which sense? 
The second line of argumentation contends that, if a temporal asymmetry is provided by 
OrQM, this asymmetry is non-structural. The strong dependence of the time asymmetry on 
measurement devices’ features to determine whether the transition was from an 
“uncollapsed/undefined” state to a “collapsed/defined” one undermines any attempt to consider 
any alleged time asymmetry as structural. Furthermore, the asymmetry would be local to the 
extent to which the wave-function of the whole universe never collapses. All this portrays a 
scenario quite similar to that of the problem of the two realms, in which any temporal 
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asymmetry is non-structural. For these reasons, in the event OrQM to be taken as an acceptable 
interpretation, the CP-induced asymmetry will be local and non-structural. 
Finally, the last line of argumentation debunks any CP-induced temporal asymmetry by 
rejecting CP itself. Though CP, and OrQM more generally, achieved a kind of exclusive 
hegemony in the physics community from the 1930s up to the present, from a more 
philosophical and conceptual sight the interpretation has been fiercely fought. Besides its inner 
obscurities and contradictions, any viable formulation of OrQM must in one way or the other 
include CP. And CP was shown to be not only flatly ad hoc, but also to render an odd picture 
of the world, if any. No need to show that if OrQM turns out to be inadequate, so will be 
anything following from it. 
To sum up. Despite what has been suggested by Penrose, Ellis, and Price, among others, 
OrQM falls quite short in clearly defining a structural temporal direction. OrQM would in fact 
provide the means to draw the distinction between both directions of time locally and relatively 
to a previously-specified measurement device. This would yield a non-structural arrow of time 
at best. But, at worse, the questionable principles of OrQM to flesh quantum theory out would 
steer to not considering the interpretation seriously, disregarding by the same token any 
temporal asymmetry coming from it. 
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VIII. 
GRW-type theories  
Time Asymmetry and Spontaneous Quantum Jumps 
OrQM is a (failed) attempt to overcome the measurement problem: SQM+CP, in fact, accounts 
for what it is observed after running experiments (no superpositions but definite values) despite 
what the SQM’s dynamics prescribes (a superposition of states; for instance, a measuring 
device in a superposition of states). The issue is that the proposal not only looks unacceptably 
ad hoc, but it also incurs in the previously-mentioned problems. Nonetheless, this is not the 
end for any collapse theory. Neither does it mean that the notion of collapse be utterly 
unacceptable. 
David Albert (1990) establishes that a workable theory of collapse ought to be able to do 
the following: 
(i) Guaranteeing that measurements always have outcomes. That is, that such a so-
complemented theory gets rid of any superposition of states when a measurement 
takes place.  
(ii) Preserving the familiar statistical connections between the outcomes of those 
measurements and the wave-function of the measured system just prior to those 
measurements. 
(iii) Being empirically consistent with the so-far-obtained evidence about the dynamics 
of physical systems. 
Giancarlo Ghirardi (2016) also prescribes a recipe of what a palatable theory of collapse must 
overcome in order to have a precisely-formulated quantum theory. In particular, it ought to 
make explicit how the process of collapse works, where and when it is to occur. SQM+CP was 
unable to provide plausible answers to any of these elementary questions, so any proposal 
intending to go beyond CP ought to, at least, provide a detailed explanation of the collapse 
mechanism. 
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Section 1. The Dynamical Reduction Program: GRW-type theories. 
Section 1.1. A bare GRW-type theory 
The Dynamical Reduction Program (DRP), wherein CP should be just considered as a first 
unsuccessful proposal, is an attempt to cook up a workable quantum theory with collapse. 
Strictly, DRP includes any theory that brings up the idea that the wave function undergoes, 
once in a while or under specific circumstances, some sort of collapse or reduction. And the 
best candidates for this task up to the present are the so-called spontaneous collapse theories, 
widely-known by the ‘GRW’ acronym due to one of its first and most successful formulations 
by Giancarlo Ghirardi, Alberto Rimini and Tulio Weber in 1986. 
The GRW-type theories are essentially a modification of the standard evolution law of 
SQM. Such a modification aims at unifying both microprocesses and macroprocesses in a 
single dynamic. In a nutshell, the guiding tenet aims at accounting for the reduction or collapse 
process dispensing notions like ‘measurement’, ‘observer’ or ‘consciousness’. It rather intends 
to provide a single dynamic where collapses take place stochastically and spontaneously by 
modifying the standard evolution given by the Schrödinger equation. Any GRW-type theory 
endorses the idea that the collapse of the wave-function is not only a real physical process, but 
that this ought to be understood in an entirely measurement-independent manner and only 
regarding individual single quantum systems. 
Though P. Pearle (1979) and N. Gisin (1984) were the first to entertain and to suggest 
this idea, the first formulation of a coherent GRW-type theory is the Quantum Mechanics with 
Spontaneous Localization (QMSL), crafted mainly by Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber in 1986 (see 
Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber 1986, Ghirardi 1995). Spontaneous localization is a working 
proposal for a stochastic and non-linear modification of the Schrödinger equation in order to 
provide not only an explanation of collapse processes, but also to overcome the measurement 
problem. The main tenet of the theory is that an individual quantum system (represented by its 
wave function) almost always evolves unitarily, deterministically and linearly according to the 
ordinary Schrödinger equation but, once in a while, it undergoes a sudden and stochastic “hit” 
(or “jump”, or “collapse”) after which the system gets a definite localization (that is, its state 
collapses onto one of its position eigenstates). In particular, what happens to a quantum system 
undergoing a collapse is that its wave function gets multiplied by a narrow three-dimensional 
Gaussian function of the position operator. Consequently, the quantum system gets a precise 
localization in the three-dimensional space, getting rid of any other term in the superposition. 
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Despite its at-first-glance simplicity, such a mechanism must be carefully detailed in order to 
get a workable theory. Let’s spell it out a bit more carefully. 
From a broad viewpoint, QMSL consists in three tenets: (i) each particle of a system of 
n (distinguishable) particles experiences, with mean frequency 𝜆, a sudden, spontaneous 
process; (ii) in the time interval between two successive spontaneous processes the system 
evolves deterministically and linearly according to the Schrödinger equation; and (iii) the 
sudden spontaneous process is a localization described by  
 
|𝜓⟩ → |𝜓𝑥
𝑖 ⟩ = |𝜑𝑥
𝑖 ⟩/‖𝜑𝑥
𝑖 ‖ (8.1 ) 
 |𝜑𝑥
𝑖 ⟩ = 𝐿𝑥
𝑖 |𝜓⟩ (8.2 ) 
where 𝐿𝑥
𝑖  is the collapse operator, a norm-reducing, positive, self-adjoint, linear operator in 
the n-particle Hilbert space, representing the localization of particle i around the point x 









2𝜎2  (8.3 ) 
 
where ?̂?𝑖 is the position operator of system I and, importantly, 𝜎 is a new constant of nature 
standing for the width of the multiplying Gaussian. I will be come back to it shortly. 
From this, one obtains that the probability density is equal to 
 𝜌𝑖(𝑥) = ‖𝜑𝑥
𝑖 ‖
2
 (8.4 ) 
And all GRW-evolution is thus described by a unified dynamic given by the Schrödinger 
equation plus this stochastic mechanism introduced in it (see eq. 8.5 for seeing this clearly). 
Let |𝜓𝑡0
𝑖 ⟩ be now the initial wave function of a “particle” i at 𝑡0. From 𝑡0 to 𝑡1 (where 
𝑡1 = 𝑡0 + ∆𝑡1 and is chosen randomly) the wave function will evolve according to the usual 
Schrödinger equation. It is worth noticing that ∆𝑡1 is a random time distributed conforming 
with the exponential distribution with rate 𝑁𝜆, where 𝜆 is a new constant of nature indicating 
the frequency that a “jump” or “hit” occurs –of the order of 10−16𝑠−1– and N is the number of 
quantum systems involved. 
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At time 𝑡1, the single system i suffers an instantaneous collapse with random center X. If 
|𝜓𝑡0
𝑖 ⟩ was in a superposition of states, one of the terms gets multiplied by a finite number, and 
all the rest by 0. In this way, all the terms (except that being multiplied by a finite number) 
vanish and the system gets a precise localization centered at, say, 𝑥𝑘. The probability that the 
ith term gets multiplied by a finite number is thus equal to |𝑥𝑖|
2. Then, the algorithm is iterated: 
the quantum system evolves again according to the Schrödinger equation up to a time 𝑡2 =
𝑡1 + ∆𝑡2 where a new collapse occurs, and so forth. 
This theory of collapse needs to introduce two new constants of nature, as noted above: 
(i) the frequency, per unit time, of a collapse (𝜆), and (ii) the width 𝜎 of the multiplying 
Gaussian curve (the 𝜎 founded in the localization operator, see eq. 8.3), whose order is of 
10−7m. The introduction of such constants is required to sharpen the collapse mechanism. 
Certainly, these constants remain unexplained and should be indeed taken as brute facts about 
what the world is like at the microscopic level according to a GRW-type theory. Though it 
might look like unacceptably ad hoc for some, the fact is that any theory needs to leave some 
hypotheses or assumptions unexplained. The relevant thing, however, is what the theory is able 
to explain and whether it accomplishes for what it was formulated. And looking at Albert’s and 
Ghirardi’s above-mentioned desiderata, QMSL certainly comes up with a theory of collapse 
free of the failures of its antecessor (CP). Let’s see this closer. 
To begin with, the theory predicts that a single quantum system in isolation will suffer a 
collapse with an extremely low probability in the following seconds. The frequency 𝜆 of a 
collapse for a single quantum system is so extremely low that it can be said. with high certainty, 
that the system is bound to evolve unitarily, linearly and deterministically for a long time (even 
though the collapse will necessarily occur in some time). In this sense, an isolated quantum 
system will virtually always remain unlocalized. 
Nevertheless, when it comes to macroscopic systems the same dynamical mechanism 
tells us a different, though closely-related, story. And this story links the micro-dynamics with 
what is eventually observed. Given that a macroscopic system (like a measuring device) 
consists of an astonishingly large amount of quantum systems (of the order of millions and 
millions), the probability of undergoing a localization will be extremely high (in the order of 
having a localization each 10−7seconds). And this is simply explained by the number N of 
quantum systems involved. This entails that, at the macroscopic level, a superposition of states 
is incredibly short-lived. In John Bell’s words, a Schrödinger’s cat is not both dead and alive 
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for more than a split of second within a GRW framework. The upshot of all this is that the same 
mechanism implies, in a nutshell, that whereas a single isolated quantum system will almost 
never suffer a collapse remaining thus unlocalized, a large enough number of quantum systems 
(like any macroscopic object) will almost always remained localized in so far as superpositions 
of states collapse almost immediately. 
In this way, QMSL brings forth an elegant and simple explanation of why definite values 
are always observed, despite SQM’s predictions. The theory notably brings forth such an 
explanation doing without any reference to ‘measurements’ or ‘observers’: a measuring 
process, for instance, is as physically ordinary as any other process, and gets an explanation 
within the QMSL framework. One can also straightforwardly see how this theory, if taken true, 
explains how, when and where collapses take place. Quantum mechanics (in its GRW-type 
interpretation) thus recovers its (alleged) fundamental nature. 
It is worth adding two further remarks. First, QMSL is not free of criticisms (see Albert 
and Vaidman 1989, Albert 1990, Shimony 1990) and drawbacks (see Ghirardi 1990). A new 
GRW-type theory was in consequence introduced few years later by Pearle (1989) and 
Ghirardi, Pearle and Rimini (1990). This new theory, usually referred to as Continuous 
Spontaneous Localization (CSL), replaces the discontinuous jumps of QMSL by a continuous 
stochastic evolution in the Hilbert space, also called ‘a diffusion process’. One of the benefits 
of CSL is that it provides a compact mathematical equation for the stochastic mechanism 
(already presented in QMSL, though less clearly), which is now based on continuous Markov 
processes in the Hilbert space (Ghirardi, Pearle and Rimini 1990: 179). Furthermore, CSL is a 
generalization of QSML where the symmetry properties of the wave function, in the case of 
identical constituents, are respected. The fundamental dynamical equation in CSL is thus a 
linear stochastic evolution equation for the state vector (see Ghirardi, Grassi and Benatti 1995). 











] |𝜓𝑤⟩ (8.5 ) 
Note that eq. 8.5 looks quite similar to the ordinary Schrödinger equation with the exception 
of two terms on the right side, where the quantities 𝐴𝑖 are commuting self-adjoint operators 
and the quantities 𝑤𝑖(𝑡) are c-number stochastic processes with a probability given, roughly, 
by the previous equations. In the following, I will exclusively refer to eq. 8.5 as the dynamical 
equation of a GRW-type theory. 
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Secondly, and more interestingly, although a GRW-type theory successfully reproduces 
all the quantum mechanics results that were obtained up to the present, it is intended to be a 
rival theory to the extent to which some of its predictions diverges from SQM’s (see Bassi and 
Ghirardi 2003, Adler 2007 and Bassi et al. 2013 for reviews). The proposed (crucial) tests are 
not yet feasible, but as technology is rapidly improving, much of the hopes for its supporters 
rely on future experiments. 
Section 1.2. A bare GRW-type theory plus its Primitive Ontology 
Most GRW theorists agree on this basic formulation. However, if a GRW-type theory is not 
only meant to be a theory about what is obtained after experiments, this cannot be the whole 
story. Thus-introduced theory remains utterly silent about what the theory is fundamentally 
about. This bare GRW-type theory would only provide the algorithm to describe the two-faced 
evolution of the wave-function in a high dimensional space. So, it could outwardly look like 
the theory is mainly about the wave-function, inhabiting in such a high dimensional space. 
However, as the theory stands, it is unable to connect with the three-dimensional matter out 
there (of which cats, chairs and tables are made). So, in order to bridge the gap between the 
high-dimensional wave-function on the one hand, and the three-dimensional matter around us, 
on the other, Giancarlo Ghirardi proposed a primitive ontology (PO) for the theory, as was 
described before (Chapter 6). When equipped with a PO, two versions of a GRW-type theory 
can be distinguished: 
• Bare GRW + PO of matter-density field (GRWm henceforth) 
• Bare GRW + PO of flashes (GRWf henceforth) 
An ontology of flashes or of matter-density field are two (physically equivalent) ways to spell 
out what the fundamental stuff of a GRW-type theory is: either the fundamental constituents 
of the theory are flashes (events), or a continuous matter-density field. Let’s say something 
more about them. 
GRWm was originally proposed by Ghirardi, Grassi and Benatti in a 1995 paper. The 
introduction of a “mass density in ordinary space” (1995: 7) aimed at overcoming the so-called 
“problem of the tails” (a drawback raised by Shimony 1990, and by David Albert and Loewer 
1990). Briefly, the problem is that even though the localization process leads to wave-functions 
strongly peaked around the spatial position of the jump, it nonetheless doesn’t avoid that the 
final wave-function be different from zero elsewhere (these are the “tails” of the peaked wave-
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function). According to Ghirardi (2016), this problem only follows if the “standard 
probabilistic interpretation of the wave-function” remains unchanged, particularly, in assuming 
that its squared modulus gives the probability density of the position variable. GRWm’s aim is 
to abandon such an interpretation and to rather turn to a “mass-density ontology”. 
GRWm suggests that the right attitude towards a GRW-type theory is to regard it as being 
about a mass-density field 𝑚(𝑥, 𝑡) for every point 𝑥 ∈  ℝ3 in the physical space and every time 
𝑡. Those variables are functionals of the wave function and are thereby determined by it, which 
plays an ontologically secondary role just as it explains how such a field behaves in a three-
dimensional space. Whereas the wave-function indeed belongs to the GRWm’s ontology, it 
shouldn’t be regarded as a fundamental constituent of it. Hence, the microscopic fundamental 
ontology of GRWm is not of particles or of wave functions but of a continuous field whose 
behavior is given by the wave-function, developing further an idea already suggested by Erwin 
Schrödinger in the 1930s. 
In order to relate the reduction process to the mass-density field, GRWm’s proponents 
introduce a mass-density operator acting upon each point 𝑥 ∈  ℝ3. The stochastic procedure 
strives to make the mass-density distribution “objectively definite” (to use Ghirardi’s word), 
relating the localization frequency to the mass of the constituents. In Ghirardi’s words:  
“what the theory is about, what is real ‘out there’ at a given space point 𝑥, is just a 
field, i.e., a variable 𝑚(𝑥, 𝑡) given by the expectation value of the mass density 
operator ?̂?(𝑥) at 𝑥 obtained by multiplying the mass of any kind of particle times 
the number density operator for the considered type of particle and summing over 
all possible types of particles which can be present” (Ghirardi 2016) 
There is yet an ontologically quite different version for GRW-type theories. According 
to it, the fundamental ontology of the theory is one of flashes, i.e., events occurring in the 
physical space. This “flashes ontology” was originally put forward by John Bell (1987) as a 
mean to identify the “local beables” of a GRW-type theory. GRWf, as it has come to be known 
ultimately, has been developed further by Adrian Kent (1989), Roderich Tumulka (2006) and 
Allori et al. (2008). 
The flashes occur in the physical space (and time) and are mathematically represented by 
single points in space-time. They are the fundamental constituents of everything out there. A 
single macroscopic object is neither a bunch of particles, nor a particular configuration of a 
matter field, but a pattern of flashes, where each flash corresponds to one of the spontaneous 
localizations or collapses of the wave-function. Under this view, three-dimensional objects can 
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be account for in terms of an extremely large amount of collapse processes occurring 
spontaneously: the larger the number of wave-function’s degrees of freedom, the bigger the 
number of flashes (collapses) (see Allori et al. 2008). 
As in GRWm, in GRWf the wave function doesn’t belong to the fundamental ontology, 
but it just plays the role of governing the PO’s behavior. In this case, the wave function is the 
law of evolution for the flashes. As Michael Esfeld and Nicolas Gisin put it:  
“(…) given an initial configuration of flashes, the wave-function enables 
conceiving histories of the distribution of flashes in space-time and makes it 
possible to assign probabilities to these histories. Note, however, that on the GRWf 
theory, only one such history actually occurs, and that the initial configuration of 
flashes does not determine a unique wave-function; any initial configuration of 
flashes is compatible with many different wave-functions” (Esfeld and Gisin 2014: 
251) 
Any fully-interpreted GRW-type theory will therefore have the following ingredients: 
(a) A formalism for quantum states and observables (akin SQM) 
(b) A dynamic given by the Schrödinger equation plus a spontaneous and stochastic 
mechanism of localization (or collapse) in it for any physical system (eq. 8.5). 
(c) Either of the followings POs: (i) a PO of a matter-density field (GRWm), (ii) PO of 
flashes (GRWf) 
Section 2. Time (a)symmetry and the arrow of time in a GRW-type 
theory 
The question of the arrow of time within any GRW-type theory boils naturally down to the 
question about whether any of the above-listed elements manifests a temporal asymmetry 
(either structural or non-structural). 
As to (a) and (b) without the amendment, there is no much to say about it within a GRW-
type theory: the question therein mostly reduces to whether the Schrödinger equation without 
any addition or modification turns out to be time-reversal invariant. And this has been already 
addressed and analyzed in Part 2. If the Schrödinger equation turns out to be non-time-reversal 
invariant, for any of the reasons I presented before, so will any GRW-type theory be. No further 
argument or reason is given on GRW’s side: GRW adds nothing to the discussion. But, if one 
comes to agree on any of the reasons that may render the Schrödinger equation time-reversal 
invariant (i.e. a relationalist stance with respect to time), then GRW-type theories could indeed 
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have something else to say about the arrow of time, which will come from those elements that 
are specific to it: either (b) with the amendment (that is, something like eq. 8.5), or (c). 
As I argued in a general fashion in Chapter 6, I’m very suspicious that a PO may introduce 
on its own, without any further assumption, a time-asymmetric feature in the theory. The same 
logically goes for both a PO of flashes and a PO of a matter-density field. In these cases, the 
PO alone doesn’t bear any information about how the patterns of flashes or the distribution of 
the matter-density field will behave in time. The PO says only what the building blocks of the 
universe are, not how they dynamically evolve in time. Both a PO of flashes and of matter-
density field on their own give us a static and inert picture of fundamental reality. All this is 
widely-recognized by GRWf’s and GRWm’s supporters as they often remark that it is the 
wave-function plus the spontaneous localization process what tell how the patterns of flashes 
or the mass-density field evolve in time42. Nonetheless, it’s not the case that the PO says 
nothing whatsoever about time or the property of time-reversal invariance. But I shall address 
this point afterwards. 
This leads us to focus on (b): the Schrödinger equation plus the spontaneous, stochastic 
and non-linear localization mechanism in it (eq. 8.5). It has been often argued that any GRW-
type theory offers the more serious and promissory candidate for a structural (fundamental) 
arrow of time in the quantum realm: the time asymmetric ingredient enters the theory entirely 
through such a stochastic mechanism. And there are broadly two senses in which a GRW-type 
theory turns out to be interesting for the arrow of time debate: 
(i) The spontaneous localization process is structurally (intrinsically, fundamentally) non-
time-reversal invariant (see Arntzenius 1997, Callender 2000, Esfeld and Sachs 2011, 
North 2011 among others) 
(ii) A GRW-type theory would offer the means to bridge finally the gap between 
thermodynamics and statistical mechanics in grounding a temporally asymmetric 
                                                          
42 There seems to be however a subtle difference between both ontologies. Whereas it’s true that a matter-density 
field without a dynamic is just something that remains inert ad infinitum, an ontology of flashes would be slightly 
different because flashes are something that happen, something that come about somehow thanks to the dynamics. 
To put it in other words: whereas a completely inert ontology of a matter-density field is (if you put effort on it) 
imaginable, an ontology of flashes is impossible because the very events can just come about thanks to the 
dynamics: an ontology of flashes without any dynamics producing them is, so to speak, no an ontology whatsoever 
for there is nothing there, just emptiness. In any case, a GRW-dynamics “produces”, so to speak, the flashes but 
they cannot introduce any temporal asymmetry on their own: just the dynamics specifying how patterns of flashes 
behave in time. 
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probabilistic tendency for systems to evolve toward equilibrium states (Albert 1994, 
2000) 
GRW-type theory would thus be killing two birds with one stone: it would, on the one side, 
exhibit a structural time asymmetry at the level of its unified dynamics, entailing that time in 
itself is temporally asymmetric conforming with the theory (the problem of a structural arrow 
of time); and it would, on the other, bridge the gap between thermodynamics and statistical 
mechanics, explaining why one has experience of a temporally asymmetric macro-world (one 
of the ways to pose the problem of the two realms). 
Section 2.1. A GRW-based structural arrow of time 
Though the Schrödinger equation might turn out to be time-reversal invariant, if one amends it 
with a new sort of evolution, the new unified dynamics could nonetheless turn out to be non-
time-reversal invariant. This has been claimed by, for instance, Jill North (2011). She says: 
“Not only is wavefunction collapse governed by a fundamental, indeterministic 
law on this theory (GRW), but by a fundamental, non-time-reversal invariant law. 
GRW assigns probabilities to the different possible future wavefunctions that a 
system’s current wave-function could collapse into.” (North 2011: 333)  
And a few lines below, 
“The theory doesn’t assign probabilities to different possible past wave-functions, 
given a system’s current wave-function. The collapse law doesn’t say anything 
about the chances of different past wave-functions.” (Ibidem) 
Finally, 
“GRW then says that different things can happen in either direction of time: 
wavefunctions can collapse in accord with lawful probabilities to the future, not 
the past.” (Ibidem) 
In relation to the arrow of time, Frank Arntzenius’s claim (1997) goes more or less along the 
same line 
“Thus, if one believes in some “orthodox” collapse version of quantum mechanics, 
or one of the more recent Pearle-GRW type collapse has reason to believe that time 
has an objective direction.” (S218) 
And in the conclusions, he adds 
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“The conclusion, therefore, is that whether one should believe that time has an 
arrow depends on one’s interpretation of quantum mechanics: If one adheres to a 
theory of probabilistic collapse, one has reason to believe that time has an arrow.” 
(S222) 
That a GRW-type theory is in the position to explain the arrow of time has been explicitly held 
by Michael Esfeld and Christian Sachse They say 
“This interpretation is in the position to explain the origin of the direction of time. 
Amending the Schrödinger equation with a stochastic term as GRW does in order 
to account for state reductions has not only the consequence that the dynamics is 
indeterministic, but also that it is not time-reversal invariant. In other words, the 
GRW equation is a candidate for a fundamental law of nature that is not time-
reversal invariant.” (Esfeld and Sachse 2011: 60) 
Craig Callender (2000) holds the same view as well. He puts it as following: 
“On collapse theories, a certain feature of the system (e.g. particle number, mass, 
being observed) will trigger a non-unitary, indeterministic transition from 𝜓 to one 
of its components 𝜓𝑖. This collapse is not governed by the Schrödinger evolution. 
And, in general, there is no way of evolving from the collapsed system back to the 
uncollapsed system with the same chance. According to collapse theories, there is 
a preferred orientation to time.” (2000: 261) 
Callender’s claim extends to any collapse theory (as being SQM+CP), including naturally any 
GRW-type theory. 
Let’s think through what means that a GRW-type theory be non-time-reversal invariant 
in the light of what was said in Chapter 2. The main manifestation of time-reversal invariance 
is the generation of a pair of time-symmetric twins for any relevant evolution. This readily 
manifests in the class of possible solutions (or possible worlds) of a theory’s dynamics. In the 
case of a time-reversal invariant law, the structure of its possible solutions (or possible worlds) 
is given by Ⱳ =Ⱳ𝑓 +Ⱳ𝑏, where a mapping going from 𝑤𝑖 ∈ Ⱳ
𝑓 to 𝑤𝑘 ∈ Ⱳ
𝑏 necessarily 
exists and Ⱳ𝑓 and Ⱳ𝑏 are physically equivalent. It is worth recalling too that this result doesn’t 
mean that a single evolution, say 𝑤𝑖, be reversible (symmetric) or irreversible (asymmetric). 
For a GRW-type theory to be genuinely non-time-reversal invariant, the class of solutions 
of the eq. 8.5 (that is, the Schrödinger equation plus the spontaneous localization mechanism 
in it) thus has to have one of the following structure: (a) either Ⱳ =Ⱳ𝑓 or Ⱳ =Ⱳ𝑏 are 
models of the theory, but not both; (b) alternatively, Ⱳ𝑓 and Ⱳ𝑏 are models of the theory but 
Ⱳ𝑓 ≠ Ⱳ𝑏. (a) can be put in words as saying that a GRW-type theory only works (that is, it 
yields predictions in the form of solutions) in one direction of time, but not in the opposite. 
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And this is exactly what North means: the collapse law doesn’t say anything about wave-
functions’ past. Or, alternatively (b), the theory says different things about wave-functions’ 
past and future. 
Let me portray this in the following toy model. Imagine a Universe containing only one 
quantum system in a position superposition state at 𝑡0, |𝜓0⟩ = ∑ 𝑎𝑖|𝑎𝑖⟩𝑖 . The GRW algorithm 
predicts the following: the quantum system is bound to evolve, towards the future, unitarily, 
deterministically and linearly according to the Schrödinger equation for a good amount of time 
but there is a real probability that in that Universe such a quantum system undergoes a 
stochastic, indeterministic and non-linear localization process at 𝑡1 (where ∆𝑇 = 𝑡1 − 𝑡0 can 
be equal to 109 years!). But, and this is the upshot of non-time-reversal invariance, the GRW 
algorithm either remains silent or says something different when time runs backward. That is, 
either it is unable to specify how a time-reversed Universe containing one quantum system in 
a position superposition state is going to evolve in the backward direction of time, or it says 
that the quantum system will evolve in a different manner in the backward direction. Let’s see 
how this happens.  
Section 2.2. A GRW-based structural arrow of time in two senses 
Stochastic and spontaneous collapses do seem to introduce a structural time asymmetry in the 
theory: A GRW-type dynamic intrinsically distinguishes the past-to-future direction from the 
future-to-past one. However, this is done in two slightly different ways: from an account closer 
to a substantivalist view of time reversal the asymmetry is introduced in the theory through a 
difference in the patterns of hits in the backward and in the forward direction of time; from an 
account closer to a Wigner’s sense of time reversal and to a relationalist view, the asymmetry 
is introduced through the idea that the original state one starts with cannot be recovered after a 
hit. To jump to the conclusions, theory is indeed non-time-reversal in both senses. 
Notwithstanding, they display a slightly different sort of time asymmetry. 
To begin, it is worth mentioning in which sense the collapse mechanism would with 
precision be time asymmetric. It might be suggested that the spontaneous localization process 
in itself, that is, independently of the Schrödinger equation, is taken to be non-time-reversal 
invariant. However, GRW’s supporters claim that one of GRW’s benefits is that any physical 
system obeys the same single dynamics: the GRW’s dynamics is the Schrödinger equation with 
an amendment (that is, eq. 8.5), so it cannot, and shouldn’t, be taken independently of the 
Schrödinger equation. Therefore, the spontaneous localization mechanism is not the right sort 
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of thing that one can temporally reverse in itself and independently of the Schrödinger equation. 
It rather just happens, abruptly, suddenly and instantaneously on a system evolving according 
to eq. 8.5. What does it thus mean that the localization mechanism occurs backward? By 
definition, the spontaneous localization is something that collapses a quantum state in a 
superposition onto one of its components (defining a precise position or region in space, for 
instance). So, its happening backward cannot mean a “spontaneous des-localization” process, 
but a “spontaneous localization” process onto a backward-in-time-evolving system according 
to a time-reversed eq. 8.5.  
Hence, I think that the right answer to the question “what does it mean that the 
localization mechanism occurs backward” is that it occurs over a time-reversed wave-function 
like |𝜓0⟩ = ∑ 𝑎𝑖|𝑎𝑖⟩𝑖 ,  evolving backward in time according to a time-reversed amended 
Schrödinger equation, that is, it occurs over something like |𝜓0
∗⟩ = ∑ 𝑎𝑖
∗|𝑎𝑖
∗⟩𝑖  instead over 
|𝜓0⟩ = ∑ 𝑎𝑖|𝑎𝑖⟩𝑖 . 
Having said that, let’s come back to the Universe containing only one quantum system 
in a position superposition state. It was already shown what a GRW-type’s dynamic predicts 
in the forward direction of time. Let’s see what happens when time goes backward in the 
Wigner’s relationalist sense of time reversal. 
Esfeld and Sachs, and also Callender in different parts, claim that once a quantum system 
has undergone a spontaneous localization (that is, it has collapsed in accordance with the 
stochastic mechanism), it cannot be evolved back to the un-collapsed state that existed before 
the first spontaneous localization occurred. And in this sense a GRW-type theory is non-time-
reversal invariant: it doesn’t provide the means to come back to the original state; or, to put it 
in other words, the quantum state one started with cannot be recovered if it has gone through a 
spontaneous localization process. 
Just-described scenario would look like this. Imagine a Universe much like the previous 
one. At 𝑡0, the state of the quantum system is in a position superposition state, |𝜓0⟩ = ∑ 𝑎𝑖|𝑎𝑖⟩𝑖 . 
Let’s make that system evolve in time conforming to GRW’s dynamics. Suppose that such an 
evolution takes 109 years, more or less. So, GRW’s predictions are that the quantum system is 
bound to evolve, towards the future, unitarily, deterministically and linearly according to the 
Schrödinger equation for about 109 years and that, in such a span of time, it will highly likely 
undergo a stochastic, indeterministic and non-linear localization process at, say, 𝑡1. 
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 |𝜓0⟩ = ∑ 𝑎𝑖|𝑎𝑖⟩𝑖   
~109
→      |𝜓1⟩ = |𝑎𝑘⟩ (8.6 ) 
And one finds, after such a span of time, that the quantum system in fact underwent a collapse 
process. 
Good. Let’s ask now the following: does GRW’s dynamics allow us to take that system 
back to the original state |𝜓0⟩? Note that the question is not whether the theory’s dynamics 
says something or not about how the quantum system would evolve backward in time, but if it 
provides any mean for tracing a quantum system back through a GRW’s evolution to its 
original state at 𝑡0. And the answer to this question is that there is no way to generate a GRW’s 
evolution that restores the original state. And this is naturally true for any GRW’s evolution 
can ever be obtained. And this is exactly a violation of time symmetry in the Wigner’s 
relationalist sense where what is meant by time reversal is motion reversal. 
Let’s now turn things around. Imagine again the same above-mentioned Universe but 
now imagine it temporally reversed. Let’s thus make that temporally-inverted system |𝜓𝑜
∗⟩ 
evolve in the backward direction of time conforming to the GRW’s dynamic. Suppose that 
such an evolution takes 109 years in the past, more or less. So, GRW’s predictions in such a 
temporally-reversed scenario are that the quantum system is bound to evolve, towards the past, 
unitarily, deterministically and linearly according to the Schrödinger equation for about 109 
years and that, in such a span of time, it will highly like undergo a stochastic, indeterministic 
and non-linear localization process at, say, 𝑡−1. 
 |𝜓−1
∗ ⟩ = |𝑎𝑘
∗ ⟩  
~109





 (8.7 ) 
Good. Let’s ask again the same question: does GRW’s dynamics allow us to take that system 
forward to the original state |𝜓𝑜
∗⟩? the answer to this question is, once again, that there is no 
way to recover the original state through a GRW-generated evolution, regardless if it lies either 
in the past or in the future. 
Recall Wigner’s general criterion for time-reversal invariance. For Wigner, time reversal 
is meant to be a transformation such that  
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑏𝑦 𝑡  𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙  𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑏𝑦 𝑡  𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙 =  𝑰 
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Within a GRW-type framework, the relevant time displacements are those long enough 
wherein spontaneous collapses occur. So, let’s suppose that during the first time-displacement 
the system evolves according to the Schrödinger equation for a good amount of time but, at 
some point, it undergoes a spontaneous collapse. Then time-(motion)-reversal is applied. This 
means that the time-reversal operator should invert the direction of time and take the complex 
conjugate over the collapsed state. The system will evolve backward in time (second time-
displacement) and it surely undergoes a spontaneous collapse after a while. However, it’s 
blatant that one will end up with a quantum state completely different from the original. The 
identity could only miraculously be achieved. As the second time-displacement will hardly 
ever give us the state one started with, the theory is not time-(motion)-reversal invariant in a 
structural sense. 
There is nonetheless a slightly different way in which a GRW-type theory turns out to be 
temporally asymmetric. And here my second sense of non-time-reversal invariance comes into 
play, which goes along with a more substantivalist-like view of time as long as one doesn’t 
necessarily expect to generate an evolution going backward in time to recover the original state, 
but to simply reflect the time axis at a given instant and to check how the two directions of time 
looks according to the theory (in this case, a GRW-type theory, in particular, how things would 
evolve conforming to eq. 8.5 towards the past and towards the future). So, in the following, 
let’s think that for any reason a substantivalist-minded person thinks that time reversal is 
implemented by something like 𝑇𝐴 (regardless what has been said in Part 2, just for the sake of 
the current argument43), and let’s ask now how a GRW-type theory deals with this, and what it 
adds to. 
One of the senses of non-time-reversal invariance (for instance, what North claims) 
seems to be that a GRW-type’s dynamic says nothing in the backward direction of time. Thus, 
this might drive one to believe that a GRW-type theory doesn’t work when time reversed just 
as the ordinary Schrödinger equation didn’t work when time reversed by 𝑇𝑈. Nonetheless, this 
is not quite so: if one time reverses the eq. 8.5 by applying 𝑇𝐴 (as it is commonly done with the 
ordinary Schrödinger equation), then what GRW’s dynamics predicts in the backward direction 
of time is that a time-reversed quantum system in the superposition state |𝜓0
∗⟩ = ∑ 𝑎𝑖
∗|𝑎𝑖
∗⟩𝑖  is 
                                                          
43 Obviously, if one formally represents time reversal in terms of 𝑇𝑈, eq. 8.5 is as non-time-reversal invariant as 
the ordinary Schrödinger equation is. But, in this case, what GRW-type theories introduce would add nothing to 
the argument, since eq. 8.5 would be non-time-reversal invariant for all the reasons mentioned in Part 2. So, let’s 
make the exercise of thinking whether a GRW-type theory introduces new reasons for non-time-reversal 
invariance independently of what has been said before. 
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bound to evolve, towards the past, unitarily, deterministically and linearly according to the 
Schrödinger equation (strictly, according to eq. 8.5 which behaves almost always much like 
the (time-reversed) Schrödinger equation) for a good amount of time and that there is a real 
probability that in that time-reversed Universe such a quantum system undergoes a stochastic, 
indeterministic and non-linear localization process at 𝑡−1 (where∆𝑇 = 𝑡0 − 𝑡−1 can be equal to 
109 years!). This is basically what eq. 8.5 prescribes. 
Note that nothing in a GRW-type theory says that localization processes only occur in 
the forward direction of time. What a GRW-type theory just says is that those stochastic 
processes occur, how often they occur, and what one should expect when they occur. But this, 
and only this, happens in both temporal directions. And the quantum state one started with is 
completely irrelevant for this as it is independent of any previous (or posterior) state. So, it 
doesn’t matter the temporal instant one stands at, a GRW-type’s algorithm will say that your 
quantum state in a superposition state is bound to evolve, towards the past and toward the 
future, unitarily, deterministically and linearly like a Schrödinger evolution for a good amount 
of time and that there is a real probability that in both Universes (the original and the time-
reversed) such a quantum system undergoes a stochastic, indeterministic and non-linear 
localization process in 109 years. Again, this is what eq. 8.5 prescribes. 
This doesn’t mean, however, that a GRW-type theory is time-reversal invariant. In 
accordance with what has been said before, a GRW-type theory would in fact have the 
following structure of solutions under time reversal, Ⱳ =Ⱳ𝑓 +Ⱳ𝑏, but the kicker is that Ⱳ𝑓 
and Ⱳ𝑏 are bound to bear completely different models. To be clear: the theory does say 
something about the past (it yields past-headed models), but the past is bound to be something 
completely different with respect to what the future will get to be, that is, Ⱳ𝑓 ≠ Ⱳ𝑏. And this 
is so due to the stochasticity of the hits: though collapses are also expected to happen towards 
the backward direction of time, it would be an enormous miracle that they are produced in the 
same way, reproducing the same patterns, that in the forward direction of time. If time-reversal 
invariant means that Ⱳ𝑓 and Ⱳ𝑏 are a pair of time-symmetric twins, one could say that a GRW-
type theory produces pairs of solutions, but they are bound to be asymmetric and not twins at 
all.  
All this is of course possible under the assumption that the right way to time reverse eq. 
8.5 is given by something like 𝑇𝐴, which permits the quantum state to evolve backward in time 
to begin with. This is what firstly generates the pair Ⱳ𝑓 and Ⱳ𝑏: an individual system evolving 
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according to eq. 8.5 will behave almost always as a system evolving according to the ordinary 
Schrödinger equation. Now, let’s put all this in the following way: the stochastic mechanism 
just randomly “triggers” a collapse both onto the original wave function evolving conforming 
with eq. 8.5 and onto the time-reversed wave function evolving conforming with (time-
reversed) eq. 8.5. The point is that there seems to be no reason why such a randomly-triggered 
process couldn’t happen in the two directions of time. When time reversal is thought of as a 
reflection, a quantum system could either evolve towards the future or towards the past 
following eq. 8.5 and spontaneous localizations are expected to happen in both cases, on both 
sides of the reflection, so to speak. Non-time-reversal invariance comes out from the fact that 
it would incredibly unlikely be that both sides of the reflection reproduce the same patterns or 
evolutions (the same possible worlds if you like). Therefore, the pair Ⱳ𝑓 and Ⱳ𝑏 is inherently 
asymmetric. And the upshot of all this is that a GRW-type theory does provide a structural 
arrow of time even in this sense too. 
Section 3. Spontaneous localizations and the foundations of thermodynamics 
There is another sense in which GRW-type theories are highly valuable for the arrow of time 
debate. This sense is that of offering deeper and more fundamental grounds for the 
thermodynamical temporal asymmetry. In other words, it has been proposed that GRW-type 
theories would bridge the gap, and relieve tension, between thermodynamics and statistical 
classical mechanics, that is, it would offer a solution to the problems of the two realms as it 
was presented in Part 1. 
The impact GRW-type theories would have on that issue has been extensively 
investigated by David Albert (1992, 1994, 2000). Not only does Albert believe that a GRW-
type theory is a fundamental non-time-reversal invariant theory, but it would also ground the 
temporally asymmetric probabilistic tendency for systems evolving toward equilibrium. The 
first step towards a “new universal statistical mechanics” (as he pompously calls his project) is 
to take GRW-based statistical mechanics seriously.  
Now, let’s set the case up. Consider a two-body system, where the temperature-difference 
between both bodies is, say, ∆𝑇. Such a situation is, naturally, compatible with a set of possible 
microstates {𝐶}. After some time, the temperature difference between two bodies will have 
varied. In accordance with the (time-reversal invariant) equations of motions of classical 
mechanics, those micro-states may evolve towards two quite different kinds of states: those 
compatible with microstates in which the temperature difference is smaller (that is, the two 
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bodies’ temperature approaches one another), and those compatible with microstates in which 
the temperature difference is bigger (that is, the two bodies’ temperature diverges one another 
as time goes by). Call the first subset of {𝐶} “normal” microstates {𝐶𝑛}, and the second subset 
“abnormal” microstates {𝐶𝑎} 
Recall that the bewildering aspect of this situation is that both microevolutions are 
equally entailed by the micro-dynamics governing those systems, though there seems to be an 
enormous numerical imbalance in nature between them that remains unexplained: {𝐶𝑛}-type 
evolutions are so much common than {𝐶𝑎}. In fact, as Albert puts it, normal microstates vastly 
outnumber abnormal microstates not only in general but also in every individual microscopic 
neighborhood of {𝐶} and even within the microscopic neighborhoods of {𝐶𝑎}.  And there seems 
to be no answer, nor way-out, within classical dynamics. 
Such an answer, or way-out, lies beyond classical dynamics: GRW-type theories, 
according to Albert, offer the right sort of dynamics capable of doing the job satisfactorily. 
That is, the right sort of theories capable of answering the above-mentioned questions from an 
internal (asymmetric) dynamical cause (Price 2002: 32). The argument runs roughly as 
follows. The above-sketched situation wherein {𝐶𝑛}-type cases vastly outnumber  {𝐶𝑎} ones 
just shows that normal states are much more stable under small perturbations than abnormal 
ones. And if the two bodies in the above example “were in fact somehow being frequently and 
microscopically and randomly perturbed, then the temperature of those two bodies would be 
overwhelmingly likely to approach one another no matter which one of the microstates in {𝐶} 
initially obtained” (Albert 1994: 203). Albert’s suggestion is that GRW’s jumps (spontaneous 
localization processes) are exactly the right sort of chancy perturbations one needs to get the 
job satisfactorily done. 
In more details, Albert’s suggestion is “that every single one of microstates in {𝐶} (and 
not merely a large majority of them) will be overwhelmingly likely, on the GRW theory, to 
evolve, over the subsequent ten minutes, into states in which the temperature difference 
between the two bodies is smaller” (1994: 203). GRW-type theories’ dynamics is precisely 
very good at, according to Albert’s thought, getting us from abnormal microconditions to 
normal ones. And this is possible only because the scales over which “the tiny individual clots 
of abnormal micro-conditions typically extend are vastly smaller than the scales over which 
the values of the 𝑃𝐴(𝐵) appreciably vary” (Albert 2000: 155). 
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In conclusion, the perturbations required to get and to single out the right sort of 
thermodynamic evolutions seem to be provided, in a genuinely chancy and fundamental 
manner, by any GRW-type theory. Those GRW-like perturbations (produced by inherently 
stochastic spontaneous localization processes) don’t prohibit transitions to abnormal 
microconditions but are extremely unlikely in virtue of the GRW’s internal asymmetric 
dynamics. As Callender puts it,   
“The innovation of the theory lies in the fact that although entropy is 
overwhelmingly likely to increase toward the future, it is not also overwhelmingly 
likely to increase toward the past (because there are no dynamic backwards 
transition probabilities provided by the theory)” (Callender 2016) 
And so, the theory does not suffer from the problem of predicting entropy-increasing processes, 
for instance, towards the past.  
To sum up. The structure of this “new universal GRW-based statistical mechanics” 
comes out like the following: 
(1) The GRW law of motion for quantum-mechanical wave functions given by the 
Schrödinger equation plus a stochastic amendment over it (eq. 8.5). 
(2) The Past Hypothesis (like the Mentaculus’ standard contraption), which postulates a 
particular low-entropy macroconditions at the beginning of the Universe. 
(3) The current state of the Universe as a contingent fact. 
And this structure would be able to offer a convincing solution of the problem of the two 
realms, as I’ve formulated it in Part 1, Chapter II. Let’s see it closer. 
Remember that the problem of the two realms comes down to three points: 
(a) Given that the underlying fundamental dynamics of the world is temporally symmetric, 
why do we have experience of a temporally-asymmetric world? 
(b) There is hence a gap between the micro-world and the macro-world. 
(c) To close the gap or to bring this shattered picture of reality together has largely been 
the problem at stake. 
Albert’s proposal changes radically the underlying fundamental dynamics: this is no 
longer the Newtonian (or Hamiltonian) classical mechanics, but a GRW-type one. Remarkably, 
not only is the dynamics non-time-reversal invariant, but also chances enter the world only 
once through the GRW-type’s dynamics: those tiny and random perturbations account for all 
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the statistics required to explain our world and its temporally asymmetric manifestation. 
Furthermore, a unified dynamic readily closes the gap between the macroscopic world and the 
microscopic one: the two above-specified laws govern equally both. Hence, one gets a deep 
explanation of why one sees what one actually sees: behind any entropy-increasing 
macroscopic behavior, a stochastic, indeterministic and non-linearly GRW-type dynamics 
rules. And the same dynamics governs both a single isolated quantum system and a soft drink 
getting warmer. Each GRW-type evolution incorporates such a built-in arrow across levels. 
One further remark. All this task was mostly accomplished by the GRW-type dynamics. 
But, what about the Past Hypothesis? As to this, its status is somehow fuzzy here. Remember 
that the idea of postulating a Past Hypothesis aimed at blocking any entropy-increasing 
evolution towards the past, as falsely predicted by the Newtonian laws of motion. As the 
underlying micro-dynamics is now a GRW-like dynamics, it seems to be no longer necessary. 
Callender, however, contends that the Past Hypothesis is required so as “to explain how the 
universe ever got into a nonequilibrium state in the first place” (Callender 2016). Alberts rather 
thinks that the Past Hypothesis is here filling an empty space left by the GRW’s dynamics: 
nothing in a GRW-type theory’s dynamics says anything about the past of a GRW-type 
particular evolution (because, as it was shown, any GRW-type dynamics is not time-(motion)-
reversal invariant in a relationalist sense). So, the Past Hypothesis is not here playing the role 
of correcting a false prediction towards the past, but filling a space left by the theory’s silence 
about any past instant. 
Many objections have been raised against Albert’s proposal. Albert himself presents a 
survey thereof in Albert 2000 (156-160) and he replies them in order therein. There is yet a 
more conceptual objection raised by Huw Price (2002) against Albert’s logic and assumptions. 
Price’s counter-argument goes as follows. 
In Albert’s proposal, the observed monotonic increase of entropy is grounded on GRW’s 
asymmetric dynamics. This claim seems to assume the following counterfactual 
If there were no such asymmetric mechanism, the observed phenomena would 
be different.  
Albert would be presupposing such a counterfactual, at least according to Price’s thought, in 
saying, for instance, that an “extraordinarily tiny and extraordinarily compressed and 
absolutely isolated gas will have no lawlike tendency whatever to spread out” (Albert 1994: 
667). And this is so because, conforming with the collapse-driven statistical mechanics, such 
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gas, in Albert’s words, wouldn’t have the enough number of constituents to suffer even a single 
GRW-type collapse44. However, the case doesn’t run counter to our intuitions and daily 
experience, because macroscopic systems are big enough to include the sufficient amount of 
quantum systems undergoing collapses and, hence, explaining the normal behaviors. 
If one regards this GRW-like asymmetric mechanism as something can be turned off or 
turned on, what Albert says is that if one had the means for turning GRW-like collapses off at 
all, then the general tendency of thermodynamics system to increase would simultaneously 
cease as well. And this counterfactual (similar to the above-mentioned one) doesn’t run counter 
to our experience. But Price puts the finger on the triviality that Albert is bringing up: every 
strictly counterfactual conditional doesn’t run counter to empirical experience, because it has 
an antecedent which is contrary to facts (Price 2002: 35). 
Furthermore, Albert (uncritically) supposes that the tendency of gases to spread out is 
“lawlike”, and it is this tendency what calls for an explanatory basis: something more basic 
must be producing such regularity. But, as very well-known, this is highly debatable. One 
strictly has experience of gases spreading out, not of any “lawlike” tendency. And what calls 
for an explanation is the gases’ spreading out, not any posit lawlike tendency.  
Price argues that other approaches, which don’t assume such a lawlike tendency, can very 
well account for the gases’ spreading out; for instance, what he calls “Boltzmann’s one-
symmetry view”, according to which, only asymmetric boundary conditions –as an initial state 
of low entropy– plus a symmetric default conditions –as entropy likely to be high– are required 
to produce an explanation of the observed entropy-increasing thermodynamic behavior. Thus, 
the burden of the proof is on Albert’s side: he has to show that the causal mechanism “makes 
a difference”. He has to justify the introduction of such a mechanism in the explanation. And, 
Price concludes, he provides none. So, the best one can say about this is an agnostic claim: one 
doesn’t know whether Albert’s proposal works, because one doesn’t know whether the GRW-
like mechanism makes a difference. 
  
                                                          
44 This is actually an objection against Albert’s view put forward by Philip Pearle. The idea is, roughly, that tiny 
gases of around 105 constituents will surely spread out after some time, though such a span of time is not enough 
for such constituent systems undergo any sort of GRW collapse. Albert’s reply is that if tiny gases manifest a 
tendency to spread out, this is due to spontaneous collapses of the wave-functions of the microscopic constituents 
of the containers of such a sort of gases, which should be taken into account to explain the whole phenomenon 
(see Albert 1994:  677, Albert 2000: 156-157). 
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Final Remarks 
Along this chapter I’ve analyzed one of the most promissory candidates for a structural arrow 
of time in non-relativistic quantum mechanics: a GRW-based structural arrow of time. Whereas 
it is not true that every collapse theory does the job satisfactorily (as shown in the previous 
chapter), a workable version of it (as GRW-type theories actually are) seems to have some 
good grips. The reason is that a GRW-type theory poses a dynamic that is intrinsically non-
time-reversal invariant in the sense of treating both directions of time differently solely in virtue 
of its intrinsic properties. I have also shown that relationalist and substantivalist accounts reach 
the same conclusion, though the very inversion of the direction of time is carried out a bit 
differently. In any case, a GRW-type theory does seem to be a knock-out case for anyone 
believing that non-relativistic quantum mechanics is structurally directionless. 
 In addition, Albert’s proposal takes a step forward: it intends to also provide a GRW-
based explanation of entropy-increasing macroscopic behaviors. To be clear, a GRW-type 
theory would not only be able to ground a structural arrow of time but would also provide the 
means to link the temporal asymmetric dynamics with entropy-increasing behaviors at the 
macro-level. That’s why GRW-type theories kills two birds with one stone: the problem of a 
structural arrow of time and the problem of the two realms. While I think the first aim is 
successfully achieved, I’m not completely sure about the latter. The main counter-argument is 
that put forward by Price: if Albert’s proposal works eventually like a “switch”, and it holds 
that a GRW dynamics makes a difference for entropy-increasing macroscopic behaviors, then 
it is Albert who should show that his proposal not only makes a difference but also is the 
simplest one that makes a difference. This doesn’t seem to be the case (as Price points). 
However, one benefits is that Albert’s proposal is certainly more unifying and all-embracing 
than any other competitor that merely explains thermodynamics behaviors. Boltzmann’s view 
(the one that Price puts as an alternative) is much more modest at its aims. 
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IX. 
Bohmian Mechanics  
The Arrow of Time and the Special Role of Time Reversal 
Collapse theories, in any of its fully-worked out forms, put forward a thorough explanation 
about what’s going on at the quantum level and how the measurement problem could be 
overcome, successfully accounting for all quantum-mechanical outcomes one obtains in 
experiments. And yet, a completely different explanation can be provided about what’s going 
on at the quantum level and how the measurement problem could be overcome. In this 
alternative explanation, the wave function is not a complete physical description of all the 
physical properties of a system: something else needs to be added to the wave function 
description so as for the quantum state to account for all physical properties of a system. In 
doing this, the explanation declines assumption A1 in Maudlin’s formulation of the 
measurement problem. But that’s not all: the explanation also demands a new extra dynamical 
equation to be introduced in the formalism, besides the original Schrödinger equation, 
declining Maudlin’s A2 assumption as well. Interestingly, the explanation manages all the 
issues without any collapse mechanism whatsoever. This alternative explanationh has received 
varied names: “the pilot-wave theory” (proposed originally by de Broglie), “the Broglie-Bohm 
theory”, “the ‘no-hidden variable’ interpretation of quantum mechanics”, or simply “Bohmian 
Mechanics”. 
The idea was firstly introduced by Louis de Broglie in 1927 at the worldwide famous 
Fifth Solvay Conference (the paper can be found in Bacciagalupi and Valentini 2009, Chapter 
2, along with an analysis). De Broglie’s seminal theory, known as “pilot-wave theory”, 
proposed that the wave-function could play the role of a “guiding field”, adding an equation 
for the particle motion equivalent to a guiding equation. However, de Broglie couldn’t nail 
down the physical nature of such a pilot wave, and the theory not only was widely rejected by 
the physicists’ community, but even abandoned by him shortly after presented. 
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Few decades later, in 1952, the idea got a new revival thanks to David Bohm. Not only 
did he fully understand the relevance of the pilot-wave theory along with its implications, but 
he also wrote down the theory in a mathematically careful manner. The “de Broglie-Bohm 
theory”, as it came to be known ever since, was developed further in the following decades. 
The seminal idea remained: the quantum state is not fully described by the wave function alone, 
but it should feature something else. Furthermore, a full specification of the full quantum state’s 
behavior requires an additional equation, as de Broglie had suggested. John Bell (1987) was a 
promoter of the de Broglie-Bohm theory during the seventies and eighties. In the nineties, the 
theory was reformulated differently by Sheldon Goldstein, Dettlef Dürr, and Nino Zanghi 
(1992, 1996, 1997, 2013), coming to be known simply as “Bohmian Mechanics”. I shall 
exclusively focus on this last modern version of the theory and the discussion it has raised. 
To put it simply, Bohmian Mechanics (BM henceforth) is a non-relativistic quantum 
theory about the motion of particles. Period. All there is out there are particles. And all one has 
to say about those particles is how they move in space and time. BM is just the required 
machinery to account for this simple fact. In virtue of this, as mentioned in passing above, BM 
presumes fundamentally two things: 
(a) Particles have always definite positions 
(b) The behavior of those particles is fully described by, on the one hand, the Schrödinger 
equation (without any amendment) and, on the other, a guidance equation. 
Any other stuff introduced in this story (like wave-functions, a potential field –like in the de 
Broglie-Bohm version–, or even any other property of a system) requires a watchful 
interpretational task: any other stuff apart from particles and their motion in space and time one 
comes up with will probably be just part of the required tools to account for the motion of 
particles. And all this brings out a fully deterministic version of quantum mechanics, without 
spontaneous collapses or objective chances. 
Let’s put some flesh on all it. 
I’ve said that BM affirms that the quantum state is not fully specified by the wave-
function alone, but it features extra data –the positions of particles. In this way, the complete 
state of a quantum system with 𝑁 variables (number of particles) at time 𝑡 is completely 
specified by the wave function and all the positions of the particles composing the system: 
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(𝜓(𝑡), 𝑄(𝑡)) (9.1 ) 
where 𝜓(𝑡) is the usual quantum state, 𝜓(𝑡) = 𝜓(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑁 , 𝑡), and 𝑄(𝑡) represents the actual 
positions of the particles composing the system, 𝑄(𝑡) = (𝑄1(𝑡), … , 𝑄𝑁(𝑡)). Since particles 
always have determined positions and particles’ positions vary along time, particles naturally 
will have trajectories as well. And, of course, different initial states will pick up different 
trajectories for the involved particles. Particles’ positions, it is worth stressing it, are an 
objective feature of the quantum world, independent of any measurement or observation. Why 
Bohmian Mechanics is (mistakenly) called it “a hidden variable theory” is due to this fact: 
particles’ positions are not included in the purely quantum-mechanical description of a system 
(that is, its wave function) but are further information that should be add according to 
Bohmians. For them, naturally, positions are not “hidden” at all but quite the opposite: it’s the 
only sort of property you ever observe (Bricmont 2016: 130). Or, more radically, it’s the only 
property that a quantum system really instantiates (see Esfeld, Lazarovici and Oldofredi 2019). 
The Bohmian evolution is given then by two equations: 
(a) the Schrödinger equation 𝐻|𝜓⟩ = 𝑖ℏ
𝜕|𝜓⟩
𝜕𝑡
 (9.2 ) 









 (𝑄1, … , 𝑄𝑁) (9.3 ) 
Whereas the Schrödinger equation governs 𝜓’s behavior, the guiding equation rules the 
evolution of the particles’ positions. Furthermore, as the second equation shows, it provides 
the particles’ velocities at any 𝑡 as a function of the wave-function at any 𝑡, its spatial derivative 
and the particles’ position at 𝑡. 
Some remarks are in order. To begin with, it’s easy to see that the guiding equation 
represents a first-order “velocity” formula45 involving the wave function whose role is to bring 
                                                          
45 Bohmian mechanics typically introduces its guiding equation as a first-order formula at present, in which 
velocity is taken to be fundamental. But this is not the way in which Bohm wrote down the dynamics. He chose 
to write it down as a second-order equation, featuring a quantum potential. In that version of the theory, particles 
move around thanks to forces stemming from that quantum potential. In any case, there is an underdetermination 
problem lurking over: Bohmian explanations don’t require the guiding equation to be exactly as it is (either in the 
Bohm’s fashion or Dürr, Goldstein, and Zanghi’s). Actually, there are many other candidates for guidance 
equations working just as well as the “official” one, somehow implying that there are many other candidates for 
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in a “velocity field” along which particles move. In this sense, the wave function “guides” (or 
“choreographs”, see Dürr, Goldstein and Zanghi 2013: 83) the motion of the particles. 
Secondly, both equations are perfectly deterministic, meaning that initial conditions determine 
a unique state at later times. Thirdly, as particles always have well-defined trajectories, they 
have determinate velocities at all times as well. It follows from this that particles have positions 
and velocities at all times, being seemingly at odds with some SQM’s principles (why this 
doesn’t violate Heisenberg’s principle, see Dürr, Goldstein, and Zanghi 1992: Section 11, and 
Bricmont 2016: 159-161).  
Fourthly, since the theory is strictly and fully deterministic, any randomness enters it 
through the initial conditions and arises from averaging over ignorance. For Bohmians, 
configurations are random in this sense, whose distribution is given by the quantum equilibrium 
distribution, |𝜓(𝑞)|2. Fifthly, Bohmian mechanics is a non-collapse quantum theory: collapses 
occur neither spontaneously nor induced by measurement or observers. The theory nonetheless 
accepts a sort of “collapse” mechanism, but it should rather be regarded merely as a “pragmatic 
affair” (Goldstein 2017) or as a “collapse in practice” (for details, see Dürr, Goldstein, and 
Zanghi 2004). In any case, this pragmatic mechanism doesn’t play any fundamental role in the 
theory, neither must it be considered as a real physical process. 
Finally, the status of 𝜓 is matter of some controversies among Bohmians.  On the one 
hand, many have considered it like a field. But it’s a field without any source and not defined 
in the physical space ℝ3 but in the configuration space ℝ3𝑁 (for instance, for a two-particle 
system, its wave function will be defined in a ℝ3 × ℝ3 configuration space). Since 𝜓 is a field, 
it behaves wavily according to the Schrödinger equation. And as 𝜓’s behavior relates to 
particles’ behavior, any alteration of its wavy behavior will too affect the particles’ trajectories. 
Notably, this “affectation” is not produced by any force and occurs, so to speak, instantaneously 
regardless distances. Stronger positions along this line have considered 𝜓 as real as the classical 
electromagnetic field. John Bell (1987) famously holds this viewpoint with respect to the wave 
function. In a widely-known passage, he claims: 
“Note that in this compound dynamical system the wave is supposed to be just as 
‘real’ and ‘objective’ as say the fields of classical Maxwell theory [...] No one can 
understand this theory until he is willing to think of as a real objective field rather 
than just a ‘probability amplitude.” (Bell 1987: 128; italics in the original) 
                                                          
a Bohm-type theory working just as well as the official one. See Stone 1994, Dürr, Goldstein, and Zangui 1996, 
Deotto and Ghirardi 1998, Peruzzi and Rimini 2000, and Skow 2010 for details. 
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David Bohm also seems to have held the same view in claiming that the wave function of an 
individual electron is “a mathematical representation of an objectively real field”, which exerts 
a force on the particles similar to that exerted by an electromagnetic field on a charge (Bohm 
1952: 170). Tim Maudlin (2007) also endorses this ontic Bohm-Bell view of the wave function 
in BM at present. 
On the other hand, some Bohmians have rather promoted the idea that the wave-function 
is nomological (or quasi-nomological). Dürr, Goldstein, and Zanghi (1997, 2013) endorse this 
view claiming that the wave function (a mathematical representation) plays a nomic role in the 
particles’ motion, so it should in fact be considered as a highly-relevant piece of information, 
but not as representing a wavy stuff out there in the world. In Goldstein’s words: 
“The fact that Bohmian mechanics requires that one take such an unfamiliar sort 
of entity seriously bothers a lot of people. It does not bother us all that much, but 
it does seem like a significant piece of information. What it suggests to us is that 
you should think of the wave-function as describing a law, not as some sort of 
concrete physical reality.” (Goldstein 2013: 97) 
This stance should yet be considered through two angles: what is truly nomological is the 
timeless wave function of the Universe (𝛙), whereas temporal worldly wave-functions should 
be rather regarded as quasi-nomological (see Goldstein 2013: 107). 
 A more minimalist proposal has also been put forward by the so-called Quantum 
Humeanism (Esfeld 2014). Under a PO approach applicable both to GRWm, GRWf and BM, 
Esfeld claims that the wave function doesn’t belong to the quantum ontology at all. To be clear: 
it’s not the case that the wave function belongs to the ontology but not to the PO, as other have 
argued. The point is that it doesn’t belong to the ontology whatsoever. Curiously, one of the 
sources for Quantum Humeanism is Bell, who seemed to support the reality of wave function 
as quoted above. Esfeld counters such a passage with the following one from Bell (1987: 53) 
“One of the apparent non-localities of quantum mechanics is the instantaneous, 
over all space, ‘collapse of the wave function’ on ‘measurement’. But this does not 
bother us if we do not grant beable status to the wave function. We can regard it 
simply as a convenient but inessential mathematical device for formulating 
correlations between experimental procedures and experimental results, i.e., 
between one set of beables and another.” (Bell 1987: 53) 
In contrast, Quantum Humeanists proposes a minimalist ontology where there are 
fundamentally only point-like particles without natural properties (the so-called primitive 
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stuff), individualized by their spatio-temporal relations. All the rest, properties like mass, 
energy or being a lepton, is grounded on, and “emerges from”, the dynamics. 
In the light of what was said so far, it is easy to see that the best candidate for a PO of 
BM is one of particles and their respective positions (for other alternatives, see Allori et al. 
2008. For discussion on ontological issues around BM, see Esfeld et al. 2013). The wave-
function can be also regarded as part of the BM’s ontology if one endorses an ontic Bohm-Bell 
view, though it would hardly be taken as part of the PO for it doesn’t inhabit a three-
dimensional physical space. Taking a nomological view should also endorse this view 
inasmuch as laws are not, typically, part of a theory’s ontology (for a different view, see 
Maudlin 2007. He considers that laws are sui generis entities and, thereby, might be part of a 
theory’s ontology). In any case, it’s clear that particles and their respective positions are the 
right sort of stuff that can play the role of “local beables” in Bell’s sense (1987). 
Therefore, the BM’s structure (at least as typically understood at present) should include: 
(a) (𝜓(𝑡), 𝑄(𝑡), as the state of a quantum system S. 
(b) The SQM’s formalism (including naturally the Schrödinger equation). 
(c) The guiding equation. 
(d) A PO of particles and their respective positions. 
Let’s now take a look at BM in action. Consider a two-slit experiment consisting of a source 
that fires electrons toward a barrier with two slits in it. The electrons get eventually detected 
on a screen behind the barrier. One well knows how the orthodox story about two-slit-like 
experiments overall goes. The story that Bohmians tell us is nonetheless quite different. To 
begin with, remember that BM assumes that electrons always have definite positions, so it’s a 
matter of fact that each electron fired by the source and reaching the screen goes through either 
the upper slit or the lower one. Furthermore, the theory is invariably deterministic, so each 
electron hitting the screen has followed a well-defined trajectory completely determined by its 
initial conditions (that is, by its initial position and wave function). Remarkably, slight 
variations in the initial position will lead to slight variations in the hits on the screen, even if 
the initial wave function does not vary at all. 
The two Bohmian equations govern the electron’s behavior through this experiment as 
follows. On the one hand, the initial wave-function will evolve according to the Schrödinger 
equation, traveling through both slits and “causing” the known interference pattern. On the 
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other, particles’ final positions (the hits on the screen) will exclusively depend on particles’ 
initial positions. Hence, a single electron being fired out by the source will go only through one 
of the slits, following a deterministic trajectory. However, the particles’ behavior is ruled by 
the guiding equation: assuming that the frequency with which a particle starts out in some 
region 𝑅1 near the source is equal to ∫ |𝜓(𝑥, 𝑡0)|
2
𝑅1
, the guidance equation shows that the 
frequency with which an electron can be found in a region 𝑅2 near the screen is equal to 
∫ |𝜓(𝑥, 𝑡)|2
𝑅2
. As particles are somewhat guided by the wave-function as well, the final hits on 
the screen will then reflect the interference pattern. This entails that, on the one hand, particles 
traveling through the lower slit will be affected by that part of the wave function going through 
the upper slit and vice versa; on the other, as particles’ trajectories depend on the wave function, 
these bend in a non-Newtonian way (for there are no external forces acting upon particles 
bending their trajectories). Notably, though particles’ trajectories may bend, they don’t cross 
one another, so one can as a matter of fact infer which slit each particle passed through from 
its final position on the screen. 
Section 2. The Arrow of Time and BM: an asymmetry in the initial 
conditions 
The question of the arrow of time within BM boils down to the question about whether any of 
the above-listed elements manifests a temporal asymmetry (either structural or non-structural). 
It’s often assumed that BM is paradigmatically a structural time symmetric quantum theory. 
This is likely due to, on the one hand, the allegedly time symmetric nature of its dynamics and, 
on the other, to the fact that the theory only deals with deterministic trajectories. The fact that 
BM is a non-collapse theory also feeds this idea: as already shown, collapse theories are often 
assumed to support a structural time asymmetry. In any case, as long as BM makes the same 
predictions as SQM-CP does and brings about the same time asymmetric predictions as SQM-
CP does (for example, the sort of conditional probabilities expected in an experiment are not 
equal in backward direction of time and in the forward direction of time), BM should provide 
some explanation about them. A collapse mechanism is a no longer available choice, so there 
should be an alternative explanation. And this gives rise to the problem of the two realms as 
presented before: provided that the Schrödinger equation (I’ve been assuming this from the 
beginning of this Part 3) and the guidance equation (which I’ll examine more closely 
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afterwards) are time-reversal invariant, the question is: where do these temporal asymmetries 
come from? 
Let’s start examining a simple case. Consider the sort of stories that Bohmians tell about 
a Mach-Zehnder-type experiment. Imagine two sources of electrons (S1 and S2) and two 
electron detectors after each source (D1 and D2). When an electron is fired out by S1, the 
electron detector D1 will emit a flash of light. And the same goes for S2 and D2. Both detectors 
let each electron to pass through, when gets it detected, towards a half-silvered mirror placed 
in the middle of the experimental arrangement. When an electron reaches the half-silvered 
mirror, it has 50% of chances of bouncing off and 50% of chances of passing through it. At the 
other extreme of the experimental arrangement, there are two electron detectors (F1 and F2), 
which emit a flash of light when an electron has either been reflected by the half-silvered mirror 
or when pass through it (see Fig. 9.1) 
 
Fig 9.1 (adapted from Arntzenius 1997) 
According to the standard formalism (SQM-CP), there are some FORWARD claims (as 
“what is the probability that F1 detects given that D2 detected?”) regarding certain conditional 
probabilities of some later state given an earlier state that are true, whereas their BACKWARD 
counterpart (“what is the probability that D2 detects given that F1 detected?”) aren’t. Such an 
asymmetry, within SQM+CP, came from the dynamics in itself as the quantum state underwent 
an induced collapse when measured or observed (this was, for instance, Penrose’s argument). 
BM should be able to only make true the same sort of FORWARD claims, but not their 
BACKWARD counterpart. Otherwise, as explained before, the theory would be plainly wrong. 
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Putting aside my analysis therein (and my caveats for considering this FORWARD-
BACKWARD asymmetry as genuine), let’s see a bit closer how it looks from a Bohmian 
perspective. One possible FORWARD question can be posed as following: what is the 
probability of getting an electron detected at F2 given that it was detected by D1? As BM yields 
the same frequencies as SQM, the answer will be ‘a half’. But the story told about it varies 
significantly. 
Consider first the future-headed case. At 𝑡0, an electron is fired by S1. Its quantum state 
will be given by a wave-function |𝜓(𝑡0)⟩𝑒, whose value is not zero in a region covering the 
vicinity of the source. This wave function can be written down as a superposition of “detected 
by F1” (“|𝐹1⟩”) and “detected by F2” (“|𝐹2⟩”) 
 
|𝜓(𝑡0)⟩𝑒 =  √
1
2
(|𝐹1⟩ + |𝐹2⟩) (9.4 ) 
Yet, as a matter of fact, the initial state is not only determined by the electron’s wave function 
at 𝑡0, but also by its position (𝑞𝑖). According to BM, the final position of the electron, that is, 
whether it will get eventually detected by either F1 or F2, depends exclusively on which its 
exact position at 𝑡0was. For simplicity, imagine that this may be either slightly on the right side 
or slightly on the left side within the region where the wave function is non-zero. It happens 
that if the electron started off on the left side (let’s say, whether it has the rough position 𝑞𝐿), 
it will surely be reflected by the half-silvered mirror, and that if it rather started off on the right 
side (let’s say whether it has the rough position 𝑞𝑅), it will surely get through the half-silvered 
mirror. One, of course, doesn’t know exactly which the position of the electron at 𝑡0 is but, as 
a matter of fact, it is in either of them. What one knows is the initial wave function of the 
electron and the frequency with which the electron begins in some either region, which is equal 




So, this is how the possible sequences of the experiments may run. The electron started 
off its trip being fired by S1 at 𝑡0. Next, it gets detected by the first electron detector, D1. When 
it reaches the half-silvered mirror, it can either be reflected or pass through it. BM’s predictions 
say that roughly half electrons will be reflected, and the other half will pass through. 
Interestingly, when the electron reaches the half-silvered mirror, its wave function splits into 
two regions where it is non-zero: one branch is reflected and the other is let passed through. 
Hence, only one of these branches (either |𝐹1⟩ or |𝐹2⟩) will “follow” the actual trajectory that 
243 | P a g e  
 
the electron went along after reaching the half-silvered mirror. Finally, the electron is detected 
by, say, the detector F2 (what entails that it was reflected by the half-silvered mirror). And 
further, from here one can straightforwardly infer that the initial position of the electron was 
somewhere slightly on the left side of the wave function’s original region: those electrons 
reflected started off their trips on the left side of the S1’s region at 𝑡0, whereas the rest started 
off on the right side of the S1’s region at 𝑡0. It is worth remembering that there is no collapse 
of the wave-function in BM, so the electron’s wave function will still be in a superposition 
after being reflected or letting passed through. The point is that only one of its branches will 
remain close to the actual electron’s position. 
This produces the following temporal sequences 
Future-headed sequences       𝑆1 𝑒(𝑞𝑅) → 𝐷1 → 𝑀 →  𝐹1 / 𝑆1 𝑒(𝑞𝐿) → 𝐷1 → 𝑀 → 𝐹2 
And, the usual FORWARD transitions probabilities. For instance,  
FORWARD   “the probability that F2 detects given that D1 detected is a half” 
It is worth stressing that these probabilities are based on agent’s ignorance about the initial 
position of the electron. If one knew the initial conditions, say the electron’s initial position is 
𝑒(𝑞𝐿), then the right sequence would be 𝑆1 𝑒(𝑞𝐿) → 𝐷1 → 𝑀 → 𝐹2. 
It’s easy to see that this Bohmian story doesn’t remain invariant when told backward in 
time. To put it simply, BM, as well as SQM, renders invariant forward transitions chances but 
non-invariant backward transitions chances. Setting aside any caveats concerning whether time 
is being reversed adequately, it is easy to see that an electron travelling backward from F2 has 
only a half of chances of being detected by D1, when in the forward case it was one. 
Furthermore, in the forward case in BM one assumed that the initial wave-function was around 
the source S1, and in a superposition of √
1
2
(|𝐹1⟩ + |𝐹2⟩). Now, in the backward case one starts 
with a precise position at F2 (either slightly on the left side or slightly on the right side), and a 
different wave-function being in a superposition of √
1
2
(|𝐷1⟩ + |𝐷2⟩). So, one ends up with 
the following (backward) sequence and BACKWARD claim 
Past-headed sequences  𝐹2 𝑒(𝑞𝑅) → 𝑀 → 𝐷1 𝑜𝑟 𝐹2 𝑒(𝑞𝐿) → 𝑀 → 𝐷2 
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BACKWARD “the probability that D1 detects given that F2 detected is one 
half” 
The crucial question at this point is: What is the source of this asymmetry between FORWARD 
and BACKWARD within BM? If BM is a quantum theory about particles and their trajectories, 
and each particles’ history is invariably and completely determined by the Bohmian laws of 
motion and particles’ initial state, the source of the asymmetry between FORWARD and 
BACKWAR must come from either of them. Moreover, the sort of asymmetry one gets 
exclusively depends on the source of it: an asymmetry at the level of the dynamics governing 
particles’ behavior will yield a structural asymmetry. But, if the asymmetry will rather depend 
only on non-dynamics ingredients, then the asymmetry will be non-structural. 
It was detailed above that BM involves two dynamical laws. Begins by considering 
whether the Schrödinger equation is time-reversal invariant. Clearly, if one gets to the 
conclusion that the Schrödinger equation is non-time-reversal invariant, then so is BM 
altogether. One should then take the charge of explaining whether the temporal asymmetry 
between FORWARD-BACKWARD come out from there, but in principle, and theoretically, 
the theory would indeed treat the past-to-future direction and the future-to-past direction 
differently.  More interesting is the case in which the Schrödinger equation is time-reversal 
invariant. It is often taken that the guidance equation is time-reversal invariant if the 
Schrödinger equation is (see Callender 2000: 260, for instance). It follows from this that if one 
assumes for a moment that the Schrödinger equation is time-reversal invariant, then the 
guidance equation is time-reversal invariant as well. In this way, the whole Bohmian dynamics 
turns out to be fully time-reversal invariant, so the source of the aforementioned temporal 
asymmetry must come out from elsewhere46.  
                                                          
46 It would be interesting to evaluate this argumentation from the Causal Symmetric Bohm Model proposed by 
Roderick Sutherland (2008). The overall aim of Sutherland’s model is to deal with Bell’s theorem and to provide 
a natural explanation of Bell non-locality in a three-dimensional space. And that’s why he proposes a Bohm model 
involving retrocausaton. Though Sutherland himself separates the notion of causal symmetry from the notion of 
time symmetry, his model introduces the notion of backward causation, which has been related to the direction 
of time in other approaches. To build the causal symmetric model, he proposes that the initial wave-function 𝜓𝑖  
(which specifies the initial boundary conditions) should be complemented with a final wave-function 𝜓𝑓 (which 
specifies the final boundary conditions). Retro causation comes in the picture because, while 𝜓𝑖  influences future 
events, 𝜓𝑓 influences past events. Importantly, 𝜓𝑓 is independent of 𝜓𝑖  and at any time there are two wave-
functions, 𝜓𝑖  and 𝜓𝑓. What would be interesting to look at is (a) whether 𝜓𝑓 makes true the same probability 
predictions as BACKWARD, (b) what is the relation between 𝜓𝑓 and the time-reversed 𝜓𝑖 . 
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The only option left at this point is that such a source be the initial state of the particle. 
The view that in BM the FORWARD-BACKWARD asymmetry is due to an asymmetry in the 
initial conditions has already been pointed out elsewhere. Frank Arntzenius (1997), for 
instance, claims that a constraint on the initial conditions is what implies the asymmetry that 
is to be accounted for in BM. The constraint consists in assuming that one initially had a wave 
function roughly near to the region S1 and D1, and in a superposition of being detected by F1 
and F2. And when taking the scenario backward, one assumed a different initial (final) 
condition, starting with a wave-function roughly near to F2 and in a superposition of D1 and 
D2. This latter assumption is what explains the usual frequencies obtained at the lab. Arntzenius 
puts it in this way:  
“This is an assumption that we always make in Bohmian theories, and rarely even 
notice. Of course, it is a good thing that we do this, for if we did the opposite, we 
would have an empirically inadequate theory, for it would predict non-invariant 
forward transitions frequencies and invariant backward one, and that is just wrong” 
(Arntzenius 1997: S219) 
The same is held by Callender (2000: 260). 
And all this leads us to the following: there would be no reason to conclude that time in 
itself is temporally asymmetric in BM according to this argument. An asymmetry in the initial 
conditions of an electron is not the right kind of source capable of producing a structural arrow 
of time. This doesn’t mean that BM is a timeless theory or that the theory is unable to draw any 
distinction between the two directions of time. It looks rather like one is dealing with a case of 
a non-structural distinction between the past-to-future and the future-to-past directions, which 
reduces to a non-structural distinction between forward transition probabilities and backward 
transitions probabilities. Though the FORWARD and the BACKWARD stories are equally 
possible according to BM’s dynamics, and thereby the structure of BM’s solutions is like 
Ⱳ = Ⱳ𝑓 + Ⱳ𝑏, a constraint on the initial conditions is required so as to pick up the right sort 
of solutions that makes true the right sort of transition probabilities experimentally obtained 
within this world. Each set of solutions instantiates unalike extrinsic properties, particularly, 
each of them starts off from different initial conditions, on which the observed asymmetry can 
be grounded. Or, to put it differently, each of them is conditionalized over different initial 
conditions. In this sense, the true of both FORWARD (or the future-headed sequence) and 
BACKWARD (or the past-headed sequence) must be related to the initial conditions one starts 
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with, specifying particles’ position and initial wave-function adequately.  For all this, BM 
renders a non-structural arrow of time, which is relative to a constraint on the initial conditions. 
Section 3. Time reversal and its special role in BM 
The idea that time is not structurally asymmetric according to BM holds because the Bohmian 
dynamics is fully time-reversal invariant. It was also mentioned in passing before that, in 
general, the guidance equation is time-reversal invariant if the Schrödinger equation is time-
reversal invariant. This is a natural presumption since the guidance equation requires the wave 
function in order to describe the evolution of the particles’ positions. As wave function’s 
behavior is ruled by the Schrödinger equation, and it is reasonable to think that if it remains 
invariant under time reversal, so will also be the guidance equation. 
Importantly, the notion of time reversal has played a highly relevant role in building up 
a standard version of BM. In fn. 45, I noted that there are many workable candidates for the 
guidance equation, leading to the fact that there are thus many BM-like theories. If BM is an 
attempt to solve the measurement problem that requires the guidance equation, why shouldn’t 
any of the alternative BM-like theories be taken instead? Dürr, Goldstein and Zanghi have put 
forward an argument for favoring BM and the official guidance equation instead of the other 
candidates. In a nutshell, the argument is based on the “theoretical virtues” of BM, in particular, 
that BM, as it is presented by them, and involving the guidance equation as is exactly 
introduced by them, is the simplest BM-like theory endowed with the right space-time 
invariances. 
I won’t get into details about this problem of the underdetermination of the guidance 
equation and about why one should prefer BM instead of any of the other BM-like candidates. 
The point I want to mention here is that in the argument used for this, Dürr, Goldstein and 
Zangui make a few noteworthy claims on time reversal within BM. That is, in justifying their 
version of the guidance equation and why this is the simplest Galilean-invariant and time-
reversal invariant version, Dürr, Goldstein and Zangui make some noteworthy assumptions 
about time reversal and time-reversal invariance. 
The justification runs as follows. The aim is to find the simplest Galilean-invariant 
version of a guidance equation. The equation mainly aims to explain how the particles move. 
And the simplest possibility is that it only prescribes velocities instead of higher derivatives 
(Dürr and Teufel 2009: 147). So, the starting point will consist in the wave-function 
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 on configuration space for all the particles. This 
is how the wave-function will govern the evolution of particles’ positions.  
Next, they assume two things:  
(a) on the one hand, that any candidate law has to guarantee that the particle’s velocity at 𝑡 
depends on the wave-function, its spatial derivative at 𝑡, the particle’s mass and ℏ;  
(b) on the other hand, that such a candidate law must be Galilean invariant and time-
reversal invariant. The former requirement follows from assuming that a Galilean 
space-time is the right setting for any BM-like theory, so that whatever the form of the 
guidance equation be, it must have a Galilean structure to fit into such setting47. 
In order to accomplish these conditions and for the equation to make sense, one needs to 
characterize the vector field 𝒗𝜓 carefully. As the sought equation ought to be Galilean 





 (9.5 ) 
Where 𝛼 stands for 
ℏ
𝑚
 and the use of ∇𝜓 comes from the fact that the equation must be invariant 
under rotation, if it’s Galilean invariant. 
However, this equation could be either real or imaginary. Whether it is to be real or 
imaginary is something that Dürr, Goldstein and Zanghi leave to time reversal to decide. And 
that’s why time reversal plays a special role within BM: Since the left side of the equation (9.5) 










. If time-reversal invariance must hold (as Dürr, Goldstein and Zanghi assume), 
then the right side of the equation ought to transform in such a way that also produces a minus 
sign. How will the right side of the equation transform under time reversal? By assuming that 
the right time-reversal operator also takes the complex conjugate over the wave-function, 
transforming 𝑇: 𝜓(𝒒, 𝑡) → 𝜓∗(𝒒, −𝑡), one obtains that the real part transforms as 
                                                          
47 See Valentini 1997 for a different argument concluding that BM’s underlying space-time is not Galilean but 
Aristotelian. 
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) (9.7 ) 
Therefore, if time-reversal invariance is demanded, one should choose the imaginary part 





→ −𝒗𝜓 = 𝛼 − Im
∇𝜓∗
𝜓∗
 (9.9 ) 
And this contributes to accept that the simplest version of the guidance equation is that 
proposed by BM. 
To put it clearly, the form of the argument is as follows: 
1. The underlying space-time is Galilean (assumption) and, in accordance with this, the 
guiding equation must be Galilean invariant (assumption). 
2. From 1, if the guiding equation is Galilean invariant (assumption), it must have the form 
of eq. (9.5), which still leave open whether it takes either the real or the imaginary part. 
3. The Schrödinger equation must be time-reversal invariant (assumption) 
4. If the Schrödinger equation is time-reversal invariant, then so is the guidance equation 
5. The Schrödinger equation is time-reversal invariant if and only if 𝑇𝐴 formally represents 
time reversal (what was showed in Part 2) 
6. From 4. And 5., the guidance equation must be invariant under the application of 𝑇𝐴 
7. In order to accomplish 6., the simplest form of the guidance equation is that proposed 
by Dürr, Goldstein and Zangui (eq. 9.3). 
The first premise is assumed without any further justification. In general, physics textbooks 
prescribe that the underlying space-time of any non-relativistic quantum theory is Galilean and, 
consequently, that the theory must be Galilean-invariant. Notwithstanding this, some 
interpretations of SQM might lead to a violation of such a prescription: as mentioned in a 
previous chapter, Valentini thinks that Bohmian Mechanics’ underlying space-time is 
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Aristotelian –rather than Galilean–, and wave function realism, which conceives the wave-
function as a scalar field, makes the theory non-Galilean-invariant as it is non-invariant under 
Galilean boosts (see Allori 2018). In any case, as the above-sketched argument shows, there is 
no way to get to this particular form of the guidance equation without assuming Galilean 
invariance. This leaves one with the following question: on which grounds does one justify that 
the underlying space-time is Galilean, and consequently, that the theory must be Galilean 
invariant? 
The third premise is equally troublesome. As shown in Part 2, the assumption can be 
seriously challenged by resting upon a different view on symmetries: one could claim that 
symmetries shouldn’t be a priori prescribed, but they should rather be considered as contingent 
properties of the dynamics one discovers a posteriori by dynamically-independent means. 
Clearly, if the Schrödinger equation is not supposed to be time-reversal invariant, then 𝑇𝐴 is 
unmotivated as a genuine formal representation of time-reversal invariance (Premise 5). This 
would break the whole argument down as there wouldn’t be, at first glance, any reason for 
choosing the imaginary part instead of the real part for eq. 9.5. In some sense, the argumentation 
seems to be running in circles. One desires to justify BM’s dynamics (particularly, that the 
guidance equation is precisely as BM says that it is). For doing this, one relies on a symmetry 
argument prescribing, on the one hand, that a dynamical equation must remain time-reversal 
invariant and, on the other, that certain formal objects (as wave functions) must transform in a 
certain way. For this, the time-reversal transformation must be 𝑇𝐴 rather than any other one. 
But the justification for taking 𝑇𝐴 rather than any other time-reversal transformation (as 𝑇𝑈) 
depends upon prior facts about the dynamics one wanted to justify, in particular, that such a 
dynamic meets time-reversal invariance. 
Let me be more precise about what is, at first sight, the problem with the argument. BM’s 
defenders employ a “symmetry argument” to justify the official guidance equation. But the 
argument crucially rests on assumptions about the symmetry transformation that strongly 
depends on the dynamics one wants to justify in the first place. Bradford Skow (2010) runs a 
similar argument in saying that Dürr, Goldstein and Zanghi’s strategy is ill-conceived since it 
fails to be “independently grounded”, which means that it strongly ties up the form of the 
symmetry operator to the theory’s dynamics to be justified. In the case of time reversal, he 
says: 
“But which operation is the time reversal operation is not so up for grabs. To 
determine whether a given equation is time reversal invariant, we have to first 
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identify, in some independent way, how time reversal (and other symmetries) act 
on states, and only then check whether the equation is invariant under those 
symmetries. And what is true here about time reversal is also true for boosts” 
(Skow 2010: 405) 
There are two ways out coming to my mind. The first consists in arguing that one actually 
wants to justify a particular formulation of the guidance equation (one of the elements of BM’s 
dynamics) through time-reversal invariance, but that the justification of the time-reversal 
transformation (𝑇𝐴) doesn’t depend on any assumption about the guidance equation but on 
assumptions about the Schrödinger equation (the other element of BM’s dynamics). Hence, 
any motivation for 𝑇𝐴 is independently grounded in so far as it doesn’t rely on the part of the 
dynamics one wanted to justify.  
The other way out comes about from the fact that only if one takes the imaginary part one 
gets an empirically adequate formulation of BM. In this way, the justification of this version 
of the guidance equation ultimately arises from empirically-grounded reasons, avoiding 
circularity. This latter way out could be indeed a very good strategy to break the circle and to 
justify why one must choose the imaginary part for eq. 9.5, and in consequence, providing 
some indirect support for choosing 𝑇𝐴. This, of course, should be firstly investigated in deep 
within a BM framework; but, anyway, I’m not so sure that it succeeds in justifying 𝑇𝐴 in any 
relevant sense. The reason is the same analyzed before: any successful justification of 𝑇𝐴 
crucially depends upon assuming time-reversal invariance beforehand. So empirical 
successfulness is not enough. 
I think the former way out doesn’t succeed either. Though it’s true that the justification 
for 𝑇𝐴 ultimately relies on the time-reversal invariance of the Schrödinger equation, and on how 
the wave function transforms under it, the guidance equation is so closely-tied to them that both 
laws cannot really be considered independent from one another. This manifests clearly in the 
Premise 4, which says that the guidance equation is time-reversal invariant if the Schrödinger 
equation is time-reversal invariant. But, by assuming that the Schrödinger equation is time 
reversal invariant and by grounding 𝑇𝐴 on the fact that it’s the unique time-reversal operator 
that leaves the equation invariant, there is no much more to say about the guidance equation: 
this logically entails that guidance equation is time-reversal invariant as well (for the 
conditional). So, there is no much room for any independence here. 
But, besides this, the guidance equation is also assumed to be time-reversal invariant! 
(see Dürr, Goldstein and Zanghi 1992, for instance). Putting aside any justification of 𝑇𝐴 based 
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on the Schrödinger equation, taking 𝑇𝐴  as the right formal representation of time reversal seems 
a bit unmotivated beyond the fact that it’s the transformation that leaves that version of the 
guidance equation invariant. So, if the Schrödinger equation is putting aside, it seems that the 
form of the time-reversal operator depends on assuming that the guidance equation must be 
invariant under so-defined time-reversal operator, which at the same time justifies the form of 
the equation that motivates it. And this looks very much like a petitio principii. 
Now look at this a bit differently. They say that the Schrödinger equation is time-reversal 
invariant because it is 𝑇𝐴-invariant. This already implies the time-reversal invariance of the 
guidance equation. But which guidance equation? Well, the one justified by using 𝑇𝐴 for 
reversing time. Could it be differently? It couldn’t, because the whole reasoning is grounded 
on prior facts on time reversal that logically imply, on the one side, that the guidance equation 
is time-reversal invariant and, on the other, that that is the right way to write the guidance 
equation down. This circular-like reasoning is not bad per se, and in fact it might look quite 
appealing so as to get an elegant and simple theory as BM intends to be. But I think one should 
be careful when doing this within a symmetry argument: there seems not to be any independent 
reason that yields 𝑇𝐴 as the right time-reversal operator without relying either on the 
Schrödinger equation or on the fact that it helps to construct BM in its official looking. 
There are two further points I’d like to bring out. First, the strategy runs the risk of 
trivializing the entire task of posing a symmetry argument. The point is that one can always 
come up with a symmetry transformation that changes the adequate variables, that transforms 
the state in such a precise way that keeps a given equation invariant. And if this at the same 
time logically implies the symmetry of the equation under construction, the entire task seems 
to be unwarranted. I have already pointed this out several times previously, and BM is here just 
incurring in the same sin, so to speak. 
Second, this leads one nowhere when discussing about a structural arrow of time within 
BM. The Bohmian dynamics comes out time-reversal invariant because 𝑇𝐴. But this decision 
is explicitly grounded on the assumption that the Schrödinger equation, and the guidance 
equation consequently, must be time-reversal invariant. As mentioned above, this premise 
appears both in the justification of 𝑇𝐴 and in the very process of constructing the theory. But 
there are no independent grounds to suppose that the theory must be time-reversal invariant 
simpliciter. One could well arrive at the conclusion that the BM’s underlying space-time is a 
Galilean space-time, and thereby, that BM’s dynamics should be built accordingly. But time-
reversal invariance doesn’t belong to the set of symmetries of a Galilean space-time. One’s 
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metaphysics could indeed play the role of grounding such an assumption, but then the right 
way to pose the argument should make this explicit. And, of course, the theory shouldn’t be 
time-reversal invariant simpliciter, but in the light, and conditionalized over, some previously-
taken metaphysical assumptions. 
Section 4. Relationalist time symmetry and BM’s PO 
As I’ve argued along Part 2, one’s metaphysics of time crucially affects the way in which one 
is to formally characterize the notion of time reversal. A substantivalist stance would naturally 
yield the Schrödinger equation non-time-reversal invariant, and thereby, a non-time-reversal 
invariant BM (see Albert 2000 and Callender 2000 for akin claims). This doesn’t automatically 
imply that the guidance equation (whatever its form comes to be) is also time-reversal invariant 
for the substantivalist, though one is somewhat left clueless about how it should then transform 
under time reversal. Beyond this, it is easy to see that if one by any reason arrives at the 
conclusion that the Schrödinger equation is non-time-reversal invariant, then so is BM 
regardless whether the guidance equation is. 
More interesting is the case of a relationalist stance with respect to time reversal, since it 
must dig into the “geographical” details of the theory to figure out how time reversal 
implements motion reversal. As mentioned early, BM is a quantum theory about particles and 
their positions, where wave function’s role is, at least in the version of Dürr, Goldstein, and 
Zangui, preeminently nomological. So, a relationalist justification of how time reversal might 
be implemented within BM could reasonably consist in drawing attention to its PO. 
Interestingly, this would be an alternative justification of that presented above: it would mostly 
rely on the ontological aspects of the theory instead of purely on its dynamics. 
Bryan Roberts (2010) has presented a rationale along this path in the framework of BM. 
He begins by pointing to the twofold dynamics of BM and to the fact that the guidance equation 
is the law that truly governs the stuff of the world. That is, the law that truly governs the PO of 
BM: particles and their trajectories. As a consequence of this, the relevant notion of time 
reversal for Bohmians is the one related to the guidance equation and to the stuff governed by 
it and not to the Schrödinger equation. This seems to suggest that the form of the “Bohmian 
time-reversal operator” should be worked out from how it should act upon the PO of BM. In 
fact, Roberts claims that a Bohmian time-reversal operator is demanded to act fundamentally 
on the positions living in a Bohmian configuration space, since this is its PO. In accordance 
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with this, a Bohmian time-reversal operator is merely a bijection from a particle’s position to 
a particle’s position plus a reparameterization of 𝑡 → −𝑡.  
But, why is one entitled to call this transformation ‘time reversal’? At first glance, this 
Bohmian time-reversal operator is just an “empty” characterization of what time reversal is 
supposed to do. A time-reversal operator cannot be such a bijection from particles’ positions 
to particles’ positions, if one wants ‘time reversal’ to preserve any relevant meaning. One is 
not whereby reversing anything dynamically relevant by mapping particles’ positions. 
Furthermore, position is exactly the right sort of thing one expects to be left unaltered under 
time reversal. Though the value of position changes with time, position in itself is not a time-
derivative magnitude: it’s primitive. Therefore, appealing to the PO to set out the form of a 
Bohmian time-reversal operator seems to be superfluous: the ontology on its own is unable to 
give any information about how time reversal must be implemented. And this is for the simple 
fact that time has not even entered the picture yet: the ontology on its own remains changeless 
in time if a dynamic is not beforehand introduced in the picture (even more, from a strict 
relationalist stance, there is no even anything like time in such a static picture!). And, as I’ve 
argued before, a relationalist time-reversal operator should aim to generate the right sort of 
transformations that reverses physical systems’ motion. And nothing like this can be ever 
reached by acting upon particles’ positions, without determining how time reversal is to act 
upon the dynamics. 
Roberts seems to note it in mentioning that there is a subtlety to deal with in determining 
the form of the Bohmian time-reversal operator. And the subtlety is precisely that the guidance 
equation also depends on the wave function. However, I don’t think that this be a subtlety at 
all but quite the opposite: it’s what is crucial to get some grasp on how a relationalist 
time(motion)-reversal operator must be formally implemented within BM. As many times 
mentioned, particles’ trajectories are governed by the wave function (as it appears within the 
guidance equation), which determines particles’ velocities. So, these are the relevant dynamical 
variables to reverse if one wants to get a backward-headed motion. 
In dealing with the “subtlety”, Roberts gives a rationale about how a Bohmian time-
reversal operator should be further characterized. In contrast with Dürr, Goldstein, and 
Zangui’s characterization, he relies on three conditions, seemingly independent of SQM: 
(a) The Bohmian time-reversal operator is an involution in configuration space 
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(b) The action of the Bohmian time-reversal operator is such that if 𝜑𝑥0 is a position 
eigenfunction, then so is its image under the action of the Bohmian time-reversal 
operator. 
(c) The Bohmian guidance equation is invariant under the Bohmian time-reversal operator 
for the free particle Hamiltonian. 
The first condition attempts to capture the idea that the Bohmian time-reversal operator intends 
to reverse motion. The second one is required because, in BM, a symmetry operator should 
give special treatment to those vectors forming the position basis. The last condition seems to 
be a bit poorly justified, but let’s set it aside for the time being. Thus-specified Bohmian time-
reversal operator, though not acting upon velocities directly, allows one to figure out how 
velocities should transform under it. As positions remain unchanged 
 
𝑇: 𝑞 →  𝑞 (9.10 ) 
and time changes sign under time reversal, 
 
𝑇: 𝑡 →  −𝑡 (9.11 ) 









 (9.12 ) 
This is helpful to find out how the left side on the guiding equation transform under the 
Bohmian time-reversal operator, but what about the right side of the equation where a wave 
function appears? The point I want to make is that if one doesn’t assume that the Bohmian 
time-reversal operator transforms the wave function by taking the complex conjugation as 
𝑇: 𝜓(𝒒, 𝑡) → 𝜓∗(𝒒, −𝑡), there is no way to get the guidance equation invariant. But the 
justification of why a Bohmian time-reversal operator must transform the wave-function into 
its complex conjugate mainly lies on the spectrum condition (see Chapter 4, Section 2.2), that 
is, within SQM’s principles. In fact, this is somehow hidden in Robert’s condition (c): so-
specified Bohamian time-reversal operator says nothing about how the Hamiltonian should 
transform. So, when Roberts demands the guidance equation to keep the free particle 
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Hamiltonian invariant, this can be only achieved by introducing further requirements coming 
from SQM48. 
Therefore, it is not quite right to claim that this approach to a Bohmian time-reversal 
operator “doesn’t presuppose any facts about time reversal in ordinary quantum mechanics” 
because it does it by specifying that time reversal within BM should turn the wave-function 
into its complex conjugate within the guidance equation. Nothing within BM alone may give 
us a hint about this. In fact, Dürr, Goldstein, and Zangui rely on the fact that the Schrödinger 
equation (a central piece of SQM) turns out to be invariant under 𝑇𝐴 to take it as the adequate 
time-reversal operator for the guidance equation as well. 
Let’s leave Robert’s argument aside and change the angle slightly. I mentioned earlier 
that Albert distinguishes between time-reversal invariance properly and partial-time-reversal 
invariance: whereas mostly all fundamental physical theories that have been taken seriously up 
to the presete are non-time-reversal invariant (according to Albert’s thought), some of them do 
turn out to be partial-time-reversal invariant. Moreover, I’ve identified partial-time-reversal 
invariance as a case of a relationalist time-reversal transformation. In this case, a relationalist 
time-reversal operator concerns only the positions and trajectories of particles, that is, the 
Bohmian PO. Hence, it seems reasonable that if one holds a relationalist stance with respect to 
time (and then one commits oneself to formally implement time reversal in terms of motion 
reversal) and also holds that the fundamental stuff of the world consists of particles and their 
positions, partial-time-reversal invariance, in Albert’s sense, is what one should mainly pay 
attention to. 
But this takes one back to a point I’ve argued against before: there is almost always some 
straightforward transformation linking every state 𝑆𝑘 with other state ?̃?𝑘 such that if there is a 
sequence going from 𝑆𝑖 to 𝑆𝑓 in accordance to the theory, there is then a time-reversed sequence 
going from ?̃?𝑓 to ?̃?𝑖 also in accordance to the theory. One problem with it: such a transformation 
is too weak on the demands. If it only aims at linking any state with other, which chiefly means 
                                                          
48 One might come to think that the argument could succeed doing without condition (c). In fact, so as to pick out 
the imaginary part in the genesis of the guidance equation, one was in need of taking, no matter what, an anti-
unitary operator (it’s the only one that produces a minus sign to the imaginary part after applied), so conditions 
(a) and (b) seem to be enough to justify an anti-unitary Bohmian time-reversal operator that doesn’t presuppose 
any fact about time reversal in ordinary quantum mechanics. Nevertheless, I’m not completely sure about this 
way out. At the end of the day, one also needs to know how the wave function transforms on the right side of the 
equation, whose behavior is given at the same time by the Schrödinger equation. So, I feel that there is nothing to 
hold on to justify that the wave function transforms as usual doing without information coming from what knows 
about the Schrödinger equation, that is, from SQM. 
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to linking any particle’s position with a time-reversed particle’s position (whatever this means) 
and keeping them invariant, then the transformed scenario will be whatever it needs to be to 
keep invariant the trajectories.  
I’m not claiming that this is completely pointless. What I want to point to is that the 
question for a structural arrow of time is, again, whether a theory’s dynamics (under the 
constraints I’ve already specified before) turns out to be invariant under time reversal, and not 
in which way it may be so. Trivially, there will be always a way to get your theory invariant 
under a transformation that changes the dynamics in such a precise way that keeps particles’ 
position invariants. Or, to put it differently, there will always be a transformation capable of 
generating a backward movement keeping invariant the trajectories. Furthermore, as I’ve 
mentioned not long ago, almost always such a straightforward transformation is completely 
dependent of the dynamics at issue, that is, it isn’t based on an independent way of justifying 
how the transformation is to act upon state without appealing to the dynamics.  
Let me now change the angle radically. Suppose now that one declines any relationalist 
commitment with time and turns into a substantivalist framework. One thus knows two things: 
(a) The Schrödinger equation comes out non-time-reversal invariant in SQM 
(b) If the Schrödinger equation comes out non-time-reversal invariant, so does guidance 
equation. 
Therefore, one is forced to conclude that BM is structurally and radically as non-time-reversal 
invariant as SQM, regardless its PO of particles and positions. Though there will always be a 
way to devise a transformation that links particles’ positions to particles’ positions, and thereby, 
that maps a trajectory to a transformed trajectory, the substantivalist will reasonably claim that 
one is not allowed to call that “artifice” time-reversal. And this is because one also has to 
specify how the wave-function transforms within the guidance equation: if one goes with a 
substantivalist time-reversal operator, one knows that time reversal doesn’t take the complex 
conjugation over the wave function. Therefore, the guidance equation is non-time-reversal-
invariant: the right side of the equation is not equal to the left one. This could be shocking at 
first glance within a deterministic theory. But, if you stop for a while and think things out, this 
is quite reasonably from the substantivalist’s perspective: the time-reversal transformation acts 
upon first-time derivatives changing their sign. And, so long as the wave function’s behavior 
is governed by the Schrödinger equation, and it turns out to be non-time-reversal invariant 
under 𝑇𝑈, there seems no way to keep the guidance equation invariant in this setting. To put it 
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simpler: for the right side of the guidance equation to transform in the right way to keep it 
invariant, the time-reversal transformation must transform the wave function into its complex 
conjugate. But 𝑇𝑈 is not the sort of transformation that does that job
49. It follows from this that 
𝑇𝑈 will ruin the right side of the guidance equation. And this justifies the point (b). There is no 
much to add here.  
Final Remarks 
Along this chapter I’ve analyzed, on the one hand, whether Bohmian Mechanics structurally 
exhibits a time asymmetry and, on the other, the role of time reversal within the theory.  
As to the former, the conventional wisdom on the matter is that it doesn’t: any temporal 
asymmetry depends on an asymmetry in the initial conditions as a last resort. In this way, BM 
is able to explain any temporal asymmetry in the theory (for instance, the difference between 
forward and backward transitions) though is clear that such an explanation is not enough to 
manifest a structural temporal asymmetry. In fact, BM turns out to be, for the conventional 
wisdom, structurally time symmetric as both the Schrödinger equation and the guidance 
equation are time-reversal invariant, if 𝑇𝐴 is taken. Nonetheless, as discussed previously, 
whether 𝑇𝐴 is taken depends on previously-assumed metaphysical commitments with respect 
to time, so the claim should be conditionalized over them: if a relationalist stance with respect 
to time is assumed, then BM turns out structurally time symmetric because their fundamental 
equations of motion are 𝑇𝐴-invariant, and thereby, time-reversal invariant.  
Unsurprisingly, BM turns out non-time-reversal invariant if a substantivalist stance with 
respect to time is rather assumed. The point is that the Schrödinger equation comes out non-
time-reversal invariant under 𝑇𝑈. This implies that guidance equation will be non-time-reversal 
invariant too. This becomes evident when one focuses on the right side of the guidance equation 
and how it would transform under 𝑇𝑈. However, this result comes out mainly from the 
Schrödinger equation and how it relates to the guidance equation. In this sense, BM is as 
structurally time asymmetric as SQM.  
I’ve also analyzed the role of time reversal in BM. Its defenders claim that time reversal 
plays a special role within the theory as it helps underpinning the simplest Galilean-invariant 
                                                          
49 Neither would it even take the imaginary part for 9.5 to begin with! And if 𝑇𝑈 is for any reason the right time-
reversal transformation, why would one use one transformation for reversing time and a different one in the 
genesis of written down the guidance equation? 
258 | P a g e  
 
version of the guidance equation (the “official” guidance equation, so to speak). Whether the 
strategy succeeds or not has been criticized elsewhere (Skow 2010). I’ve rather focused on the 
role of time reversal in the argument. The conclusion is that, once again, there is no means to 
judge whether guidance equation is time-reversal invariance or not independently of whether 
the Schrödinger equation is.  
In this sense, BM doesn’t add any new argument for or against time-reversal invariance. 
Neither for or against a structural arrow of time. On the one side, whether the guidance equation 
is time-reversal invariant heavily depends on the time reversal transformation one goes with. 
And this, at the same time, depends on facts about the Schrödinger equation and its time-
reversal invariance. 
On the other, any strategy relying on BM’s PO is somewhat hopeless. First, the PO on its 
own is unable to give us a hint about how time reversal should be implemented. It’s the 
dynamics what one should look at so as to figure out how the relevant magnitudes should 
transform. And this leads one again to work out how the wave-function should transform. And 
any recipe for this will come from SQM, not from BM’s PO.  




Or what all this was about… 
And yet … and yet . . . Denying temporal succession, denying the 
self, denying the astronomical universe, are apparent 
desperations and secret consolations. Our destiny is not frightful 
by being unreal; it is frightful because it is irreversible and iron-
clad. Time is the substance I am made of. Time is a river which 
sweeps me along, but I am the river; it is a tiger which destroys 
me, but I am the tiger; it is a fire which consumes me, but I am 
the fire. 
(Jorge Luis Borges) 
“And yet…and yet…Negar la sucesión temporal, negar el yo, 
negar el universo astronómico, son desesperaciones aparentes y 
consuelos secretos. Nuestro destino no es espantoso por irreal; es 
espantoso porque es irreversible y de hierro. El tiempo es la 
sustancia de que estoy hecho. El tiempo es un río que me 
arrebata, pero yo soy el río; es un tigre que me destroza, pero yo 
soy el tigre; es un fuego que me consume, pero yo soy el fuego” 
(Jorge Luis Borges)  
The main idea underlying this research has been that philosophers of physics and philosophers 
of time have, despite what it has been largely said, well-based reasons to hold that there is 
something like a quantum arrow of time, which doesn’t exclusively and solely depend upon 
contingent facts about matter or initial conditions, but rather may be grounded in fundamental 
laws. This conclusion, as well as the opposite, is not of course free of assumptions. Hence, the 
other guiding idea driving this work is that our claims about the arrow of time, time reversal, 
time-reversal invariance, and so forth, intrinsically depend upon a panoply of previously-taken 
commitments. Some of them, surprisingly, have been largely overlooked. As it was mentioned 
at the end of the Introduction, my intention wasn’t to coercively force others to take a heterodox 
view on the matter, or to affirm that the way in which things have been thought of so far was 
deeply and simply mistaken. Broadly speaking, the motivation was to point the way towards 
an (alternative) understanding of the problem of the arrow of time and of some of the concepts 
it involves, which have been gravitating around philosophy and physics since long ago. 
Naturally, I do think that this is a noteworthy path to set forth on, and that’s what I hope I have 
justified convincingly. 
260 | P a g e  
 
As each part and chapter finished with a summary, there is no much need for extensive 
final remarks, but it will suffice to put all the pieces together briefly and to put on view the 
overall argumentation. I started off this research by pointing to the fact that the very formulation 
of the problem of the arrow of time (as typically understood in the literature) is already a 
philosophical problem in itself calling for clarification. The undertaken task mainly consisted 
in unpacking the problem, unthreading closely-related, though differentiable, notions and 
sorting out some problems commonly put under the same label. From this unpacking task, I 
arrived at two main conclusions: First, that the notion of irreversibility and (non)-time-reversal 
invariance ought to be properly distinguished. Second, that the general problem of the arrow 
of time encloses two different problems frequently mixed up: the problem of a structural arrow 
of time and the problem of the two realms. Whereas the latter greatly relies on irreversibility, 
the former on the time reversal. In addition, I’ve shown in which way the latter conceptually 
presupposes the former. Their modal scope and metaphysical implications were also stemmed 
from such a distinction. I finally highlighted that the notion of time-reversal invariance played 
a paramount role in asserting whether time is structurally directed or not, backed up by the 
symmetry-to-reality inference and the connections between dynamics’ symmetries and space-
time’s symmetries. 
With all this conceptual machinery under our belt, I stepped into standard non-relativistic 
quantum mechanics. I pointed out there that the problem to be primarily addressed was whether 
the Schrödinger equation turns out to be time-reversal invariant (Chapter IV). At this point, I 
argued that two approaches to time reversal, and thereby to time-reversal invariance, may be 
rightfully and soundly defended in this framework: and orthodox approach and a heterodox 
approach. After exposing conceptually and formally in detail the notion of time reversal 
according to the orthodox approach, I opposed it to the heterodox one. Notably, whereas the 
former concludes that the Schrödinger equation is time-reversal invariant, the latter arrives at 
the opposite result. The argumentation was then overall based on two pillars: (a) showing that 
both approaches don’t really return contradictory conclusions, because in fact they understand 
time reversal differently (both in its formal and conceptual aspects), (b) pointing to the 
(overlooked) fact that both approaches rely heavily upon a bunch of metaphysical, epistemic 
and methodological statements on time and symmetries. Therefore, both approaches’ 
lawfulness takes root in such a broader bunch of statements. This rendered two sides in the 
debate: 
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(i) The orthodox approach to time reversal is based on a relationalist metaphysics of 
time (as long as it understands time reversal as motion reversal and represent the 
symmetry transformation accordingly) and on a view that takes symmetries as 
theory relative and as guides to theory construction. 
(ii) The heterodox approach to time reversal rather resorts on a substantivalist 
metaphysics of time (as long as it understands time reversal as metaphysically and 
physically distinct from motion reversal) and on a view that takes symmetries as 
theory independent and as contingent properties of the dynamics. 
The (partial) upshot of all this was that the declaration of time-reversal invariance or non-time-
reversal invariance should be therefore relativized to these backgrounds. Notwithstanding, I 
argued next that the orthodox approach, though defendable and workable in many contexts, 
might not be quite appropriate when addressing some metaphysical problems as the problem 
of a structural arrow of time (Chapter V). Then, it was shown that OA runs the risk of violating 
some of the conditions that make the problem of the arrow of time (like contingency and 
fundamentality) philosophically interesting. This led philosophers of physics and time to an 
uneasy scenario where something has to be given updropped: either the problem of the arrow 
of time is reformulated, or the orthodox approach is abandoned. The overall conclusion in Part 
2 was that, even though two legitimate approaches to time reversal co-exist and can be 
rightfully held (under some relevant assumptions), the orthodox approach doesn’t seem 
adequate to address the problem of a structural arrow of time, which left us with the following 
bold conclusion: if these issues for the orthodox approach cannot be overcome, the heterodox 
approach should be rather taken when addressing the problem of a structural arrow of time 
within standard non-relativistic quantum mechanics. Therefore, the Schrödinger equation turns 
out non-time-reversal invariance. Therefore, it does exhibit a structural arrow of time. 
Part 3 introduced some interpretations of standard non-relativistic quantum mechanics 
available to the present. Setting aside the above-mentioned conclusion, and assuming as usual 
that the Schrödinger equation is time-reversal invariant, it was explored whether, and in which 
sense, various interpretations of the standard formalism deliver new theoretical elements that 
might drive to a different treatment of the two directions of time. Those interpretations that 
modify the standard dynamics were exclusively taken into account: Orthodox Quantum 
Mechanics (which introduces the Collapse Postulate), Spontaneous Collapse Theories 
(paradigmatically, GRW-type theories) and Bohmian Mechanics. Though all these 
interpretations are able to objectively distinguish between the past-to-future and the future-to-
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past direction, only Spontaneous Collapse Theories are able to do it in a structural way, that is, 
based purely on intrinsic properties of the theory’s dynamics. Therefore, GRW-type theories 
are the most promissory candidates for a structural arrow of time in non-relativistic quantum 
mechanics, even in the case that the Schrödinger equation be time-reversal invariant. Orthodox 
Quantum Mechanics and Bohmian Mechanics can just account for time asymmetry in terms of 
either dynamics’ external properties or boundary conditions, yielding thereby a non-structural 
arrow of time. 
After such a long road, it is worth coming back to the question this thesis started with: 
Does time (whatever it comes to be) objectively instantiate the property of “having 
a privileged direction” in non-relativistic quantum mechanics? 
And the answer is, in general, “yes, it does but…”. Where “but” must be unwrapped taken into 
consideration the distinctions I drew along this thesis: what sort of temporal asymmetry is being 
given, what one’s metaphysical, epistemic and methodological commitments are with respect 
to the terms involved, and so forth. Even the most radical form of temporal asymmetry (a 
structural arrow of time grounded in the fact that the standard formalism, in the simplest cases, 
comes out non-time-reversal invariance) may be defendable by deconstructing the widely-
extended orthodox view. 
Philosophers and physicist have tirelessly disputed about the nature of time for centuries 
and it is highly likely that things will remain the same in the future. However, as mentioned in 
the Introduction, progress is sometimes made by clarifying what a problem is really about, by 
exploring what the alternative paths are and by exposing some deeply-ingrained assumptions. 
In such a philosophical exercise, one can, not only, discover new dead ends as well as unseen 
way outs, but also get to a far-reaching understanding of the problem and to deeper 
considerations of its current challenges as well as of its eventual answers. However, the 
philosophical task should not only push one’s convictions beyond, but also allow one to 
occasionally come back to them on firmer grounds. In any case, all this drives our knowledge 
of the world farther.  
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